The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 troops were not well trained and that their military equipment was largely outdated.20 When CCP leaders and PLA officers were devising concrete strat- egies and tactics for the planned military operations,their main concern was how to maintain logistical supplies for their own troops,not how to crush re- sistance by the Tibetans.2 Mao was fully aware of the long-standing rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze.From the beginning,the Chinese authorities sought to gain the cooperation and sup- port of the Panchen Lama in order to confer legitimacy on the CCP's "libera- tion”of Tibet..22 Yet despite Mao's urging,the PLA was unable to complete its prepara- tions for the planned incursion into Tibet by the late summer of 1950.In ad- dition,the PLA's First Field Army reported that no proper roads led to Tibet from the northwest.(The road across the Tanggula Pass was not constructed until 1954.)CCP leaders therefore decided that the PLA would march south- west(from Sichuan)into Tibet.23 In early August 1950 the PLA's Southwest Military Region and the Eighteenth Army(which was assigned the task of en- tering and occupying Tibet)conducted a series of planning meetings that re- sulted in the strategy of occupying Chamdo (or Qamdo),the southwest entry point into Tibet and the deployment site of the main force of the Tibetan army,by the end of 1950.2 Mao endorsed the plan,but he regarded the oper- ation as far more than a purely military undertaking.He pointed out that "now India has issued a statement to acknowledge that Tibet is part of Chi- nese territory but hopes that the issue can be solved in a peaceful way rather than through military means."He also noted that"originally Britain did not allow the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing,and now it has allowed the delegation to do so."Mao thus emphasized that if the PLA could destroy the Tibetan army's main force and occupy Chamdo,"it is possible that the Ti- betan delegation will come to Beijing to pursue a peaceful solution [of the Tibet issue]through negotiation."He stressed that"we should carry out the 20.Ji Youquan,Baixue:Jiefang xizang jishi [White Snow:A Factual Record of the Liberation of Tibet] (Beijing:Zhongguo wuzi,1993),pp.32-33. 21.See,for example,Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.38-39,40-41.See also CCP South- west Bureau and PLA Southwest Military Region,"Instructions on Guaranteeing the Logistical Sup- plies for Marching into Tibet"(9 February 1950),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Heping jiefang xizang.pp.62-63. 22.See,for example,Mao wengao,Vol.1.p.450;and Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,p.19. 23.Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun diyi yazhanjun wenxian xuanbian [Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army](Beijing:Jiefangjun,2000).Vol.2.pp.713- 714,716-717;and Mao wengao,Vol.1,pp.475-477. 24.Ji,Baixue,pp.143-144.See also PLA Southwest Military Region,"Orders on Initiating the Chamdo Campaign"(26 August 1950),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang.pp.87-88. 59
troops were not well trained and that their military equipment was largely outdated.20 When CCP leaders and PLA ofªcers were devising concrete strategies and tactics for the planned military operations, their main concern was how to maintain logistical supplies for their own troops, not how to crush resistance by the Tibetans.21 Mao was fully aware of the long-standing rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze. From the beginning, the Chinese authorities sought to gain the cooperation and support of the Panchen Lama in order to confer legitimacy on the CCP’s “liberation” of Tibet.22 Yet despite Mao’s urging, the PLA was unable to complete its preparations for the planned incursion into Tibet by the late summer of 1950. In addition, the PLA’s First Field Army reported that no proper roads led to Tibet from the northwest. (The road across the Tanggula Pass was not constructed until 1954.) CCP leaders therefore decided that the PLA would march southwest (from Sichuan) into Tibet.23 In early August 1950 the PLA’s Southwest Military Region and the Eighteenth Army (which was assigned the task of entering and occupying Tibet) conducted a series of planning meetings that resulted in the strategy of occupying Chamdo (or Qamdo), the southwest entry point into Tibet and the deployment site of the main force of the Tibetan army, by the end of 1950.24 Mao endorsed the plan, but he regarded the operation as far more than a purely military undertaking. He pointed out that “now India has issued a statement to acknowledge that Tibet is part of Chinese territory but hopes that the issue can be solved in a peaceful way rather than through military means.” He also noted that “originally Britain did not allow the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing, and now it has allowed the delegation to do so.” Mao thus emphasized that if the PLA could destroy the Tibetan army’s main force and occupy Chamdo, “it is possible that the Tibetan delegation will come to Beijing to pursue a peaceful solution [of the Tibet issue] through negotiation.” He stressed that “we should carry out the 59 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 20. Ji Youquan, Baixue: Jiefang xizang jishi [White Snow: A Factual Record of the Liberation of Tibet] (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi, 1993), pp. 32–33. 21. See, for example, Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 38–39, 40–41. See also CCP Southwest Bureau and PLA Southwest Military Region, “Instructions on Guaranteeing the Logistical Supplies for Marching into Tibet” (9 February 1950), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang, pp. 62–63. 22. See, for example, Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 450; and Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, p. 19. 23. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun diyi yazhanjun wenxian xuanbian [Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 2000), Vol. 2, pp. 713– 714, 716–717; and Mao wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 475–477. 24. Ji, Baixue, pp. 143–144. See also PLA Southwest Military Region, “Orders on Initiating the Chamdo Campaign” (26 August 1950), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang, pp. 87–88
Chen Jian policy of striving for the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing while at the same time reducing Nehru's fear [of us]."25 The PLA's military attack on Chamdo that began on 6 October and lasted for two weeks resulted in a decisive victory.The Chinese forces routed the ineptly commanded and poorly prepared Tibetan troops.Because the Tibetans had almost no reserve force between Chamdo and Lhasa,the door to Tibet's capital city was already open for the PLA.6 With the Tibetans no longer in a position to wage any effective military resistance,Chinese leaders shifted the emphasis of their strategy to negotiat- ing with the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in Lhasa.2 From the beginning,the CCP made clear that a prerequisite for any peaceful solution of the Tibet issue was Lhasa's acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of the PRC.Chinese officials also emphasized that in the long run Tibet would have to be trans- formed into a"people's democratic"society-a phrase that in the Maoist dis- course meant destroying Tibet's traditional political,economic,and social structures and replacing them with socialist ones.But to ensure that a peace- ful settlement in Tibet could be achieved,Mao was willing to accept a series of key compromises,including temporarily allowing the feudal economy and polity to exist in Tibet,in exchange for the Dalai Lama's acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. The Tibetan government had no means of military resistance,and its ap- peals for help to the international community-including the United Na- tions,the United States,India,and Britain-failed to elicit any response.2 Consequently,the Tibetans had no choice but to send a delegation to Beijing in the spring of 1951.29 On 23 May 1951 the Tibetan negotiators in Beijing signed the "Seventeen-Point Agreement,"which began with the statement that "the Tibetan people shall unite and drive imperialist forces from Tibet and shall re- 25.Mao wengao,Vol.1,pp.475-477. 26.For a detailed account of the Chamdo military campaign,see Goldstein,A History of Modern Ti- bet,ch.18.For an official Chinese account,see Han Huanzhi et al.,Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Armyl,Vol.1(Beijing:Zhongguo shehui kexue,1990),Pp.212-215. 27.The Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 19 December 1950 and was then staying at Yadong.a small town close to the Tibetan-Indian border. 28.For an informative discussion,see Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet,chs.19-20;and Qiang Zhai,The Dragon,the Lion,and the Eagle:Chinese-British-American Relations,1949-1958(Kent,OH: Kent State University Press,1994),ch.3. 29.The Tibetan government had tried to hold the negotiations at a"neutral location,"but Beijing firmly rejected any such effort.Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized that the negotia- tions had to take place in Beijing and that the Tibetan delegation would have to travel there.See,for example,Mao wengao,Vol.1,p.369;and Li Ping et al,eds.,Zhou Enlai nianpu,1949-1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai,1949-1976](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1997),Vol.1. p.43. 60
policy of striving for the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing while at the same time reducing Nehru’s fear [of us].”25 The PLA’s military attack on Chamdo that began on 6 October and lasted for two weeks resulted in a decisive victory. The Chinese forces routed the ineptly commanded and poorly prepared Tibetan troops. Because the Tibetans had almost no reserve force between Chamdo and Lhasa, the door to Tibet’s capital city was already open for the PLA.26 With the Tibetans no longer in a position to wage any effective military resistance, Chinese leaders shifted the emphasis of their strategy to negotiating with the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in Lhasa.27 From the beginning, the CCP made clear that a prerequisite for any peaceful solution of the Tibet issue was Lhasa’s acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of the PRC. Chinese ofªcials also emphasized that in the long run Tibet would have to be transformed into a “people’s democratic” society—a phrase that in the Maoist discourse meant destroying Tibet’s traditional political, economic, and social structures and replacing them with socialist ones. But to ensure that a peaceful settlement in Tibet could be achieved, Mao was willing to accept a series of key compromises, including temporarily allowing the feudal economy and polity to exist in Tibet, in exchange for the Dalai Lama’s acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. The Tibetan government had no means of military resistance, and its appeals for help to the international community—including the United Nations, the United States, India, and Britain—failed to elicit any response.28 Consequently, the Tibetans had no choice but to send a delegation to Beijing in the spring of 1951.29 On 23 May 1951 the Tibetan negotiators in Beijing signed the “Seventeen-Point Agreement,” which began with the statement that “the Tibetan people shall unite and drive imperialist forces from Tibet and shall re- 60 Chen Jian 25. Mao wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 475–477. 26. For a detailed account of the Chamdo military campaign, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, ch. 18. For an ofªcial Chinese account, see Han Huanzhi et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1990), pp. 212–215. 27. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 19 December 1950 and was then staying at Yadong, a small town close to the Tibetan-Indian border. 28. For an informative discussion, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, chs. 19–20; and Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949–1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), ch. 3. 29. The Tibetan government had tried to hold the negotiations at a “neutral location,” but Beijing ªrmly rejected any such effort. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized that the negotiations had to take place in Beijing and that the Tibetan delegation would have to travel there. See, for example, Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 369; and Li Ping et al., eds., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), Vol. 1, p. 43
The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 turn to the big family of the Motherland-the People's Republic of China." The Chinese government,for its part,agreed that it would maintain"the es- tablished status,functions,and powers of the Dalai Lama,"refrain from alter- ing Tibet's feudal and theocratic political,economic,and social systems,and adopt"various reforms"in Tibet only if the Tibetan people so demanded and only after consultation with "the leading personnel of Tibet."The Dalai Lama,who had been in Yadong,a border town near India,since late 1950, approved the agreement and returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951.That fall, PLA units moved into Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet without encoun- tering resistance. The Path toward Rebellion The Seventeen-Point Agreement opened a new era in Beijing's relations with Tibet.The agreement,by all appearances,laid out a series of mutually accept- able principles that defined Tibet's relationship with the PRC.The Tibetans were obliged to accept China's claim to sovereignty over the "Land of Snows," thus joining the"big family"of the Chinese motherland.The PRC,in turn, was supposed to treat Tibet differently from other"minority regions,"includ- ing Xinjiang.Most important of all,the CCP promised not to carry out sweeping social and political changes in Tibet for a certain period.In the in- terim,the Communist regime would respect and coexist with Tibet's existing political,social,and monastic systems. Although the Seventeen-Point Agreement was seemingly based on equal- ity,the commitments undertaken by the two sides were in fact highly un- equal.The Tibetans'commitment to accept Tibet as an integral part of the PRC was permanent and irreversible,whereas the PRC's commitment to re- spect and coexist with Tibet's existing political,social,and monarchic systems was conditional and provisional.To many Tibetans,especially the political and monastic elites,the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and the coming of the Chinese Communists held out a future of great uncertainty. Not surprisingly,almost immediately after the PLA entered Tibet,ten- sions developed between the Chinese Communists and many Tibetans.Al- though the PLA followed Mao's instructions and sought to avoid provoca- tions,the presence of several thousand Chinese Communist soldiers in Lhasa and its surrounding areas imposed a great burden on the limited local re- 30.For the text of the"Seventeen-Point Agreement"("Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet"),see Tsering Shakya,The Dragon in the Land of Snows:A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York:Columbia University Press,1999),pp.449-452. 61
turn to the big family of the Motherland—the People’s Republic of China.” The Chinese government, for its part, agreed that it would maintain “the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama,” refrain from altering Tibet’s feudal and theocratic political, economic, and social systems, and adopt “various reforms” in Tibet only if the Tibetan people so demanded and only after consultation with “the leading personnel of Tibet.”30 The Dalai Lama, who had been in Yadong, a border town near India, since late 1950, approved the agreement and returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951. That fall, PLA units moved into Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet without encountering resistance. The Path toward Rebellion The Seventeen-Point Agreement opened a new era in Beijing’s relations with Tibet. The agreement, by all appearances, laid out a series of mutually acceptable principles that deªned Tibet’s relationship with the PRC. The Tibetans were obliged to accept China’s claim to sovereignty over the “Land of Snows,” thus joining the “big family” of the Chinese motherland. The PRC, in turn, was supposed to treat Tibet differently from other “minority regions,” including Xinjiang. Most important of all, the CCP promised not to carry out sweeping social and political changes in Tibet for a certain period. In the interim, the Communist regime would respect and coexist with Tibet’s existing political, social, and monastic systems. Although the Seventeen-Point Agreement was seemingly based on equality, the commitments undertaken by the two sides were in fact highly unequal. The Tibetans’ commitment to accept Tibet as an integral part of the PRC was permanent and irreversible, whereas the PRC’s commitment to respect and coexist with Tibet’s existing political, social, and monarchic systems was conditional and provisional. To many Tibetans, especially the political and monastic elites, the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and the coming of the Chinese Communists held out a future of great uncertainty. Not surprisingly, almost immediately after the PLA entered Tibet, tensions developed between the Chinese Communists and many Tibetans. Although the PLA followed Mao’s instructions and sought to avoid provocations, the presence of several thousand Chinese Communist soldiers in Lhasa and its surrounding areas imposed a great burden on the limited local re- 61 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 30. For the text of the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” (“Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”), see Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 449–452
Chen Jian sources (and food supplies in particular)and caused a surge of inflation in Lhasa.3 The conservatives among Tibet's political and monastic elites,who had never been happy with the Seventeen-Point Agreement,tried to exploit popular discontent to squeeze concessions from the Chinese Communists.In late March and early April 1952 the newly formed "People's Representatives" organized a series of demonstrations and protests against the Chinese Com- munist presence in Tibet.32 Mao and his fellow CCP leaders regarded the turmoil in Lhasa as a warn- ing signal.They adopted a dual-track policy to handle the situation.On the one hand,they instructed the CCP's "Tibet Work Committee"to put pres- sure on the Dalai Lama and force him to dissolve the "People's Representa- tives"and dismiss Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi,the two Tibetan officials (Silons,or Prime Ministers)who the Chinese Communists believed were be- hind the recent turmoil.3 On the other hand,Mao emphasized that the Chi- nese Communists should not hastily push for reforms and changes in Tibet but should work patiently with the local Tibetan elites while at the same time laying the groundwork for future reforms.In a long inner-CCP instruction ti- tled "Concerning Policies toward the Work in Tibet,"which was drafted by Mao himself,the Chinese leader acknowledged that "we lack a material basis in Tibet,and,in terms of social power,they [Tibetan elites]are stronger than we are,a situation that will not change in the near future."He argued that "for the time being [we should]leave everything [in Lhasa and Tibet]as it is, let this situation drag on,and not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now."Mao believed that the CCP would face "two possibilities"in the future development of Tibet: One is that our united front policy toward the upper stratum,a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few,will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us,so that the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel.The other possibility is that the bad elements who believe we are weak and can be bullied around may lead the Tibetan troops to rebel and our army to counter-attack in self-defense and deal them a telling blow.Either will be favorable for us. 31.Mao and the CCP leaders were aware of the situation.See,for example,"The CCP Central Com- mittee's Instructions on the Work Issue in Tibet"(1 April 1951),in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,p.60;and Heping jiefang xizang.pp.139-140. 32.Shakya,The Dragon in the Land of Snows,pp.102-111;and Wang et al.,Xizang lishi diwei bian. Pp.504-508. 33.Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.67-79.Mao emphasized the necessity of "using the re- cent events to conduct a political counteroffensive."In particular,he wanted to force the Dalai Lama to agree that Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi should resign. 62
sources (and food supplies in particular) and caused a surge of inºation in Lhasa.31 The conservatives among Tibet’s political and monastic elites, who had never been happy with the Seventeen-Point Agreement, tried to exploit popular discontent to squeeze concessions from the Chinese Communists. In late March and early April 1952 the newly formed “People’s Representatives” organized a series of demonstrations and protests against the Chinese Communist presence in Tibet.32 Mao and his fellow CCP leaders regarded the turmoil in Lhasa as a warning signal. They adopted a dual-track policy to handle the situation. On the one hand, they instructed the CCP’s “Tibet Work Committee” to put pressure on the Dalai Lama and force him to dissolve the “People’s Representatives” and dismiss Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi, the two Tibetan ofªcials (Silons, or Prime Ministers) who the Chinese Communists believed were behind the recent turmoil.33 On the other hand, Mao emphasized that the Chinese Communists should not hastily push for reforms and changes in Tibet but should work patiently with the local Tibetan elites while at the same time laying the groundwork for future reforms. In a long inner-CCP instruction titled “Concerning Policies toward the Work in Tibet,” which was drafted by Mao himself, the Chinese leader acknowledged that “we lack a material basis in Tibet, and, in terms of social power, they [Tibetan elites] are stronger than we are, a situation that will not change in the near future.” He argued that “for the time being [we should] leave everything [in Lhasa and Tibet] as it is, let this situation drag on, and not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now.” Mao believed that the CCP would face “two possibilities” in the future development of Tibet: One is that our united front policy toward the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so that the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel. The other possibility is that the bad elements who believe we are weak and can be bullied around may lead the Tibetan troops to rebel and our army to counter-attack in self-defense and deal them a telling blow. Either will be favorable for us. 62 Chen Jian 31. Mao and the CCP leaders were aware of the situation. See, for example, “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions on the Work Issue in Tibet” (1 April 1951), in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, p. 60; and Heping jiefang xizang, pp. 139–140. 32. Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, pp. 102–111; and Wang et al., Xizang lishi diwei bian, pp. 504–508. 33. Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 67–79. Mao emphasized the necessity of “using the recent events to conduct a political counteroffensive.” In particular, he wanted to force the Dalai Lama to agree that Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi should resign
The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 Mao asserted that"[now]apparently not only the two Silons but also the Dalai Lama and most of his clique are reluctant to accept the [Seventeen- Point]agreement and are unwilling to carry it out.As yet we do not have the material basis for this purpose [implementing the agreement]in terms of sup- port among the masses or in the upper stratum,to force its implementation will do more harm than good."But Mao believed that time was on the CCP's side: Things will be different in a few years.By then they [the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elites]will have no choice but to carry out the agreement in full and re- organize the Tibetan troops.If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebel- lions and are repulsed by our army each time,we will be all the more justified in reorganizing them. Mao concluded that "we should be prepared to make concessions,wait for conditions to become mature,prepare for taking the offensive in the future." Mao's directive encompassed a series of well-conceived strategies and tac- tics.He was evidently aware of the extraordinary obstacles the CCP and the PLA would have to overcome in order to incorporate the people and land of Tibet into the Chinese "socialist motherland."Therefore,he was willing to adopt a policy that was characterized by gradualism and included making multiple concessions to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag.This was a battle concerning the hearts of the Tibetan people that could not be won through military means.Indeed,in Mao's discussion of the Tibet issue,the chairman even touched upon such details as that"on our part [we should]concentrate on good deeds of production,trade,road-building,medical services and united front work so as to win over the masses."3 But these measures were no more than temporary tactics.The CCP chairman made clear that the strategic goal of Beijing's policies toward Tibet was the "complete implementation of the [Seventeen-Point]Agreement."For Mao,this meant not only that Tibet should become a part of China but also that through political,social,and eco- nomic reforms Tibet,like other parts of the PRC,eventually should be trans- formed into a socialist society. Mao repeatedly mentioned in his instructions to the CCP cadres in Tibet that although the emphasis of the CCP's policy should be on gradualism,the Party cadres should also be prepared to deal with serious crises provoked by "bad elements"in Tibet who would rebel against Chinese rule.A scenario of 34.CCP Central Committee (drafted by Mao Zedong),"Concerning the Policy of the Work in Ti- bet"(6 April 1952),in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.61-64.For an English translation of most of the text,see Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing:Foreign Language Press,1977),Vol.5, Pp.73-76. 35.CCP Central Committee,"Concerning the Policy of the Work in Tibet,"p.63. 63
Mao asserted that “[now] apparently not only the two Silons but also the Dalai Lama and most of his clique are reluctant to accept the [SeventeenPoint] agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we do not have the material basis for this purpose [implementing the agreement] in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum, to force its implementation will do more harm than good.” But Mao believed that time was on the CCP’s side: Things will be different in a few years. By then they [the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elites] will have no choice but to carry out the agreement in full and reorganize the Tibetan troops. If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebellions and are repulsed by our army each time, we will be all the more justiªed in reorganizing them. Mao concluded that “we should be prepared to make concessions, wait for conditions to become mature, prepare for taking the offensive in the future.”34 Mao’s directive encompassed a series of well-conceived strategies and tactics. He was evidently aware of the extraordinary obstacles the CCP and the PLA would have to overcome in order to incorporate the people and land of Tibet into the Chinese “socialist motherland.” Therefore, he was willing to adopt a policy that was characterized by gradualism and included making multiple concessions to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag. This was a battle concerning the hearts of the Tibetan people that could not be won through military means. Indeed, in Mao’s discussion of the Tibet issue, the chairman even touched upon such details as that “on our part [we should] concentrate on good deeds of production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work so as to win over the masses.”35 But these measures were no more than temporary tactics. The CCP chairman made clear that the strategic goal of Beijing’s policies toward Tibet was the “complete implementation of the [Seventeen-Point] Agreement.” For Mao, this meant not only that Tibet should become a part of China but also that through political, social, and economic reforms Tibet, like other parts of the PRC, eventually should be transformed into a socialist society. Mao repeatedly mentioned in his instructions to the CCP cadres in Tibet that although the emphasis of the CCP’s policy should be on gradualism, the Party cadres should also be prepared to deal with serious crises provoked by “bad elements” in Tibet who would rebel against Chinese rule. A scenario of 63 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 34. CCP Central Committee (drafted by Mao Zedong), “Concerning the Policy of the Work in Tibet” (6 April 1952), in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 61–64. For an English translation of most of the text, see Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977), Vol. 5, pp. 73–76. 35. CCP Central Committee, “Concerning the Policy of the Work in Tibet,” p. 63