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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion

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International Studies Quarterly(1998)42,709-731 Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion DANIEL W.DREZNER University of Colorado at Boulder Despite their increasing importance,there is little theoretical under- standing of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions or what deter- mines their success.These events are often explained away as "symbolic politics"driven completely by domestic-level factors.This article develops a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion to show that both "senders"and "targets"of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior.Conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect on'coercion events.First,senders that anticipate frequent conflicts will be more willing to initiate economic coercion,even if such attempts are costly.Senders that anticipate few conflicts will not threaten sanctions unless they incur mini- mal costs and the target would suffer significantly.While a robust antici- pation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions.Target states that anticipate frequent conflict with the sender will make fewer concessions.Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains.These hypotheses are tested statistically,with the results strongly supporting the conflict expectations model. In 1990,the United States convinced the United Nations Security Council to impose stringent economic sanctions against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.These sanctions achieved the greatest degree of international coop- eration in modern history and cost Iraq half of its GNP in lost trade.The Iraqi regime refused to back down,however,and force was needed to restore Kuwaiti independence. In 1991,the United States threatened to withhold loan guarantees from Israel unless that country agreed to halt the construction of new housing in the West Bank and attend a multilateral peace conference in Madrid.Unlike the Iraqi case,in this episode the United States acted alone,without much fanfare,and against the wishes of an active domestic lobby.The costs of the sanctions to Israel were significant but far lower than in the Iraqi case.Yet in the end the Israelis acquiesced. Why were the outcomes so different?More generally,under what conditions will a sanctioning country (called the sender)attempt economic coercion?What determines the magnitude of the concessions made by the sanctioned country(called the target)? Author's nate:I thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,John Ferejohn,Kurt Taylor Gaubatz,Judy Goldstein,Stephen D. Krasner,and Paul Krugman for their comments on earlier drafts.Previous versions of this article were presented at Stanford University,the University of Colorado at Boulder,and the University of California at Santa Barbara.I am grateful to the seminar participants at these places for their valuable contributions.All remaining errors are my own. 1998 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishers,350 Main Street,Malden,MA 02148,USA,and 108 Cowley Road,Oxford OX4 IJF,UK

International Studies QuaTterly (1998) 42, 709-73 1 Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion Uniuersity of Colorado at Boulder Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions or what determines their success. These events are often explained away as "symbolic politics" driven completely by domestic-level factors. This article develops a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion to show that both "senders" and "targets" of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect oncoercion events. First, senders that anticipate frequent conflicts will be more willing to initiate economic coercion, even if such attempts are costly. Senders that anticipate few conflicts will not threaten sanctions unless they incur minimal costs and the target would suffer significantly. While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions. Target states that anticipate frequent conflict with the sender will make fewer concessions. Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. These hypotheses are tested statistically, with the results strongly supporting the conflict expectations model. In 1990, the United States convinced the United Nations Security Coun'cil to impose stringent economic sanctions against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. These sanctions achieved the greatest degree of international cooperation in modern history and cost Iraq half of its GNP in lost trade. The Iraqi regime refused to back down, however, and force was needed to restore Kuwaiti independence. In 199 1, the United States threatened to withhold loan guarantees from Israel unless that country agreed to halt the construction of new housing in the West Bank and attend a multilateral peace conference in Madrid. Unlike the Iraqi case, in this episode the United States acted alone, without much fanfare, and against the wishes of an active domestic lobby. The costs of the sanctions to Israel were significant but far lower than in the Iraqi case. Yet in the end the Israelis acquiesced. Why were the outcomes so ddferent? More generally, under what conditions will a sanctioning country (called the sender) attempt economic coercion? What determines the magnitude of the concessions made by the sanctioned country (called the target)? Author's note: I thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, John Ferejohn, Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Judy Goldstein, Stephen D. Krasner, and Paul Krugman for their comments on earlier drafts. Previous versions of this article were presented at Stanford University, the University of Colorado at Boulder, and the University of California at Santa Barbara. I am grateful to the seminar participants at these places for their valuable contributions. All remaining errors are my own. 01998 International Studies Association. Published by Black~~~ell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK

710 Conflict Exbectations The answers to these questions are not trivial.The use of economic coercion in international relations has a long pedigree;the Athenian boycott of Megara was one of the triggering events of the Peloponnesian War.The end of the Cold War has brought this tool of statecraft renewed prominence.The United States has threat- ened or implemented economic coercion against more than forty countries since 1990.The Russian Federation has been quite willing to employ economic coercion as a way of gaining political concessions from the newly independent states.As public resistance to military interventions has increased,policymakers are turning more and more to economic statecraft as an alternative policy option.I The increased prominence of economic coercion has led to an increase in the scholarly literature,but not much progress has been made.With some notable exceptions (Martin,1992;Morgan and Schwebach,1997)most of the recent contributions consist of well-crafted theories that lack empirical support(Eaton and Engers,1992;Smith,1996),or well-crafted case studies that produce generalizations of dubious quality (Galtung,1967;Cortright and Lopez,1995;Klotz,1996).One scholar claims that the one constant about economic sanctions is that each event is purposefully random (Tsebelis,1990).Furthermore,most of the literature has focused on the outcomes of coercion attempts;there has been little research explain- ing when senders will initiate threats or acts of economic sanctions. This article uses a simple game-theoretic model to develop a theory of economic coercion that can answer those questions.The short-run opportunity costs of sanctions imposition are important,but they are not the only factor.Just as important to explaining economic coercion are the expectations of future bilateral conflict held by the target and sender countries.Conceding in the face of economic coercion implies a redistribution of assets between the target and sender.Nation- states care about this redistribution if they think it will harm their bargaining position in future conflicts.This expectation of future conflict is translated into a short-run concern for relative gains and reputation that varies with the expectation of future threats or conflicts in the bilateral relationship between the sender and target. Conflict expectations is an abstract concept that can be empirically measured by observing the alignment between the target and the sender.Allies will expect fewer political conflicts than adversaries.Adversaries will expect more zero-sum conflicts in the future,and so will care more about the material and reputational repercus- sions of existing conflicts.Because of heightened conflict expectations,adversaries will care more than allies about relative gains and reputation for bargaining toughness. The expectation of future conflict has a contradictory effect on economic coer- cion.On the one hand,it makes senders more willing to threaten economic sanctions.The greater the concern for relative gains,the more likely the sanctioner will prefer a stalemate outcome of disrupted economic exchange and attempt to coerce.With adversaries,a sender will be willing to incur significant costs,provided the target incurs even greater costs.With an ally,the costs to itself must be less and the costs to the target must be greater before the sender will attempt economic I In this article,I switch between the terms ecomnomic coercion,economic statecraf,and economic sanctions in the interest of style,but I am much more comfortable with the first term because of its inclusiveness.There is an odd demarcation line between what is described as a sanctions event and what is not.For example,the United States imposed trade sanctions on South Africa in 1985.The sanctions were threatened and then implemented as a way of putting pressure on South Africa's government to end apartheid.In 1997,the United States pressured the World Bank to postpone loans to Croatia until that country more closely adhered to the Dayton Accord provisions on refugees and war criminals.The former event is commonly described as a sanctions episode,while the latter is not.They are both efforts at economic coercion,however,and the theory developed here will try to explain both events.See Baldwin,1985,for a further discussion

710 Conjict Expectations The answers to these questions are not trivial. The use of economic coercion in international relations has a long pedigree; the Athenian boycott of Megara was one of the triggering events of the Peloponnesian War. The end of the Cold War has brought this tool of statecraft renewed prominence. The United States has threatened or implemented economic coercion against more than forty countries since 1990. The Russian Federation has been quite willing to employ economic coercion as a way of gaining political concessions from the newly independent states. As public resistance to military interventions has increased, policymakers are turning more and more to economic statecraft as an alternative policy option.1 The increased prominence of economic coercion has led to an increase in the scholarly literature, but not much progress has been made. With some notable exceptions (Martin, 1992; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997) most of the recent contributions consist of well-crafted theories that lack empirical support (Eaton and Engers, 1992; Smith, 1996), or well-crafted case studies that produce generalizations of dubious quality (Galtung, 1967; Cortright and Lopez, 1995; Klotz, 1996). One scholar claims that the one constant about economic sanctions is that each event is purposefully random (Tsebelis, 1990). Furthermore, most of the literature has focused on the outcomes of coercion attempts; there has been litt,le research explaining when senders will initiate threats or acts of economic sanctions. This article uses a simple game-theoretic model to develop a theory of economic coercion that can answer those questions. The short-run opportunity costs of sanctions imposition are important, but they are not the only factor. Just as important to explaining economic coercion are the expectations of future bilateral conflict held by the target and sender countries. Conceding in the face of economic coercion implies a redistribution of assets between the target and sender. Nationstates care about this redistribution if they think it will harm their bargaining position in future conflicts. This expectation of future conflict is translated into a short-run concern for relative gains and reputation that varies with the expectation of future threats or conflicts in the bilateral relationship between the sender and target. Conflict expectations is an abstract concept that can be empirically measured by observing the alignment between the target and the sender. Allies will expect fewer political conflicts than adversaries. Adversaries will expect more zero-sum conflicts in the future, and so will care more about the material and reputational repercussions of existing conflicts. Because of heightened conflict expectations, adversaries will care more than allies about relative gains and reputation for bargaining toughness. The ex~ectation of future conflict has a contradictorv effect on economic coer- i cion. On the one hand, it makes senders more willing to threaten economic sanctions. The greater the concern for relative gains, the more likely the sanctioner will prefer a stalemate outcome of disrupted economic exchange and attempt to coerce. With adversaries, a sender will be willing to incur significant costs, provided the target incurs even greater costs. With an ally, the costs to itself must be less and the costs to the target must be greater before the sender will attempt economic 1 In this article, I switch between the terms economic coercion, economic statecraft, and economic sunctions in the interest of style, but I am much more comfortable with the first term because of its inclusiv~ness. There is an odd demarcation line between what is described as a sanctions event and what is not. For example, the United States imposed trade sanctions on South Africa in 1985.The sanctions were threatened and then implemented as a way of putting pressure on South Africa's government to end apartheid. In 1997,the United States pressured the World Bank to postpone loans to Croatia until that country more closely adhered to the Dayton Accord provisions on refugees and war criminals. The former event is commonly described as a sanctions episode, while the latter is not. They are both efforts at economic coercion, however, and the theory developed here will try to explain both events. See Baldwin, 1985, for a further discussion

DANIEL W.DREZNER 711 pressure.Ceteris paribus,senders will be eager to coerce adversaries,and reluctant to coerce allies. Eagerness does not translate into greater concessions.The second effect of conflict expectations is paradoxical and surprising.While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy,it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions.The target's conflict expectations determine the magnitude of concessions.Facing an adversarial sender,the target will be worried about the long-run implications ofacquiescing.Because it expects frequent conflicts, the target will be concerned about concessions in the present undercutting its bargaining position in future interactions.The sender might exploit the material or reputational effects from conceding in later conflicts.When relative gains concern is prominent,a concession represents a gain for the coercer and a loss for the coerced.When reputation is important,acquiescence bolsters the sender's credibil- ity as a tough negotiator while weakening the target's reputation.With allies,this concern is not prominent,because the target anticipates fewer zero-sum conflicts. Ceteris paribus,targets will concede more to allies than adversaries.Ironically,a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about relative gains. A conflict expectations model can explain the dynamics of economic coercion with more accuracy and parsimony than other theories.A major problem with the existing literature is that theories are developed from just one or two well-publicized cases of economic sanctions (Galtung,1967;Hoffman,1967;Schreiber,1973; Losman,1979;Renwick,1981;Doxey,1987).The very celebrity of these cases suggests they are atypical,that they stand out in some unusual way.In "classic"cases, the sender and target are usually adversaries.Thus,existing explanations overlook less contentious but more successful coercion attempts between allies.By choosing cases that take on extreme values of both the dependent variable and several independent variables,the literature commits two errors.First,there is a tendency to underestimate the main causal effects on the universe of events.Second,these studies will overestimate effects that are unique to the extreme set of cases (Collier and Mahoney,1996).In focusing on a limited subset of coercion cases,these writings have painted a distorted picture of economic sanctions.These arguments are not necessarily wrong,but the empirical evidence marshaled for their arguments is insufficient.In contrast to a conflict expectations model,they explain fewer cases, and less of the variation in outcomes. The following section further develops the notion of conflict expectations.The next section uses a simple coercion game to formalize the argument;the model generates testable propositions about the relationship between opportunity costs, alignment,and coercion events.The following three sections (a)consider what happens when conflict expectations change during the sanctions episode,(b) describe the data and testing procedures,and(c)examine the statistical results on sanctions events data and show they provide moderately strong support for the model.The final section summarizes and concludes. The Effect of Conflict Expectations For the purposes of this model,the actors are the foreign policy leaders of nation-states.It is assumed that the foreign policy regimes within these states act as a unitary,rational actor.This assumption has been made repeatedly in international relations theory (Krasner,1978;Bueno de Mesquita,1981),and the justification for it will not be delved into here. Conflict expectations influence state preferences about conceding to coercive pressure in a conflict in two ways.First,states are concerned that concessions made in the present can be used later to threaten their security.This possibility leads to

pressure. Ceteris paribus, senders will be eager to coerce adversaries, and reluctant to coerce allies. Eagerness does not translate into greater concessions. The second effect of conflict expectations is paradoxical and surprising. While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions. The target's conflict expectations determine the magnitude of concessions. Facing an adversarial sender, the target will be worried about the long-run implications of acquiescing. Because it expects frequent conflicts, the target will be concerned about concessions in the present undercutting its bargaining position in future interactions. The sender might exploit the material or reputational effects from conceding in later conflicts. When relative gains concern is prominent, a concession represents a gain for the coercer and a loss for the coerced. When re~utation is im~ortant. acauiescence bolsters the sender's credibil- I 1 ' I ity as a tough negotiator while weakening the target's reputation. With allies, this concern is not prominent, because the target anticipates fewer zero-sum conflicts. Ceteris paribus, targets will concede more to allies than adversaries. Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about relative gains. A conflict ex~ectations model can ex~lain the dvnamics of economic coercion I 1 i with more accuracy and parsimony than other theories. A major problem with the existing literature is that theories are developed from just one or two well-publicized cases of economic sanctions (Galtung, 1967; Hoffman, 1967; Schreiber, 1973; Losman, 1979; Renwick, 1981; Doxey, 1987). The very celebrity of these cases suggests they are atypical, that they stand out in some unusual way. In "classic" cases, the sender and target are usually adversaries. Thus, existing explanations overlook less contentious but more successful coercion attempts between allies. By choosing cases that take on extreme values of both the dependent variable and several indeeendent variables. the literature commits two errors. First, there is a tendencv to underestimate the main causal effects on the universe of events. Second, these studies will overestimate effects that are unique to the extreme set of cases (Collier and Mahoney, 1996). In focusing on a limited subset of coercion cases, these writings have painted a distorted picture of economic sanctions. These arguments are not necessarily wrong, but the empirical evidence marshaled for their zrguments is insufficient. In contrast to a conflict exeectations model, thev explain fewer cases, ' , A and less of the variation in outcomes. The following section further develops the notion of conflict expectations. The next section uses a simple coercion game to formalize the argument; the model generates testable propositions about the relationship between opportunity costs, alignment, and coercion events. The following three sections (a) consider what happens when conflict expectations change during the sanctions episode, (b) describe the data and testing procedures, and (c) examine the statistical results on sanctions events data and show they provide moderately strong support for the model. The final section summarizes and concludes. The Effect of Conflict Expectations For the purposes of this model, the actors are the foreign policy leaders of nation-states. It is assumed that the foreign policy regimes within these states act as a unitary, rational actor. This assumption has been made repeatedly in international relations theory (Krasner, 1978; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981), and the justification for it will not be delved into here. Conflict expectations influence state preferences about conceding to coercive eressure in a conflict in two wavs. First. states are concerned that concessions made in the present can be used later to threaten their security. This possibility leads to

712 Conflict Expectations an explicit concern for relative gains.This concern becomes more important if states expect frequent disputes.Second,states prefer to have a reputation for tough bargaining.The importance of reputation increases as the likelihood of repeated conflict increases. The debate about the role of relative gains concern in international relations is an all too familiar one.For the past decade,it has been couched in terms of the debate between the neoliberal and neorealist paradigms.2 Realists argue that states must be wary of gaps in gains because of the ever present possibility that those gaps will be exploited in a future military attack.Neoliberals,by contrast,argue that these factors are salient only under extreme circumstances.This debate is concerned with variables such as polarity and the offense-defense balance to determine the extent of relative gains.The logic developed here sidesteps this debate.It argues that states will care about relative gains if they anticipate that those gaps will reduce their absolute utility in the long run (Viner,1948;Matthews,1996).This could be due to the possibility of a military conflict,as realists argue.It could also be due to the possibility that a small concession in the present could lead to the long-run disintegration of a state's position on a particular issue.Either way,foreign policy leaders will care about relative gains if they expect that an unequal distribution of gains in the present will lead to reduced benefits in future conflicts. Concessions made in the present can be translated into future leverage.Robert Keohane observes: For relative gains,rather than simply the desire to maximize utility to account for tough negotiations,there must be some plausible way by which one's partner could use advantages gained from the international agreement to hurt oneself in a future period,and a significant motivation to do so.Only if the advocate of a relative gains interpretation can show that these conditions are met,is it plausible to entertain this hypothesis.(1993:281) The subject matter of economic coercion is well suited to Keohane's criteria.In a sanctions dispute,economic leverage is used to extract political concessions.Unlike economic cooperation,a successful sanctions episode results in an explicit transfer of political assets from the target to the sender.States will be concerned about relative gains due to the possibility of today's concessions becoming tomorrow's leverage.A variety of demands could be used in this fashion.A Great Power may use economic coercion to secure basing rights,and those bases are used in a later coercion episode to threaten the targeted country.A demand for greater liberaliza- tion within the target regime might permit the sender country to exploit domestic divisions in a later dispute.The importance of the transfer increases as the likelihood of future conflict increases.When a country makes a political concession to a potential aggressor,the decision to acquiesce has a greater probability of coming back to haunt the country in the future. How important are these transfers?The standard realist argument assumes that between states of unequal power,the concern for relative gains is unimportant, because the distribution of power is already lopsided.Such an argument assumes that all power is fungible,and therefore Great Powers can readily impose their will on smaller states.Any transfer is of little importance in the overall distribution of power.There are two flaws in this logic,however,that suggest that unequal adversaries will care just as much about material transfers as equal adversaries.First, 2For the realist argument see Grieco,1988,1990;Gowa,1994;Powell,1991;Mearsheimer,1995;and Rousso,1996. For the neoliberal responses see Snidal,1991;Keohane,1993;Keohane and Martin,1995;and Liberman,1996

7 12 Conjlict Expectations an explicit concern for relative gains. This concern becomes more important if states expect frequent disputes. Second, states prefer to have a reputation for tough bargaining. The importance of reputation increases as the likelihood of repeated conflict increases. The debate about the role of relative gains concern in international relations is " an all too familiar one. For the past decade, it has been couched in terms of the debate between the neoliberal and neorealist paradigms.2 Realists argue that states must be wary of gaps in gains because of the ever present possibility that those gaps will be exploited in a future military attack. Neoliberals, by contrast, argue that these factors are salient only under extreme circumstances. This debate is concerned with variables such as ~olaritv and the offense-defense balance to determine the extent of relative gains. ?he loiic developed here sidesteps this debate. It argues that states will care about relative gains if they anticipate that those gaps will reduce their absolute utility in the long run (Viner, 1948; Matthews, 1996). This could be due to the possibility of a military conflict, as realists argue. It could also be due to the possibility that a small concession in the present could lead to the long-run disintegration of a state's position on a particular issue. Either way, foreign policy leaders will care about relative gains if they expect that an unequal distribution of gains in the present will lead to reduced benefits in future conflicts. Concessions made in the mesent can be translated into future leverage. Robert U Keohane observes: For relative gains, rather than simply the desire to maximize utility to account for tough negotiations, there must be some plausible way by which one's partner could use advantages gained from the international agreement to hurt oneself in a future period, and a significant motivation to do so. Only if the advocate of a relative gains interpretation can show that these conditions are met, is it plausible to entertain this hypothesis. (1993:281) The subject matter of economic coercion is well suited to'Keohane's criteria. In a sanctions dispute, economic leverage is used to extract political concessions. Unlike economic cooperation, a successful sanctions episode results inin explicit transfer of political assets from the target to the sender. States will be concerned about relative gains due to the possibility of today's concessions becoming tomorrow's leverage. A variety of demands could be used in this fashion. A Great Power may use economic coercion to secure basing rights, and those bases are used in a later coercion episode to threaten the targeted country. A demand for greater liberalization within the target regime might permit the sender country to exploit domestic divisions in a later dispute. The importance of the transfer increases as the likelihood of future conflict increases. When a country makes a political concession to a potential aggressor, the decision to acquiesce has a greater probability of coming back to haunt the country in the future. How important are these transfers? The standard realist argument assumes that between states of unequal power, the concern for relative gains is unimportant, because the distribution of power is already lopsided. Such an argument assumes that all power is fungible, and therefore Great Powers can readily impose their will on smaller states. Any transfer is of little importance in the overall distribution of power. There are two flaws in this logic, however, that suggest that unequal adversaries will care just as much about material transfers as equal adversaries. First, 2 For the realist argument see Grieco, 1988, 1990; Gowa, 1994; Powell, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1995; and Rousso, 1996. For the neoliberal responses see Snidal, 1991; Keohane, 1993; Keohane and Martin, 1995; and Liberman, 1996

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