Author Query Sheet Manuscript Information Journal FCWH Acronym Volume and 7-4 issue Author name Zhang Manuscript 262035 No.(if applicable) AUTHOR:The following queries have arisen during the editing of your manuscript.Please answer the queries by making the necessary corrections on the CATS online corrections form.Once you have added all your corrections,please press the SUBMIT button. QUERY NO. QUERY DETAILS 1 the Chinese people...,including peaceful means',but only...unification be possible'-two closing and only one opening quote mark-please check 2 CCP Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials/Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials-are these the same?Assume they are (also see notes) 3 Ministry of Foreign Fairs-should it be Foreign Affairs
Author Query Sheet Manuscript Information Journal Acronym FCWH Volume and issue 7-4 Author name Zhang Manuscript No. (if applicable) 262035 AUTHOR: The following queries have arisen during the editing of your manuscript. Please answer the queries by making the necessary corrections on the CATS online corrections form. Once you have added all your corrections, please press the SUBMIT button. QUERY NO. QUERY DETAILS 1 2 3 ‘the Chinese people …, including peaceful means’, but only … unification be possible’ – two closing and only one opening quote mark – please check CCP Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials/Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials – are these the same? Assume they are (also see notes) Ministry of Foreign Fairs – should it be Foreign Affairs ?
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History Vol.7,No.4,November 2007,pp.509-528 oued 5 Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences,1954-55 10 Shu Guang Zhang 15 In the heyday of the Cold War,China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing's diplomacy of peaceful coexistence'and 'united front' at the Geneva and Bandung conferences.Based on recently declassified archives and 20 material in China and probing into the insights of China's foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s,this article argues that,through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy,the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of anormal state'and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia. 25 'It is my view,Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Mao Zedong proclaimed in Moscow on 18 November 1957,'that current situation is characteristic of the east wind prevailing over the west wind,that is,the forces of the socialist [camp] is prevailing over that of the imperialist [world]."Much a metaphysician himself,Mao 30 was using this traditional Chinese proverb to describe his take of the Cold War posture.His 'wind'metaphor entailed a dual implication:on the one hand,the East referring to the positive side in Chinese was overtaking the West,the negative side;on the other hand,the Asian Orientals were taking a lead over all Westerners.Mao's confidence derived partly from China's daring a dual with the mighty America in 35 Korea,Indochina and the Taiwan Strait but more so from Beijing's successful Shu Guang Zhang is distinguished visiting professor at Shanghai International Studies University and professor of international history at the University of Maryland.He is author of Deterrence and Strategic Culture:Chinese- 40 American Confrontations,1949-58,Mao's Military Romanticism:China and the Korean War,1950-53,and Economic Cold War:America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance,1949-1963.He also co-edited Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia.Correspondence to:Shu Guang Zhang,Shanghai International Studies University,Administrative Building,Room 603,550 Dalian Road (West),Shanghai,China 200083.Email:shgzh@shisu.edu.cn ISSN1468-2745(print)/ISsN1743-7962(online)/07/040509-20 2007 Taylor Francis D0L:10.1080/14682740701621846
Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55 Shu Guang Zhang In the heyday of the Cold War, China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing’s diplomacy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘united front’ at the Geneva and Bandung conferences. Based on recently declassified archives and material in China and probing into the insights of China’s foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s, this article argues that, through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy, the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of a ‘normal state’ and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia. ‘It is my view’, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao Zedong proclaimed in Moscow on 18 November 1957, ‘that current situation is characteristic of the east wind prevailing over the west wind, that is, the forces of the socialist [camp] is prevailing over that of the imperialist [world].’1 Much a metaphysician himself, Mao was using this traditional Chinese proverb to describe his take of the Cold War posture. His ‘wind’ metaphor entailed a dual implication: on the one hand, the East referring to the positive side in Chinese was overtaking the West, the negative side; on the other hand, the Asian Orientals were taking a lead over all Westerners. Mao’s confidence derived partly from China’s daring a dual with the mighty America in Korea, Indochina and the Taiwan Strait but more so from Beijing’s successful ISSN 1468-2745 (print)/ISSN 1743-7962 (online)/07/040509-20 q 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14682740701621846 Shu Guang Zhang is distinguished visiting professor at Shanghai International Studies University and professor of international history at the University of Maryland. He is author of Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese– American Confrontations, 1949–58, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–53, and Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963. He also co-edited Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia. Correspondence to: Shu Guang Zhang, Shanghai International Studies University, Administrative Building, Room 603, 550 Dalian Road (West), Shanghai, China 200083. Email: shgzh@shisu.edu.cn FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2007, pp. 509–528 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 510 S.G.Zhang diplomatic outreach in Asia,primarily through the Geneva and Bandung conferences in 1954-55,during which China tried to construct a system of 'peaceful coexistence' in Asia so as to portray a benevolent image in the international politics. What persuaded the CCP to accept more a cooperative foreign policy than the 45 confrontational one?What type of peaceful coexistence'did Beijing try to construct in Asia?What exactly did the Chinese leaders expect to achieve?How would the more conciliatory members of the leadership reconcile with the more belligerent ones in the course of action?Existing literature has touched on these issues,for example,Chang and Zhang see'threat perceptions'as one of the driving forces while Chen Jian places 50 emphasis on the framing role of ideology,2 but there is room for more discussion. By focusing on China's diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung,this article tries to reconcile constructivist arguments about normalizing rules of international politics and constructing a nation-state's identity in the world community'with the newly available historical evidence. 55 As the military conflict in Korea approached its end in the summer of 1953,the Chinese leadership found two top priorities in its immediate policy making:getting 60 prepared for the First Five Year Plan'at home,and reducing as much as possible the hostilities from abroad.On the latter,China was faced with two choices:either to continue its belligerent foreign policy,or to resort to a more conciliatory diplomacy. Although rhetorically celebrating China's 'great success'in beating the mighty imperialists'in Korea,Mao and his colleagues began to take a more realistic look at the 65 international environment that China found itself in and the strategic options that it might have. Framed in the ideological confrontations,the Chinese leaders came to believe,the Cold War would not invariably lead to a general war between the two superpowers. The major contradiction in today's world,Premier Zhou Enlai asserted in a meeting 70 with a group of senior Chinese diplomats on 5 June 1953,'is that of peace or war.' The protracted war in Korea,seen by Zhou as 'a three-year war with two-year negotiations,showed clearly that 'another world war has been put off,because 'the strength for peace has grown and America's difficulty has increased'.Therefore,Zhou pointed out,the Korean War entailed 'special implications'as far as the postwar world 75 was concerned:it has resolved for us many puzzles we encountered about international affairs;of which one was that a general war could be averted.5 As the war in Korea stalemated further,Mao also declared that'if it can not even win the war in Korea,how can the US provoke another world war?" The significant reduction in the danger of another world war,in the CCP 80 leadership's view,was a result of new changes in geopolitics.Before engaging in a head- on confrontation with one another,Mao Zedong had predicted earlier,the two superpowers had to compete for the vast land of'intermediate zones'which consisted of those formal colonies and 'semi-colonies'in Asia,Africa,and Latin America.?
diplomatic outreach in Asia, primarily through the Geneva and Bandung conferences in 1954–55, during which China tried to construct a system of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in Asia so as to portray a benevolent image in the international politics. What persuaded the CCP to accept more a cooperative foreign policy than the confrontational one? What type of ‘peaceful coexistence’ did Beijing try to construct in Asia? What exactly did the Chinese leaders expect to achieve? How would the more conciliatory members of the leadership reconcile with the more belligerent ones in the course of action? Existing literature has touched on these issues, for example, Chang and Zhang see ‘threat perceptions’ as one of the driving forces while Chen Jian places emphasis on the framing role of ideology,2 but there is room for more discussion. By focusing on China’s diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung, this article tries to reconcile constructivist arguments about normalizing rules of international politics and constructing a nation-state’s identity in the world community3 with the newly available historical evidence.4 I As the military conflict in Korea approached its end in the summer of 1953, the Chinese leadership found two top priorities in its immediate policy making: getting prepared for the ‘First Five Year Plan’ at home, and reducing as much as possible the hostilities from abroad. On the latter, China was faced with two choices: either to continue its belligerent foreign policy, or to resort to a more conciliatory diplomacy. Although rhetorically celebrating China’s ‘great success’ in beating ‘the mighty imperialists’ in Korea, Mao and his colleagues began to take a more realistic look at the international environment that China found itself in and the strategic options that it might have. Framed in the ideological confrontations, the Chinese leaders came to believe, the Cold War would not invariably lead to a general war between the two superpowers. ‘The major contradiction in today’s world’, Premier Zhou Enlai asserted in a meeting with a group of senior Chinese diplomats on 5 June 1953, ‘is that of peace or war.’ The protracted war in Korea, seen by Zhou as ‘a three-year war with two-year negotiations’, showed clearly that ‘another world war has been put off’, because ‘the strength for peace has grown and America’s difficulty has increased’. Therefore, Zhou pointed out, the Korean War entailed ‘special implications’ as far as the postwar world was concerned: it ‘has resolved for us many puzzles we encountered about international affairs’, of which one was that a general war could be averted.5 As the war in Korea stalemated further, Mao also declared that ‘if it can not even win the war in Korea, how can the US provoke another world war?’6 The significant reduction in the danger of another world war, in the CCP leadership’s view, was a result of new changes in geopolitics. Before engaging in a headon confrontation with one another, Mao Zedong had predicted earlier, the two superpowers had to compete for the vast land of ‘intermediate zones’ which consisted of those formal colonies and ‘semi-colonies’ in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.7 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 510 S. G. Zhang 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 511 In the 1950s,a 'second intermediate zone'began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart.'As far as I can see,Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954,[Washington's]first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.America's goal was to bring 85 under its control all the nations within this 'vast'zone 'so as to bully them,control their economies,build military bases on their territories,and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak:s Along the same lines,Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between 90 Washington and Moscow had become 'four-dimensional':'war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy;imperialist countries versus colonial nations;and between the imperialists.The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency.With the Cold War in full play,Zhou believed,the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart:first,the 'vanguard' 95 nations including South Korea,Taiwan,and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece,and Turkey proved 'unreliable';second,the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict,evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea;and,third,the rearmament of Japan and(West)Germany was a distant possibility,offering no immediate help. 100 What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China?The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities.Fighting for the two 'intermediate zones,Mao asserted in August 1954,the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones;as a result,US hostilities toward the People's Republic of 105 China(PRC)would surely be intensified and last for a long time.Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization(SEATO)and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi's harassment'of China's mainland,US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence.'If a great power like the United States does not want peace,the CCP chairman stressed,we 110 won't have [a minute of]tranquillity,and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity:10On the hand,however,China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. The law of imperialist war,Zhou said in June 1953,'is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.'As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence,it was highly likely that the US may not dare to attack China.In order to win time to 115 become 'as strong as walls of bronze [Tonggiang tiebi],China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy. To this end,Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953,the current focus of China's foreign policy was that we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations....We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful 120 competition among all different systems.This type of diplomacy was possible,he explained,[because]the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia,Middle East and
In the 1950s, a ‘second intermediate zone’ began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart. ‘As far as I can see’, Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954, ‘[Washington’s] first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.’ America’s goal was to bring under its control all the nations within this ‘vast’ zone ‘so as to bully them, control their economies, build military bases on their territories, and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak’.8 Along the same lines, Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between Washington and Moscow had become ‘four-dimensional’: ‘war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy; imperialist countries versus colonial nations; and between the imperialists’. The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency. With the Cold War in full play, Zhou believed, the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart: first, the ‘vanguard’ nations including South Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey proved ‘unreliable’; second, the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict, evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea; and, third, the rearmament of Japan and (West) Germany was a distant possibility, offering no immediate help.9 What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China? The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities. Fighting for the two ‘intermediate zones’, Mao asserted in August 1954, the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones; as a result, US hostilities toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would surely be intensified and last for a long time. Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi’s ‘harassment’ of China’s mainland, US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence. ‘If a great power like the United States does not want peace’, the CCP chairman stressed, ‘we won’t have [a minute of] tranquillity, and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity.’10 On the hand, however, China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. ‘The law of imperialist war’, Zhou said in June 1953, ‘is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.’ As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence, it was highly likely that ‘the US may not dare to attack China’. In order to win time to become ‘as strong as walls of bronze [Tongqiang tiebi]’, China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy.11 To this end, Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953, the current focus of China’s foreign policy was that ‘we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations.... We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition among all different systems’. This type of diplomacy was possible, he explained, ‘[because] the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia, Middle East and FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 511 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 512 S.G.Zhang North Africa to keep a distance from America...[the people's]voice for peace will sound stronger and stronger:12 While sticking to its anti-imperialism stance,Beijing felt the need to win international sympathy and support.Continuing to 'expose and criticize US 125 imperialism,the CCP hoped to demonstrate that the new regime was capable of acting benevolently and responsibly in international politics,so long as it preserved [ideological]principles.Attempting to exploit world opinion so as to 'shame' America,Beijing stressed the need to respect national sovereignty and non- interference in others'domestic affairs,which,the CCP propaganda asserted,was the 130 cornerstone of peaceful coexistence.As the US government could hardly stay away from others'affairs,China's adherence to 'non-intervention and non-interference' would help galvanize the peoples around the world,including the American people,to disfavour war or confrontation.It was imperative,Zhou Enlai pointed out at a meeting of the foreign ministry in June 1953,to persuade world opinion that 'we are 135 the ones who advocate to resolve all international disputes through peaceful consultation and negotiation,and the other side is the one who insists on the use of force or hostility in resolving [international]conflicts.Should military conflict occur, the US,as the 'perpetrator of war,would then be blamed rightly and squarely.3 The CCP also looked upon its pursuit of 'peaceful coexistence'as a weapon to 140 weaken US ties with its chief allies.Seeing its international position greatly enhanced as a result of its armed intervention in Korea,the CCP leadership believed that America's prestige and strength were strained.The US would encounter much greater difficulties than before in maintaining control of its allies and gaining influence over other non-communist countries.As France and Germany were,in particular,opposed 145 to belligerent US policies,Zhou explained in June 1953 that 'America's [European] allies have already been proven [to Washington]as unreliable.Moreover,America's attempt to round up support from the colonies and semi-colonies had so far been in vain,because these nations have merely waved flags and shouted battle cries'for Washington and hardly followed US policy.4 150 More specifically,Beijing believed that China's willingness to accept peaceful coexistence would enhance its chance to defeat the Western isolation of China. As international peace would forge an environment conducive to economic development,many capitalist countries including Britain,France,Germany,and Japan which had suffered greatly during World War II and remained anxious for their 155 own economic reconstruction,would find it highly desirable to trade with China.Zhou Enlai told his associates at the foreign ministry on 12 August 1954 that Western Europe has to look for a way out by finding a vast [foreign]market in its efforts to restore its economy,and the East-West trade certainly provides that outlet.The Western countries,Zhou continued,all understood that,given its 600 million population, 160 China has always been a very large market and thus to trade with China has enormous potential.To improve the PRC's relations with West European countries,'we will stress [world]peace in our political [propaganda]and foreign trade in our economic policy. These two weapons would hit America's central nerves.Because of its fear of peace
North Africa to keep a distance from America... [the people’s] voice for peace will sound stronger and stronger’.12 While sticking to its anti-imperialism stance, Beijing felt the need to win international sympathy and support. Continuing to ‘expose and criticize US imperialism’, the CCP hoped to demonstrate that the new regime was capable of acting benevolently and responsibly in international politics, so long as it preserved ‘[ideological] principles’. Attempting to exploit world opinion so as to ‘shame’ America, Beijing stressed the need to respect national sovereignty and noninterference in others’ domestic affairs, which, the CCP propaganda asserted, was the cornerstone of ‘peaceful coexistence’. As the US government could hardly stay away from others’ affairs, China’s adherence to ‘non-intervention and non-interference’ would help galvanize the peoples around the world, including the American people, to disfavour war or confrontation. It was imperative, Zhou Enlai pointed out at a meeting of the foreign ministry in June 1953, to persuade world opinion that ‘we are the ones who advocate to resolve all international disputes through peaceful consultation and negotiation, and the other side is the one who insists on the use of force or hostility in resolving [international] conflicts’. Should military conflict occur, the US, as the ‘perpetrator of war’, would then be blamed rightly and squarely.13 The CCP also looked upon its pursuit of ‘peaceful coexistence’ as a weapon to weaken US ties with its chief allies. Seeing its international position greatly enhanced as a result of its armed intervention in Korea, the CCP leadership believed that America’s prestige and strength were strained. The US would encounter much greater difficulties than before in maintaining control of its allies and gaining influence over other non-communist countries. As France and Germany were, in particular, opposed to belligerent US policies, Zhou explained in June 1953 that ‘America’s [European] allies have already been proven [to Washington] as unreliable’. Moreover, America’s attempt to round up support from the colonies and semi-colonies had so far been in vain, because these nations ‘have merely waved flags and shouted battle cries’ for Washington and hardly followed US policy.14 More specifically, Beijing believed that China’s willingness to accept peaceful coexistence would enhance its chance to defeat the Western isolation of China. As international peace would forge an environment conducive to economic development, many capitalist countries including Britain, France, Germany, and Japan which had suffered greatly during World War II and remained anxious for their own economic reconstruction, would find it highly desirable to trade with China. Zhou Enlai told his associates at the foreign ministry on 12 August 1954 that Western Europe ‘has to look for a way out by finding a vast [foreign] market in its efforts to restore its economy, and the East–West trade certainly provides that outlet’. The Western countries, Zhou continued, all understood that, ‘given its 600 million population, China has always been a very large market and thus to trade with China has enormous potential’. To improve the PRC’s relations with West European countries, ‘we will stress [world] peace in our political [propaganda] and foreign trade in our economic policy’. These two weapons would hit America’s central nerves. ‘Because of its fear of peace’, FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 512 S. G. Zhang 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160