APS Beijing and the Korean Crisis,June 1950-June 1951 Author(s):Michael H.Hunt Reviewed work(s): Source:Political Science Quarterly,Vol.107,No.3(Autumn,1992),pp.453-478 Published by:The Academy of Political Science Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440 Accessed:27/02/201208:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The Academy of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Political Science Quarterly. 291 STOR http://www.jstor.org
Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951 Author(s): Michael H. Hunt Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 453-478 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440 . Accessed: 27/02/2012 08:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Academy of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Science Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org
Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951 MICHAEL H.HUNT Our understanding of the Korean War and especially the crisis- filled first year of that war has undergone some dramatic changes.Through the 1980s,approaching the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war,some twenty books appeared dealing with the war's politics,diplomacy,and strategy. The late Gregory Henderson,writing in an elegiac vein,acknowledged this new era in scholarship."The men who lived the Korean War now pass.A new genera- tion,eyes deep in mountains of documents declassified up to 1954,claims the old fields.The headiness of those years for us who lived them ebbs.We come,cooly [sic]enmeshed in footnotes,to the scribes'time."2 The scribes have been busiest rewriting American policy and Anglo-American relations during the war.Perhaps as much as anything,the appearance between 1976 and 1984 of the relevant volumes in the U.S.foreign relations series and the clock-like opening of pertinent materials in the British Public Records Office stimulated this fresh research.New accounts have also brought the role of Ko- A count that included military and campaign histories would go substantially higher.The findings of Bruce Cumings,Rosemary Foot,Burton I.Kaufman,Callum A.MacDonald,and others have served cumulatively to displace David Rees,Korea:The Limited War (New York:St.Martin's Press, 1964),the standard treatment for at least twenty years.For recent reviews of the new literature,see Rosemary Foot,"Making Known the Unknown War:Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,"Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991):411-31;:Philip West,"Interpreting the Korean War,"American Historical Review 94 (February 1989):80-96. Gregory Henderson,book review,Journal of Asian Studies 47 (May 1988):389. MICHAEL H.HUNT,professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,is the author of Ideology and U.S.Foreign Policy and The Making of a Special Relationship,which is a study of early U.S.-China ties.He is now completing a book on the origins of Chinese Communist foreign policy. Political Science Quarterly Volume 107 Number 3 1992 453
Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951 MICHAEL H. HUNT Our understanding of the Korean War and especially the crisisfilled first year of that war has undergone some dramatic changes. Through the 1980s, approaching the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, some twenty books appeared dealing with the war's politics, diplomacy, and strategy.' The late Gregory Henderson, writing in an elegiac vein, acknowledged this new era in scholarship. "The men who lived the Korean War now pass. A new generation, eyes deep in mountains of documents declassified up to 1954, claims the old fields. The headiness of those years for us who lived them ebbs. We come, cooly [sic] enmeshed in footnotes, to the scribes' time."2 The scribes have been busiest rewriting American policy and Anglo-American relations during the war. Perhaps as much as anything, the appearance between 1976 and 1984 of the relevant volumes in the U.S. foreign relations series and the clock-like opening of pertinent materials in the British Public Records Office stimulated this fresh research. New accounts have also brought the role of KoI A count that included military and campaign histories would go substantially higher. The findings of Bruce Cumings, Rosemary Foot, Burton I. Kaufman, Callum A. MacDonald, and others have served cumulatively to displace David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), the standard treatment for at least twenty years. For recent reviews of the new literature, see Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411-31; and Philip West, "Interpreting the Korean War," American Historical Review 94 (February 1989): 80-96. 2 Gregory Henderson, book review, Journal of Asian Studies 47 (May 1988): 389. MICHAEL H. HUNT, professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is the author of Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy and The Making of a Special Relationship, which is a study of early U.S.-China ties. He is now completing a book on the origins of Chinese Communist foreign policy. Political Science Quarterly Volume 107 Number 3 1992 453
454 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reans into clearer focus.Integrating Korean sources with the English-language literature,those accounts have focused attention on the peninsular origins of the war and the interaction between the great powers and the local actors,between international politics and local politics.On a third front,Soviet involvement,the first volume of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs opened up some intriguing insights in 1970,and the 1990 volume has offered some supplementary details.But in general,our view on the Kremlin remained limited in the age of glasnost,and little has yet changed now in the age of Boris Yeltsin.3 The Chinese role has,at least until recently,been only marginally better under- stood.Whether and when the Chinese might release illuminating material on the war has been a subject of occasional,generally pessimistic comment.But the Chinese are making their own contribution to our understanding of the war,helping us to move beyond the point researchers relying heavily on the contemporary public record had carried us.5 Thanks to new material China's intrusion into the narrative need no longer be accompanied by a relentless rain of speculation and misinformation.We can now correct misconceptions by nonspecialists intent on a more global view of the war,s subject undocu- mented claims to critical scrutiny,?and begin to nail down such vital but elu- 3 See John Merrill,review article,Journal of Korean Studies 3(1981):181-91,for a helpful appraisal of Nikita S.Khrushchev,Khrushchev Remembers,Strobe Talbott,trans.and ed.,2 vols. (Boston:Little,Brown,1970 and 1974).See also Khrushchev Remembers:The Glasnost Tapes, Jerrold L.Schecter with Vyacheslav V.Luchkov,trans.and eds.(Boston:Little,Brown,1990),143- 47.For recent revelations,perhaps a harbinger,see the Reuters report from Moscow,"Ex-North Korea Envoy Says Kim Started War,"New York Times,6 July 1990;and N.Anin (pseud.),"How the War in Korea Started,"Newsreview,13 July 1991,31,and 20 July 1991,29,and 27 July 1991, 30.Milton Leitenberg was kind enough to supply me with a copy of the latter item. 4 For example,Max Hastings writing in 1987 suggested that the Chinese records are either lost or forever sealed."It may never be possible to piece together the precise decision-making process in Peking that led to the order to enter Korea.Almost all the key participants are dead,and among the living there is no reliable body of records to enable even those who wish to establish the objective truth about recent Chinese political history to do so."Hastings,The Korean War(New York:Simon Schuster,1987),132.Edwin P.Hoyt,The Day the Chinese Attacked:Korea,1950(New York: McGraw-Hill,1990),144,is similarly pessimistic. 5 Allen S.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu:The Decision to Enter the Korean War (originally published 1960,Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,1968),a meticulous reconstruction of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950,is the best known and most influential of these works based primarily on the public record. 6 Take for example the basic error of making Lin Biao the commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in Joseph C.Goulden,Korea:The Untold Story of the War (New York:Times Books, 1982),309;and Clay Blair,The Forgotten War:America in Korea,1950-53 (New York:Times Books, 1987),390,396. 7 See for example the imaginative treatment of Chinese decision making in October and November 1950 in Russell Spurr,Enter the Dragon:China's Undeclared War against the U.S.in Korea,1950- 5/(New York:Newmarket Press,1988).Spurr fails to indicate precisely how the interviews in China on which he relies so heavily support his narrative.Hoyt,The Day the Chinese Attacked,a somewhat better grounded account,also dispenses with precise documentation
454 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reans into clearer focus. Integrating Korean sources with the English-language literature, those accounts have focused attention on the peninsular origins of the war and the interaction between the great powers and the local actors, between international politics and local politics. On a third front, Soviet involvement, the first volume of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs opened up some intriguing insights in 1970, and the 1990 volume has offered some supplementary details. But in general, our view on the Kremlin remained limited in the age of glasnost, and little has yet changed now in the age of Boris Yeltsin.3 The Chinese role has, at least until recently, been only marginally better understood. Whether and when the Chinese might release illuminating material on the war has been a subject of occasional, generally pessimistic comment.4 But the Chinese are making their own contribution to our understanding of the war, helping us to move beyond the point researchers relying heavily on the contemporary public record had carried US.5 Thanks to new material China's intrusion into the narrative need no longer be accompanied by a relentless rain of speculation and misinformation. We can now correct misconceptions by nonspecialists intent on a more global view of the war,6 subject undocumented claims to critical scrutiny,7 and begin to nail down such vital but elu- 3 See John Merrill, review article, Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1981): 181-91, for a helpful appraisal of Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970 and 1974). See also Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 143- 47. For recent revelations, perhaps a harbinger, see the Reuters report from Moscow, "Ex-North Korea Envoy Says Kim Started War," New York Times, 6 July 1990; and N. Anin (pseud.), "How the War in Korea Started," Newsreview, 13 July 1991, 31, and 20 July 1991, 29, and 27 July 1991, 30. Milton Leitenberg was kind enough to supply me with a copy of the latter item. 4For example, Max Hastings writing in 1987 suggested that the Chinese records are either lost or forever sealed. "It may never be possible to piece together the precise decision-making process in Peking that led to the order to enter Korea. Almost all the key participants are dead, and among the living there is no reliable body of records to enable even those who wish to establish the objective truth about recent Chinese political history to do so." Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 132. Edwin P. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 144, is similarly pessimistic. 5 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (originally published 1960, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), a meticulous reconstruction of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950, is the best known and most influential of these works based primarily on the public record. 6 Take for example the basic error of making Lin Biao the commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), 309; and Clay Blair, TheForgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53 (New York: Times Books, 1987), 390, 396. 7See for example the imaginative treatment of Chinese decision making in October and November 1950 in Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea, 1950- 51 (New York: Newmarket Press, 1988). Spurr fails to indicate precisely how the interviews in China on which he relies so heavily support his narrative. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked, a somewhat better grounded account, also dispenses with precise documentation
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 455 sive topics as the domestic impact of the wars and its effects on Sino-Soviet re- lations. The credit for this advance on the Chinese front of the Korean War,but one aspect of a broad movement to develop and open up party history,goes to the Communist party central committee itself.Much of the headway made through the 1980s was due to the efforts of three historical units in Beijing operating under the direct supervision of a central committee"small group."The party center's own research offices have put out a wide variety of material relevant to Mao Zedong's central role in the crisis as well as the context in which he operated. Adding significantly to the literature,the Chinese military itself has promoted research and publication on a topic in which it takes considerable pride.Officers who played a prominent role in the conflict together with military researchers have produced an impressive body of work,much of it published by one or another of the military-run presses.2 These various secondary treatments and 8 The most ambitious study to date is Larry S.Weiss,"Storm Around the Cradle:The Korean War and the Early Years of the People's Republic of China"(Ph.D.dissertation in Political Science, Columbia University,1981),which contends that the war radicalized China's domestic policy,thus bringing to a premature end the New Democracy stage of China's development. See Robert R.Simmons,The Strained Alliance:Peking,Pyongyang,Moscow and the Politics of the Korean War (New York:Free Press,1975);Wilbur A.Chaffee,"Two Hypotheses of Sino- Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the Korean War,Journal ofKorean Affairs 6(1976- 77):1-13;and Nakajima Mineo,"The Sino-Soviet Confrontation:Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War,"Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs I (January 1979):19-47. 10 For a fuller treatment of developments over the last decade,Michael H.Hunt and Odd Arne Westad,"The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs:A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems,"China Quarterly 122(Summer 1990):258-72.For an updated listing of sources,see Steven M.Goldstein and He Di,"New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War,"Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992):4-6. i Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,comp.,Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong manuscripts for the period following the establishment of the country],5 vols.to date, internal circulation (Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1987),vols.1-4 covering the Korean War;and Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu,comp.,Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan [A selection of Peng Dehuai works on military affairs](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1988).For a selection of translated materials from Jianguo yilai,vol.1,see Li Xiaobing et al.,"Mao's Despatch of Chinese Troops into Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams,July-October 1950,"Chinese Historians 5(Spring 1992):63-86. 12 The military compiled and published the first major collection of inner party documents and military dispatches in Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan,comp.,Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works on military affairs],internal circulation(Beijing:Zhong- guo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi,1981;Tokyo reprint,Sososha,1985).For recent overviews by re- searchers in the military,Yao Xu,Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian:Weida de kangMei yuanChao zhanzheng [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom:The great war to resist America and aid Korea], internal circulation (Beijing:Renmin,1985);Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian,KangMei yuan- Chao jishi [A record of resisting America and aiding Korea],internal circulation(Beijing:Zhonggong dangshi ziliao,1987);and Chai and Zhao,Banmendian tanpan:Chaoxian zhanzheng juan [The Panmunjom talks:A volume on the Korean War](Beijing:Jiefangjun,1989);Junshi jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu,comp.,Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChao zhanshi [A battle history of resistance to America and aid to Korea by the Chinese people's volunteer army],internal circulation (Beijing:Junshi jiaoxue,1988);and Xu Yan,Diyici jiaoliang:KangMei yuanChao zhan-
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 455 sive topics as the domestic impact of the war8 and its effects on Sino-Soviet relations.9 The credit for this advance on the Chinese front of the Korean War, but one aspect of a broad movement to develop and open up party history, goes to the Communist party central committee itself. Much of the headway made through the 1980s was due to the efforts of three historical units in Beijing operating under the direct supervision of a central committee "small group."'0 The party center's own research offices have put out a wide variety of material relevant to Mao Zedong's central role in the crisis as well as the context in which he operated."I Adding significantly to the literature, the Chinese military itself has promoted research and publication on a topic in which it takes considerable pride. Officers who played a prominent role in the conflict together with military researchers have produced an impressive body of work, much of it published by one or another of the military-run presses.-2 These various secondary treatments and 8 The most ambitious study to date is Larry S. Weiss, "Storm Around the Cradle: The Korean War and the Early Years of the People's Republic of China" (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Columbia University, 1981), which contends that the war radicalized China's domestic policy, thus bringing to a premature end the New Democracy stage of China's development. I See Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Free Press, 1975); Wilbur A. Chaffee, "Two Hypotheses of SinoSoviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the Korean War," Journal of Korean Affairs 6 (1976- 77): 1-13; and Nakajima Mineo, "The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 1 (January 1979): 19-47. 10 For a fuller treatment of developments over the last decade, see Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems," China Quarterly 122 (Summer 1990): 258-72. For an updated listing of sources, see Steven M. Goldstein and He Di, "New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992): 4-6. " Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong manuscripts for the period following the establishment of the country], 5 vols. to date, internal circulation (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987), vols. 1-4 covering the Korean War; and Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu, comp., Peng Dehuaijunshi wenxuan [A selection of Peng Dehuai works on military affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1988). For a selection of translated materials from Jianguo yilai, vol. 1, see Li Xiaobing et al., "Mao's Despatch of Chinese Troops into Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, July-October 1950," Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992): 63-86. 12 The military compiled and published the first major collection of inner party documents and military dispatches in Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, comp., Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works on military affairs], internal circulation (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi, 1981; Tokyo reprint, Sososha, 1985). For recent overviews by researchers in the military, Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian: Weida de kangMei yuanChao zhanzheng [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom: The great war to resist America and aid Korea], internal circulation (Beijing: Renmin, 1985); Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, KangMei yuanChaojishi [A record of resisting America and aiding Korea], internal circulation (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1987); and Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan: Chaoxian zhanzheng juan [The Panmunjom talks: A volume on the Korean War] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1989); Junshi jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, comp., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChao zhanshi [A battle history of resistance to America and aid to Korea by the Chinese people's volunteer army], internal circulation (Beijing: Junshi jiaoxue, 1988); and Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang: KangMeiyuanChao zhan-
456 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY documentary collections provide a window-indirect to be sure-into military, party,and foreign ministry archives.Taken together,they offer a view that contrasts sharply with what was available earlier in China.13 Foreign scholars soon recognized this historical opening.The first hints came at a conference in Beijing in 1986.14 Since then,as more and more material has been published and reached specialists outside China,additional accounts in English have begun to appear,pulling aside the curtain long obscuring Chinese decision making.i5 While the record of China's role in the Korean War is by no means complete, the materials now in hand are voluminous and reliable enough to invite a sweeping reappraisal of Beijing's response to the crisis and an overall reassessment of the crisis itself.These new Chinese materials on the Korean War are especially rich for the first year of the conflict when Beijing moved toward a decision to intervene, struggled to formulate war aims and an appropriate strategy,and finally accepted negotiations and a military stalemate.This article begins by sketching out some of the central findings that have emerged to date.It then seeks to relate those findings to themes drawn from the more fully documented Anglo-American side zheng de lishi huigu yu fansi [The first test of strength:A historical review and evaluation of the war to resist America and aid Korea](Beijing:Zhongguo guangbo dianshi,1990).The chief memoirists from the military side are Nie Rongzhen,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen]3 vols.(Beijing:Janshi,1983,and Jiefangjun,1984);Du Ping,Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu [With the headquarters of the volunteer army](Beijing:Jiefangjun,1989);Yang Chengwu,Yang Chengwu huiyilu [Memoirs of Yang Chengwu]2 vols.(Beijing:Jiefangjun,1987 and 1990);Yang Dezhi,Weile heping [For the sake of peace](Beijing:Changzheng,1987);and Hong Xuezhi,KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huiyi ["Recollections of the war to resist U.S.aggression and aid Korea"](Beijing:Jiefang- jun wenyi,1990). 13 For an impression of how thin and domestically oriented the treatment of the war was before the recent explosion of publications,see Hu Zhongchi,KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua [An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea campaign](Beijing:ZhongHua qingnian,1956);and Zhongguo renmin kangMei yuanChao zonghui xuanchuanbu,comp.,Weida de kangMei yuanChao yundong [The great resist-America,aid-Korea campaign](Beijing:Renmin,1954),a collection of documents. 14 The two conference papers that deal with the Korean War are Jonathan D.Pollack's "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations,"a treatment that is strongest on the first months of the war,and Chen Xiaolu's "China's Policy Toward the United States,1949-1955,"both in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming,eds.,Sino-American Relations 1945-1955:A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington,DE:Scholarly Resources,1989),213-37 and 184-97. Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War:History Revisited," China Quarterly 121 (March 1990):94-115,is a revealing treatment rendered problematic by its heavy reliance on unattributed interviews.That account has been improved upon and extended by Chen Jian,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War"(Occasional paper,Cold War International History Project,Woodrow Wilson Center,Washington,DC,n.d.[1992?]);Chen Jian,"China's Changing Aims during the Korean War,1950-1951,"The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992):8-41;:Thomas J.Christensen,"Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace:The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams,"International Security 17 (Summer 1992):122-54.Chen,drawing on a book manuscript he is preparing on Chinese policy and the origins of the Korean War,offers the most detailed treatment
456 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY documentary collections provide a window - indirect to be sure - into military, party, and foreign ministry archives. Taken together, they offer a view that contrasts sharply with what was available earlier in China.'3 Foreign scholars soon recognized this historical opening. The first hints came at a conference in Beijing in 1986.14 Since then, as more and more material has been published and reached specialists outside China, additional accounts in English have begun to appear, pulling aside the curtain long obscuring Chinese decision making.'5 While the record of China's role in the Korean War is by no means complete, the materials now in hand are voluminous and reliable enough to invite a sweeping reappraisal of Beijing's response to the crisis and an overall reassessment of the crisis itself. These new Chinese materials on the Korean War are especially rich for the first year of the conflict when Beijing moved toward a decision to intervene, struggled to formulate war aims and an appropriate strategy, and finally accepted negotiations and a military stalemate. This article begins by sketching out some of the central findings that have emerged to date. It then seeks to relate those findings to themes drawn from the more fully documented Anglo-American side zheng de lishi huigu yufansi [The first test of strength: A historical review and evaluation of the war to resist America and aid Korea] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi, 1990). The chief memoirists from the military side are Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] 3 vols. (Beijing: Janshi, 1983, and Jiefangjun, 1984); Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu [With the headquarters of the volunteer army] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1989); Yang Chengwu, Yang Chengwu huiyilu [Memoirs of Yang Chengwu] 2 vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1987 and 1990); Yang Dezhi, Weile heping [For the sake of peace] (Beijing: Changzheng, 1987); and Hong Xuezhi, KangMeiyuanChao zhanzheng huiyi ["Recollections of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea"] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi, 1990). 13 For an impression of how thin and domestically oriented the treatment of the war was before the recent explosion of publications, see Hu Zhongchi, KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua [An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea campaign] (Beijing: ZhongHua qingnian, 1956); and Zhongguo renmin kangMei yuanChao zonghui xuanchuanbu, comp., Weida de kangMeiyuanChao yundong [The great resist-America, aid- Korea campaign] (Beijing: Renmin, 1954), a collection of documents. 14 The two conference papers that deal with the Korean War are Jonathan D. Pollack's "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations," a treatment that is strongest on the first months of the war, and Chen Xiaolu's "China's Policy Toward the United States, 1949-1955," both in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 213-37 and 184-97. 15 Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," China Quarterly 121 (March 1990): 94-115, is a revealing treatment rendered problematic by its heavy reliance on unattributed interviews. That account has been improved upon and extended by Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War" (Occasional paper, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, n.d. [1992?]); Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-195 1," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 8-41; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17 (Summer 1992): 122-54. Chen, drawing on a book manuscript he is preparing on Chinese policy and the origins of the Korean War, offers the most detailed treatment