上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 4_English materials_Eisenhower & Rhee.pdf

60 Pacific Historical Review By the time the conference began in Geneva in April 1954,however,Korea was no longer the most pressing issue of the Cold War,having been overshadowed by the deep- ening crisis in Indochina.The Korea conference occurred simultaneously with the more widely reported Indochina conference in the same city;the latter negotiations led to a redrawing of the map of Southeast Asia and indirectly to American participation in the Vietnam War,but the Korea conference ended in continued stalemate,with little changed and nothing settled.For these reasons,the Korea conference, relegated to second billing in its day,has been similarly ne- glected by historians.? With the recent opening of much of the documentary record,a reconsideration of this conference and the events leading up to it is in order,and for at least two reasons.First, decisions and developments of this period set the pattern for three decades of American relations with South Korea. Eisenhower and his advisers entered office hoping to relieve the United States of its Korean burden,or at least to lighten it;instead they managed to lock the United States into a com- mitment that Americans have often found uncomfortable, but from which they have never succeeded in extricating article IV of the truce agreement quoted in David Rees,Korea:The Limited War(Lon- don,1964),482.Though written twenty years ago,Rees's book remains in many re- spects the most useful account of the Korean War.Joseph C.Goulden's Korea:The Untold Story of the War (New York,1982)includes some fresh material,but the book does not quite fulfill the breathless promise of its subtitle.The best work on the early background of the war is Bruce Cumings,The Origins of the Korean War:Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes,1945-1947(Princeton,1981). 2.Most accounts of the Korean War end with the ceasefire of July 1953,men- tioning the Geneva conference,if at all,only in passing.See,for example:Rees, Korea,439;Goulden,Untold Story,648.Accounts of American-Korean relations display a similar neglect-for instance,Frank Baldwin,ed.,Without Parallel:The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York,1973);Tae-Hwan Kwak,ed., U.S.-Korean Relations,1882-1982 (Seoul,1982);Youngnok Koo and Dae-Sook Suh, eds.,Korea and the United States:A Century of Cooperation(Honolulu,1984);Sung-joo Han,ed.,After One Hundred Years:Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations (Seoul,1982);and Gerald L.Curtis and Sung-joo Han,eds.,The U.S.-South Korean Alliance (Lexington,Mass.,1983). This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

60 Pacific Historical Review By the time the conference began in Geneva in April 1954, however, Korea was no longer the most pressing issue of the Cold War, having been overshadowed by the deepening crisis in Indochina. The Korea conference occurred simultaneously with the more widely reported Indochina conference in the same city; the latter negotiations led to a redrawing of the map of Southeast Asia and indirectly to American participation in the Vietnam War, but the Korea conference ended in continued stalemate, with little changed and nothing settled. For these reasons, the Korea conference, relegated to second billing in its day, has been similarly neglected by historians.2 With the recent opening of much of the documentary record, a reconsideration of this conference and the events leading up to it is in order, and for at least two reasons. First, decisions and developments of this period set the pattern for three decades of American relations with South Korea. Eisenhower and his advisers entered office hoping to relieve the United States of its Korean burden, or at least to lighten it; instead they managed to lock the United States into a commitment that Americans have often found uncomfortable, but from which they have never succeeded in extricating article IV of the truce agreement quoted in David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London, 1964), 482. Though written twenty years ago, Rees's book remains in many respects the most useful account of the Korean War. Joseph C. Goulden's Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York, 1982) includes some fresh material, but the book does not quite fulfill the breathless promise of its subtitle. The best work on the early background of the war is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, 1981). 2. Most accounts of the Korean War end with the ceasefire of July 1953, mentioning the Geneva conference, if at all, only in passing. See, for example: Rees, Korea, 439; Goulden, Untold Story, 648. Accounts of American-Korean relations display a similar neglect-for instance, Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York, 1973); Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul, 1982); Youngnok Koo and Dae-Sook Suh, eds., Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation (Honolulu, 1984); Sung-joo Han, ed., After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations (Seoul, 1982); and Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance (Lexington, Mass., 1983). This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The“Other”Geneva Conference 61 themselves.Second,American relations with the Republic of Korea(ROK)-to use South Korea's official name-provide a valuable case study in the kind of superpower-client rela- tions that have been an abiding feature of the Cold War,es- pecially in Asia.Syngman Rhee,the South Korean president, depended on American support,and he knew it.But Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors in South Vietnam,also understood the degree to which American leaders believed that their country's credi- bility and prestige rested on America's willingness to defend him,and he played this advantage for all it was worth.It turned out to be worth a great deal. In the context of American-South Korean relations,the Geneva conference effectively began several weeks before the official opening date of April 26,1954.The first,and in some ways the most trying,task for the Eisenhower administration was to persuade Rhee to send delegates to the conference.In mid-February,the foreign ministers of the Big Four-the United States,the Soviet Union,Britain,and France-agreed at Berlin to a conference of interested parties at Geneva for the purpose of seeking the peaceful reunification of Korea and an end to the war in Indochina.No sooner had the com- munique from Berlin been issued than Rhee and his spokes- men began objecting vociferously to the proposed gathering, decrying both the conditions under which it had been called and the announced terms of negotiation,and threatening to boycott the conference. Rhee's reaction,in the opinion of American officials,was entirely in character.In the months before the armistice of 1953,Rhee had been extremely obstructive,fomenting opposition to the purposes of the UN forces in Korea and repeatedly hinting at unilateral action against the Commu- nists.Rhee's rhetoric and subversive activity had jeopardized the safety of American troops to such a degree that the Eisenhower administration seriously considered authorizing UN commander Mark Clark to conduct a military coup,ar- rest Rhee,and declare martial law throughout South Korea. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22.04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The "Other" Geneva Conference 61 themselves. Second, American relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK)-to use South Korea's official name-provide a valuable case study in the kind of superpower-client relations that have been an abiding feature of the Cold War, especially in Asia. Syngman Rhee, the South Korean president, depended on American support, and he knew it. But Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors in South Vietnam, also understood the degree to which American leaders believed that their country's credibility and prestige rested on America's willingness to defend him, and he played this advantage for all it was worth. It turned out to be worth a great deal. In the context of American-South Korean relations, the Geneva conference effectively began several weeks before the official opening date of April 26, 1954. The first, and in some ways the most trying, task for the Eisenhower administration was to persuade Rhee to send delegates to the conference. In mid-February, the foreign ministers of the Big Four-the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France-agreed at Berlin to a conference of interested parties at Geneva for the purpose of seeking the peaceful reunification of Korea and an end to the war in Indochina. No sooner had the communique from Berlin been issued than Rhee and his spokesmen began objecting vociferously to the proposed gathering, decrying both the conditions under which it had been called and the announced terms of negotiation, and threatening to boycott the conference. Rhee's reaction, in the opinion of American officials, was entirely in character. In the months before the armistice of 1953, Rhee had been extremely obstructive, fomenting opposition to the purposes of the UN forces in Korea and repeatedly hinting at unilateral action against the Communists. Rhee's rhetoric and subversive activity had jeopardized the safety of American troops to such a degree that the Eisenhower administration seriously considered authorizing UN commander Mark Clark to conduct a military coup, arrest Rhee, and declare martial law throughout South Korea. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

62 Pacific Historical Review Though this option had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,it was opposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the political risks of such a move to outweigh any military advantages.The United States,after all,had spent billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives pro- tecting Rhee's government;at this late date,the Eisenhower administration could hardly declare that he was not worth saving,or worse,that it would assist in his removal.Rejecting the coup plan,Dulles suggested soliciting Rhee's acquies- cence in an armistice with the promise of a security pact. At a meeting on May 30,1953,Eisenhower approved the recommendation.3 Even with the pledge of a treaty guaranteeing the secu- rity of the ROK,Rhee still did his best to subvert the truce negotiations.On June 18,he unilaterally solved the vexing problem of prisoner repatriation by allowing the "escape"of 25,000 North Korean POWs.Though Rhee's action was not unanticipated,it still infuriated American leaders,coming as it did at a crucial moment in the truce talks.However,there was little that could be done after the fact,and when the Communists appeared willing to overlook the incident and proceed to an armistice,Eisenhower contented himself with a stern warning to Rhee that similar action in the future would leave the ROK on its own. As a consequence of these actions,Rhee developed a 3.The contingency plan was labeled"Everready"and was described in a paper submitted by U.S.Eighth Army Commander Maxwell Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 4,1953.See U.S.Dept.of State,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954,Vol.XV:Korea(2 pts.,Washington,D.C.,1984),965-968.Also,memo- randum of State-JCS meeting,May 29,ibid.,1114-1119;memorandum for record, June 1,1953,ibid.,1126-1129.In addition,see Barton J.Bernstein,"The Origins of America's Commitments in Korea,"Foreign Service Journal,55(1978),10-13,34;and John Kotch,"The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea,"in Bruce Cumings,ed.,Child of Conflict:The Korean-American Relationship,1943-1953 (Seattle,1983),239-259. 4.Goulden,Untold Story,638-641;Eisenhower,Mandate for Change,185- 186;minutes of NSC meeting,June 18,1953,Foreign Relations,1952-1954,XV, 1,200-1.205. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

62 Pacific Historical Review Though this option had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was opposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the political risks of such a move to outweigh any military advantages. The United States, after all, had spent billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives protecting Rhee's government; at this late date, the Eisenhower administration could hardly declare that he was not worth saving, or worse, that it would assist in his removal. Rejecting the coup plan, Dulles suggested soliciting Rhee's acquiescence in an armistice with the promise of a security pact. At a meeting on May 30, 1953, Eisenhower approved the recommendation.3 Even with the pledge of a treaty guaranteeing the security of the ROK, Rhee still did his best to subvert the truce negotiations. On June 18, he unilaterally solved the vexing problem of prisoner repatriation by allowing the "escape" of 25,000 North Korean POWs. Though Rhee's action was not unanticipated, it still infuriated American leaders, coming as it did at a crucial moment in the truce talks. However, there was little that could be done after the fact, and when the Communists appeared willing to overlook the incident and proceed to an armistice, Eisenhower contented himself with a stern warning to Rhee that similar action in the future would leave the ROK on its own.4 As a consequence of these actions, Rhee developed a 3. The contingency plan was labeled "Everready" and was described in a paper submitted by U.S. Eighth Army Commander Maxwell Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 4, 1953. See U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XV: Korea (2 pts., Washington, D.C., 1984), 965-968. Also, memorandum of State-JCS meeting, May 29, ibid., 1114-1119; memorandum for record, June 1, 1953, ibid., 1126-1129. In addition, see BartonJ. Bernstein, "The Origins of America's Commitments in Korea," Foreign Service Journal, 55 (1978), 10-13, 34; and John Kotch, "The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea," in Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle, 1983), 239-259. 4. Goulden, Untold Story, 638-641; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 185- 186; minutes of NSC meeting, June 18, 1953, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, XV, 1,200-1,205. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions