Chen Jian this sort,he believed,might actually redound to the CCP's advantage.The emergence of a"reactionary"opposition in Tibet could,if properly manipu- lated,awaken the Tibetan masses,thus allowing the CCP to introduce politi- cal and social reforms in Tibet at an accelerated rate. In a deeper sense,Mao's management of the Tibet issue during the early stage of the post-1951 period revealed a profound sense of superiority.Al- though he acknowledged the importance of pursuing "ethnic equality"and avoiding"big Han chauvinism"in Tibet,his fundamental view was that the CCP and the PLA,as the"liberators"of Tibet,would win popular support by transforming Tibet's"backward"political,social,and economic institutions and structures.Mao's otherwise sophisticated analysis of the situation in Tibet was marred by his glaring disregard of Tibet's history and culture-a short- coming that would help precipitate the Tibetan rebellion in 1959. Mao's generals and cadres in Lhasa sensed from the outset that Mao's gradualism was provisional.For them,the establishment of conditions for po- litical and social reforms in Tibet became a priority.The right opportunity seemed to come in 1956 when a"high tide of socialist transformation and so- cialist reconstruction"swept across China's cities and countryside.In April of that year,with the CCP Central Committee's approval,Mao set up a"Prepa- ratory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region."37 The next month,the CCP Tibet Work Committee,headed by Zhang Jingwu and Zhang Guohua,reported that"the high tide of the socialist trans- formation has emerged all over the country"and that "the minority areas neighboring Tibet are all preparing to conduct democratic reforms."The committee believed it was desirable to put the pursuit of"democratic reforms" in Tibet at the top of its agenda.In a report to the CCP Central Committee dated 1 July 1956,the Tibet Work Committee proposed that the reforms in Tibet could begin in the winter of 1956 and spring of 1957,initially in a few places and then extended to the whole of Tibet.To facilitate the reforms,the Tibet Work Committee asked for the establishment of a"public security po- lice force"of 4,000-6,000,an increase in the regular "people's police"and economic police force by 2,400,the raising of 40,000-60,000 cadres from lo- cal Tibetans,the recruitment of 20,000-30,000 Tibetans into the CCP and 30,000-50,000 Tibetan youth into the Communist Youth League,and the transfer of another 6,000 Han Communist cadres to Tibet.Beginning in July,large numbers of Communist cadres entered Tibet in groups. 36.Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.74-75.78-79. 37.CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.57- 58;and Dangdai zhongguo de xizang,p.218. 38.Dangdai zhongguo de xizang,p.225. 64
this sort, he believed, might actually redound to the CCP’s advantage. The emergence of a “reactionary” opposition in Tibet could, if properly manipulated, awaken the Tibetan masses, thus allowing the CCP to introduce political and social reforms in Tibet at an accelerated rate.36 In a deeper sense, Mao’s management of the Tibet issue during the early stage of the post-1951 period revealed a profound sense of superiority. Although he acknowledged the importance of pursuing “ethnic equality” and avoiding “big Han chauvinism” in Tibet, his fundamental view was that the CCP and the PLA, as the “liberators” of Tibet, would win popular support by transforming Tibet’s “backward” political, social, and economic institutions and structures. Mao’s otherwise sophisticated analysis of the situation in Tibet was marred by his glaring disregard of Tibet’s history and culture—a shortcoming that would help precipitate the Tibetan rebellion in 1959. Mao’s generals and cadres in Lhasa sensed from the outset that Mao’s gradualism was provisional. For them, the establishment of conditions for political and social reforms in Tibet became a priority. The right opportunity seemed to come in 1956 when a “high tide of socialist transformation and socialist reconstruction” swept across China’s cities and countryside. In April of that year, with the CCP Central Committee’s approval, Mao set up a “Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region.”37 The next month, the CCP Tibet Work Committee, headed by Zhang Jingwu and Zhang Guohua, reported that “the high tide of the socialist transformation has emerged all over the country” and that “the minority areas neighboring Tibet are all preparing to conduct democratic reforms.” The committee believed it was desirable to put the pursuit of “democratic reforms” in Tibet at the top of its agenda. In a report to the CCP Central Committee dated 1 July 1956, the Tibet Work Committee proposed that the reforms in Tibet could begin in the winter of 1956 and spring of 1957, initially in a few places and then extended to the whole of Tibet. To facilitate the reforms, the Tibet Work Committee asked for the establishment of a “public security police force” of 4,000–6,000, an increase in the regular “people’s police” and economic police force by 2,400, the raising of 40,000–60,000 cadres from local Tibetans, the recruitment of 20,000–30,000 Tibetans into the CCP and 30,000–50,000 Tibetan youth into the Communist Youth League, and the transfer of another 6,000 Han Communist cadres to Tibet.38 Beginning in July, large numbers of Communist cadres entered Tibet in groups. 64 Chen Jian 36. Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 74–75, 78–79. 37. CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 57– 58; and Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, p. 218. 38. Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, p. 225
The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 The sudden acceleration of the CCP's efforts to push for "democratic re- forms"in Tibet had tremendous repercussions among Tibetans.Resistance and revolts occurred in Lhasa and,even more,in areas belonging to "ethnographic Tibet,"where"democratic reforms"had been introduced ear- lier and carried out more ruthlessly.In late July,armed rebellions erupted in Chamdo and quickly spread to other areas.Faced with this turmoil,the lead- ers of the CCP reiterated the importance of maintaining patience and gradu- alism in the implementation of"democratic reforms"in Tibet.On 18 August, Mao Zedong wrote to the Dalai Lama acknowledging that "the time now is not ripe for carrying out reforms in Tibet."Two weeks later,on 4 September 1956,the CCP Central Committee issued the "September Fourth Instruc- tion,"emphasizing that "democratic reforms"should be waged in peaceful ways,and that in order to pursue peaceful reforms it was crucial to work on Tibet's upper-classes and elites.The instruction pointed out in particular that "considering the work foundation in Tibet at present,the status of cadres,the attitudes of the upper stratum,and the recent events in the Chamdo area,the conditions for carrying out reforms in Tibet are far from auspicious."The CCP leadership thus concluded that"democratic reforms [in Tibet]certainly should not be introduced during the first Five-Year Plan,4 and are unlikely to happen even during the second Five-Year Plan,and possibly may even be postponed to the third Five-Year Plan."41 For Mao and his fellow CCP leaders,the postponement of the "demo- cratic reforms"in Tibet was no more than a tactical action.In the same "Sep- tember Fourth Instruction,"the CCP leadership also made it clear that mak- ing concessions to the Tibetan upper-class elites was by no means a"passive policy design."On the contrary,the CCP leaders emphasized,we must do our job in active ways."In their calculation, from now on,until the reforms are carried out,we must grasp tightly the upper stratum of the united front,raise more Tibetan cadres,recruit more [Commu- nist]Party and [Communist Youth]League members,support the production activities of the masses and try our best to improve their quality of life,and grad- ually democratize the Autonomous Region's political regime,so that we can try to make progress and prepare conditions for the reforms.2 39.CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji,p.66. 40.The first Five Year Plan in the PRC covered the period of 1953-1957. 41.CCP Central Committee,"September Fourth Instruction"(4 September 1956),in Dangdai zhongguo de xizang,pp.226-227;and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji,p.67.See also Mao Zedong."On Correctly Managing the Contra- dictions within the People"(27 February 1957),in Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedongl (Beijing:People,1977),pp.386-387.The first Five-Year Plan in the PRC covered the period 1953-1957. 42.Dangdai zhongguo de xizang,p.227. 65
The sudden acceleration of the CCP’s efforts to push for “democratic reforms” in Tibet had tremendous repercussions among Tibetans. Resistance and revolts occurred in Lhasa and, even more, in areas belonging to “ethnographic Tibet,” where “democratic reforms” had been introduced earlier and carried out more ruthlessly. In late July, armed rebellions erupted in Chamdo and quickly spread to other areas. Faced with this turmoil, the leaders of the CCP reiterated the importance of maintaining patience and gradualism in the implementation of “democratic reforms” in Tibet. On 18 August, Mao Zedong wrote to the Dalai Lama acknowledging that “the time now is not ripe for carrying out reforms in Tibet.”39 Two weeks later, on 4 September 1956, the CCP Central Committee issued the “September Fourth Instruction,” emphasizing that “democratic reforms” should be waged in peaceful ways, and that in order to pursue peaceful reforms it was crucial to work on Tibet’s upper-classes and elites. The instruction pointed out in particular that “considering the work foundation in Tibet at present, the status of cadres, the attitudes of the upper stratum, and the recent events in the Chamdo area, the conditions for carrying out reforms in Tibet are far from auspicious.” The CCP leadership thus concluded that “democratic reforms [in Tibet] certainly should not be introduced during the ªrst Five-Year Plan,40 and are unlikely to happen even during the second Five-Year Plan, and possibly may even be postponed to the third Five-Year Plan.”41 For Mao and his fellow CCP leaders, the postponement of the “democratic reforms” in Tibet was no more than a tactical action. In the same “September Fourth Instruction,” the CCP leadership also made it clear that making concessions to the Tibetan upper-class elites was by no means a “passive policy design.” On the contrary, the CCP leaders emphasized, “we must do our job in active ways.” In their calculation, from now on, until the reforms are carried out, we must grasp tightly the upper stratum of the united front, raise more Tibetan cadres, recruit more [Communist] Party and [Communist Youth] League members, support the production activities of the masses and try our best to improve their quality of life, and gradually democratize the Autonomous Region’s political regime, so that we can try to make progress and prepare conditions for the reforms.42 65 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 39. CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, p. 66. 40. The ªrst Five Year Plan in the PRC covered the period of 1953–1957. 41. CCP Central Committee, “September Fourth Instruction” (4 September 1956), in Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, pp. 226–227; and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, p. 67. See also Mao Zedong, “On Correctly Managing the Contradictions within the People” (27 February 1957), in Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: People, 1977), pp. 386–387. The ªrst Five-Year Plan in the PRC covered the period 1953–1957. 42. Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, p. 227
Chen Jian For the CCP leaders,the pursuit of political and social reforms in Tibet re- mained an unchangeable goal. This goal shaped the CCP's response to the visit by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to India in November 1956.The visit originated with an invitation issued by the Indian government to celebrate the 2,500th anniver- sary of the birth of Buddha.When the CCP leadership considered whether the Dalai Lama should be allowed to go to India,many CCP cadres in Tibet opposed the idea on the grounds that the Dalai Lama might refuse to return to Lhasa,Mao conceded that the Dalai Lama might stay in India and might even make anti-Communist statements there,but the Chinese leader said that even if the Dalai Lama decided not to return to Tibet,this might actually benefit the CCP insofar as it would provide another reason to enact reforms in Tibet."We will never initiate the offensive,"stressed Mao,"and will instead allow them to initiate the offensive.We will then launch a counteroffensive and mercilessly crush those who started the offensive."4 When it appeared that the Dalai Lama would indeed seek asylum in In- dia,the CCP leadership actively tried to attract him back.Premier Zhou Enlai traveled to India and met with the Dalai Lama to persuade him to re- turn to Lhasa.During the meetings,Zhou,in conveying Mao's sentiment, promised to the Dalai Lama that reforms would not be introduced in Tibet (including the Chamdo area)without consulting with Tibet's upper-class elites.He also promised that no reforms would be carried out during the sec- ond Five-Year-Plan;that is,for another six years.Whether any steps would be introduced after that six-year period,Zhou told the Dalai Lama,"is an issue that will be determined by you in accordance with the situation and condi- tions at that time."The Dalai Lama,believing that he could do more for Tibetans from within Tibet,decided in February 1957 to return to Lhasa,ar- riving first in Yadong on 15 February and then eventually to the capital on 1 April. All of this,however,was insufficient to forestall a profound crisis.For the Tibetans,Zhou's promise not to embark on any reforms over the next six years was no more than a short-term palliative.It created even greater uncer- tainty about the region's long-term future.For the CCP leaders,these events underscored the party's weak position in Tibet,thus pushing them to step up their preparations for a definitive resolution of the Tibet problem.On 5 March 1957 the CCP Central Secretariat met to discuss policy toward 43.Ibid,p.228. 44.Li et al eds Zhou Enlai nianpu.Vol.1,pp.650-651;Zhonggon xizang dangsbi dashi ji.1949- 1994.p.70:and Dangdai zhongguo de xizang.pp.230-231. 66
For the CCP leaders, the pursuit of political and social reforms in Tibet remained an unchangeable goal. This goal shaped the CCP’s response to the visit by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to India in November 1956. The visit originated with an invitation issued by the Indian government to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha. When the CCP leadership considered whether the Dalai Lama should be allowed to go to India, many CCP cadres in Tibet opposed the idea on the grounds that the Dalai Lama might refuse to return to Lhasa, Mao conceded that the Dalai Lama might stay in India and might even make anti-Communist statements there, but the Chinese leader said that even if the Dalai Lama decided not to return to Tibet, this might actually beneªt the CCP insofar as it would provide another reason to enact reforms in Tibet. “We will never initiate the offensive,” stressed Mao, “and will instead allow them to initiate the offensive. We will then launch a counteroffensive and mercilessly crush those who started the offensive.”43 When it appeared that the Dalai Lama would indeed seek asylum in India, the CCP leadership actively tried to attract him back. Premier Zhou Enlai traveled to India and met with the Dalai Lama to persuade him to return to Lhasa. During the meetings, Zhou, in conveying Mao’s sentiment, promised to the Dalai Lama that reforms would not be introduced in Tibet (including the Chamdo area) without consulting with Tibet’s upper-class elites. He also promised that no reforms would be carried out during the second Five-Year-Plan; that is, for another six years. Whether any steps would be introduced after that six-year period, Zhou told the Dalai Lama, “is an issue that will be determined by you in accordance with the situation and conditions at that time.”44 The Dalai Lama, believing that he could do more for Tibetans from within Tibet, decided in February 1957 to return to Lhasa, arriving ªrst in Yadong on 15 February and then eventually to the capital on 1 April. All of this, however, was insufªcient to forestall a profound crisis. For the Tibetans, Zhou’s promise not to embark on any reforms over the next six years was no more than a short-term palliative. It created even greater uncertainty about the region’s long-term future. For the CCP leaders, these events underscored the party’s weak position in Tibet, thus pushing them to step up their preparations for a deªnitive resolution of the Tibet problem. On 5 March 1957 the CCP Central Secretariat met to discuss policy toward 66 Chen Jian 43. Ibid., p. 228. 44. Li et al. eds., Zhou Enlai nianpu, Vol. 1, pp. 650–651; Zhonggon xizang dangshi dashi ji, 1949– 1994, p. 70; and Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, pp. 230–231
The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 Tibet.The meeting was also attended by leading members of the CCP Tibet Work Committee,including Zhang Jingwu,Zhang Guohua,Fan Ming, Zhou Renshan,Wang Qimei,Ya Hanzhang,and Mu Shengzhong.5 On the basis of the meeting's discussion,the CCP Central Committee adopted its "Remarks on the Tibet Work Committee's Decisions on Future Work in Tibet."The CCP leaders recognized that "suitable conditions for carry- ing out democratic reforms in Tibet do not yet exist."However,they stressed that although the commitment not to enact reforms for at least the next six years is naturally a major concession to the upper stratum in Tibet,this concession is not intended to restrict or hinder our work,let alone to forsake the positive goals [of our policies].Making necessary concessions now is intended solely to create favorable conditions to achieve our positive goals in the future. The document set the basic tone of the CCP's policies toward Tibet over the next six years,emphasizing that major efforts should be made in five areas: First,we should continue to carry out united front work vis-a-vis the upper stra- tum,with the Dalai Lama's clique as the main target.Second,we should con- tinue to pay attention to recruiting and educating Tibetan cadres.In addition to developing some through local work,a small number of young people can be sent to study inland.Third,we should continue to operate economic and cul- tural enterprises that are welcomed by the masses,endorsed by the upper stra- tum,in good condition to operate,and likely to have a beneficial impact on the masses.Fourth,we should continue to insist that national defense,foreign af- fairs,and national defense highways be placed under the control of the Central Government.Fifth,we should use a variety of proper means to undertake patri- otic education in the Tibetan upper stratum and masses,while opposing the ac- tivities of separatists. This statement reflected the real nature of the "concessions"that the CCP leaders believed they were making to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan political and monastic elites in 1956-1957.The measures were intended to strengthen the CCP's own position in Tibet,as well as to prepare for an offensive in the future.If possible,Mao preferred to use peaceful means to achieve Tibet's transformation,but if that did not work he was determined to ensure that the CCP would be able to control Tibet no matter what happened. 45.Dangdai zhongguo de xizang.p.231;and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.73-74. 46.Dangdai zhongguo de xizang,p.232;and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.75-76. 47.Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,p.154. 67
Tibet. The meeting was also attended by leading members of the CCP Tibet Work Committee, including Zhang Jingwu, Zhang Guohua, Fan Ming, Zhou Renshan, Wang Qimei, Ya Hanzhang, and Mu Shengzhong.45 On the basis of the meeting’s discussion, the CCP Central Committee adopted its “Remarks on the Tibet Work Committee’s Decisions on Future Work in Tibet.” The CCP leaders recognized that “suitable conditions for carrying out democratic reforms in Tibet do not yet exist.” However, they stressed that although the commitment not to enact reforms for at least the next six years is naturally a major concession to the upper stratum in Tibet, this concession is not intended to restrict or hinder our work, let alone to forsake the positive goals [of our policies]. Making necessary concessions now is intended solely to create favorable conditions to achieve our positive goals in the future. The document set the basic tone of the CCP’s policies toward Tibet over the next six years, emphasizing that major efforts should be made in ªve areas: First, we should continue to carry out united front work vis-à-vis the upper stratum, with the Dalai Lama’s clique as the main target. Second, we should continue to pay attention to recruiting and educating Tibetan cadres. In addition to developing some through local work, a small number of young people can be sent to study inland. Third, we should continue to operate economic and cultural enterprises that are welcomed by the masses, endorsed by the upper stratum, in good condition to operate, and likely to have a beneªcial impact on the masses. Fourth, we should continue to insist that national defense, foreign affairs, and national defense highways be placed under the control of the Central Government. Fifth, we should use a variety of proper means to undertake patriotic education in the Tibetan upper stratum and masses, while opposing the activities of separatists.46 This statement reºected the real nature of the “concessions” that the CCP leaders believed they were making to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan political and monastic elites in 1956–1957. The measures were intended to strengthen the CCP’s own position in Tibet, as well as to prepare for an offensive in the future. If possible, Mao preferred to use peaceful means to achieve Tibet’s transformation, but if that did not work he was determined to ensure that the CCP would be able to control Tibet no matter what happened.47 67 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 45. Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, p. 231; and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 73–74. 46. Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, p. 232; and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 75–76. 47. Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, p. 154
Chen Jian Complicating the situation further was the Chinese authorities'view that the "Seventeen-Point Agreement"and the moderate policy toward Tibet should be applied only to "political Tibet."When Zhou Enlai promised not to pursue"democratic reforms"in Tibet for at least six years,he intended this only for "political Tibet."In the Tibetan-inhabited areas of Sichuan,Yunnan, and Qinghai,"democratic reforms"were promptly introduced despite the"no reforms for at least six years"pledge.By1958,as the "Great Leap Forward" swept across all of China,more radical "reforms"were enacted in these areas. As a result,many Tibetans,from both upper and lower classes,rebelled against Chinese rule and formed the"Four Rivers and Six Ranges"guerrilla groups The rebels,as we now know,received various kinds of support from the U.S.Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).When they were attacked by the PLA,a large number of them fled to Lhasa to seek protection and to urge the Kashag to take a firmer stand against the Chinese.Together with the many Tibetan troops in Lhasa who had long been upset by the Chinese Com- munist military presence,the rebels posed a significant challenge to the CCP's efforts to pursue a path of gradual change in Tibet. By late 1958 and early 1959,Lhasa and many other parts of both politi- cal and ethnographic Tibet had become volatile.Although Mao and his fellow CCP leaders continued to stress in public that "no democratic reforms would be carried out for at least six years,"their internal discussions focused mostly on ways of dealing with a large-scale rebellion in Tibet.On 24 June 1958, Mao Zedong,in commenting on the CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee's "Instructions on Suppressing Rebellions Spreading throughout the Province," indicated that the party had to be"prepared to deal with the prospect of a full- scale rebellion that is likely to break out there."He emphasized that"if the re- actionary forces in Tibet dare to start a full-scale rebellion,this without any doubt will mean that working people [in Tibet]will benefit from an earlier liberation."5 In mid-July,the CCP Central Committee reiterated this point in an instruction to the CCP Tibet Work Committee: 48.Shakya.The Dragon in the Land of Snow,pp.165-170. 49.For a highly informative account of the CIA's involvement in supporting the Tibetan rebels,see John Kenneth Knaus,Orphans of the Cold War:America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New York:Public Affairs,1999).According to Knaus,Washington made the decision to support the Ti- betan resistance in the summer of 1956(pp.139-140),and the first group of Tibetan rebels was se- cretly brought to Saipan for training in December 1956.The trainees were then sent back to Tibet in 1957 to help the Tibetan rebels to establish contacts with the CIA and to join the resistance them- selves.Available Chinese sources give no indication that the Chinese Communists were aware of America's secret involvement in promoting the rebellion in Tibet during this period. 50.CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.80- 81. 68
Complicating the situation further was the Chinese authorities’ view that the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” and the moderate policy toward Tibet should be applied only to “political Tibet.” When Zhou Enlai promised not to pursue “democratic reforms” in Tibet for at least six years, he intended this only for “political Tibet.” In the Tibetan-inhabited areas of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai, “democratic reforms” were promptly introduced despite the “no reforms for at least six years” pledge. By1958, as the “Great Leap Forward” swept across all of China, more radical “reforms” were enacted in these areas. As a result, many Tibetans, from both upper and lower classes, rebelled against Chinese rule and formed the “Four Rivers and Six Ranges” guerrilla group48 The rebels, as we now know, received various kinds of support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).49 When they were attacked by the PLA, a large number of them ºed to Lhasa to seek protection and to urge the Kashag to take a ªrmer stand against the Chinese. Together with the many Tibetan troops in Lhasa who had long been upset by the Chinese Communist military presence, the rebels posed a signiªcant challenge to the CCP’s efforts to pursue a path of gradual change in Tibet. By late 1958 and early 1959, Lhasa and many other parts of both political and ethnographic Tibet had become volatile. Although Mao and his fellow CCP leaders continued to stress in public that “no democratic reforms would be carried out for at least six years,” their internal discussions focused mostly on ways of dealing with a large-scale rebellion in Tibet. On 24 June 1958, Mao Zedong, in commenting on the CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee’s “Instructions on Suppressing Rebellions Spreading throughout the Province,” indicated that the party had to be “prepared to deal with the prospect of a fullscale rebellion that is likely to break out there.” He emphasized that “if the reactionary forces in Tibet dare to start a full-scale rebellion, this without any doubt will mean that working people [in Tibet] will beneªt from an earlier liberation.”50 In mid-July, the CCP Central Committee reiterated this point in an instruction to the CCP Tibet Work Committee: 68 Chen Jian 48. Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snow, pp. 165–170. 49. For a highly informative account of the CIA’s involvement in supporting the Tibetan rebels, see John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). According to Knaus, Washington made the decision to support the Tibetan resistance in the summer of 1956 (pp. 139–140), and the ªrst group of Tibetan rebels was secretly brought to Saipan for training in December 1956. The trainees were then sent back to Tibet in 1957 to help the Tibetan rebels to establish contacts with the CIA and to join the resistance themselves. Available Chinese sources give no indication that the Chinese Communists were aware of America’s secret involvement in promoting the rebellion in Tibet during this period. 50. CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 80– 81