The MIT Press Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War Author(s):Roger Dingman Reviewed work(s): Source:International Security,Vol.13,No.3(Winter,1988-1989),pp.50-91 Published by:The MIT Press Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538736 Accessed:27/01/201321:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Security. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War Author(s): Roger Dingman Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 50-91 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538736 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 21:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy Roger Dingman During the Korean War In January 1956,Life magazine published an article that purportedly explained how the Eisen- hower administration had ended the Korean War.Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed that he had conveyed an "unmistakable warning"to Beijing that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China if rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement was not made.He asserted that it was "a pretty fair inference"that this nuclear threat had worked. Dulles made this claim in defense of the notion that nuclear weapons were useful,indeed essential,tools of statecraft:When nuclear capability was combined with communication of intent to use it if necessary,deterrence- and even compellence-worked.1 Dulles spoke in response to partisan critics at the beginning of an election year,but his words influenced policy and history long after the 1956 contest ended.They defined the parameters of a debate about the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons generally and the outcome of the Korean War in particular.2 However,the secretary of state's claim was doubly deceptive.It focused analysts'attention on the six months of Republican conflict management,to the neglect of the preceding two and one-half years of Democratic stewardship.Moreover,Dulles's claim prompted a debate over This essay was prepared for a conference on the study of nuclear weapons held at Columbia University with the support of the John D.and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation.I am especially indebted to Roger M.Anders,Dennis Bilger,William H.Cunliffe,David Haight, Brigadier General John W.Huston,USAFR,and Edward Reese for archival guidance;to Robert Jervis,Franklin D.Mitchell,and colleagues at the School of Modern Asian Studies,Griffith University,Brisbane,Australia,for comments on earlier draft portions of the manuscript;and to the U.S.Naval War College and the Department of History,University of Southern California, for financing my travels to necessary archives.I alone bear responsibility for the arguments advanced herein Roger Dingman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California.He has also served as Professor of Strategy at the U.S.Naval War College and is Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at the U.S.Air Force Academy for 1988-89. 1.James Shepley,"How Dulles Averted War,"Life,January 16,1956,pp.70-72ff. 2.Edward C.Keefer,"President Dwight D.Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History,Vol.10,No.3(Summer 1986),pp.267-268,summarizes the historiographical debate triggered by Dulles's claim.A recent restatement of Dulles's argument,based primarily upon published sources,is Daniel Calingaert,"Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War,"Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol.11,No.2 (June 1988),pp.177-202. International Security,Winter 1988/89 (Vol.13,No.3) 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 50 This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AtOmiC Diplomacy Roger Dingman During the Korean War In January 1956, Life magazine published an article that purportedly explained how the Eisenhower administration had ended the Korean War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed that he had conveyed an "unmistakable warning" to Beijing that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China if rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement was not made. He asserted that it was "a pretty fair inference" that this nuclear threat had worked. Dulles made this claim in defense of the notion that nuclear weapons were useful, indeed essential, tools of statecraft: When nuclear capability was combined with communication of intent to use it if necessary, deterrenceand even compellence-worked.1 Dulles spoke in response to partisan critics at the beginning of an election year, but his words influenced policy and history long after the 1956 contest ended. They defined the parameters of a debate about the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons generally and the outcome of the Korean War in particular.2 However, the secretary of state's claim was doubly deceptive. It focused analysts' attention on the six months of Republican conflict management, to the neglect of the preceding two and one-half years of Democratic stewardship. Moreover, Dulles's claim prompted a debate over This essay was prepared for a conference on the study of nuclear weapons held at Columbia University with the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. I am especially indebted to Roger M. Anders, Dennis Bilger, William H. Cunliffe, David Haight, Brigadier General John W. Huston, USAFR, and Edward Reese for archival guidance; to Robert Jervis, Franklin D. Mitchell, and colleagues at the School of Modern Asian Studies, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, for comments on earlier draft portions of the manuscript; and to the U.S. Naval War College and the Department of History, University of Southern California, for financing my travels to necessary archives. I alone bear responsibility for the arguments advanced herein. Roger Dingman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California. He has also served as Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and is Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy for 1988-89. 1. James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16, 1956, pp. 70-72ff. 2. Edward C. Keefer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 267-268, summarizes the historiographical debate triggered by Dulles's claim. A recent restatement of Dulles's argument, based primarily upon published sources, is Daniel Calingaert, "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 177-202. International Security, Winter 1988/89 (Vol. 43, No. 3) ? 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 50 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 51 the effects of Washington's atomic diplomacy that deflected attention from its substance and character.The result was to reinforce an essentially partisan interpretation of what occurred and to leave unconsidered more fundamental questions as to how,when,and why the United States tried to use nuclear weapons to its advantage in managing a limited war. This article attempts to answer those basic questions.It focuses on Wash- ington's attempts to derive political and diplomatic rather than tactical mili- tary advantage from the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. What follows differs from earlier explorations of this subject in three vital respects.First,it reviews the entire war to demonstrate that atomic diplomacy was an element of American statecraft throughout the conflict and not just in its concluding months.Secondly,the story rests upon a deeper and broader documentary foundation than earlier treatments of this subject.The availability of previously top-secret documents from the papers of key indi- viduals,the several armed services,the State and Defense Departments,the National Security Council (NSC),and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) permits a more detailed analysis of Washington's attempts to use nuclear weapons as tools of conflict management.3 Finally,the examination goes beyond words to deeds.By tracing military and diplomatic actions as well as parsing political intentions,the narrative that follows seeks to provide fresh insight into the history of United States Korean War policies and the evolution of American thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons. Attitudes and Assumptions American statesman and military professionals brought three basic assump- tions about nuclear weapons to the task of conflict management during the Korean War.They believed that the United States enjoyed clear,but qualified nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.They assumed that such superi- ority ought,somehow,to be usable.They also thought that the combination 3.Two sorts of previously unavailable archival materials proved most useful in the development of this essay.The papers of senior U.S.Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission(AEC)officials, most notably those of General Curtis E.LeMay,General Hoyt S.Vandenberg,and AEC Chair- man Gordon A.Dean,include not only individual diaries but also official papers unavailable elsewhere.Many of the personal daily schedules of ranking officials-most notably those of Dean G.Acheson,Omar N.Bradley,J.Lawton Collins,Louis A.Johnson,and Hoyt S.Van- denberg-contain notations of visitors and telephone conversations.When used in conjunction with departmental documents,these materials facilitated detailed reconstruction of patterns of decision and action. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy |51 the effects of Washington's atomic diplomacy that deflected attention from its substance and character. The result was to reinforce an essentially partisan interpretation of what occurred and to leave unconsidered more fundamental questions as to how, when, and why the United States tried to use nuclear weapons to its advantage in managing a limited war. This article attempts to answer those basic questions. It focuses on Washington's attempts to derive political and diplomatic rather than tactical military advantage from the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. What follows differs from earlier explorations of this subject in three vital respects. First, it reviews the entire war to demonstrate that atomic diplomacy was an element of American statecraft throughout the conflict and not just in its concluding months. Secondly, the story rests upon a deeper and broader documentary foundation than earlier treatments of this subject. The availability of previously top-secret documents from the papers of key individuals, the several armed services, the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council (NSC), and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) permits a more detailed analysis of Washington's attempts to use nuclear weapons as tools of conflict management.3 Finally, the examination goes beyond words to deeds. By tracing military and diplomatic actions as well as parsing political intentions, the narrative that follows seeks to provide fresh insight into the history of United States Korean War policies and the evolution of American thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons. Attitudes and Assumptions American statesman and military professionals brought three basic assumptions about nuclear weapons to the task of conflict management during the Korean War. They believed that the United States enjoyed clear, but qualified nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. They assumed that such superiority ought, somehow, to be usable. They also thought that the combination 3. Two sorts of previously unavailable archival materials proved most useful in the development of this essay. The papers of senior U.S. Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officials, most notably those of General Curtis E. LeMay, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and AEC Chairman Gordon A. Dean, include not only individual diaries but also official papers unavailable elsewhere. Many of the personal daily schedules of ranking officials-most notably those of Dean G. Acheson, Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Louis A. Johnson, and Hoyt S. Vandenberg-contain notations of visitors and telephone conversations. When used in conjunction with departmental documents, these materials facilitated detailed reconstruction of patterns of decision and action. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 52 of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had worked and could prove effective in future crises.Because these three ideas profoundly influenced the decisions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations,they deserve further explication. In June 1950,Washington had a clear but qualified nuclear advantage over Moscow.America had nearly three hundred atomic bombs in its stockpile, and more than two hundred sixty aircraft capable of putting them on Soviet targets.4 The Soviet Union had exploded its first nuclear device only ten months earlier and could strike the United States only by one-way bomber missions or by smuggling nuclear weapons into American harbors aboard merchant vessels.5 While both powers dramatically increased their nuclear stockpiles and improved their delivery systems during the Korean War,this balance favoring the United States did not change fundamentally between 1950and1953.6 But American decision-makers recognized that their nuclear superiority was qualified in two respects.First,despite flaws in enemy delivery capa- bilities,the grim truth was that Moscow's ability to strike the American heartland was growing.7 Secondly,Washington acknowledged real limita- tions in America's ability to put nuclear weapons on enemy targets.Although 4.David Alan Rosenberg,"U.S.Nuclear Stockpile 1945 to 1950,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.38,No.5(May1982),p.26. 5.Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),Intelligence memorandum 323-SRC,August 25,1950, intelligence file,president's secretary's file (PSF),Box 250,Harry S Truman papers,Truman Library,Independence,Missouri (hereafter"Truman papers,HSTL"). 6.Executive Secretary,National Security Council(NSC),to Chairman,AEC,December 6,1950, NSC atomic weapons file,PSF,Box 202,Truman papers,HSTL;Briefing:Air Estimate of the Situation,1951-1954,U.S.Air Force Commanders'Conference,October 30,1951,item 168.7026- 9,Charles Cabell papers,Simpson Historical Research Center,Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama (hereafter "Cabell papers").The briefing document puts Soviet nuclear strength at less than half the estimated American stockpile as of January 1951.New York Times,October 2,1951;Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command (SAC),Development of Strategic Air Command,1946-1976 (Omaha:U.S.Air Force SAC,1976),Pp.20,27,33,35,38;Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary,NSC,June 8,1953,Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA) NSC subject file,atomic energy series,Box 1,Dwight D.Eisenhower papers,Dwight D.Eisen- hower Library,Abilene,Kansas;Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command,Status of Strategic Air Command,January-June 1953,Volume 1,frame 0481,reel K4263,Office of Air Force History,Bolling Air Force Base,Maryland. 7.President Truman publicly acknowledged American vulnerability to Soviet attack in April 1951;Public Papers of the President,1951(Washington,D.C.:U.S.Government Printing Office [U.S.GPO],1965),pp.225-226.This series will hereafter be cited as Truman Public Papers,with dates and pages.By early 1953,President Eisenhower's advisers were debating the extent,not the possibility,of damage from Soviet nuclear strikes.See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter"FRUS"),1952-1954,Volume 2,National Security Affairs (Washington,D.C.:U.S.GPO, 1984),pp.203,213-214,232-233. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 j 52 of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had worked and could prove effective in future crises. Because these three ideas profoundly influenced the decisions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, they deserve further explication. In June 1950, Washington had a clear but qualified nuclear advantage over Moscow. America had nearly three hundred atomic bombs in its stockpile, and more than two hundred sixty aircraft capable of putting them on Soviet targets.4 The Soviet Union had exploded its first nuclear device only ten months earlier and could strike the United States only by one-way bomber missions or by smuggling nuclear weapons into American harbors aboard merchant vessels.5 While both powers dramatically increased their nuclear stockpiles and improved their delivery systems during the Korean War, this balance favoring the United States did not change fundamentally between 1950 and 1953.6 But American decision-makers recognized that their nuclear superiority was qualified in two respects. First, despite flaws in enemy delivery capabilities, the grim truth was that Moscow's ability to strike the American heartland was growing.7 Secondly, Washington acknowledged real limitations in America's ability to put nuclear weapons on enemy targets. Although 4. David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 1945 to 1950," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1982), p. 26. 5. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence memorandum 323-SRC, August 25, 1950, intelligence file, president's secretary's file (PSF), Box 250, Harry S Truman papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter "Truman papers, HSTL"). 6. Executive Secretary, National Security Council (NSC), to Chairman, AEC, December 6, 1950, NSC atomic weapons file, PSF, Box 202, Truman papers, HSTL; Briefing: Air Estimate of the Situation, 1951-1954, U.S. Air Force Commanders' Conference, October 30, 1951, item 168.7026- 9, Charles Cabell papers, Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (hereafter "Cabell papers"). The briefing document puts Soviet nuclear strength at less than half the estimated American stockpile as of January 1951. New York Times, October 2, 1951; Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1976 (Omaha: U.S. Air Force SAC, 1976), pp. 20, 27, 33, 35, 38; Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary, NSC, June 8, 1953, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), NSC subject file, atomic energy series, Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command, Status of Strategic Air Command, January-June 1953, Volume 1, frame 0481, reel K4263, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland. 7. President Truman publicly acknowledged American vulnerability to Soviet attack in April 1951; Public Papers of the President, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1965), pp. 225-226. This series will hereafter be cited as Truman Public Papers, with dates and pages. By early 1953, President Eisenhower's advisers were debating the extent, not the possibility, of damage from Soviet nuclear strikes. See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter "FRUS"), 1952-1954, Volume 2, National Security Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1984), pp. 203, 213-214, 232-233. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 53 war plans called for launching an atomic blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union in the event of general war,not one nuclear-configured aircraft was deployed outside the continental United States when the Korean fighting began.s Strategic Air Command(SAC)planners estimated that it would take three months to bomb Moscow into submission,given the inadequacy of forward bases and overseas fuel supplies.9 By 1953 the probability of swifter,suc- cessful strikes against the Soviet Union had increased thanks to the intro- duction of jet bombers,the development of overseas bases,and the deploy- ment of aircraft carriers modified so as to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.10 But the Pentagon did not have custody of any complete atomic bombs,and the State Department had not begun negotiations for their de- ployment to foreign soil.11 That meant that Washington had no immediately usable nuclear force near Korea. Despite these limitations,President Truman,President Eisenhower,many of their key advisers,and probably most politicians along with a majority of the general public believed that nuclear superiority ought to be usable.12 While the two presidents were sensitive to the moral dilemmas posed by the indis- criminate destructiveness of atomic weapons,both,as trained military men, placed them at the top of the hierarchy of usable force.Within days of the outbreak of fighting in Korea,both men alluded to the possibility of using atomic arms.13 By early July 1950,Pentagon staff officers and the commander 8.SAC,Development of SAC,pp.20-21;David Alan Rosenberg,"The Origins of Overkill," International Security,Vol.7,No.4(Spring 1983),pp.15-18,25. 9.Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command,"History of the Strategic Air Command: January-June 1950,"Volume 2,chapter 7(declassified by author's Freedom of Information Act request);Major General S.E.Anderson,Director of Plans,U.S.Air Force,to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington,April 11,1950,Box 100,Office of Secretary of the Air Force papers, Record Group (RG)330,U.S.National Archives (hereafter "NA"). 10.SAC,Development of SAC,pp.35,38;Status of Strategic Air Command,January-June 1953 Volume 1,frame 0502,reel K4263,Volume 7,frame 0946,reel K4264,Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base. 11.James Lay to Truman,December 5,1950,Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary,NSC May 1,1951,NSC atomic file,PSF,Truman papers,HSTL;Atomic Energy Commission,"Weap- ons Custody and Use,"April 25,1961,AEC 867/49,file 1442,folder 2,Atomic Energy Secretariat papers,Department of Energy(hereafter AEC,"Weapons Custody and Use");Herbert B.Loper to Clinton P.Anderson,November 10,1960,"Memorandum on History of Atomic Weapons Custody,"Minutes,Box 5,Records of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy(JCAE),RG 128,NA (hereafter cited as "Loper memorandum"). 12.Carlton Savage to George Kennan,memorandum,"Preliminary Study of Attitudes of U.S. Population about U.S.Use of Atomic Bomb in War,"December 21,1949,Box 50,Paul Nitze file,Policy Planning Staff files,Department of State papers,RG 59,NA. 13.David E.Lilienthal,Journals:The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950(New York:Harper and Row, 1964),p.391;Robert Ferrell,ed.,The Eisenhower Diaries (New York:Norton,1981),pp.175-176; FRUS,1950,Volume 7,Korea,pp.159-160. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy |53 war plans called for launching an atomic blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union in the event of general war, not one nuclear-configured aircraft was deployed outside the continental United States when the Korean fighting began.8 Strategic Air Command (SAC) planners estimated that it would take three months to bomb Moscow into submission, given the inadequacy of forward bases and overseas fuel supplies.9 By 1953 the probability of swifter, successful strikes against the Soviet Union had increased thanks to the introduction of jet bombers, the development of overseas bases, and the deployment of aircraft carriers modified so as to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.10 But the Pentagon did not have custody of any complete atomic bombs, and the State Department had not begun negotiations for their deployment to foreign soil.11 That meant that Washington had no immediately usable nuclear force near Korea. Despite these limitations, President Truman, President Eisenhower, many of their key advisers, and probably most politicians along with a majority of the general public believed that nuclear superiority ought to be usable. 12 While the two presidents were sensitive to the moral dilemmas posed by the indiscriminate destructiveness of atomic weapons, both, as trained military men, placed them at the top of the hierarchy of usable force. Within days of the outbreak of fighting in Korea, both men alluded to the possibility of using atomic arms.13 By early July 1950, Pentagon staff officers and the commander 8. SAC, Development of SAC, pp. 20-21; David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 15-18, 25. 9. Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command, "History of the Strategic Air Command: January-June 1950," Volume 2, chapter 7 (declassified by author's Freedom of Information Act request); Major General S.E. Anderson, Director of Plans, U.S. Air Force, to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, April 11, 1950, Box 100, Office of Secretary of the Air Force papers, Record Group (RG) 330, U.S. National Archives (hereafter "NA"). 10. SAC, Development of SAC, pp. 35, 38; Status of Strategic Air Command, January-June 1953, Volume 1, frame 0502, reel K4263, Volume 7, frame 0946, reel K4264, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base. 11. James Lay to Truman, December 5, 1950, Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary, NSC, May 1, 1951, NSC atomic file, PSF, Truman papers, HSTL; Atomic Energy Commission, "Weapons Custody and Use," April 25, 1961, AEC 867/49, file 1442, folder 2, Atomic Energy Secretariat papers, Department of Energy (hereafter AEC, "Weapons Custody and Use"); Herbert B. Loper tQ Clinton P. Anderson, November 10, 1960, "Memorandum on History of Atomic Weapons Custody," Minutes, Box 5, Records of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), RG 128, NA (hereafter cited as "Loper memorandum"). 12. Carlton Savage to George Kennan, memorandum, "Preliminary Study of Attitudes of U.S. Population about U.S. Use of Atomic Bomb in War," December 21, 1949, Box 50, Paul Nitze file, Policy Planning Staff files, Department of State papers, RG 59, NA. 13. David E. Lilienthal, Journals: The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 391; Robert Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 175-176; FRUS, 1950, Volume 7, Korea, pp. 159-160. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions