上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 7_English materials_jcws.2006.8.3

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union 中 Chen Jian n 10 March 1959 an anti-Chinese and anti-Communist popu- lar revolt erupted in Lhasa,the capital of Tibet,which had been under the reign of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)since 1951.One week later, the 14h Dalai Lama,Tibet's political and spiritual leader,fled the capital to avoid a Chinese crackdown.In the meantime,the revolt in Lhasa rapidly esca- lated into a full-scale rebellion.The authorities in Beijing kept the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)in Tibet on the defensive for ten days,but on 20 March they ordered the army to crush the rebellion.The CCP also hur- riedly transferred more PLA units to Tibet from other parts of China. In subsequent weeks,the PLA ruthlessly mopped up the resistance in Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet.On 28 March,Zhou Enlai,the premier of the People's Republic of China(PRC),formally announced the dissolution of the Kashag(the Tibetan local government),putting political power in Tibet into the hands of the "Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autono- mous Region."Zhou also called on the people of Tibet to"unite"in"seeking to construct a democratic and socialist new Tibet."2 Three days later,on 31 March,the Dalai Lama and his followers crossed the border to take refuge in northern India.By the end of May 1959,as many as 7,000 Tibetan refu- gees had entered India to seek asylum there,causing serious tension in Sino- Indian relations-relations that until 1959 had been characterized by friend- ship and high-level cooperation.In the fall of 1959,two clashes between Chi- nese and Indian garrisons erupted along the border,and the long-existing yet hitherto well-controlled Chinese-Indian territorial disputes immediately 1.Until late 1961,however,the Chinese were unable to suppress other rebellions in Tibet. 2.See Zhou's remarks in Remmin ribao [People's Dailyl,28 March 1959,p.1.Real power in Tibet lay with a"Military Control Committee"established on 23 March 1959. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.8,No.3,Summer 2006,pp.54-101 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 54

54 CThe Tn Jibianetan Rebellion of 1959 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union ✣ Chen Jian On 10 March 1959 an anti-Chinese and anti-Communist popu￾lar revolt erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, which had been under the reign of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1951. One week later, the 14th Dalai Lama, Tibet’s political and spiritual leader, ºed the capital to avoid a Chinese crackdown. In the meantime, the revolt in Lhasa rapidly esca￾lated into a full-scale rebellion. The authorities in Beijing kept the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet on the defensive for ten days, but on 20 March they ordered the army to crush the rebellion. The CCP also hur￾riedly transferred more PLA units to Tibet from other parts of China. In subsequent weeks, the PLA ruthlessly mopped up the resistance in Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet.1 On 28 March, Zhou Enlai, the premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), formally announced the dissolution of the Kashag (the Tibetan local government), putting political power in Tibet into the hands of the “Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autono￾mous Region.” Zhou also called on the people of Tibet to “unite” in “seeking to construct a democratic and socialist new Tibet.”2 Three days later, on 31 March, the Dalai Lama and his followers crossed the border to take refuge in northern India. By the end of May 1959, as many as 7,000 Tibetan refu￾gees had entered India to seek asylum there, causing serious tension in Sino￾Indian relations—relations that until 1959 had been characterized by friend￾ship and high-level cooperation. In the fall of 1959, two clashes between Chi￾nese and Indian garrisons erupted along the border, and the long-existing yet hitherto well-controlled Chinese-Indian territorial disputes immediately 1. Until late 1961, however, the Chinese were unable to suppress other rebellions in Tibet. 2. See Zhou’s remarks in Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], 28 March 1959, p. 1. Real power in Tibet lay with a “Military Control Committee” established on 23 March 1959. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 54–101 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 made international headlines.What is more surprising,though,is that the PLA's suppression of the rebellion in Tibet not only caused a souring of Sino- Indian relations but also sparked acrimony and recriminations with the Soviet Union.The two Communist allies criticized each other's policies toward Tibet and India.Consequently,the events of 1959 along the Sino-Indian bor- der were,in some sense,the beginning of the collapse of the "great Sino- Soviet solidarity”that was once claimed to be“indissoluble”and“eternal,” pushing the global Cold War into a new and different stage. Why did a large-scale rebellion erupt in Tibet in the spring of 1959?How did Beijing's leaders,particularly Mao Zedong,perceive the rebellion?What were the PRC's strategies to cope with the rebellion and defuse the crisis with India?Why did the Tibetan rebellion not only cause Beijing's disputes and conflicts with New Delhi but also deepen and accelerate its split with Mos- cow?By drawing on newly available Chinese-language sources,this article will offer some preliminary answers to these questions. Historical Background The Tibetan rebellion began in March 1959,but the seeds of it had been sown a decade earlier,when Chinese Communist forces entered and occupied Tibet.To understand the environment in which the rebellion was shaped,we must first briefly review the historical development of China's relations with Tibet,especially during the PRC's first ten years. The relationship between China proper and Tibet was long and tortuous. One of the earliest Chinese-Tibetan contacts occurred during the Tang Dy- nasty(618-907)in the seventh century when King Songtsen Gampo unified Tibet and received a Chinese princess as a bride.Both China and Tibet were under the rule of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty in the thirteenth and four- teenth centuries.3 The Ming Dynasty(1368-1644),despite conferring many honorary titles on prominent members of the Tibetan elite,made no substan- tial effort to extend Chinese administrative control to Tibetan territory.Not until the Qing or Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911)did the imperial court in Beijing exert more formal control over Tibet,especially after the Qian Long Emperor(c.1735-1795)stationed two Qing imperial envoys (amban),with the protection of Qing garrisons,in Lhasa.In addition,the Qing,through political and military maneuvering,brought several Tibetan-inhabited border 3.China's official history of Sino-Tibetan relations claims that Tibet became a part of China during Yuan times.See,for example,Dangdai zhongguo de xizang [Contemporary China's Tibet](Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue,1991),Vol.1,pp.40-43;and Wang Gui et al.,Xizang lishi diwei bian [A Discussion on Tibet's Historical Position](Beijing:Minzu,1995),ch.4. 55

made international headlines. What is more surprising, though, is that the PLA’s suppression of the rebellion in Tibet not only caused a souring of Sino￾Indian relations but also sparked acrimony and recriminations with the Soviet Union. The two Communist allies criticized each other’s policies toward Tibet and India. Consequently, the events of 1959 along the Sino-Indian bor￾der were, in some sense, the beginning of the collapse of the “great Sino￾Soviet solidarity” that was once claimed to be “indissoluble” and “eternal,” pushing the global Cold War into a new and different stage. Why did a large-scale rebellion erupt in Tibet in the spring of 1959? How did Beijing’s leaders, particularly Mao Zedong, perceive the rebellion? What were the PRC’s strategies to cope with the rebellion and defuse the crisis with India? Why did the Tibetan rebellion not only cause Beijing’s disputes and conºicts with New Delhi but also deepen and accelerate its split with Mos￾cow? By drawing on newly available Chinese-language sources, this article will offer some preliminary answers to these questions. Historical Background The Tibetan rebellion began in March 1959, but the seeds of it had been sown a decade earlier, when Chinese Communist forces entered and occupied Tibet. To understand the environment in which the rebellion was shaped, we must ªrst brieºy review the historical development of China’s relations with Tibet, especially during the PRC’s ªrst ten years. The relationship between China proper and Tibet was long and tortuous. One of the earliest Chinese-Tibetan contacts occurred during the Tang Dy￾nasty (618–907) in the seventh century when King Songtsen Gampo uniªed Tibet and received a Chinese princess as a bride. Both China and Tibet were under the rule of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty in the thirteenth and four￾teenth centuries.3 The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), despite conferring many honorary titles on prominent members of the Tibetan elite, made no substan￾tial effort to extend Chinese administrative control to Tibetan territory. Not until the Qing or Manchu Dynasty (1644–1911) did the imperial court in Beijing exert more formal control over Tibet, especially after the Qian Long Emperor (c. 1735–1795) stationed two Qing imperial envoys (amban), with the protection of Qing garrisons, in Lhasa. In addition, the Qing, through political and military maneuvering, brought several Tibetan-inhabited border 55 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 3. China’s ofªcial history of Sino-Tibetan relations claims that Tibet became a part of China during Yuan times. See, for example, Dangdai zhongguo de xizang [Contemporary China’s Tibet] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1991), Vol. 1, pp. 40–43; and Wang Gui et al., Xizang lishi diwei bian [A Discussion on Tibet’s Historical Position] (Beijing: Minzu, 1995), ch. 4

Chen Jian areas under the jurisdiction of Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces,thus creating a distinction between"Political Tibet"and"Ethnographic Tibet.In general, the Qing policy toward Tibet significantly strengthened the connections be- tween China proper and Tibet and reinforced the Chinese conviction that Tibet was part of China.Entering the nineteenth century,with the decline of the Qing in the wake of the Western incursions into China,the authority of the Qing-appointed ambans gradually waned,and Tibet increasingly became autonomous,reducing Chinese hegemony over Tibet to nothing more than a symbol.3 The 1911 revolution destroyed the Qing Dynasty and led to the estab- lishment of the Republic of China(ROC).Throughout the Republican peri- od (1911-1949),the successive governments were too weak and too busy with more urgent matters to pay attention to the Tibet issue.As a result,until 1949,when the CCP defeated the Nationalists in the civil war and planned to send troops to“liberate”"Tibet,,the“Land of Snows”enjoyed the status of a de facto independent polity.However,no ROC government had ever given up China's claim of sovereignty over Tibet,and the government in Lhasa made no real effort to turn Tibet's de facto independence into a de jure status that would be recognized by the international community.s As the Chinese Communists neared final victory in the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership began to prepare for the"liberation of Tibet."7 On 6 August 1949,Mao instructed Peng Dehuai,commander of the PLA's First Field Army,"When you attack Lanzhou you should pay special at- tention to protecting the Panchen [Lama]and the Tibetans living in Gansu and Qinghai,so that you will be prepared to settle the Tibet issue."In a tele- 4."Political Tibet"usually refers to the area that has been continuously ruled by the government in Lhasa,and "ethnographic Tibet"refers to the Tibetan-inhabited regions in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai,Gansu,Sichuan,and Yunnan.See Melvyn C.Goldstein,The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China,Tibet and the Dalai Lama(Berkeley:University of Califomia Press,1997),pp.x-xi. 5.See ibid.,ch.1. 6.For an illuminating,detailed discussion of Tibet's internal and extemal developments during the Republican period,see Melvyn C.Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet,1913-1951:The Demise of the Lamaist State(Berkeley:The University of California Press,1989).For an account reflecting the Chinese view,see Dangdai zhongguo de xizhang,pp.64-74. 7.Tibet did not occupy an important position in CCP strategic thinking and policymaking until after 1949.During the early stage of the Chinese Communist revolution,Mao Zedong's own perception of Tibet's future relationship with China seemed vague.In an interview with American joumalist Edgar Snow in July 1936,for example,Mao reportedly said that Tibet,together with Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang"will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation"after"the People's Revo- lution has been victorious."Edgar Snow,Red Star over China(New York:Grove Weidenfeld,1968), p.444.But the idea of a"China federation"disappeared completely in Mao's and the CCP leadership's design of the“new China”in the late I940s 8.Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers].(Beijing:Junshi kexue, 1993),Vol.5,p.655. 56

areas under the jurisdiction of Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces, thus creating a distinction between “Political Tibet” and “Ethnographic Tibet.”4 In general, the Qing policy toward Tibet signiªcantly strengthened the connections be￾tween China proper and Tibet and reinforced the Chinese conviction that Tibet was part of China. Entering the nineteenth century, with the decline of the Qing in the wake of the Western incursions into China, the authority of the Qing-appointed ambans gradually waned, and Tibet increasingly became autonomous, reducing Chinese hegemony over Tibet to nothing more than a symbol.5 The 1911 revolution destroyed the Qing Dynasty and led to the estab￾lishment of the Republic of China (ROC). Throughout the Republican peri￾od (1911–1949), the successive governments were too weak and too busy with more urgent matters to pay attention to the Tibet issue. As a result, until 1949, when the CCP defeated the Nationalists in the civil war and planned to send troops to “liberate” Tibet, the “Land of Snows” enjoyed the status of a de facto independent polity. However, no ROC government had ever given up China’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet, and the government in Lhasa made no real effort to turn Tibet’s de facto independence into a de jure status that would be recognized by the international community.6 As the Chinese Communists neared ªnal victory in the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership began to prepare for the “liberation of Tibet.”7 On 6 August 1949, Mao instructed Peng Dehuai, commander of the PLA’s First Field Army, “When you attack Lanzhou you should pay special at￾tention to protecting the Panchen [Lama] and the Tibetans living in Gansu and Qinghai, so that you will be prepared to settle the Tibet issue.”8 In a tele- 56 Chen Jian 4. “Political Tibet” usually refers to the area that has been continuously ruled by the government in Lhasa, and “ethnographic Tibet” refers to the Tibetan-inhabited regions in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. See Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. x–xi. 5. See ibid., ch. 1. 6. For an illuminating, detailed discussion of Tibet’s internal and external developments during the Republican period, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1989). For an account reºecting the Chinese view, see Dangdai zhongguo de xizhang, pp. 64–74. 7. Tibet did not occupy an important position in CCP strategic thinking and policymaking until after 1949. During the early stage of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mao Zedong’s own perception of Tibet’s future relationship with China seemed vague. In an interview with American journalist Edgar Snow in July 1936, for example, Mao reportedly said that Tibet, together with Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang “will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation” after “the People’s Revo￾lution has been victorious.” Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1968), p. 444. But the idea of a “China federation” disappeared completely in Mao’s and the CCP leadership’s design of the “new China” in the late 1940s. 8. Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers], (Beijing: Junshi kexue, 1993), Vol. 5, p. 655

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 gram dated 23 November 1949,Mao set"fall or winter of next year"as the target date for"the completion of the settlement of the Tibet issue."In subse- quent months,even when Mao was visiting the Soviet Union to meet Josif Stalin(from December 1949 to February 1950),CCP officials sought to de- vise a strategy that would allow them to solve the"Tibet issue"quickly.From the beginning,Mao and his colleagues believed"it is impossible to settle the Tibet issue without using military force.In the meantime,Chinese leaders also were convinced that"although liberating Tibet is a military issue,and therefore a certain number of military forces should be used,it is primarily a political issue in an overall sense."Realizing the complexity of Tibet's inter- nal conditions and external environment,Mao and his fellow CCP leaders found it necessary and possible to combine military operations with sophisti- cated diplomatic and "united front"work,especially toward Tibet's political and monastic elites.(Tibet's pre-1949 sociopolitical structure was character- ized by a form of feudal theocracy,with the Dalai Lama serving as both a sec- ular andan ecclesiastical ruler.)Mao's original plan was that the"military in- tervention in Tibet should begin in mid-April [1950]"and that"by October the whole of Tibet should be occupied."3 Mao's eagerness to settle the "Tibet issue"in the shortest possible time was based on several key assumptions and considerations.First,when devising a strategy toward Tibet,Mao and his comrades took for granted that Tibet was part of China and that"liberating"the region was a crucial step they must take in order to complete China's unification.In internal discussions and in conversations with Soviet leaders,Mao and his colleagues argued that the "liberation of Tibet"was as important as the"liberation of Taiwan"and that if 9.Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1987),Vol.1,pp.152-153 (hereinafter referred to as Mao wengao). 10.Ibid. 11."Deng Xiaoping's Speech at the Meeting of the Commanders of the PLA's 18th Army,15 January 1950."in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang danghi dashi ji. 1949-1994 [Important Events in CCP History in Tibet,1949-1994](Lhasa:Xizang renmin,1995). pp.4-5;and The CCP Committee of the PLA's 18th Army,"Instructions on Marching into Tibet"(1 February 1950),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Heping jiefang xizang [The Peaceful Liberation of Tibet](Lhasa:Xizang renmin 1995).pp.59-60. 12.Jianguo yilai Liu Shaogi wengao [Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Re- public](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1998),p.2;Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan [Mao Zedong's Selected Works on Tibetan Affairs](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian and Zhongguo zangxue, 2001).pp.9-10;and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.7-8. 13.Mao wengao,Vol.1,p.208.The CCP leaders decided that the PLA's military intervention in Tibet should be carried out mainly from the southwest(from Sichuan and Xikang Provinces),and that oper- ations from the northwest(from Qinghai and Xinjiang)should play only a supplementary and sup- porting role. 57

gram dated 23 November 1949, Mao set “fall or winter of next year” as the target date for “the completion of the settlement of the Tibet issue.”9 In subse￾quent months, even when Mao was visiting the Soviet Union to meet Josif Stalin (from December 1949 to February 1950), CCP ofªcials sought to de￾vise a strategy that would allow them to solve the “Tibet issue” quickly. From the beginning, Mao and his colleagues believed “it is impossible to settle the Tibet issue without using military force.”10 In the meantime, Chinese leaders also were convinced that “although liberating Tibet is a military issue, and therefore a certain number of military forces should be used, it is primarily a political issue in an overall sense.”11 Realizing the complexity of Tibet’s inter￾nal conditions and external environment, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders found it necessary and possible to combine military operations with sophisti￾cated diplomatic and “united front” work, especially toward Tibet’s political and monastic elites. (Tibet’s pre-1949 sociopolitical structure was character￾ized by a form of feudal theocracy, with the Dalai Lama serving as both a sec￾ular and an ecclesiastical ruler.)12 Mao’s original plan was that the “military in￾tervention in Tibet should begin in mid-April [1950]” and that “by October the whole of Tibet should be occupied.”13 Mao’s eagerness to settle the “Tibet issue” in the shortest possible time was based on several key assumptions and considerations. First, when devising a strategy toward Tibet, Mao and his comrades took for granted that Tibet was part of China and that “liberating” the region was a crucial step they must take in order to complete China’s uniªcation. In internal discussions and in conversations with Soviet leaders, Mao and his colleagues argued that the “liberation of Tibet” was as important as the “liberation of Taiwan” and that if 57 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 9. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987), Vol. 1, pp. 152–153 (hereinafter referred to as Mao wengao). 10. Ibid. 11. “Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Meeting of the Commanders of the PLA’s 18th Army, 15 January 1950,” in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, 1949–1994 [Important Events in CCP History in Tibet, 1949–1994] (Lhasa: Xizang renmin, 1995), pp. 4–5; and The CCP Committee of the PLA’s 18th Army, “Instructions on Marching into Tibet” (1 February 1950), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang [The Peaceful Liberation of Tibet] (Lhasa: Xizang renmin 1995), pp. 59–60. 12. Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao [Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Formation of the People’s Re￾public] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), p. 2; Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan [Mao Zedong’s Selected Works on Tibetan Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian and Zhongguo zangxue, 2001), pp. 9–10; and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 7–8. 13. Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 208. The CCP leaders decided that the PLA’s military intervention in Tibet should be carried out mainly from the southwest (from Sichuan and Xikang Provinces), and that oper￾ations from the northwest (from Qinghai and Xinjiang) should play only a supplementary and sup￾porting role

Chen Jian either of these two tasks went unfulfilled the mission of the Chinese revolu- tion would not be completed.4 This issue became even more crucial when Mao proclaimed that the formation of the PRC meant that"we the Chinese people have stood up."Mao and the CCP saw the reassertion of China's sov- ereignty in Tibet as a critical test case for the new Communist regime's credi- bility and legitimacy before the Chinese people and indeed the whole world. Another reason that Mao wanted a quick solution to the Tibet issue is that he understood the region's strategic importance to China.In internal de- liberations,CCP leaders consistently demonstrated an appreciation of Tibet's strategic value.PLA commanders noted that "Tibet is located in China's southwest border area,neighboring India,Nepal,and Bhutan and serving as China's strategic gate in the southwest direction....Both the British and the U.S.imperialists have long cast greedy eyes on Tibet,so Tibet's position in [China's]national defense is extremely important.Mao echoed these senti- ments,arguing that"although Tibet does not have a large population,its in- ternational [strategic]position is extremely important.Therefore,we must occupy it and transform it into a people's democratic Tibet. The CCP's decision to use military force to occupy Tibet was also based on the assumption that the international environment was conducive to such a strategy.Despite Tibet's de facto independent status from 1911 to 1950,the international community had never formally recognized it as an independent state.In discussing the PLA's military plans for the occupation of Tibet,Mao told his comrades that"because Britain,India and Pakistan have now all rec- ognized us [the PRC],it is an auspicious time for [our]military intervention in Tibet."s The CCP leaders believed that using military force to occupy Tibet would not cause serious international repercussions and would certainly not spur foreign powers to send troops to Tibet. CCP officials and PLA commanders realized that their military forces were overwhelmingly superior to those of the Tibetans,and they assumed that by combining resolute military action with shrewd diplomatic and "united front"strategies,the Tibet issue could be swiftly resolved.In a detailed report on"the situation in Tibet,"completed in May 1950,the Tibet Issue Research Office under the PLA's Southwest Military Region pointed out that Tibetan 14.See,for example,Shi Zhe,"With Mao and Stalin:The Reminiscences of Mao's Interpreter,"Chi- nese Historians,Vol.5.No.1 (Spring 1992),p.41;and Jianguo yilai Liu Shaogi wengao,Vol.1,p.2. 15.Mao Zedong,"The Chinese People Have Stood Up"(21 September 1949),in Mao wengao,Vol.1, Pp.4-8. 16.The CCP Committee of the PLA's 18th Army,"Instructions on Marching into Tibet,"pp.59-60. 17.Mao wengao,Vol.1,p.208. 18.bid,p.226. 19.The CCP Committee of the PLA's 18th Army,"Instructions on Marching into Tibet,"p.60. 58

either of these two tasks went unfulªlled the mission of the Chinese revolu￾tion would not be completed.14 This issue became even more crucial when Mao proclaimed that the formation of the PRC meant that “we the Chinese people have stood up.”15 Mao and the CCP saw the reassertion of China’s sov￾ereignty in Tibet as a critical test case for the new Communist regime’s credi￾bility and legitimacy before the Chinese people and indeed the whole world. Another reason that Mao wanted a quick solution to the Tibet issue is that he understood the region’s strategic importance to China. In internal de￾liberations, CCP leaders consistently demonstrated an appreciation of Tibet’s strategic value. PLA commanders noted that “Tibet is located in China’s southwest border area, neighboring India, Nepal, and Bhutan and serving as China’s strategic gate in the southwest direction. . . . Both the British and the U.S. imperialists have long cast greedy eyes on Tibet, so Tibet’s position in [China’s] national defense is extremely important.”16 Mao echoed these senti￾ments, arguing that “although Tibet does not have a large population, its in￾ternational [strategic] position is extremely important. Therefore, we must occupy it and transform it into a people’s democratic Tibet.”17 The CCP’s decision to use military force to occupy Tibet was also based on the assumption that the international environment was conducive to such a strategy. Despite Tibet’s de facto independent status from 1911 to 1950, the international community had never formally recognized it as an independent state. In discussing the PLA’s military plans for the occupation of Tibet, Mao told his comrades that “because Britain, India and Pakistan have now all rec￾ognized us [the PRC], it is an auspicious time for [our] military intervention in Tibet.”18 The CCP leaders believed that using military force to occupy Tibet would not cause serious international repercussions and would certainly not spur foreign powers to send troops to Tibet.19 CCP ofªcials and PLA commanders realized that their military forces were overwhelmingly superior to those of the Tibetans, and they assumed that by combining resolute military action with shrewd diplomatic and “united front” strategies, the Tibet issue could be swiftly resolved. In a detailed report on “the situation in Tibet,” completed in May 1950, the Tibet Issue Research Ofªce under the PLA’s Southwest Military Region pointed out that Tibetan 58 Chen Jian 14. See, for example, Shi Zhe, “With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of Mao’s Interpreter,” Chi￾nese Historians, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 41; and Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, Vol. 1, p. 2. 15. Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up” (21 September 1949), in Mao wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 4–8. 16. The CCP Committee of the PLA’s 18th Army, “Instructions on Marching into Tibet,” pp. 59–60. 17. Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 208. 18. Ibid., p. 226. 19. The CCP Committee of the PLA’s 18th Army, “Instructions on Marching into Tibet,” p. 60