846:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY the (invariably capitalized)"Free World"rang hollow in the face of the dis- crimination and violence endured by many African Americans,and as massive resistance in the South to the Supreme Court's Brown ruling of 1954 began to gather pace." After the so-called loss of China to communism in 1949,successive admin- istrations in Washington experienced deep anxiety that further setbacks were likely if Asian hearts and minds were not won over to the Western position. The frustrating stalemate in Korea,followed by the emergence of a Commu- nist state in North Vietnam in 1954,added to the sense that the United States, and the message it was carrying,was not only on the defensive,but steadily losing ground.Amid speculation that McCarthyism had brought the interna- tional image of the United States to a low point,in the summer of 1o53 the NSC asked for studies on the subject to be compiled.The results made for some uncomfortable reading,with links with the older European colonial powers seen as a major problem,and suspicion of American imperialism considered "the single most adverse influence on American prestige";in its analysis of the Far East,the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)reported the prevalence of "racial sensitivity and antipathy to [the]Western powers,"as well as the "per- sistent belief,despite U.S.professions to contrary,that [the]U.S.regards Asiatic people as inferior,that [the]U.S.tends to patronize Asia,and that U.S.peoples and practices do not accord Asiatic governments genuinely equal status with [the]Western powers."3 These issues were particularly pronounced when it came to relations with India,often considered the most significant non-Communist power in Asia, and where for Indians,as Chester Bowles,the U.S.ambassador,wrote to John Foster Dulles in March 1953,"in forming individual and national attitudes toward world affairs the color question is the most basic of all."+From the record of U.S.diplomacy in the Middle East,Asia,and South Africa,it was easy to draw the lesson that the U.S.government,as at home,identified with the interests of whites over nonwhites.In February 1955,the U.S.charge d'affaires in New Delhi was telling the New York Tintes correspondent Cy Sulzberger that anti-American feeling in India derived from: 21.See,for example,Dudziak,Cold War Civil Rights,118-19;also Frenise A.Logan, "Racism and U.S.-Indian Relations,1947-1953:Views in the Indian Press,"Pacific Historical Review 54 (February 1985):71-79. 22.See Christina Klein,Cold War Orientalism:Asia in the Middlebrou Imagination, 1945-196r (Berkeley,CA,2003),27-28. 23.Study prepared by the OCB,"Reported Decline in U.S.Prestige Abroad,"23 Sep- tember 1953,in FRUS,1952-54 (Washington,DC,1983),pt.1,1:1466-47,1489-90,1531. 24.This was also,Bowles believed,the reason why most Indians looked "with strong sym- pathy toward other Asian people including the Chinese"and "admit to [a]certain twisted, secret,pleasurable reaction when they hear that their fellow Asians,the Chinese,are success- fully holding off the Americans in Korea."See Bowles to Dulles,20 March 1953.folder 243, box 94,Chester Bowles Papers,Sterling Memorial Library,Yale University,New Haven, Connecticut
the (invariably capitalized) “Free World” rang hollow in the face of the discrimination and violence endured by many African Americans, and as massive resistance in the South to the Supreme Court’s Brown ruling of 1954 began to gather pace.21 After the so-called loss of China to communism in 1949, successive administrations in Washington experienced deep anxiety that further setbacks were likely if Asian hearts and minds were not won over to the Western position. The frustrating stalemate in Korea, followed by the emergence of a Communist state in North Vietnam in 1954, added to the sense that the United States, and the message it was carrying, was not only on the defensive, but steadily losing ground.22 Amid speculation that McCarthyism had brought the international image of the United States to a low point, in the summer of 1953 the NSC asked for studies on the subject to be compiled. The results made for some uncomfortable reading, with links with the older European colonial powers seen as a major problem, and suspicion of American imperialism considered “the single most adverse influence on American prestige”; in its analysis of the Far East, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) reported the prevalence of “racial sensitivity and antipathy to [the] Western powers,” as well as the “persistent belief, despite U.S. professions to contrary, that [the] U.S. regards Asiatic people as inferior, that [the] U.S. tends to patronize Asia, and that U.S. peoples and practices do not accord Asiatic governments genuinely equal status with [the] Western powers.”23 These issues were particularly pronounced when it came to relations with India, often considered the most significant non-Communist power in Asia, and where for Indians, as Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador, wrote to John Foster Dulles in March 1953, “in forming individual and national attitudes toward world affairs the color question is the most basic of all.”24 From the record of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, Asia, and South Africa, it was easy to draw the lesson that the U.S. government, as at home, identified with the interests of whites over nonwhites. In February 1955, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in New Delhi was telling the New York Times correspondent Cy Sulzberger that anti-American feeling in India derived from: 846 : diplomatic history 21. See, for example, Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 118–19; also Frenise A. Logan, “Racism and U.S.-Indian Relations, 1947–1953: Views in the Indian Press,” Pacific Historical Review 54 (February 1985): 71–79. 22. See Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961 (Berkeley, CA, 2003), 27–28. 23. Study prepared by the OCB, “Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad,” 23 September 1953, in FRUS, 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1983), pt. 1, 1:1466–47, 1489–90, 1531. 24. This was also, Bowles believed, the reason why most Indians looked “with strong sympathy toward other Asian people including the Chinese” and “admit to [a] certain twisted, secret, pleasurable reaction when they hear that their fellow Asians, the Chinese, are successfully holding off the Americans in Korea.” See Bowles to Dulles, 20 March 1953, folder 243, box 94, Chester Bowles Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
A“Segregated”Asia2:847 I.Racisu:the American white domination attitude. 2.Iuperialisi:the white man was the imperialist in Asia.We supported the French in Indochina and Chiang as a dummy against Mao.We are the all-powerful representative of the white West.'s As Christina Klein has contended,these accumulated anxieties,that a negative policy of containment was inadequate in the face of the insidious Communist threat in Asia,found cultural and aesthetic expression in an "imaginary of integration,"where differences between peoples could be bridged through the empathy,commitment,and engagement of ordinary Americans with a world emerging from colonialism.The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism,to discard any association with the language and attitudes of im- perialism,and to bring about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia formed important strands in the policy and rhetorical approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.6 Examining Washington's attempts to organize the collective defense of Southeast Asia during 1954,and the subsequent reactions induced by the gath- ering of twenty-nine Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955,help to show how these concerns,and the subject of race,lay beneath much official Ameri- can thinking in this period.*7 Throughout the early 1osos,U.S.policymakers referred repeatedly to the need to avoid any impression being given to Asian 25.Diary entry for 8 February 1955,C.L.Sulzberger,The Last of the Giants (New York, 1970),132.U.S.officials were also aware that the Soviet Union,due to its supposed part-Asian "racial"characteristics,possessed clear advantages in appealing to a non-European audience; in 1955,the CIA's assistant director of national estimates can be found arguing that "West- erners have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner.They don't forget the Kipling concept of 'lesser breeds.'The Communists are very astute in their approach.They have created the impression that they do not look upon these people as 'backward'or 'underdevel- oped,'phrases we have too often used.The struggle between the Soviets and U.S.and Western Europe,together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets,have made it pos- sible for the Soviets to get themselves accepted as non-Europeans,as fellow Asians."See "Reasons for the Impact of the Soviet Orbit's Military,Economic and Cultural Drive in the Middle East,South and Southeast Asia,"Sherman Kent memorandum for Allen Dulles,29 November 1955,folder 9,box Ioo,Allen Dulles Papers,Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University,Princeton,New Jersey. 26.Klein,Cold War Orientalism,37-49.Note also Andrew Rotter's view that"white Amer- ican policymakers...saw Indians and other dark-skinned people as racial Others,in funda- mental ways different from and inferior to whites.Because racial differences were felt so deeply by whites,race thinking conditioned foreign policy decisions.American policymakers after 1947 seldom said they were making policy for racial reasons.It would not have been fashion- able to do so....And yet,there is indirect but compelling evidence that American officials were thinking in racial terms when they made policy toward Latin America,Asia and Africa"; see Andrew J.Rotter,Comrades at Odds:The United States and India,1947-1964 (Ithaca,NY, 200o,154 27.American reactions to the Bandung Conference have also been traced by Cary Fraser. This article differs in the important links it draws with other contemporary developments, including the formation of SEATO,the conclusions it reaches regarding Bandung's signifi- cance for pan-Asianism,and the array of perspectives and sources it employs;see Cary Fraser, "An American Dilemma:Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Con- ference,1955,"in Plummer,Window on Freedom,115-40
1. Racism: the American white domination attitude. 2. Imperialism: the white man was the imperialist in Asia. We supported the French in Indochina and Chiang as a dummy against Mao. We are the all-powerful representative of the white West.25 As Christina Klein has contended, these accumulated anxieties, that a negative policy of containment was inadequate in the face of the insidious Communist threat in Asia, found cultural and aesthetic expression in an “imaginary of integration,” where differences between peoples could be bridged through the empathy, commitment, and engagement of ordinary Americans with a world emerging from colonialism. The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism, to discard any association with the language and attitudes of imperialism, and to bring about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia formed important strands in the policy and rhetorical approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.26 Examining Washington’s attempts to organize the collective defense of Southeast Asia during 1954, and the subsequent reactions induced by the gathering of twenty-nine Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955, help to show how these concerns, and the subject of race, lay beneath much official American thinking in this period.27 Throughout the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers referred repeatedly to the need to avoid any impression being given to Asian A “Segregated” Asia? : 847 25. Diary entry for 8 February 1955, C. L. Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants (New York, 1970), 132. U.S. officials were also aware that the Soviet Union, due to its supposed part-Asian “racial” characteristics, possessed clear advantages in appealing to a non-European audience; in 1955, the CIA’s assistant director of national estimates can be found arguing that “Westerners have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner. They don’t forget the Kipling concept of ‘lesser breeds.’ The Communists are very astute in their approach. They have created the impression that they do not look upon these people as ‘backward’ or ‘underdeveloped,’ phrases we have too often used. The struggle between the Soviets and U.S. and Western Europe, together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets, have made it possible for the Soviets to get themselves accepted as non-Europeans, as fellow Asians.” See “Reasons for the Impact of the Soviet Orbit’s Military, Economic and Cultural Drive in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia,” Sherman Kent memorandum for Allen Dulles, 29 November 1955, folder 9, box 100, Allen Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 26. Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 37–49. Note also Andrew Rotter’s view that “white American policymakers . . . saw Indians and other dark-skinned people as racial Others, in fundamental ways different from and inferior to whites. Because racial differences were felt so deeply by whites, race thinking conditioned foreign policy decisions. American policymakers after 1947 seldom said they were making policy for racial reasons. It would not have been fashionable to do so. . . . And yet, there is indirect but compelling evidence that American officials were thinking in racial terms when they made policy toward Latin America, Asia and Africa”; see Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, NY, 2000), 154. 27. American reactions to the Bandung Conference have also been traced by Cary Fraser. This article differs in the important links it draws with other contemporary developments, including the formation of SEATO, the conclusions it reaches regarding Bandung’s signifi- cance for pan-Asianism, and the array of perspectives and sources it employs; see Cary Fraser, “An American Dilemma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955,” in Plummer, Window on Freedom, 115–40
848:D IP LO MAT IC HISTORY opinion that security arrangements in the Far East were being built around an exclusive all-white grouping,involving the principal Western powers with inter- ests or colonial possessions in the region.The early meetings of the ANZUS alliance,bringing together the United States,Australia,and New Zealand,had already,noted the U.S.ambassador to Thailand in February 1953,aroused"an undercurrent [of]concern [that the]major Western Powers [are]determined [to]exercise some kind of White man's monopoly over [the]defense [of]South- east Asia."The regional planning adviser in the State Department's Far East Bureau,Charlton Ogburn,emphasized the dangers of organizing defense efforts "behind the backs of the Asians,"while there was no explanation,so far as I can see,that we can offer the Asians of our reasons for developing special and exclusive relationships with the other Western powers in their part of the world that will not allay or even mitigate the sense of affront and of injury with which they must regard such a development ..the plain fact is that any exclusively Western joint action in Asia must carry with it the implication that we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferior.We shall not be able to avoid this impli- cation because that is indeed our attitude.*9 One of the reasons why both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were so adamantly opposed to any extension of ANZUS to include Britain was the belief,as U.S.Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith put it in August 1953,that this would be further represented in Asia as "either a revival of western imperialism'or an instrument of 'white supremacy.'"3 Prompted by the Indochina crisis of 1954 into reconsidering their prior opposition to sponsoring the formation of a wider security pact to cover South- east Asia,Eisenhower,Dulles,and other senior officials were convinced that by including friendly Asian states in any new alliance grouping the stigma of asso- ciation with Western imperialism could be avoided.3 The racial dimension to 28.Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton)to Department of State,18 February 1953,FRUS, 1952-54 (Washington,DC,1984),pt.I,12:274. 29.Memorandum by the Far East Regional Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for the Far East,2I January 1953,ibid.,260-62. 30.See Acheson to Truman,30 July 1952,ibid.,16o;memorandum of conversation between Acheson,Casey,and Spender,II November 1952,ibid.,238;Bedell Smith to Wilson, 2I August 1953,ibid.,335.A similar point is also made in Henry W.Brands,Jr,"From ANZUS to SEATO:United States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954,"International History Review 9 (May 1987):261-63.During the discussions over the formation of ANZUS in early 1951,John Foster Dulles,then acting as a consultant to the State Department,had hoped to provide for Philippine inclusion,so that the alliance did not appear as a"closed club for Anglo-Saxons";see W.David McIntyre,Background to the ANZUS Pact:Policy-Making,Strategy and Diplomacy,1945-55 (London,1995),334. 31.Asian participation might also counter the charge that the United States shared the common Western colonial practice of assigning races to martial or nonmartial categories, assuming that,as Kiernan put it,"Generally speaking,the lighter the skin,the sharper the sword."See Victor Gordon Kiernan,The Lords of Human Kind:European Attitudes towards the Outside World in the Imperial Age (London,1969),315
opinion that security arrangements in the Far East were being built around an exclusive all-white grouping, involving the principal Western powers with interests or colonial possessions in the region. The early meetings of the ANZUS alliance, bringing together the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, had already, noted the U.S. ambassador to Thailand in February 1953, aroused “an undercurrent [of ] concern [that the] major Western Powers [are] determined [to] exercise some kind of White man’s monopoly over [the] defense [of ] Southeast Asia.”28 The regional planning adviser in the State Department’s Far East Bureau, Charlton Ogburn, emphasized the dangers of organizing defense efforts “behind the backs of the Asians,” while there was no explanation, so far as I can see, that we can offer the Asians of our reasons for developing special and exclusive relationships with the other Western powers in their part of the world that will not allay or even mitigate the sense of affront and of injury with which they must regard such a development . . . the plain fact is that any exclusively Western joint action in Asia must carry with it the implication that we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferior. We shall not be able to avoid this implication because that is indeed our attitude.29 One of the reasons why both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were so adamantly opposed to any extension of ANZUS to include Britain was the belief, as U.S. Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith put it in August 1953, that this would be further represented in Asia as “either a revival of ‘western imperialism’ or an instrument of ‘white supremacy.’”30 Prompted by the Indochina crisis of 1954 into reconsidering their prior opposition to sponsoring the formation of a wider security pact to cover Southeast Asia, Eisenhower, Dulles, and other senior officials were convinced that by including friendly Asian states in any new alliance grouping the stigma of association with Western imperialism could be avoided.31 The racial dimension to 848 : diplomatic history 28. Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to Department of State, 18 February 1953, FRUS, 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1984), pt. 1, 12:274. 29. Memorandum by the Far East Regional Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for the Far East, 21 January 1953, ibid., 260–62. 30. See Acheson to Truman, 30 July 1952, ibid., 160; memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Casey, and Spender, 11 November 1952, ibid., 238; Bedell Smith to Wilson, 21 August 1953, ibid., 335. A similar point is also made in Henry W. Brands, Jr., “From ANZUS to SEATO: United States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952–1954,” International History Review 9 (May 1987): 261–63. During the discussions over the formation of ANZUS in early 1951, John Foster Dulles, then acting as a consultant to the State Department, had hoped to provide for Philippine inclusion, so that the alliance did not appear as a “closed club for Anglo-Saxons”; see W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945–55 (London, 1995), 334. 31. Asian participation might also counter the charge that the United States shared the common Western colonial practice of assigning races to martial or nonmartial categories, assuming that, as Kiernan put it, “Generally speaking, the lighter the skin, the sharper the sword.” See Victor Gordon Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes towards the Outside World in the Imperial Age (London, 1969), 315
A“Segregated”Asia::849 these concerns over what finally emerged as the Manila Pact,or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO)as it became more popularly known soon after its formation in September 1954,was apparent throughout.During talks with the British over the scheme for collective defense in April 1954,it was noted that there was "agreement that neither by composition nor otherwise should the arrangements be developed so that they would be regarded as a white coalition."One subsequent message discussed and approved by Eisenhower ran:"The United States will not agree to a 'white man's party'to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations."3 Congressional leaders,during meetings in early May with the president and his senior officials,urged that Asian participation was essential to curb suspicions that the white powers alone wanted to settle the affairs of Asia.In June 1954,there were deep reservations among U.S.officials about the wisdom of convening discreet five-power talks on Southeast Asian defense in Washington involving the United States,Britain, France,Australia,and New Zealand.Such doubts were confirmed when the news leaked,and protests followed from friendly Asian states over their omis- sion.Thai diplomats called the talks"another example of the archaic idea of the white man's burden,"while the Philippine ambassador noted that public opinion at home would see the gathering as "evidence that the Western Powers were still 'drawing a color line'in Asia."35 The response of the Eisenhower administration was to move quickly to approach Thailand and the Philippines,two solid American allies already,with the offer of membership in a regional security pact in the hope that local Asian criticisms could be deflected.As the president remarked to the NSC in May 1954,"Small or not,such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation."Yet there was a strong reluctance to go any further. Dulles,for all his concern about the appearance of a white line up was,in fact, anxious that India not join any new security pact for the region.Not only did the secretary of state believe that an invitation to India would lead to calls from within the United States for the addition of Nationalist China,but he also har- bored deep reservations over Nehru's reliability and lack of steadfastness when faced with the Communist threat.7 Dulles was hardly alone among senior U.S. 32.Memorandum of conversation by the director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs,16 April 1954,FRUS,1952-54,pt.1,12:427 33.Memorandum of discussion,7 May 1954,ibid.,457 n9. 34.See"Secretary's Briefing for Members of Congress,"5 May 1954,Subject series,box 9,John Foster Dulles Papers,Dwight David Eisenhower Library,Abilene,Kansas(DDEL). 35.Memorandum of conversation by the officer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27 May 1954,ibid.,519,and see 52o n2;memorandum of conversation between Romulo and Murphy held 3 June 1954,o9I Indo-China,Chairman's File,box 1o,RG 218,U.S.National Archives (USNA),College Park,Maryland. 36.Memorandum of discussion at 195th meeting of the NSC,6 May 1954.FRUS, 1952-54,pPtI,12455. 37.See,for example,record of discussion between Dulles and Eden,13 April 1954. ZP3/2G,FO 371/125123,UKNA;also see Rotter,Comrades at Odds,219,which highlights
these concerns over what finally emerged as the Manila Pact, or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as it became more popularly known soon after its formation in September 1954, was apparent throughout. During talks with the British over the scheme for collective defense in April 1954, it was noted that there was “agreement that neither by composition nor otherwise should the arrangements be developed so that they would be regarded as a white coalition.”32 One subsequent message discussed and approved by Eisenhower ran: “The United States will not agree to a ‘white man’s party’ to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.”33 Congressional leaders, during meetings in early May with the president and his senior officials, urged that Asian participation was essential to curb suspicions that the white powers alone wanted to settle the affairs of Asia.34 In June 1954, there were deep reservations among U.S. officials about the wisdom of convening discreet five-power talks on Southeast Asian defense in Washington involving the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand. Such doubts were confirmed when the news leaked, and protests followed from friendly Asian states over their omission. Thai diplomats called the talks “another example of the archaic idea of the white man’s burden,” while the Philippine ambassador noted that public opinion at home would see the gathering as “evidence that the Western Powers were still ‘drawing a color line’ in Asia.”35 The response of the Eisenhower administration was to move quickly to approach Thailand and the Philippines, two solid American allies already, with the offer of membership in a regional security pact in the hope that local Asian criticisms could be deflected. As the president remarked to the NSC in May 1954, “Small or not, such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation.”36 Yet there was a strong reluctance to go any further. Dulles, for all his concern about the appearance of a white line up was, in fact, anxious that India not join any new security pact for the region. Not only did the secretary of state believe that an invitation to India would lead to calls from within the United States for the addition of Nationalist China, but he also harbored deep reservations over Nehru’s reliability and lack of steadfastness when faced with the Communist threat.37 Dulles was hardly alone among senior U.S. A “Segregated” Asia? : 849 32. Memorandum of conversation by the director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs, 16 April 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, pt. 1, 12:427. 33. Memorandum of discussion, 7 May 1954, ibid., 457 n9. 34. See “Secretary’s Briefing for Members of Congress,” 5 May 1954, Subject series, box 9, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight David Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (DDEL). 35. Memorandum of conversation by the officer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27 May 1954, ibid., 519, and see 520 n2; memorandum of conversation between Romulo and Murphy held 3 June 1954, 091 Indo-China, Chairman’s File, box 10, RG 218, U.S. National Archives (USNA), College Park, Maryland. 36. Memorandum of discussion at 195th meeting of the NSC, 6 May 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, pt. 1, 12:455. 37. See, for example, record of discussion between Dulles and Eden, 13 April 1954, ZP3/2G, FO 371/125123, UKNA; also see Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 219, which highlights
850:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY figures in holding these feelings.In September 1953,the Republican leader in the Senate,William F.Knowland,having undertaken an Asian tour,vented his conviction to acting Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury,that Nehru "posed as the leader of Asia,but in fact he did not represent Korea or Formosa or Thai- land or Malaya or Pakistan.The most he could be said to speak for was India itself,Burma and Indonesia,which was practically Communist anyway."Know- land had "no use for those who sat on the fence.If war did break out in Asia, India would be quickly swamped beneath the Communist waves.By contrast, the British view was that Indian influence in Southeast Asia was too great to be so easily discounted,and hence Nehru had to be assiduously courted;as Salis- bury ventured to Knowland,"The right policy was to make as much use of India as possible,while recognising that orientals were not the same as us in outlook."38 Part of the problem was the premise that underlay any new security arrangements:while the Eisenhower administration envisaged an alliance whose raison d'etre was built around the need to deter further Communist advances, the British,for example,initially thought more in terms of a pact that would offer guarantees to ensure post-Geneva regional stability.39 The American determination to go ahead quickly with the new pact with just Thailand and the Philippines as members from the region itself spread much anxiety among British officials."Nobody here regards Siam and the Philippines as truly representative of Asian opinion,"Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden told the British ambassador in Washington in April 1954."If we do not make [a]real effort to include at least Burma I fear the whole of this scheme may be prejudiced,which I should deplore."Associating some of the so-called Colombo powers(India,Indonesia,Burma,Ceylon,and Pakistan)with the pro- posed Southeast Asian pact,Eden later explained to Dulles at Geneva,"would be a considerable gain,and would be a reply to the Chinese Communist cry of 'Asia for the Asians.'"Nehru had,however,already indicated that it was probably too late for such remedial action with a speech delivered in the Lok Sabba on 24 April which had denounced "American statements which come near to assuming protection,or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine,unilaterally over the countries of South East Asia."+The belated addition of Pakistan to the ranks of Asian states eventually willing to join SEATO only seemed to make matters worse,joining as it did primarily to enhance its own security the gendered attributes of effeminate weakness assigned to Indian males in popular American stereotyping of the period. 38.See conversation between Knowland and Salisbury,3o September 1953,FE/53/go,FO 8oo/784,UKNA. 39.See Roger Dingman,"John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954,"International History Review 11(August 1989):460. 40.Foreign Office to Washington (Eden to Makins),No.1696,19 April 1954,FE/54/21, FO 8o0/785,UKNA. 41.Geneva Conference (U.K.delegation)to Foreign Office (from Eden),No.86,I May 1954,PREM 11/649,UKNA. 42.New York Times,25 April 1954
figures in holding these feelings. In September 1953, the Republican leader in the Senate, William F. Knowland, having undertaken an Asian tour, vented his conviction to acting Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, that Nehru “posed as the leader of Asia, but in fact he did not represent Korea or Formosa or Thailand or Malaya or Pakistan. The most he could be said to speak for was India itself, Burma and Indonesia, which was practically Communist anyway.” Knowland had “no use for those who sat on the fence. If war did break out in Asia, India would be quickly swamped beneath the Communist waves.” By contrast, the British view was that Indian influence in Southeast Asia was too great to be so easily discounted, and hence Nehru had to be assiduously courted; as Salisbury ventured to Knowland, “The right policy was to make as much use of India as possible, while recognising that orientals were not the same as us in outlook.”38 Part of the problem was the premise that underlay any new security arrangements: while the Eisenhower administration envisaged an alliance whose raison d’etre was built around the need to deter further Communist advances, the British, for example, initially thought more in terms of a pact that would offer guarantees to ensure post-Geneva regional stability.39 The American determination to go ahead quickly with the new pact with just Thailand and the Philippines as members from the region itself spread much anxiety among British officials. “Nobody here regards Siam and the Philippines as truly representative of Asian opinion,” Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden told the British ambassador in Washington in April 1954. “If we do not make [a] real effort to include at least Burma I fear the whole of this scheme may be prejudiced, which I should deplore.”40 Associating some of the so-called Colombo powers (India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan) with the proposed Southeast Asian pact, Eden later explained to Dulles at Geneva, “would be a considerable gain, and would be a reply to the Chinese Communist cry of ‘Asia for the Asians.’”41 Nehru had, however, already indicated that it was probably too late for such remedial action with a speech delivered in the Lok Sabha on 24 April which had denounced “American statements which come near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally over the countries of South East Asia.”42 The belated addition of Pakistan to the ranks of Asian states eventually willing to join SEATO only seemed to make matters worse, joining as it did primarily to enhance its own security 850 : diplomatic history the gendered attributes of effeminate weakness assigned to Indian males in popular American stereotyping of the period. 38. See conversation between Knowland and Salisbury, 30 September 1953, FE/53/90, FO 800/784, UKNA. 39. See Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954,” International History Review 11 (August 1989): 460. 40. Foreign Office to Washington (Eden to Makins), No. 1696, 19 April 1954, FE/54/21, FO 800/785, UKNA. 41. Geneva Conference (U.K. delegation) to Foreign Office (from Eden), No. 86, 1 May 1954, PREM 11/649, UKNA. 42. New York Times, 25 April 1954