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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Institutions and International Political Economy）The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy

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THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY Politics,Coalitions,and International Trade By MICHAEL A.BAILEY,JUDITH GOLDSTEIN,and BARRY R.WEINGAST ey的be political conditions that will support such a policy.According to con- ventional views,even if politicians recognize that society gains from trade,they are constrained because of an organizational bias in society: those who lose from increased trade have a greater incentive to orga- nize than those who benefit from the policy.The outcome is an over- representation of protectionist interests and constant pressure on governments to close markets.Although logically consistent,the con- ventional view suffers from the empirical problem that democracies have and continue to support free-trade policies.We argue that politi- cal institutions,by structuring conflict over trade policy,provide an ex- planation for the divergence between analyses that predict economic closure and the empirical reality of relatively free trade. The importance of institutional rules is no more apparent than in the case of the creation and sustenance of a liberal trade policy in the United States.For most of the nineteenth century,protectionist inter- ests successfully pressured Congress to maintain high barriers to trade. Although the interest of manufacturers in cheap raw materials period- ically led Congress to enact a"free list"for such products,the interests of consumers and exporters were largely ignored.This situation changed dramatically with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agree- ments Act(RTAA)in 1934,which changed the way trade policy was de- termined and set the stage for American leadership in efforts to expand international trade. Trade liberalization in the United States was neither inevitable nor irrevocable;the structure of American politics in the middle of the twentieth century made trade policy still vulnerable to protectionist impulses that were difficult to contain.Hence,any explanation of American trade policy must account not only for the passage of the World Politics 49(April 1997),309-38 This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue,13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use Terms ad Conditions

THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade By MICHAEL A. BAILEY, JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, and BARRY R. WEINGAST WHILE economists are unanimous in their agreement that free trade yields significant welfare gains, no consensus exists on the political conditions that will support such a policy. According to con ventional views, even if politicians recognize that society gains from trade, they are constrained because of an organizational bias in society: those who lose from increased trade have a greater incentive to orga nize than those who benefit from the policy The outcome is an over representation of protectionist interests and constant pressure on governments to close markets. Although logically consistent, the con ventional view suffers from the empirical problem that democracies have and continue to support free-trade policies. We argue that politi cal institutions, by structuring conflict over trade policy, provide an ex planation for the divergence between analyses that predict economic closure and the empirical reality of relatively free trade. The importance of institutional rules is no more apparent than in the case of the creation and sustenance of a liberal trade policy in the United States. For most of the nineteenth century, protectionist inter ests successfully pressured Congress to maintain high barriers to trade. Although the interest of manufacturers in cheap raw materials period ically led Congress to enact a "free list" for such products, the interests of consumers and exporters were largely ignored. This situation changed dramatically with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agree ments Act (rtaa) in 1934, which changed the way trade policy was de termined and set the stage for American leadership in efforts to expand international trade. Trade liberalization in the United States was neither inevitable nor irrevocable; the structure of American politics in the middle of the twentieth century made trade policy still vulnerable to protectionist impulses that were difficult to contain. Hence, any explanation of American trade policy must account not only for the passage of the World Politics 49 (April 1997), 309-38 This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue, 13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

310 WORLD POLITICS RTAA but also for how and why Congress sustained the trade liberaliza- tion program in the ensuing decades. This essay offers an explanation for the timing,form,and efficacy of this institutional innovation.The argument has two parts.First,we ask what explains the choice of the rules and procedures that characterized the 1934 foundational legislation.Two rule changes distinguished the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act from its predecessors:(1)it man- dated reciprocal,not unilateral,tariff reductions,and(2)it authorized trade agreements on the basis of a simple majority vote instead of the supermajority mandated in the Constitution.We argue that these changes in trade rules reflected efforts by the Democratic Party to build support for free trade within the party and to insulate trade policy from a future Republican Congress. Second,the essay demonstrates how these two institutional changes shifted American policy to a more liberal equilibrium.The real signifi- cance of the RTAA was not just that it was passed;had it been overturned a few years later,after all,it would be nothing but a footnote to Ameri- can trade history.Rather,the RTAA had an impact because it created a dynamic of political support for free trade.In contrast to perspectives in which Congress is seen to have abdicated control of trade policy,we focus on how presidential agreements affected congressional prefer- ences.The president's"bundling"of international and domestic tariffs made low tariffs politically durable.The ensuing increases in world trade made members of Congress more willing to trade off the political risk of reducing U.S.tariffs for the political benefits of gaining access to foreign markets.This change in preference enabled presidents to ask for and receive ever broader authority to negotiate tariff reductions. We divide this essay into three sections.Section I begins with the empirical observation of the breakdown of partisan divisions on trade and the emergence of a free-trade coalition,a puzzling occurrence given the previous decades of trade closure and continued congressional involvement in trade policy.Section II explains the origins of the RTAA and shows how political factors changed the institutional environment of trade policy.We offer a model in which members of Congress,the president,and a generic foreign government interact on trade policy. Section III examines the dynamic effects of the RTAA and shows how its institutional structure changed the political environment of trade policy.Not only did the RTAA dramatically increase the political dura- bility of low tariffs,but,as we show through an empirical examination of congressional voting in 1953 and 1962,the rise in exports that it brought about also led to changes in congressional preferences on trade. This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue,13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

310 WORLD POLITICS RTAA but also for how and why Congress sustained the trade liberaliza tion program in the ensuing decades. This essay offers an explanation for the timing, form, and efficacy of this institutional innovation. The argument has two parts. First, we ask what explains the choice of the rules and procedures that characterized the 1934 foundational legislation. Two rule changes distinguished the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act from its predecessors: (1) it man dated reciprocal, not unilateral, tariff reductions, and (2) it authorized trade agreements on the basis of a simple majority vote instead of the supermajority mandated in the Constitution. We argue that these changes in trade rules reflected efforts by the Democratic Party to build support for free trade within the party and to insulate trade policy from a future Republican Congress. Second, the essay demonstrates how these two institutional changes shifted American policy to a more liberal equilibrium. The real signifi cance of the RTAA was not just that it was passed; had it been overturned a few years later, after all, it would be nothing but a footnote to Ameri can trade history. Rather, the RTAA had an impact because it created a dynamic of political support for free trade. In contrast to perspectives in which Congress is seen to have abdicated control of trade policy, we focus on how presidential agreements affected congressional prefer ences. The president s "bundling" of international and domestic tariffs made low tariffs politically durable. The ensuing increases in world trade made members of Congress more willing to trade off the political risk of reducing U.S. tariffs for the political benefits of gaining access to foreign markets. This change in preference enabled presidents to ask for and receive ever broader authority to negotiate tariff reductions. We divide this essay into three sections. Section I begins with the empirical observation of the breakdown of partisan divisions on trade and the emergence of a free-trade coalition, a puzzling occurrence given the previous decades of trade closure and continued congressional involvement in trade policy. Section II explains the origins of the RTAA and shows how political factors changed the institutional environment of trade policy. We offer a model in which members of Congress, the president, and a generic foreign government interact on trade policy. Section III examines the dynamic effects of the RTAA and shows how its institutional structure changed the political environment of trade policy. Not only did the RTAA dramatically increase the political dura bility of low tariffs, but, as we show through an empirical examination of congressional voting in 1953 and 1962, the rise in exports that it brought about also led to changes in congressional preferences on trade. This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue, 13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 311 I.BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR TRADE POLICY One of the anomalies in the history of U.S.politics involves the rela- tively rapid change in the political salience of trade policy.Where trade policy was a defining issue of partisan politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,it all but disappeared from the political arena by the 1950s.Indicative of the charged political climate of early tariff policy-making were policy shifts that followed changes in control of government.As shown in Table 1,trade policy through 1934 shows tremendous predictability.In general,when Democrats took office, they lowered tariffs;when Republicans held office,they did the oppo- site.This ability to predict policy based on party control disappears in midcentury.After World War II the parties look increasingly similar in their voting behavior.(See Figures 1 and 2.)What explains this change in congressional preferences? There is an impressive body of literature suggesting that change oc- curred because Congress abdicated its control over trade policy when the RTAA transferred authority for setting tariffs to the president.By one account,the work associated with tariff legislation had become so onerous that members of Congress chose to remove themselves from the process.While revision of tariff schedules had never been a simple matter,the process had degenerated into a frenzy of special-interest TABLE 1 PARTISAN PATTERNS OF MAJOR TARIFF LEGISLATION (1846-1934) Control of Congress Year and Presidency Legislation General Effect 1846 Democrat Walker reduced tariffs 1861 Republican Morrill increased tariffs 1890 Republican McKinley increased tariffs 1894 Democrat Wilson-Gorman reduced tariffs 1897 Republican Dingley increased tariffs 1909 Republican Payne-Aldrich reduced tariffs 1913 Democrat Underwood reduced tariffs 1922 Republican Fordney-McCumber increased tariffs 1930 Republican Smoot-Hawley increased tariffs 1934 Democrat RTAA reduced tariffs Raymond Bauer,Ithiel de Sola Pool,and Lewis Dexter,American Business and Public Policy,2d ed. (Chicago:Aldine-Atherton,1972),14;Douglas Nelson,"Domestic Political Preconditions of U.S. Trade Policy:Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics,"Journal of Public Policy 9(January-April 1986). This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue,13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AMERICAN TRADE POLICY I. Bipartisan Support for Trade Policy 311 One of the anomalies in the history of U.S. politics involves the rela tively rapid change in the political salience of trade policy. Where trade policy was a defining issue of partisan politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it all but disappeared from the political arena by the 1950s. Indicative of the charged political climate of early tariff policy-making were policy shifts that followed changes in control of government. As shown in Table 1, trade policy through 1934 shows tremendous predictability. In general, when Democrats took office, they lowered tariffs; when Republicans held office, they did the oppo site. This ability to predict policy based on party control disappears in midcentury. After World War II the parties look increasingly similar in their voting behavior. (See Figures 1 and 2.) What explains this change in congressional preferences? There is an impressive body of literature suggesting that change oc curred because Congress abdicated its control over trade policy when the RTAA transferred authority for setting tariffs to the president. By one account, the work associated with tariff legislation had become so onerous that members of Congress chose to remove themselves from the process.1 While revision of tariff schedules had never been a simple matter, the process had degenerated into a frenzy of special-interest Table 1 Partisan Patterns of Major Tariff Legislation (1846-1934) Control of Congress Year and Presidency Legislation General Effect 1846 1861 1890 1894 1897 1909 1913 1922 1930 1934 Democrat Republican Republican Democrat Republican Republican Democrat Republican Republican Democrat Walker Morrill McKinley Wilson-Gorman Dingley Payne-Aldrich Underwood Fordney-McCumber Smoot-Hawley RTAA reduced tariffs increased tariffs increased tariffs reduced tariffs increased tariffs reduced tariffs reduced tariffs increased tariffs increased tariffs reduced tariffs 1 Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, American Business and Public Policy* 2d ed. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 14; Douglas Nelson, "Domestic Political Preconditions of U.S. Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics," Journal of Public Policy 9 (January-April 1986). This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue, 13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

312 WORLD POLITICS 1.00 00 0.70 0.60 -Dem 0.50 0A0 .....Rep 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 茵卧恩罩 FIGURE 1 VOTING IN SENATE ON PASSAGE OF MAJOR TRADE LEGISLATION BY PARTY (1913-62) SOURCES:The votes included in the figures are as follows:1913 Underwood Tariff,1922 Fordney- McCumber Tariff,1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff,1934 RTAA,1937 RTAA Renewal,1940 RTAA Renewal, 1943 RTAA Renewal,1945 RTAA Renewal (HR3240),1951 RTAA Renewal in Senate(HR1612) (House vote was voice vote),1953 RTAA Renewal (HR5495),1954 RTAA Renewal (HR9474),1955 RTAA Renewal(HR1),1958 RTAA Renewal(HR12591),1962 Trade Expansion Act(HR 11970). Votes in favor of the Underwood Tariff,the RTAA,all RTAA renewals,and the Trade Expansion Act are coded as votes for liberalization.Votes against the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff bills are coded as votes for liberalization.The 1948 vote on RTAA renewal (HR6556)has been omitted,as it was particularly idiosyncratic.Most Democrats opposed renewal because of the inclusion of protec- tionist"peril point"provisions.Obviously,their votes were not votes against liberalization. lobbying and deal making with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930. Schattschneider wrote of the"truly Sisyphean labor"to which the leg- islation condemned Congress-eleven thousand pages of testimony and briefs collected over forty-three days and five nights of hearings.2 Many therefore viewed the congressional move to delegate authority to change tariffs as a means of avoiding months of tedious hearings and negotiations. Several factors make it difficult to accept that the fundamental mo- tivation for the RTAA was a desire to reduce workload.First,the easiest way to reduce workload is to do nothing.Clearly this was not the choice of Congress.3 Second,there were many other ways to streamline 2E.E Schattschneider,Politics,Pressure and the Tarif A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Pol- itics as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tarif(Hamden,Conn.:Archon Books,1935),29,36. 3Karen Schnietz,"To Delegate or Not to Delegate:Congressional Institutional Choices in the Reg- ulation of Foreign Trade,1916-1934"(Ph.D.diss.,University of California,1994),125. This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue,13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use toSTOR Terms a Conditions

312 WORLD POLITICS -Dem -Rep Figure 1 Voting in Senate on Passage of Major Trade Legislation by Party (1913-62) SOURCES: The votes included in the figures are as follows: 1913 Underwood Tariff, 1922 Fordney McCumber Tariff, 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 1934 RTAA, 1937 RTAA Renewal, 1940 RTAA Renewal, 1943 RTAA Renewal, 1945 RTAA Renewal (HR3240), 1951 RTAA Renewal in Senate (HR1612) (House vote was voice vote), 1953 RTAA Renewal (HR5495), 1954 RTAA Renewal (HR9474), 1955 RTAA Renewal (HR1), 1958 RTAA Renewal (HR12591), 1962 Trade Expansion Act (HR 11970). Votes in favor of the Underwood Tariff, the RTAA, all RTAA renewals, and the Trade Expansion Act are coded as votes for liberalization. Votes against the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff bills are coded as votes for liberalization. The 1948 vote on RTAA renewal (HR6556) has been omitted, as it was particularly idiosyncratic. Most Democrats opposed renewal because of the inclusion of protec tionist "peril point" provisions. Obviously, their votes were not votes against liberalization. lobbying and deal making with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930. Schattschneider wrote of the "truly Sisyphean labor" to which the leg islation condemned Congress?eleven thousand pages of testimony and briefs collected over forty-three days and five nights of hearings.2 Many therefore viewed the congressional move to delegate authority to change tariffs as a means of avoiding months of tedious hearings and negotiations. Several factors make it difficult to accept that the fundamental mo tivation for the RTAA was a desire to reduce workload. First, the easiest way to reduce workload is to do nothing. Clearly this was not the choice of Congress.3 Second, there were many other ways to streamline 2 E. E Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Pol itics as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the r?n^(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1935), 29,36. 3 Karen Schnietz, aTo Delegate or Not to Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choices in the Reg ulation of Foreign Trade, 1916-1934" (Th.D. diss., University of California, 1994), 125. This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Tue, 13 Jan 2015 03:41:43 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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