WILEY The Geneva Conference of 1954:A Case of Tacit Deception Author(s):Frank C.Zagare Reviewed work(s): Source:International Studies Quarterly,Vol.23,No.3(Sep.,1979),pp.390-411 Published by:Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600174 Accessed:27/01/201321:58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Studies Ouarterly. STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Geneva Conference of 1954: A Case of Tacit Deception Author(s): Frank C. Zagare Reviewed work(s): Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1979), pp. 390-411 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600174 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 21:58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Studies Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Geneva Conference of 1954 A Case of Tacit Deception FRANK C.ZAGARE Department of Political Science Boston University This article uses a game-theoretic model of deception to examine a game played at the Geneva Conference of 1954 by the Western Alliance,the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Vietminh.It argues that if this game were played as a game of complete information,the sophisticated outcome would have been a withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam, followed immediately by an election whose probable winner would have been Ho Chi Minh.For the Western Alliance,especially the United States,this outcome was seen as the least-preferred of the three possible outcomes.However,because the Western Alliance was able to make a false announcement of its preferences,it was able tacitly to deceive the Soviets,Chinese,and Vietminh into believing that its misrepresentation was its true preference.Thus,it was able to induce its second-most-preferred alternative,the partition of Vietnam,as the (manipulated)sophisticated outcome of the game. Contradictions in a nation's foreign policy pronouncements are sometimes explained in terms of bureaucratic inefficiency (Allison,1971:ch.4),the lack of an integrated and coherent policy (Reston,1955:62),or shifting or "deteriorating"prefer- ences(Howard,1971:148,199-201).However,such a discrepancy may also indicate that another process is at work,namely,decep- tion.In many situations it may be rational for an actor to deceive another in order to induce a more-preferred outcome.1 1.For a listing of these situations,see Zagare(1977a)and Brams(1977). AUTHOR'S NOTE:I would like to thank Steven J.Brams,Gerald DeMaio,the late Oskar Morgenstern,Richard N.Swift,Maria Zaremba,and Dina A.Zinnes for reading an earlier version of this manuscript and making many helpful suggestions. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY,Vol.23 No.3,September 1979 390-411 ©1979L.S.A. 390 ThPM ns and Conditions
The Geneva Conference of 1954 A Case of Tacit Deception FRANK C. ZAGARE Department of Political Science Boston University This article uses a game-theoretic model of deception to examine a game played at the Geneva Conference of 1954 by the Western Alliance, the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Vietminh. It argues that if this game were played as a game of complete information, the sophisticated outcome would have been a withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam, followed immediately by an election whose probable winner would have been Ho Chi Minh. For the Western Alliance, especially the United States, this outcome was seen as the least-preferred of the three possible outcomes. However, because the Western Alliance was able to make a false announcement of its preferences, itwas able tacitly to deceive the Soviets, Chinese, and Vietminh into believing that its misrepresentation was its true preference. Thus, it was able to induce its second-most-preferred alternative, the partition of Vietnam, as the (manipulated) sophisticated outcome of the game. Contradictions in a nation's foreign policy pronouncements are sometimes explained in terms of bureaucratic inefficiency (Allison, 1971: ch. 4), the lack of an integrated and coherent policy (Reston, 1955: 62), or shifting or "deteriorating" preferences (Howard, 1971: 148, 199-201). However, such a discrepancy may also indicate that another process is at work, namely, deception. In many situations it may be rational for an actor to deceive another in order to induce a more-preferred outcome.' 1. For a listing of these situations, see Zagare (1977a) and Brams (1977). AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank Steven J. Brams, Gerald DeMaio, the late Oskar Morgenstern, Richard N. Swift, Maria Zaremba, and Dina A. Zinnes for reading an earlier version of this manuscript and making many helpful suggestions. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 23 No. 3, September 1979 390-411 o 1979 ISA. 390 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Zagare GENEVA CONFERENCE 1954 391 Contradictory statements by government officials might be a manifestation of such a deceptive strategy. To demonstrate this contention,I will briefly describe a model of deception developed by Brams and Zagare(1977).Then, once a few key game-theoretic terms are operationalized and ascribed empirical meaning,I will show how the model can be used to offer an explanation of the apparent lack of coherence in the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward Southeast Asia in 1954,a policy that one analyst has characterized as wavering "between a point just short of military intervention and a point just short of appeasement"(Reston,1955:62). A Brief Exposition of the Deception Model Consider a game composed of three players,Plane,Row,and Column,and assume the players must choose from among a set of three alternatives A=fai,a2,as.Let the first alternative,a,be identified as the status quo. Assume that decisions in this game are a function of the following decision rule:If two or more of the players agree on one of the three alternatives,that alternative is the social choice.If there is no agreement,that is,if all three players disagree,the status quo,al,prevails. Given this set of alternatives and this decision rule,the three- dimensional outcome matrix depicted in Figure 1 results.Each dimension (plane,row,and column)represents the outcomes associated with the strategy choices available to the players with the corresponding name. In this game,each player has three possible strategies,that is, to pursue one of the three alternatives.This essay assumes that the the choice of the Plane,Row,and Column players associated with the strategy"pursue ai"is the first plane,row,and column respec- tively,and similarly for the other strategy choices.Hence,the symbol "a"not only stands for an alternative but also for a 2.This section is based on Brams and Zagare(1977,1979). ThPM rms and Conditions
Zagare / GENEVA CONFERENCE 1954 391 Contradictory statements by government officials might be a manifestation of such a deceptive strategy. To demonstrate this contention, I will briefly describe a model of deception developed by Brams and Zagare (1977). Then, once a few key game-theoretic terms are operationalized and ascribed empirical meaning, I will show how the model can be used to offer an explanation of the apparent lack of coherence in the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward Southeast Asia in 1954, a policy that one analyst has characterized as wavering "between a point just short of military intervention and a point just short of appeasement" (Reston, 1955: 62). A Brief Exposition of the Deception Model2 Consider a game composed of three players, Plane, Row, and Column, and assume the players must choose from among a set of three alternatives A = {a,, a2, a3}. Let the first alternative, ai, be identified as the status quo. Assume that decisions in this game are a function of the following decision rule: If two or more of the players agree on one of the three alternatives, that alternative is the social choice. If there is no agreement, that is, if all three players disagree, the status quo, ai, prevails. Given this set of alternatives and this decision rule, the threedimensional outcome matrix depicted in Figure I results. Each dimension (plane, row, and column) represents the outcomes associated with the strategy choices available to the players with the corresponding name. In this game, each player has three possible strategies, that is, to pursue one of the three alternatives. This essay assumes that the the choice of the Plane, Row, and Column players associated with the strategy "pursue ai" is the first plane, row, and column respectively, and similarly for the other strategy choices. Hence, the symbol "as" not only stands for an alternative but also for a 2. This section is based on Brams and Zagare (1977, 1979). This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
392 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Column 1 Row 2 Plane Figure 1:Original Outcome Matrix with the Dominated Strategies of Plane and Column Crossed out strategy choice,and,as will be seen shortly,for the possible outcomes of the game. The possible outcomes of this game,ai,az,and a3 are repre- sented in the Figure 1 outcome matrix by the numbers 1,2,and 3 respectively.They are assigned to the outcome matrix by a function defined by the decision rule discussed earlier.For example,the choice of "pursue a"by the Plane,Row,and a品2品26w
392 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Column i__ -- 1 I /' / 4 Row 9 / / _ / Plane 2 Figure 1: Original Outcome Matrix with the Dominated Strategies of Plane and Column Crossed out strategy choice, and, as will be seen shortly, for the possible outcomes of the game. The possible outcomes of this game, a,, a2, and a3 are represented in the Figure 1 outcome matrix by the numbers 1, 2, and 3 respectively. They are assigned to the outcome matrix by a function defined by the decision rule discussed earlier. For example, the choice of "pursue ai" by the Plane, Row, and This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Zagare GENEVA CONFERENCE 1954 393 Column players results in the outcome al at the intersection of the first plane,first row,and first column. To illustrate the subsequent analysis,assume that the players prefer the outcomes in the order listed: Plane: (a1,a2,a3) Row: (a2,a3,a） Column: (a3,a1,az) How,then,should the players select a strategy that ensures the best possible outcome for themselves?If information is complete, that is,if the players are informed about both the preferences of the other players and the decision rule,a sophisticated strategy is optimal for each player,provided that the other players are also sophisticated (Farquharson,1969). A sophisticated strategy requires each player to eliminate successively his dominated strategies.A strategy is dominated when another strategy available to a player produces at least as good a result for him in every contingency and a better result in one or more contingencies.A strategy which dominates all a player's other strategies is called straightforward.A straight- forward strategy is a player's unconditionally best strategy. In the game outlined above,a emerges as the"sophisticated" outcome,as may easily be demonstrated.From Figure I it can be seen that both Plane and Column have straightforward strategies. For Plane,the choice of his strategy "pursue ar"(the first plane) is unconditionally best since it dominates both of his other two strategies,that is,no matter what choices are made by the other players,the outcomes resulting are either the same as or better than the outcomes resulting from the choice of either of his other two strategies,given his preference scale postulated earlier. Similarly,Column's choice of "pursue a"(the third column)is straightforward-it dominates both his first and second strate- gies. In contrast,Row has no unconditionally best strategy.His second strategy dominates his first but not his third.Therefore, Row's choice of a best strategy depends upon the other two players'choices. ThPM
Zagare / GENEVA CONFERENCE 1954 393 Column players results in the outcome ai at the intersection of the first plane, first row, and first column. To illustrate the subsequent analysis, assume that the players prefer the outcomes in the order listed: Plane: (a,, a2, a3) Row: (a2, a3, al) Column: (a3, a,, a2) How, then, should the players select a strategy that ensures the best possible outcome for themselves? If information iscomplete, that is, if the players are informed about both the preferences of the other players and the decision rule, a sophisticated strategy is optimal for each player, provided that the other players are also sophisticated (Farquharson, 1969). A sophisticated strategy requires each player to eliminate successively his dominated strategies. A strategy is dominated when another strategy available to a player produces at least as good a result for him in every contingency and a better result in one or more contingencies. A strategy which dominates all a player's other strategies is called straightforward. A straightforward strategy is a player's unconditionally best strategy. In the game outlined above, a3 emerges as the "sophisticated" outcome, as may easily be demonstrated. From Figure l it can be seen that both Plane and Column have straightforward strategies. For Plane, the choice of his strategy "pursue ai" (the first plane) is unconditionally best since it dominates both of his other two strategies, that is, no matter what choices are made by the other players, the outcomes resulting are either the same as or better than the outcomes resulting from the choice of either of his other two strategies, given his preference scale postulated earlier. Similarly, Column's choice of "pursue a3" (the third column) is straightforward-it dominates both his first and second strategies. In contrast, Row has no unconditionally best strategy. His second strategy dominates his first but not his third. Therefore, Row's choice of a best strategy depends upon the other two players' choices. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions