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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Institutions and International Political Economy）The Promise of Institutionalist Theory

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The Promise of Robert O.Keohane and Institutionalist Theory Lisa L.Martin n his usual direct way, John J.Mearsheimer has sharpened the theoretical issues dividing realist from institutionalist theory,and for this service we are grateful.We are also pleased that he has read the institutionalist literature so thoroughly.He correctly asserts that liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced,and that institutional- ists only expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant com- mon interests.Hence institutionalist theory does not espouse the Wilsonian concept of collective security-which Charles and Clifford Kupchan refer to as "ideal collective security"-critiqued so well by I.L.Claude thirty years ago. Nor does institutionalism embrace the aspirations to transform international relations put forward by some critical theorists.Like realism,institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic.2 However,Professor Mearsheimer's version of realism has some rather seri- ous flaws.Among them are its penchant for assertions that turn out to be incorrect;its propensity to privilege its own viewpoint,so that in the absence of decisive evidence either way it invariably seems to prevail;its failure to explicate the conditions for the operation of its generalizations;and its logical contradictions,escaped only through verbal sleight-of-hand.We will begin by pointing out such errors from his own recent articles in this journal,then Robert O.Keohane is Stanfield Professor of International Peace,Harvard University,and author of After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy(Princeton University Press, 1984).Lisa L.Martin is John L.Loeb Associate Professor of Government,Harvard University,and author of Coercive Cooperation:Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton University Press, 1992). The authors thank Marc Busch,Chris Gelpi,Andrew Moravcsik,and Celeste Wallander for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay. 1.Inis L.Claude,Power and International Relations (New York:Random House,1962).Mearsheimer relies heavily on Claude's critique in his own discussion of collective security. 2.See Richard K.Ashley,"The Poverty of Neorealism,"International Organization,Vol.38,No.2 (Spring 1984),pp.225-286.Ashley included Robert O.Keohane as one of the "neorealists"whose "orrery of errors"he rejected.The fact that Mearsheimer criticized institutionalism and critical theory in the same article should not,therefore,lead readers to believe that there is an intellectual affinity between these two schools of thought.However,the work of "constructivist"theorists such as Alexander Wendt eloquently makes a number of arguments that many institutionalists would accept. International Security,Vol.20,No.1(Summer 1995),pp.39-51 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 39

The Promise of Robert 0. Keohane Ins t Institutionalist Theory Th~eory ~~~and Lisa L. Martin In his usual direct way, John J. Mearsheimer has sharpened the theoretical issues dividing realist from institutionalist theory, and for this service we are grateful. We are also pleased that he has read the institutionalist literature so thoroughly He correctly asserts that liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, and that institutionalists only expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant common interests. Hence institutionalistheory does not espouse the Wilsonian concept of collective security-which Charles and Clifford Kupchan refer to as "ideal collective security"-critiqued so well by I.L. Claude thirty years ago.1 Nor does institutionalism embrace the aspirations to transform international relations put forward by some critical theorists. Like realism, institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic.2 However, Professor Mearsheimer's version of realism has some rather serious flaws. Among them are its penchant for assertions that turn out to be incorrect; its propensity to privilege its own viewpoint, so that in the absence of decisive evidence either way it invariably seems to prevail; its failure to explicate the conditions for the operation of its generalizations; and its logical contradictions, escaped only through verbal sleight-of-hand. We will begin by pointing out such errors from his own recent articles in this journal, then Robert 0. Keohane is Stanfield Professor of International Peace, Harvard University, and author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984). Lisa L. Martin is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton University Press, 1992). The authors thank Marc Busch, Chris Gelpi, Andrew Moravcsik, and Celeste Wallander for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay. 1. Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Mearsheimer relies heavily on Claude's critique in his own discussion of collective security. 2. See Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 225-286. Ashley included Robert 0. Keohane as one of the "neorealists" whose "orrery of errors" he rejected. The fact that Mearsheimer criticized institutionalism and critical theory in the same article should not, therefore, lead readers to believe that there is an intellectual affinity between these two schools of thought. However, the work of "constructivist" theoristsuch as Alexander Wendt eloquently makes a number of arguments that many institutionalists would accept. International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51 ? 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 39

International Security 20:1 40 examine his major claims about institutionalism.We consider the illusory divide between security and economic issues,the muddled question of"rela- tive gains,"and empirical work(admittedly in its early stages)that provides evidence of the significance of international institutions.We conclude that institutions sometimes matter,and that it is a worthy task of social science to discover how,and under what conditions,this is the case. The Fallacious Logic of Realism Five years ago Professor Mearsheimer forecast the imminent decline of NATO: "It is the Soviet threat that holds NATO together.Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent,whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate."3 At the same time,he predicted that "the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War]to grow weaker,not stronger with time."4 Yet now that both NATO and the European Community,now the European Union (EU),are expanding their memberships,and hardly in decline,he abandons specificity for the equally false but more difficult to falsify generalization that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability in a post-Cold War world."5 Professor Mearsheimer demands proof that international institutions matter. Yet he begins his article by reminding us that major governments recently have been emphasizing the value of international institutions;he could have added that they invest significant material and reputational resources in NATO,the EU,and also in organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT,recently strengthened to create the World Trade Organization) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).Not all international institutions command such resources from governments,but some do.How are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions,if such institutions are lacking in sig- nificance?Mearsheimer suggests that the answer lies in an ideological blind- ness of American policymakers,whose hostility toward realism drives them to the more congenial institutionalist framework (pp.47-49).It is difficult to 3.John J.Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instability in Europe after the Cold War,"International Security,Vol.15,No.1 (Summer 1990),p.52. 4.John J.Mearsheimer,"Correspondence:Back to the Future,Part II,"International Security,Vol. 15,No.2Fa1990),p.199. 5.John J.Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions,"International Security,Vol. 19,No.3(Winter 1994/95),p.7.Subsequent references to this article are in parentheses in the text

International Security 20:1 | 40 examine his major claims about institutionalism. We consider the illusory divide between security and economic issues, the muddled question of "relative gains," and empirical work (admittedly in its early stages) that provides evidence of the significance of international institutions. We conclude that institutionsometimes matter, and that it is a worthy task of social science to discover how, and under what conditions, this is the case. The Fallacious Logic of Realism Five years ago Professor Mearsheimer forecast the imminent decline of NATO: "It is the Soviet threat that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate."3 At the same time, he predicted that "the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War] to grow weaker, not stronger with time."4 Yet now that both NATO and the European Community, now the European Union (EU), are expanding their memberships, and hardly in decline, he abandons specificity for the equally false but more difficulto falsify generalization that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability in a post-Cold War world."5 Professor Mearsheimer demands proof that international institutions matter. Yet he begins his article by reminding us that major governments recently have been emphasizing the value of international institutions; he could have added that they invest significant material and reputational resources in NATO, the EU, and also in organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, recently strengthened to create the World Trade Organization) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Not all international institutions command such resources from governments, but some do. How are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions, if such institutions are lacking in significance? Mearsheimer suggests that the answer lies in an ideological blindness of American policymakers, whose hostility toward realism drives them to the more congenial institutionalist framework (pp. 47-49). It is difficult to 3. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 52. 4. John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondemnce: Back to the Future, Part II," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 199. 5. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 7. Subsequent references to this article are in parentheses in the text

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory 41 square this assertion of a collective delusion with the dominant role of realist theory in policy discussions,or with realism's own precepts about the forces that drive state behavior.In light of states'investments in international insti- tutions,it is fair to turn Mearsheimer's question around:could we not legiti- mately demand evidence either that leaders of governments are deluded or that NATO and the EU are designed to deceive unsophisticated observers? Mearsheimer assumes that his view is privileged,in the sense that we must accept realism unless overwhelmingly convincing evidence is presented for an alternative view;but the fact that states invest in international institutions make this stance quite problematic. Institutionalism and realism differ in a number of other respects,one of the most significant of which concerns how they approach social science.A central fault of Mearsheimer's realism as a scientific theory-rather than as rhetoric- is that the conditions for the operation of its "grim picture of world politics" (p.9)typically are not well-specified.Realism is replete with global generali- zations,lacking qualifications about the conditions under which they may be valid.Let us consider two examples from Mearsheimer's own article.First, Mearsheimer writes that "states in a realist world...must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation"(p.12, emphasis added).But he later admits that this proposition may be false when the threat of aggressive war is low-for instance,when defensive technologies (such as secure second-strike nuclear forces)are prevalent (pp.23-25).Second, in Mearsheimer's realist world,"every state would like to be the most formi- dable military power in the system"(p.12).But since no one thinks that Switzerland,Argentina,or contemporary Britain actually seeks to become "the most formidable military power,"what Mearsheimer presumably means to argue is that states with sufficient capabilities always pursue this goal.Even this statement is often false:for example,the United States during the interwar period could reasonably have expected to become the most powerful state in the world,but did not seek such a position.Confronted with such contradic- tions and anomalies,realism typically retreats from universal rhetoric to post hoc and ad hoc qualifications,taking into account geography,history,percep- tions,and domestic politics. Institutionalism,in contrast,seeks to state in advance the conditions under which its propositions apply.Our theory may therefore have less appeal to those who require simple"truths,"but purportedly scientific theories should specify the conditions under which the theory is expected to hold a priori.As Mearsheimer indicates,when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation,we do not expect cooperation to occur,nor the institutions

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory | 41 square this assertion of a collective delusion with the dominant role of realist theory in policy discussions, or with realism's own precepts about the forces that drive state behavior. In light of states' investments in international institutions, it is fair to turn Mearsheimer's question around: could we not legitimately demand evidence either that leaders of governments are deluded or that NATO and the EU are designed to deceive unsophisticated observers? Mearsheimer assumes that his view is privileged, in the sense that we must accept realism unless overwhelmingly convincing evidence is presented for an alternative view; but the fact that states invest in international institutions make this stance quite problematic. Institutionalism and realism differ in a number of other respects, one of the most significant of which concerns how they approach social science. A central fault of Mearsheimer's realism as a scientific theory-rather than as rhetoricis that the conditions for the operation of its "grim picture of world politics" (p. 9) typically are not well-specified. Realism is replete with global generalizations, lacking qualifications about the conditions under which they may be valid. Let us consider two examples from Mearsheimer's own article. First, Mearsheimer writes that "states in a realist world . . . must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation" (p. 12, emphasis added). But he later admits that this proposition may be false when the threat of aggressive war is low-for instance, when defensive technologies (such as secure second-strike nuclear forces) are prevalent (pp. 23-25). Second, in Mearsheimer's realist world, "every state would like to be the most formidable military power in the system" (p. 12). But since no one thinks that Switzerland, Argentina, or contemporary Britain actually seeks to become "the most formidable military power," what Mearsheimer presumably means to argue is that states with sufficient capabilities always pursue this goal. Even this statement is often false: for example, the United States during the interwar period could reasonably have expected to become the most powerful state in the world, but did not seek such a position. Confronted with such contradictions and anomalies, realism typically retreats from universal rhetoric to post hoc and ad hoc qualifications, taking into account geography, history, perceptions, and domestic politics. Institutionalism, in contrast, seeks to state in advance the conditions under which its propositions apply. Our theory may therefore have less appeal to those who require simple "truths," but purportedly scientific theories should specify the conditions under which the theory is expected to hold a priori. As Mearsheimer indicates, when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur, nor the institutions

International Security 20:1 42 that facilitate cooperation to develop.When states can jointly benefit from cooperation,on the other hand,we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions.Institutions can provide information,reduce transaction costs,make commitments more credible,establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur,institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid.It is in this sense that institutionalism claims to subsume realism. Realism's proclivity for bold,unqualified generalizations not only generates anomalies but gets its proponents into logical difficulties.Mearsheimer holds that "institutions have no independent effect on state behavior"(p.7);that NATO is an institution (p.13);and that NATO played a role in preventing World War III and helping the West win the Cold War (pp.13-14).These propositions sound like a classically fallacious syllogism,until one recognizes that there is an escape clause:"NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War,and it was that balance of power,not NATO per se,that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent"(p.14).But liberal institutionalists,who see institu- tions as rooted in the realities of power and interest,do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions.What we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities.Institutions are important "independently"only in the ordi- nary sense used in social science:controlling for the effects of power and interests,it matters whether they exist.They also have an interactive effect, meaning that their impact on outcomes varies,depending on the nature of power and interests.Mearsheimer is forced to admit the truth of institutional effects with regard to NATO,although for rhetorical purposes he shifts his ground to attack a view that we do not hold:that institutions can prevent war regardless of the structure in which they operate. Hence Mearsheimer's version of realism is replete with analytical problems. However,it is not our duty here to correct realism's copy-book.In the rest of this brief response,therefore,we focus on the promise of institutionalist theory, and the research directions that we hope will help to realize that promise. Political Economy vs.Security and the Issue of Relative Gains Although Mearsheimer has provided an admirable summary of several aspects of institutionalist theory,his version of our argument requires correction on

International Security 20:1 | 42 that facilitate cooperation to develop. When states can jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions. Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity. By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur, institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid. It is in this sense that institutionalism claims to subsume realism. Realism's proclivity for bold, unqualified generalizations not only generates anomalies but gets its proponents into logical difficulties. Mearsheimer holds that "institutions have no independent effect on state behavior" (p. 7); that NATO is an institution (p. 13); and that NATO played a role in preventing World War III and helping the West win the Cold War (pp. 13-14). These propositions sound like a classically fallacious syllogism, until one recognizes that there is an escape clause: "NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent" (p. 14). But liberal institutionalists, who see institutions as rooted in the realities of power and interest, do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions. What we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities. Institutions are important "independently" only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist. They also have an interactive effect, meaning that their impact on outcomes varies, depending on the nature of power and interests. Mearsheimer is forced to admit the truth of institutional effects with regard to NATO, although for rhetorical purposes he shifts his ground to attack a view that we do not hold: that institutions can prevent war regardless of the structure in which they operate. Hence Mearsheimer's version of realism is replete with analytical problems. However, it is not our duty here to correct realism's copy-book. In the rest of this brief response, therefore, we focus on the promise of institutionalist theory, and the research directions that we hope will help to realize that promise. Political Economy vs. Security and the Issue of Relative Gains Although Mearsheimer has provided an admirable summary of several aspects of institutionalistheory, his version of our argument requires correction on

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