MATTHEW JONES A"Segregated"Asia?:Race,the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy,1954-1955 Writing in a March 1927 editorial for the Negro World,Amy Jacques Garvey conjectured that a "guilty conscience [had]begun to torture the white race. They foresee in awakened Asia the stern hand of retribution preparing to return measure for measure all that it has received.They are in the throes of a horrid nightmare....The cycle of civilization is shifting,and with it the battleground of the future.The age of the Atlantic has passed,the age of the Pacific is here." With the coming of Pacific dominance,the "superior force of Asiatic arms," aroused against Western influence,could eventually be turned against the United States.In such circumstances,Garvey asked,would fifteen million oppressed American Negroes "say that the Asiatics are wrong to demand racial equality,or will they sing,My country 'tis of thee,sweet land of liberty'?" Although there was a future possibility that the United States might offer a hand of friendship to China,she was not optimistic the racial divide between the white and nonwhite worlds could be bridged,concluding: It seems as if the inevitable must happen;Nordic arrogance refuses to treat with young Asia,and war clouds thicken,as the blacks of Africa and America and the yellow and brown peoples of Asia nurse a common resentment for being called inferior by white nations that spend their time exploiting and keeping them underfoot.' Such potent images of a united Asia,typically under Japanese leadership, forming a transnational alliance with disaffected African Americans found cur- rency in black internationalist writings during the interwar years.'One can also see how the war in the Far East of 1941-45 generated a new surge in these ideas,as concerns among white Americans mounted that Japan's ideology of “Asia for the Asians'”might create conditions where the peoples of a“liberated” 1.Amy Jacques Garvey,"Awakened Asia,"Negro World,19 March 1927.Reprinted in Voices of a Black Nation:Political Journalism in the Harlem Renaissance,ed.Theodore G.Vincent (San Francisco,1973),295-96. 2.See Marc Gallicchio,Tbe African American Encounter witb Japan and Cbina:Black Inter- nationalism in Asia,1895-1945 (Chapel Hill,NC,2000),210. DIPLOMATIC HisToRy,Vol.29,No.5 (November 2005).2005 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishing,Inc.,350 Main Street,Malden,MA,02148,USA and 96oo Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ,UK. 841
matthew jones A “Segregated” Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955 Writing in a March 1927 editorial for the Negro World, Amy Jacques Garvey conjectured that a “guilty conscience [had] begun to torture the white race. They foresee in awakened Asia the stern hand of retribution preparing to return measure for measure all that it has received. They are in the throes of a horrid nightmare. . . . The cycle of civilization is shifting, and with it the battleground of the future. The age of the Atlantic has passed, the age of the Pacific is here.” With the coming of Pacific dominance, the “superior force of Asiatic arms,” aroused against Western influence, could eventually be turned against the United States. In such circumstances, Garvey asked, would fifteen million oppressed American Negroes “say that the Asiatics are wrong to demand racial equality, or will they sing, ‘My country ’tis of thee, sweet land of liberty’?” Although there was a future possibility that the United States might offer a hand of friendship to China, she was not optimistic the racial divide between the white and nonwhite worlds could be bridged, concluding: It seems as if the inevitable must happen; Nordic arrogance refuses to treat with young Asia, and war clouds thicken, as the blacks of Africa and America and the yellow and brown peoples of Asia nurse a common resentment for being called inferior by white nations that spend their time exploiting and keeping them underfoot.1 Such potent images of a united Asia, typically under Japanese leadership, forming a transnational alliance with disaffected African Americans found currency in black internationalist writings during the interwar years.2 One can also see how the war in the Far East of 1941–45 generated a new surge in these ideas, as concerns among white Americans mounted that Japan’s ideology of “Asia for the Asians” might create conditions where the peoples of a “liberated” 841 Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 5 (November 2005). © 2005 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. 1. Amy Jacques Garvey, “Awakened Asia,” Negro World, 19 March 1927. Reprinted in Voices of a Black Nation: Political Journalism in the Harlem Renaissance, ed. Theodore G. Vincent (San Francisco, 1973), 295–96. 2. See Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), 210
842:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY Asia were pitted against the humiliated European colonial powers,uneasily associated with the United States,in a struggle over the future of world civi- lization.3 According to Stanley Hornbeck,the longtime State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs,world events were opening up not just"the chasm between Occident and Orient"but "the chasm of color."+That the pan-Asian "contagion"might spread to the African-American population (as several inva- sion fantasies of the Iozos published in Japan had predicted)was not entirely discounted by the U.S.authorities;in 1942,Secretary of War Henry L.Stimson, for example,believed that Japanese and Communist agitators were encourag- ing African-American demands for equality,and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation was busy targeting Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims for their pro-Japanese sympathies.3 Over thirty years ago,in the middle of another Asian war which pitted "Occi- dentals"against "Orientals,"Harold Isaacs brought home the importance of race as a factor in the way the U.S.role in world affairs was perceived by a domestic and global audience.In the past few years,the multifaceted intersec- tion between race and U.S.foreign policy in the twentieth century has gener- ated an abundance of fresh scholarship.Studies have focused on the Cold War political pressures making for change in domestic civil rights policy,on the internationalism practiced by African Americans themselves,as they challenged colonialism and the apartheid regime in South Africa,and on the views of sig- nificant black leaders such as W.E.B.Du Bois.7 This article aims for a differ- ent perspective by looking at the ways preoccupations with race and color 3.The work of Christopher Thorne is essential here;see Allies of a Kind:The United States,Britain,and the War against Japan,1941-1945 (London,1978),5-12,175,291,359,539. See also John Dower,War witbout Mercy:Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, I986. 4.Quoted in Christopher Thorne,The Issue of War:States,Societies and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941-1945 (London,1985),178. 5.The points about Japanese propaganda and the Black Muslims are made in Dower, War witbout Mercy,174-75;for Japanese interwar invasion fantasies see Gallicchio,Africam American Encounter,58. 6.Harold R.Isaacs,"Race and Color in World Affairs,"Foreign Affairs 47 January 1969): 235-50.This is an article which is also included in the collection,George W.Shepherd,ed., Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy (New York,1970). 7.See Mary L.Dudziak,"Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,"Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988):61-120;Dudziak,Cold War Civil Rigbts (London,2001);Azza Salama Layton,International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States,1941-1960(Cambridge, MA,2000);Brenda Gayle Plummer,Rising Wind:Black Americans and U.S.Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill,NC,1996);Penny M.Von Eschen,Race against Empire:Black Amer- icans and Anticolonialism,1937-1957 (Ithaca,NY,1997);Gerald Horne,Black and Red:W.E.B. Du Bois and tbe Afro-American Response to the Cold War,1943-1963(Albany,NY,1986);Thomas Borstelmann,The Cold War and the Color Line:American Race Relations in the Global Arena (London,2001);Brenda Gayle Plummer,ed.,Windou on Freedom:Race,Civil Rights,and Foreign Affirs,1945-1988 (Chapel Hill,NC,2003);and,most recently,the pertinent and persuasive observations in Justin Hart,"Making Democracy Safe for the World:Race,Propaganda,and the Transformation of U.S.Foreign Policy during World War Two,"Pacific Historical Review 73 (February 2004):49-84
Asia were pitted against the humiliated European colonial powers, uneasily associated with the United States, in a struggle over the future of world civilization.3 According to Stanley Hornbeck, the longtime State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs, world events were opening up not just “the chasm between Occident and Orient” but “the chasm of color.”4 That the pan-Asian “contagion” might spread to the African-American population (as several invasion fantasies of the 1920s published in Japan had predicted) was not entirely discounted by the U.S. authorities; in 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, for example, believed that Japanese and Communist agitators were encouraging African-American demands for equality, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was busy targeting Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims for their pro-Japanese sympathies.5 Over thirty years ago, in the middle of another Asian war which pitted “Occidentals” against “Orientals,” Harold Isaacs brought home the importance of race as a factor in the way the U.S. role in world affairs was perceived by a domestic and global audience.6 In the past few years, the multifaceted intersection between race and U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century has generated an abundance of fresh scholarship. Studies have focused on the Cold War political pressures making for change in domestic civil rights policy, on the internationalism practiced by African Americans themselves, as they challenged colonialism and the apartheid regime in South Africa, and on the views of significant black leaders such as W. E. B. Du Bois.7 This article aims for a different perspective by looking at the ways preoccupations with race and color 842 : diplomatic history 3. The work of Christopher Thorne is essential here; see Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (London, 1978), 5–12, 175, 291, 359, 539. See also John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986). 4. Quoted in Christopher Thorne, The Issue of War: States, Societies and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945 (London, 1985), 178. 5. The points about Japanese propaganda and the Black Muslims are made in Dower, War without Mercy, 174–75; for Japanese interwar invasion fantasies see Gallicchio, African American Encounter, 58. 6. Harold R. Isaacs, “Race and Color in World Affairs,” Foreign Affairs 47 ( January 1969): 235–50. This is an article which is also included in the collection, George W. Shepherd, ed., Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy (New York, 1970). 7. See Mary L. Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988): 61–120; Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights (London, 2001); Azza Salama Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941–1960 (Cambridge, MA, 2000); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996); Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1943–1963 (Albany, NY, 1986); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (London, 2001); Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003); and, most recently, the pertinent and persuasive observations in Justin Hart, “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy during World War Two,” Pacific Historical Review 73 (February 2004): 49–84
A“Segregated'”Asia::843 informed American thinking and behavior about the U.S.position in Asia during the mid-195os,as recurring images and fears of potential racial conflict were applied to a new set of circumstances.By these means,it is possible to provide an extra layer of analysis to some of the more traditional approaches toward examining Sino-American confrontation across the decade.As Matthew Connelly has reminded us,alongside the anti-Communist fixations of the Cold War,the Eisenhower administration was often fearful of the emergence of North-South and more general racial tensions when it surveyed the interna- tional scene.The worldviews of individuals such as John Foster Dulles,it should be recalled,were shaped during the interwar years when pessimistic views of demographic trends in the West and a coming transnational race war were given wide currency.For Dulles,at times China could become "a big yellow blot on the map,"as he described it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955." The idea of being "swamped"by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface of the Western imagination.In one revealing minute composed in May 1953,Churchill vented his objections to the use of the"Amer- ican expression Asian"in the Foreign Office telegrams he had seen.Instead,the prime minister asserted that the term "Asiatic more correctly describes the vast and divergent communities of Asia,"and then added with unease:"Asian would look as if we were trying to bring them all together."On this occasion,it had to be explained to Churchill that "Asiatic"was "regarded in Asia as having a derogatory connotation"and hence its use had been discouraged,Foreign Office instructions having been issued in 1o5o to substitute the phrase "Asian" 8.Throughout this article,words denoting categories such as "white,""nonwhite,"and "Asian"are generally used without quotation marks for ease of style,but this should not be taken as unawareness about the sharply contested nature of such terms,or the "racial certain- ties"they tend to imply:in this I find sympathy with the approach of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Wbiteness of a Different Color:European Immigrants and the Alcbemy of Race (Cambridge,MA, I998),1X. 9.Matthew Connelly,"Taking off the Cold War Lens:Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,"American Historical Review io5 (June 2000): 739-69.See also Matthew Connelly,A Diplomatic Revolution:Algeria's Figbt for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York,2002). 1o.Connelly,"Taking off the Cold War Lens,"752-53.Dulles was certainly "color con- scious"insofar as he identified himself as part of white,"Anglo-Saxon"civilization.In 1939, he wrote of the possibility of developing an "organic relationship"between the "democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples"as a solution to the problems of peace and world order,while five ely e erce p maemelypleny thing which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring."See Dulles to Curtis,II January 1939,f.23-4,MSS Curtis 13,and Dulles to Curtis,19 September 1944. f.36,MSS Curtis 31,Lionel Curtis Papers,Western Manuscripts Collection,Bodleian Library, Oxford.I am indebted to Inderjeet Parmar for drawing my attention to the existence of this correspondence. II.See Dulles statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty,24 January 1955,Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series),vol. VII,84th Cong.,ist sess.,1955(Washington,DC,1978),113
informed American thinking and behavior about the U.S. position in Asia during the mid-1950s, as recurring images and fears of potential racial conflict were applied to a new set of circumstances.8 By these means, it is possible to provide an extra layer of analysis to some of the more traditional approaches toward examining Sino-American confrontation across the decade. As Matthew Connelly has reminded us, alongside the anti-Communist fixations of the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration was often fearful of the emergence of North-South and more general racial tensions when it surveyed the international scene.9 The worldviews of individuals such as John Foster Dulles, it should be recalled, were shaped during the interwar years when pessimistic views of demographic trends in the West and a coming transnational race war were given wide currency.10 For Dulles, at times China could become “a big yellow blot on the map,” as he described it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955. 11 The idea of being “swamped” by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface of the Western imagination. In one revealing minute composed in May 1953, Churchill vented his objections to the use of the “American expression Asian” in the Foreign Office telegrams he had seen. Instead, the prime minister asserted that the term “Asiatic more correctly describes the vast and divergent communities of Asia,” and then added with unease: “Asian would look as if we were trying to bring them all together.” On this occasion, it had to be explained to Churchill that “Asiatic” was “regarded in Asia as having a derogatory connotation” and hence its use had been discouraged, Foreign Office instructions having been issued in 1950 to substitute the phrase “Asian” A “Segregated” Asia? : 843 8. Throughout this article, words denoting categories such as “white,” “nonwhite,” and “Asian” are generally used without quotation marks for ease of style, but this should not be taken as unawareness about the sharply contested nature of such terms, or the “racial certainties” they tend to imply; in this I find sympathy with the approach of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA, 1998), ix. 9. Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review 105 ( June 2000): 739–69. See also Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York, 2002). 10. Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens,” 752–53. Dulles was certainly “color conscious” insofar as he identified himself as part of white, “Anglo-Saxon” civilization. In 1939, he wrote of the possibility of developing an “organic relationship” between the “democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples” as a solution to the problems of peace and world order, while five years later noted his pessimism about the outcome of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference “largely because the different Russian philosophy makes it extremely difficult to produce anything which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring.” See Dulles to Curtis, 11 January 1939, f.23–4, MSS Curtis 13, and Dulles to Curtis, 19 September 1944, f.36, MSS Curtis 31, Lionel Curtis Papers, Western Manuscripts Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford. I am indebted to Inderjeet Parmar for drawing my attention to the existence of this correspondence. 11. See Dulles statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty, 24 January 1955, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. VII, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955 (Washington, DC, 1978), 113
844:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY instead."The image that was immediately invoked for many Americans in the Iosos by the term "Asia,"as Isaacs highlighted in an influential study of the period,was of "an undifferentiated crush of humanity,""a dread blur of mystery and fearfulness,associated with vast numbers,with barbarism,and with disease."What was also clear,moreover,was that Asia was restive and in ferment,consumed by the drive for self-determination and independence,with "dark peoples determined to assert themselves."With the struggle against communism now fully engaged,Asia was increasingly viewed as a source of future danger to the United States,adherents to this "apocalyptic"perspective making such free associations as:"Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, overwhelming combinations of Asian populations;Western civilization is out- numbered,white civilization is outnumbered,and could go under." As Americans contemplated their role and policies in Asia during the 1o5os, two features that contributed to racial factors playing such a significant part in the still-recent Far Eastern war of 1941-45 were once again present.The first was that the United States faced another nonwhite adversary,the People's Republic of China(PRC),animated by an ideology that stressed anti- imperialism and the expulsion of a corrosive Western influence from Asia,the latter representing a point of continuity with the wartime message propagated by the Japanese.With few exceptions,this fundamental point has tended to be neglected as diplomatic historians have concentrated more on the traditional geopolitical and strategic aspects of the conflict with China.'s In the first few years after Pearl Harbor,China had been regarded by the United States as a key ally in the struggle against Japan,not least as this relationship could mitigate the degree to which the war in Asia represented a clash between East and West,or white and nonwhite peoples.By the Iosos,Washington was once more in search of Asian friends and allies,this time in their struggle against the mainland Communist Chinese usurpers.Though the geopolitical need to construct a military ring of containment around China was paramount,a sub- sidiary (and often overlooked)purpose of this search was to counteract any impression that this was once again a "civilizational"confrontation between the 12.See Churchill minute for Strang,M.120/53,I May 1953,Swinton to Churchill,No. 21/53,18 May 1953,PREM 11/518,U.K.National Archives (UKNA),Kew,London;the prime minister was not impressed:"I fear I can not agree.Pray discuss this with me";Churchill note,28 May 1953,PREM I1/518,UKNA.During the same period,Chester Bowles,the U.S. ambassador to India,was also noting how the word"Asiatic"was now"taken as a kind of insult" in the region;see Chester Bowles,Ambassador Reports (London,1954),97. 13.Harold R.Isaacs,Scratcbes on Our Minds:American Views of China and India (New York, 198o;originally published 1958),54-55. 14.Ibid.,58. I5.On the mixing of the imagery of the“yellow”and“red”perils in the language of the Eisenhower administration see Gordon Chang,Friends and Enemies:The United States,China, and tbe Soviet Union,1948-1972 (Stanford,CA,1990),170-74.Bruce Cumings has also high- lighted the racial imagery employed by Americans during the Korean War;see,for example, Tbe Origins of the Korean War,Volume Il:Tbe Roaring of tbe Cataract,1947-1950 (Princeton, J,199o,694-96
instead.12 The image that was immediately invoked for many Americans in the 1950s by the term “Asia,” as Isaacs highlighted in an influential study of the period, was of “an undifferentiated crush of humanity,” “a dread blur of mystery and fearfulness, associated with vast numbers, with barbarism, and with disease.” What was also clear, moreover, was that Asia was restive and in ferment, consumed by the drive for self-determination and independence, with “dark peoples determined to assert themselves.”13 With the struggle against communism now fully engaged, Asia was increasingly viewed as a source of future danger to the United States, adherents to this “apocalyptic” perspective making such free associations as: “Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, overwhelming combinations of Asian populations; Western civilization is outnumbered, white civilization is outnumbered, and could go under.”14 As Americans contemplated their role and policies in Asia during the 1950s, two features that contributed to racial factors playing such a significant part in the still-recent Far Eastern war of 1941–45 were once again present. The first was that the United States faced another nonwhite adversary, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), animated by an ideology that stressed antiimperialism and the expulsion of a corrosive Western influence from Asia, the latter representing a point of continuity with the wartime message propagated by the Japanese. With few exceptions, this fundamental point has tended to be neglected as diplomatic historians have concentrated more on the traditional geopolitical and strategic aspects of the conflict with China.15 In the first few years after Pearl Harbor, China had been regarded by the United States as a key ally in the struggle against Japan, not least as this relationship could mitigate the degree to which the war in Asia represented a clash between East and West, or white and nonwhite peoples. By the 1950s, Washington was once more in search of Asian friends and allies, this time in their struggle against the mainland Communist Chinese usurpers. Though the geopolitical need to construct a military ring of containment around China was paramount, a subsidiary (and often overlooked) purpose of this search was to counteract any impression that this was once again a “civilizational” confrontation between the 844 : diplomatic history 12. See Churchill minute for Strang, M.120/53, 1 May 1953, Swinton to Churchill, No. 21/53, 18 May 1953, PREM 11/518, U.K. National Archives (UKNA), Kew, London; the prime minister was not impressed: “I fear I can not agree. Pray discuss this with me”; Churchill note, 28 May 1953, PREM 11/518, UKNA. During the same period, Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India, was also noting how the word “Asiatic” was now “taken as a kind of insult” in the region; see Chester Bowles, Ambassador Reports (London, 1954), 97. 13. Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India (New York, 1980; originally published 1958), 54–55. 14. Ibid., 58. 15. On the mixing of the imagery of the “yellow” and “red” perils in the language of the Eisenhower administration see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford, CA, 1990), 170–74. Bruce Cumings has also highlighted the racial imagery employed by Americans during the Korean War; see, for example, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton, NJ, 1990), 694–96
A“Segregated”Asia::845 West and Asia,with the Americans carrying the banner for Western and white imperialism. In their quest for influence on the Asian scene,the United States was ham- pered,in a second feature of continuity from its wartime experience,by ties with the European colonial powers.During the Iosos,Washington often saw its anticolonial credentials undermined by the support it felt compelled to offer European-controlled areas faced with Communist threats and pressures,while the PRC lost little opportunity to push home such double standards in their own search for influence among Asian nationalist movements.6 It was widely recognized that the United States faced a demanding challenge if it wanted to convince Asian nationalist leaders of its good intentions.In May 1951,one of the important National Security Council (NSC)48 series of policy papers on the area warned that Asian resentment tended to be directed at talk of Western- style democracy,when this had so often in the past been associated with colonial oppression and white privilege:"The United States faces a formidable political and propaganda task in establishing relations with Asia on a basis of mutual confidence and common interest,and in influencing the intense nation- alism to take a direction harmonious with the interests of the Free World."7 For Americans,alignment with"the West"as a distinct entity could not be easily avoided,and this dilemma was raised in its most volatile form when it came to the issue of race,where the U.S.domestic record was a serious handicap.For Asian societies emerging from colonial rule,racial discrimination had been an intrinsic component of Western imperial domination,and the area continued to be acutely sensitive as new governments sought recognition and equality of status and treatment by the major powers.At a press conference in Cairo in June 1953,Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took the opportunity to remind his audience that "the strongest urge still in Asia and Africa is basically the nationalist urge against foreign domination.But together with that I may associate of course the urge against racial domination."9 Following her trip to India in 1954,Eleanor Roosevelt reported that"we have against us their feeling that we,because our skins are white,necessarily look down upon all peoples whose skins are yellow or black or brown.This thought is never out of their minds [and]they always asked me pointedly...about our treatment of minori- ties in our country."To many Asian observers,American talk of leadership of 16.See,for example,the essays in David Ryan and Victor Pungong,eds.,The United States and Decolonization:Power and Freedom (London,2000). 17.NSC 48/5,"U.S.Objectives,Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,"17 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS),1951(Washington,DC,1977),pt.1, 6:44 18.See,for example,Philip Mason,Patterns of Dominance (London,1971),33-38;Hugh Tinker,Race,Conflict and the International Order:From Empire to United Nations (London,1977), 17-22. 19.Nehru statement,25 June 1953,Ravinder Kumar and H.Y.Sharada Prasad,eds., Selected Works of Jawabarlal Nebru,2d series,vol.22 (New Delhi,1998),82. 20.Eleanor Roosevelt,India and the Awakening East (London,1954),91
West and Asia, with the Americans carrying the banner for Western and white imperialism. In their quest for influence on the Asian scene, the United States was hampered, in a second feature of continuity from its wartime experience, by ties with the European colonial powers. During the 1950s, Washington often saw its anticolonial credentials undermined by the support it felt compelled to offer European-controlled areas faced with Communist threats and pressures, while the PRC lost little opportunity to push home such double standards in their own search for influence among Asian nationalist movements.16 It was widely recognized that the United States faced a demanding challenge if it wanted to convince Asian nationalist leaders of its good intentions. In May 1951, one of the important National Security Council (NSC) 48 series of policy papers on the area warned that Asian resentment tended to be directed at talk of Westernstyle democracy, when this had so often in the past been associated with colonial oppression and white privilege: “The United States faces a formidable political and propaganda task in establishing relations with Asia on a basis of mutual confidence and common interest, and in influencing the intense nationalism to take a direction harmonious with the interests of the Free World.”17 For Americans, alignment with “the West” as a distinct entity could not be easily avoided, and this dilemma was raised in its most volatile form when it came to the issue of race, where the U.S. domestic record was a serious handicap. For Asian societies emerging from colonial rule, racial discrimination had been an intrinsic component of Western imperial domination, and the area continued to be acutely sensitive as new governments sought recognition and equality of status and treatment by the major powers.18 At a press conference in Cairo in June 1953, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took the opportunity to remind his audience that “the strongest urge still in Asia and Africa is basically the nationalist urge against foreign domination. But together with that I may associate of course the urge against racial domination.”19 Following her trip to India in 1954, Eleanor Roosevelt reported that “we have against us their feeling that we, because our skins are white, necessarily look down upon all peoples whose skins are yellow or black or brown. This thought is never out of their minds [and] they always asked me pointedly . . . about our treatment of minorities in our country.”20 To many Asian observers, American talk of leadership of A “Segregated” Asia? : 845 16. See, for example, the essays in David Ryan and Victor Pungong, eds., The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom (London, 2000). 17. NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” 17 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1951 (Washington, DC, 1977), pt. 1, 6:44. 18. See, for example, Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London, 1971), 33–38; Hugh Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order: From Empire to United Nations (London, 1977), 17–22. 19. Nehru statement, 25 June 1953, Ravinder Kumar and H. Y. Sharada Prasad, eds., Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2d series, vol. 22 (New Delhi, 1998), 82. 20. Eleanor Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East (London, 1954), 91