The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 Our policy is to strive for peaceful reforms in Tibet.But if the reactionary ele- ments insist on starting an armed rebellion,we will definitely use force to sup- press the rebels.Rebellion by a small group of reactionaries will spark [a response by the CCP that will result in]the relatively comprehensive liberation of the overwhelming majority of the working people.So if a rebellion breaks out,it will not necessarily be a bad thing for the Tibetan people.If the Central Com- mittee properly handles [its response to]the rebellion,this bad thing will be turned into a good thing for the Tibetan people.s On 22 January 1959,with the situation in Tibet continuing to deteriorate, Mao issued further instructions: In the Tibetan area over the next several years,the enemy side and our side will compete for the [support of the]masses and test the abiliry of the armed forces. After several years-for example,three to four years,or five to six years,or seven to eight years-it is inevitable that a great showdown will occur.Only then can the problems be thoroughly resolved.Initially,the military forces deployed by the Tibetan rulers were quite weak,but now they command a rebel force of 10,000 whose combat spirit is relatively high.This is a dangerous enemy for us. But this is not necessarily a bad thing;rather,it could be a good thing because it enables [us]to resolve the problem through war.52 In early February 1959,the Xinhua News Agency described in an inter- nal report how "the revolts in the Tibetan region have gathered pace and de- veloped into a nearly full-scale rebellion."In mid-February the CCP Central Committee's Administrative Office circulated the Xinhua item in a"situation report"for top CCP leaders.When Mao read it on 18 February,he com- mented:"The more chaotic [the situation]in Tibet becomes the better;for it will help train our troops and toughen the masses.Furthermore,[the chaos] will provide a sufficient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out reforms in the future."The next day,the Chinese leader saw a report from the PLA General Staff's Operations Department describing rebellions by Tibetans in Sichuan,Yunnan,Gansu,and Qinghai.He again stressed that"rebellions like these are extremely favorable for us because they will benefit us in helping to train our troops,train the people,and provide a sufficient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out comprehensive reforms in the future."He concluded that"in a military sense we should not be afraid of a rebellion and should 51.lbid,p.81. 52."Mao Zedong's Remarks on the CCP Central Committee's Instruction on Mobilizing 2,000 Youth to Enter Tibet for Participating in Production"(22 January 1959),in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,p.164. 53.Mao wengao,Vol.8,p.46. 69
Our policy is to strive for peaceful reforms in Tibet. But if the reactionary elements insist on starting an armed rebellion, we will deªnitely use force to suppress the rebels. Rebellion by a small group of reactionaries will spark [a response by the CCP that will result in] the relatively comprehensive liberation of the overwhelming majority of the working people. So if a rebellion breaks out, it will not necessarily be a bad thing for the Tibetan people. If the Central Committee properly handles [its response to] the rebellion, this bad thing will be turned into a good thing for the Tibetan people.51 On 22 January 1959, with the situation in Tibet continuing to deteriorate, Mao issued further instructions: In the Tibetan area over the next several years, the enemy side and our side will compete for the [support of the] masses and test the ability of the armed forces. After several years—for example, three to four years, or ªve to six years, or seven to eight years—it is inevitable that a great showdown will occur. Only then can the problems be thoroughly resolved. Initially, the military forces deployed by the Tibetan rulers were quite weak, but now they command a rebel force of 10,000 whose combat spirit is relatively high. This is a dangerous enemy for us. But this is not necessarily a bad thing; rather, it could be a good thing because it enables [us] to resolve the problem through war.52 In early February 1959, the Xinhua News Agency described in an internal report how “the revolts in the Tibetan region have gathered pace and developed into a nearly full-scale rebellion.” In mid-February the CCP Central Committee’s Administrative Ofªce circulated the Xinhua item in a “situation report” for top CCP leaders. When Mao read it on 18 February, he commented: “The more chaotic [the situation] in Tibet becomes the better; for it will help train our troops and toughen the masses. Furthermore, [the chaos] will provide a sufªcient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out reforms in the future.”53 The next day, the Chinese leader saw a report from the PLA General Staff’s Operations Department describing rebellions by Tibetans in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai. He again stressed that “rebellions like these are extremely favorable for us because they will beneªt us in helping to train our troops, train the people, and provide a sufªcient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out comprehensive reforms in the future.” He concluded that “in a military sense we should not be afraid of a rebellion and should 69 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 51. Ibid., p. 81. 52. “Mao Zedong’s Remarks on the CCP Central Committee’s Instruction on Mobilizing 2,000 Youth to Enter Tibet for Participating in Production” (22 January 1959), in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, p. 164. 53. Mao wengao, Vol. 8, p. 46
Chen Jian instead welcome it,although we must be prepared to suppress a rebellion promptly at any time."s Mao's optimistic assessment of Beijing's capacity to cope with a large- scale rebellion in Tibet was reinforced by reports from Lhasa that the CCP was enjoying ever greater support and cooperation from the Tibetans.On 13 November 1958 the CCP Tibet Work Committee informed Beijing that the Communist Party had significantly expanded its influence among the Tibetan population."Over the past eight years,"according to the Tibet Work Committee,"we have absorbed and trained a total of 6,128 Tibetan cadres, attracted 1,190 Tibetans to join the Party and another 1,934 to join the League,and established and developed many patriotic organizations in- volving young people and women."The committee claimed that"this devel- opment signifies the emergence of a fresh revolutionary force that no one can ignore in the realization of the Tibetan people's complete liberation,and it also constitutes our most valuable resource in carrying out the democratic re- forms in Tibet and in building a new Tibet."The committee told the CCP leaders in Beijing that even among Tibet's political and monastic elites there existed some "progressives,"such as Ngabo Ngawang Jigme,and that the CCP would protect them so that"the strength of the progressives will be con- solidated and expanded."56 The CCP leaders fully shared the Tibet Work Committee's view that the party had to pursue the "further expansion of support and cooperation among the [Tibetan]masses while at the same time isolating the [Tibetan]reactionaries."The CCP leaders also believed that "these issues [winning support and cooperation among the Tibetans] cannot be thoroughly resolved unless there is a general showdown [with the reactionaries]."57 Consequently,by early 1959,with many Tibetans increasingly deter- mined to use force to defend what they saw as their basic values and way of life,and with Mao equally determined to resort to force to pursue a definitive resolution of the Tibet issue,the stage had been set for the emergence of a ma- jor crisis in Tibet.Even a small spark could ignite a wider conflict. 54.Ibid,pp.47-48. 55.CCP Tibet Work Committee,"Report on a Basic Summary of the Work in the Past Eight Years in Tibet and the Policies and Tasks in the Next Four Years"(13 November 1958),in CCP History Mate- rial Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.84-85.See also Dangdai zhongguo de xizang,pp.233-234. 56.CCP Tibet Work Committee,"Report on a Basic Summary of the Work in the Past Eight Years in Tibet";and CCP Tibet Work Committee,"Instructions on Protecting the Progressives"(27 February 1959),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji. Pp.84,88. 57.CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji. p.87. 70
instead welcome it, although we must be prepared to suppress a rebellion promptly at any time.”54 Mao’s optimistic assessment of Beijing’s capacity to cope with a largescale rebellion in Tibet was reinforced by reports from Lhasa that the CCP was enjoying ever greater support and cooperation from the Tibetans. On 13 November 1958 the CCP Tibet Work Committee informed Beijing that the Communist Party had signiªcantly expanded its inºuence among the Tibetan population. “Over the past eight years,” according to the Tibet Work Committee, “we have absorbed and trained a total of 6,128 Tibetan cadres, attracted 1,190 Tibetans to join the Party and another 1,934 to join the League, and established and developed many patriotic organizations involving young people and women.” The committee claimed that “this development signiªes the emergence of a fresh revolutionary force that no one can ignore in the realization of the Tibetan people’s complete liberation, and it also constitutes our most valuable resource in carrying out the democratic reforms in Tibet and in building a new Tibet.”55 The committee told the CCP leaders in Beijing that even among Tibet’s political and monastic elites there existed some “progressives,” such as Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, and that the CCP would protect them so that “the strength of the progressives will be consolidated and expanded.”56 The CCP leaders fully shared the Tibet Work Committee’s view that the party had to pursue the “further expansion of support and cooperation among the [Tibetan] masses while at the same time isolating the [Tibetan] reactionaries.” The CCP leaders also believed that “these issues [winning support and cooperation among the Tibetans] cannot be thoroughly resolved unless there is a general showdown [with the reactionaries].”57 Consequently, by early 1959, with many Tibetans increasingly determined to use force to defend what they saw as their basic values and way of life, and with Mao equally determined to resort to force to pursue a deªnitive resolution of the Tibet issue, the stage had been set for the emergence of a major crisis in Tibet. Even a small spark could ignite a wider conºict. 70 Chen Jian 54. Ibid., pp. 47–48. 55. CCP Tibet Work Committee, “Report on a Basic Summary of the Work in the Past Eight Years in Tibet and the Policies and Tasks in the Next Four Years” (13 November 1958), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 84–85. See also Dangdai zhongguo de xizang, pp. 233–234. 56. CCP Tibet Work Committee, “Report on a Basic Summary of the Work in the Past Eight Years in Tibet”; and CCP Tibet Work Committee, “Instructions on Protecting the Progressives” (27 February 1959), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 84, 88. 57. CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, p. 87