AL ASSOCIAT N OXFORD JOURNALS OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS NCORPORATED 1885 The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency,Luck,Deterrence Author(s):Gordon H.Chang and He Di Reviewed work(s): Source:The American Historical Review,Vol.98.No.5(Dec.,1993),pp.1500-1524 Published by:Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2167064 Accessed:27/01/201322:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence Author(s): Gordon H. Chang and He Di Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 98, No. 5 (Dec., 1993), pp. 1500-1524 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2167064 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 22:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency,Luck,Deterrence? GORDON H.CHANG and HE DI KNOWN IN THE WEST AS THE QUEMOY-MATSU CRISIS OF 1954-1955,the dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China over several small offshore islands held by the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan is often cited as one of the most intense confrontations of the early Cold War.For almost nine months,the American public feared that widespread military conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons,could break out at any time.After the crisis, American writers devoted considerable attention to its intensity,drama,and duration.They have studied it to understand U.S.-China relations,Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidential leadership,and the practice of deterrence,especially the doctrines of "brinksmanship"and "massive retaliation."Most American accounts have assumed that the Beijing leadership sought territorial expansion and have concluded that the Eisenhower administration's military resolve,deft political maneuvering,and public determination frustrated Beijing's ambitions, thus preventing widespread hostilities and even war.According to most American literature on this topic,Washington's handling of the crisis is a positive example of crisis management and of effective American conduct of the Cold War generally.1 This essay,one of the first collaborative efforts between an American historian and a scholar from the People's Republic of China,began in 1987 and struggled with the obstacles of political upheaval and distance.This essay draws from an expanded documentary base,but the authors also engaged in an interactive effort to seek common standards of argument,understanding about existing literature and interpretations,analytical assumptions,conceptual frameworks,methodologies,and expression. The final product is a genuine synthesis-it is impossible to determine who was responsible for which argument or conclusion.The authors wish to thank the Social Science Research Council(Committee on Foreign Policy Studies),Committee on International Relations Studies with the People's Republic of China,the Brookings Institution,and Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control and Center for East Asian Studies for financial support that made this essay possible. The authors also express their appreciation for encouragement and for comments on earlier versions from A.Doak Barnett,Warren I.Cohen,Katherine de St.Paer,Alexander L.George,Harry Harding,Miles Kahler,John W.Lewis,Scott D.Sagan,Allen S.Whiting,and Xue Litai.We also thank Jing Li for her help with research. Most American accounts of the crisis have generally accepted Dwight D.Eisenhower's entire framework for understanding the crisis and his selection of issues for examination.See his presidential memoir Mandate for Change:1953-1956,The White House Years(New York,1963).Other extended discussions of the crisis in English can be found in the following works,Stephen E. Ambrose,Eisenhower,Vol.II:The President (New York,1985);Robert Accinelli,"Eisenhower, Congress,and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis,"Presidential Studies Quarterly,20(Spring 1990): 329-48;Richard K.Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance(Washington,D.C.,1987);H.W. Brands,Jr.,"Testing Massive Retaliation:Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," International Security,12(Spring 1988):124-51;McGeorge Bundy,Danger and Survival:Choices about 1500
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence? GORDON H. CHANG and HE DI KNOWN IN THE WEST AS THE QUEMOY-MATSU CRISIS OF 1954-1955, the dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China over several small offshore islands held by the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan is often cited as one of the most intense confrontations of the early Cold War. For almost nine months, the American public feared that widespread military conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons, could break out at any time. After the crisis, American writers devoted considerable attention to its intensity, drama, and duration. They have studied it to understand U.S.-China relations, Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidential leadership, and the practice of deterrence, especially the doctrines of "brinksmanship" and "massive retaliation." Most American accounts have assumed that the Beijing leadership sought territorial expansion and have concluded that the Eisenhower administration's military resolve, deft political maneuvering, and public determination frustrated Beijing's ambitions, thus preventing widespread hostilities and even war. According to most American literature on this topic, Washington's handling of the crisis is a positive example of crisis management and of effective American conduct of the Cold War generally.' This essay, one of the first collaborative efforts between an American historian and a scholar from the People's Republic of China, began in 1987 and struggled with the obstacles of political upheaval and distance. This essay draws from an expanded documentary base, but the authors also engaged in an interactive effort to seek common standards of argument, understanding about existing literature and interpretations, analytical assumptions, conceptual frameworks, methodologies, and expression. The final product is a genuine synthesis-it is impossible to determine who was responsible for which argument or conclusion. The authors wish to thank the Social Science Research Council (Committee on Foreign Policy Studies), Committee on International Relations Studies with the People's Republic of China, the Brookings Institution, and Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control and Center for East Asian Studies for financial support that made this essay possible. The authors also express their appreciation for encouragement and for comments on earlier versions from A. Doak Barnett, Warren I. Cohen, Katherine de St. Paer, Alexander L. George, Harry Harding, Miles Kahler, John W. Lewis, Scott D. Sagan, Allen S. Whiting, and Xue Litai. We also thank Jing Li for her help with research. I Most American accounts of the crisis have generally accepted Dwight D. Eisenhower's entire framework for understanding the crisis and his selection of issues for examination. See his presidential memoir Mandate for Change: 1953-1956, The White House Years (New York, 1963). Other extended discussions of the crisis in English can be found in the following works, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. II: The President (New York, 1985); Robert Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 20 (Spring 1990): 329-48; Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C., 1987); H. W. Brands, Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," International Security, 12 (Spring 1988): 124-5 1; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about 1500 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1501 American studies,however,have relied almost exclusively on U.S.documentary material and Western public sources and have only been able to infer the Chinese side of the story from Chinese published materials and observed behavior.On the other side,the standard Chinese public account of the 1950s,reflecting Beijing's official view of events and political purposes,has characterized U.S.China policy in the Taiwan Strait as one of inflexible hostility,aggressiveness,and warmongering.2 The following study contradicts much of these two established interpretations and is the first to use extensive archival material on the crisis from both China and the United States.Access to Chinese documentary material makes possible a fuller understanding of the conflict,as well as a reconceptualization of the entire confrontation.Through examining such documents,we are now able to gain a wider view of Chinese purposes and activity and thus evaluate the wisdom and effectiveness of both U.S.and Chinese policy making based on the consequences of policy and action,that is,on the interaction of U.S.and Chinese decision making.The Chinese evidence also raises new questions and issues and places U.S.documents in a substantially different interpretive light.(The authors of this essay together studied as much of the evidence as was available,but because access to some Chinese material remains restricted,the authors attempted to verify conclusions by using a variety of evidence and did not rely on a single source.) In particular,this essay presents reassessments of seven principal issues related to the encounter:who initiated the crisis;Mao Zedong's purposes in the Taiwan Strait;Eisenhower's ambiguous policy,the Yijiangshan campaign,and the esca- lation of the crisis;China's attitude toward U.S.diplomatic efforts to end the crisis;U.S.interpretation of events in March and April 1955 and the climax of the the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York,1988);O.Edmund Clubb,"Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy,1950-1955,Political Science Quarterly,74 (December 1959): 517-31;Michael Dockdrill,"Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis,1954-55,"in Dockdrill and John W.Young,eds.British Foreign Policy,1945-56 (London,1989),173-96;Robert A. Divine,Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York,1981);Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice (New York,1974);Leonard H.D.Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait,1954-1962,"Journal of American History,72(December 1985):637-60;Morton H.Halperin and Tang Tsou,"United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands,"Public Policy,15(1966):119-38;Paul K.Huth,Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven,Conn.,1988);J.H.Kalicki,The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London,1975);Bennett C.Rushkoff,"Eisenhower,Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,1954-1955,"Political Science Quarterly,96(August 1981):465-80;and Thomas E.Stolper,China,Taiwan,and the Offshore Islands (Armonk,N.Y.,1985).Also see the essays by Marc S.Gallicchio,Waldo Heinrichs,Rosemary Foot,Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,and others in Warren I.Cohen and Akira Iriye,eds.,The Great Powers in East Asia,1953-1960 (New York,1990); and the essays by Chen Xiaolu,Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,Wang Jisi,and Jia Qingguo in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming,eds.,Sino-American Relations,1945-1955:A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington,Del.,1989). The authors have previously written on the offshore island crisis in Gordon H.Chang,Friends and Enemies:The United States,China,and the Soviet Union,1948-1972(Stanford,Calif.,1990);and He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands,"in Cohen and Iriye,Great Powers. 2 For example,see Han Nianlong,et al,eds.,Diplomacy of Contemporary China,Qiu Ke'an,et al, trans.(Hong Kong,1990).This is a translation of the semi-official Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao(Beijing, 1989).A recent article in the official Beijing Review on the offshore island crises reflects the use of much of the Chinese documentary material consulted for this essay and familiarity with current American scholarship;see Li Yuanchao,"The Politics of Artillery Shelling:A Study of the Taiwan Strait Crises," Beijing Review (September 7-13,1992):32-38;also see Xu Yan,Jinmen Zhi Zhan (Beijing,1992). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1501 American studies, however, have relied almost exclusively on U.S. documentary material and Western public sources and have only been able to infer the Chinese side of the story from Chinese published materials and observed behavior. On the other side, the standard Chinese public account of the 1950s, reflecting Beijing's official view of events and political purposes, has characterized U.S. China policy in the Taiwan Strait as one of inflexible hostility, aggressiveness, and warmongering.2 The following study contradicts much of these two established interpretations and is the first to use extensive archival material on the crisis from both China and the United States. Access to Chinese documentary material makes possible a fuller understanding of the conflict, as well as a reconceptualization of the entire confrontation. Through examining such documents, we are now able to gain a wider view of Chinese purposes and activity and thus evaluate the wisdom and effectiveness of both U.S. and Chinese policy making based on the consequences of policy and action, that is, on the interaction of U.S. and Chinese decision making. The Chinese evidence also raises new questions and issues and places U.S. documents in a substantially different interpretive light. (The authors of this essay together studied as much of the evidence as was available, but because access to some Chinese material remains restricted, the authors attempted to verify conclusions by using a variety of evidence and did not rely on a single source.) In particular, this essay presents reassessments of seven principal issues related to the encounter: who initiated the crisis; Mao Zedong's purposes in the Taiwan Strait; Eisenhower's ambiguous policy, the Yijiangshan campaign, and the escalation of the crisis; China's attitude toward U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the crisis; U.S. interpretation of events in March and April 1955 and the climax of the the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); 0. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Political Science Quarterly, 74 (December 1959): 517-31; Michael Dockdrill, "Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis, 1954-55," in Dockdrill and John W. Young, eds. British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (London, 1989), 173-96; Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974); Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962," Journal of American History, 72 (December 1985): 637-60; Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands," Public Policy, 15 (1966): 119-38; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, Conn., 1988); J. H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London, 1975); Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," Political Science Quarterly, 96 (August 1981): 465-80; and Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, N.Y., 1985). Also see the essays by Marc S. Gallicchio, Waldo Heinrichs, Rosemary Foot, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and others in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York, 1990); and the essays by Chen Xiaolu, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Wang Jisi, and Jia Qingguo in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del., 1989). The authors have previously written on the offshore island crisis in Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, Calif., 1990); and He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands," in Cohen and Iriye, Great Powers. 2 For example, see Han Nianlong, et al., eds., Diplomacy of Contemporary China, Qiu Ke'an, et al., trans. (Hong Kong, 1990). This is a translation of the semi-official Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao (Beijing, 1989). A recent article in the official Beiing Review on the offshore island crises reflects the use of much of the Chinese documentary material consulted for this essay and familiarity with current American scholarship; see Li Yuanchao, "The Politics of Artillery Shelling: A Study of the Taiwan Strait Crises," Beijing Review (September 7-13, 1992): 32-38; also see Xu Yan,Jinmen Zhi Zhan (Beijing, 1992). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1502 Gordon H.Chang and He Di crisis;the end of the confrontation;and leadership performance during the crisis. Mutual misunderstanding about intentions and objectives in the confrontation was exceedingly high between the two countries(and remained so for forty years), and much of the historical interpretation on both sides has been deeply mislead- ing.This essay,as part of an emerging post-Cold War historiography that draws on Communist sources,suggests that some important assumptions and even lessons drawn from the conduct of the Cold War,especially in the area of security studies,may require rethinking as we begin to learn more about"the other side."s EISENHOWER AND MOST AMERICAN HISTORIANS have given September 3,1954, when Chinese Communist shore batteries opened fire on the Nationalist-held offshore island of Quemoy,as the beginning of a crisis that lasted for almost nine months.4 Most Western accounts have assumed that the Communist leadership ordered the shelling as part of a centrally directed military campaign that was at least a probe of the strength of the U.S.security commitment to Quemoy,if not the beginning of an actual effort to seize the island.Washington reacted to the shelling by dramatically increasing the U.S.military presence in the Taiwan Strait, strengthening Nationalist defenses,and issuing increasingly stern warnings to Beijing over the following months.To bolster its commitment to the Nationalists, the Eisenhower administration completed negotiation of a mutual defense treaty and received a blank check from Congress in early 1955,the so-called Formosa Resolution,for the use of American forces to defend Taiwan island and the nearby Pescadores. The Chinese documentary record of high-level decision making at that time, however,does not indicate that Beijing considered September 3 shelling a precipitant event or even an unintentional initiation of a confrontation with the United States.Furthermore,the Chinese documentary record does not show that China's leaders considered the period from September 1954 to late April 1955 to be especially tense.In contrast to former U.S.officials who vividly recollected the main events,high-level Communist officials and advisers active during the 1950s and interviewed for this essay did not recall the September 3 bombardment or consider the time one of sharp conflict with America.5 3 See,for example,James G.Blight and David A.Welch,On the Brink:Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York,1989);and Sergei N.Goncharov,John W.Lewis,and Xue Li-tai,Uncertain Partners:Stalin,Mao,and the Korean War(Stanford,Calif.,forthcoming,1994). 4The significance of September 3 for the United States is also reflected in the documentary record.See Foreign Relations of the United States(hereafter,FRUS),1952-54 (Washington,D.C.,1985), 14:556-58;Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),"The Chinese Offshore Islands,"September 8,1954, Formosa(1),Box 9,International Series,Eisenhower(AW),Dwight D.Eisenhower Library,Abilene, Kansas;New York Times (September 5,1954):1.We understand a "crisis"as being a distinct period of escalating international tension with a high possibility of the outbreak of large-scale military conflict. 5 See Han,Diplomacy of Contemporary China,94-100,131-37;interviews with Chinese officials;Han Huaizhi,et al.,Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo(Beijing,1988),254-71,384-418;Yang Guoyu,et al.,Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Beijing,1987),189-223.The issue concerning the term "crisis"is substantive and not semantic:Chinese documentary evidence and current semi-official accounts indicate that China's leadership considered the 1958 confrontation over the offshore islands a"crisis,"with a distinct beginning and conclusion and a high level of tension.This essay refers to the 1954-1955 confrontation as a crisis,since at.least one party,the United States,saw it as one and acted accordingly. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1502 Gordon H. Chang and He Di crisis; the end of the confrontation; and leadership performance during the crisis. Mutual misunderstanding about intentions and objectives in the confrontation was exceedingly high between the two countries (and remained so for forty years), and much of the historical interpretation on both sides has been deeply misleading. This essay, as part of an emerging post-Cold War historiography that draws on Communist sources, suggests that some important assumptions and even lessons drawn from the conduct of the Cold War, especially in the area of security studies, may require rethinking as we begin to learn more about "the other side."3 EISENHOWER AND MOST AMERICAN HISTORIANS have given September 3, 1954, when Chinese Communist shore batteries opened fire on the Nationalist-held offshore island of Quemoy, as the beginning of a crisis that lasted for almost nine months.4 Most Western accounts have assumed that the Communist leadership ordered the shelling as part of a centrally directed military campaign that was at least a probe of the strength of the U.S. security commitment to Quemoy, if not the beginning of an actual effort to seize the island. Washington reacted to the shelling by dramatically increasing the U.S. military presence in the Taiwan Strait, strengthening Nationalist defenses, and issuing increasingly stern warnings to Beijing over the following months. To bolster its commitment to the Nationalists, the Eisenhower administration completed negotiation of a mutual defense treaty and received a blank check from Congress in early 1955, the so-called Formosa Resolution, for the use of American forces to defend Taiwan island and the nearby Pescadores. The Chinese documentary record of high-level decision making at that time, however, does not indicate that Beijing considered September 3 shelling a precipitant event or even an unintentional initiation of a confrontation with the United States. Furthermore, the Chinese documentary record does not show that China's leaders considered the period from September 1954 to late April 1955 to be especially tense. In contrast to former U.S. officials who vividly recollected the main events, high-level Communist officials and advisers active during the 1950s and interviewed for this essay did not recall the September 3 bombardment or consider the time one of sharp conflict with America.5 3See, for example, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1989); and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Li-tai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., forthcoming, 1994). 4The significance of September 3 for the United States is also reflected in the documentary record. See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter, FRUS), 1952-54 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 14: 556-58; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "The Chinese Offshore Islands," September 8, 1954, Formosa (1), Box 9, International Series, Eisenhower (AW), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; New York Times (September 5, 1954): 1. We understand a "crisis" as being a distinct period of escalating international tension with a high possibility of the outbreak of large-scale military conflict. 5 See Han, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 94-100, 131-37; interviews with Chinese officials; Han Huaizhi, et al., Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de junshi Gongzuo (Beijing, 1988), 254-71, 384-418; Yang Guoyu, et al., Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Beijing, 1987), 189-223. The issue concerning the term "crisis" is substantive and not semantic: Chinese documentary evidence and current semi-official accounts indicate that China's leadership considered the 1958 confrontation over the offshore islands a "crisis," with a distinct beginning and conclusion and a high level of tension. This essay refers to the 1954-1955 confrontation as a crisis, since at-least one party, the United States, saw it as one and acted accordingly. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1503 Naniing (Nanking) Hangzhou (Hangchow) Yijiang Dachen Tachen) Wenzhou (Wenchow) Mazu (Matsu] Fuzhou (Foochow) Xiamen Jinmen (Amoyis b一1 Quemoy] TAIWAN Formosa) Penghu (Pescadores) Shantou Guangzhou (Canton) 合iong Kong 1o0 300 miles Macau Offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait.Copyright Stanford University Press. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1503 ')Nanhinlg ( Nanking) \ Hangzhou Wenzhou (WenchowJ 0 / I Itf Sf {~ ~ ~ Fuzhou M u , I~~~Foochow ( ; Xiamen linmen 1' 9,I (Amoy * aliQuemoy) >/,'. ,,>s)8->(~~~~Pe.adores Guangzhou (Canton) 0 -100 100 ong Kong O ies Macau Offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait. Copyright Stanford University Press. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions