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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe

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World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe David M.Rowe Profound and rapid changes in the costs and risks of international trade are now widely acknowledged to be a potent source of domestic political conflict.By altering the relative prices of goods available from world markets,these changes alter the rewards that flow to different factors of production from different economic activi- ties.These distributional consequences of changing levels of trade,in turn,alter the configuration of interests in the domestic political economy,strain existing political alignments,and enable the construction of new political coalitions.Thus,global changes in the economy,such as the transportation and telecommunications revolu- tions in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries or the collapse of international trade and finance during the interwar years,will have global consequences as they reverberate within and through the domestic politics of all countries that trade on world markets.! But surely such changes do more than influence countries'domestic politics.As scholars of international relations recognize,these changes occur within a system of sovereign states where concerns over national security are important determinants of state behavior.Consequently,should we not expect these changes to also systemati- cally and predictably affect the economic constraints within which states must formu- late and pursue their security interests?And,by affecting these constraints,to affect the broader stability of international relations? I thank David Bearce,Pamela Camerra-Rowe,Thomas Christensen,Albert Fishlow,Timothy Frye, John Garofano,Peter Gourevitch,Peter Katzenstein,Jonathan Kirshner,Judy Kullberg,David Lake,Ned Lebow,Edward Mansfield,Patrick McDonald,Joseph McGarvey,Patrick Morgan,James Morrow,Wayne Sandholtz Randall Schweller,David Skidmore,Andrew Sobel,Katherine Lawyer Sperling.Alec Stone Sweet,the participants in seminars at the Global Peace and Conflict Studies program of the University of California,Irvine,and the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University,and the anonymous reviewers for comments on previous drafts.I alone am responsible for any errors.I also thank Kenyon College for the gracious use of its library resources while I was an affiliated scholar at that institution.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation.grant no.SBR-9709556. 1.See Gourevitch 1978 and 1986;Rogowski 1987 and 1989:Frieden 1991:Keohane and Milner 1996: and Alt et al.1996. International Organization 53.2,Spring 1999,pp.195-231 1999 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre–World War I Europe David M. Rowe Profound and rapid changes in the costs and risks of international trade are now widely acknowledged to be a potentsource of domestic political con ict. By altering the relative prices of goods available from world markets, these changes alter the rewards that ow to different factors of production from different economic activities. These distributional consequences of changing levels of trade, in turn, alter the con guration of interests in the domestic political economy, strain existing political alignments, and enable the construction of new political coalitions. Thus, global changes in the economy, such as the transportation and telecommunicationsrevolutions in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries or the collapse of international trade and nance during the interwar years, will have global consequences as they reverberate within and through the domestic politics of all countries that trade on world markets.1 But surely such changes do more than in uence countries’ domestic politics. As scholars of international relationsrecognize, these changes occur within a system of sovereign states where concerns over nationalsecurity are important determinants of state behavior. Consequently,should we not expect these changes to also systematically and predictably affect the economic constraintswithin which states must formulate and pursue their security interests? And, by affecting these constraints, to affect the broader stability of international relations? I thank David Bearce, Pamela Camerra-Rowe, Thomas Christensen, Albert Fishlow, Timothy Frye, John Garofano, Peter Gourevitch, Peter Katzenstein, Jonathan Kirshner, Judy Kullberg, David Lake, Ned Lebow, Edward Mans eld, Patrick McDonald,Joseph McGarvey, Patrick Morgan,James Morrow,Wayne Sandholtz, Randall Schweller, David Skidmore, Andrew Sobel, Katherine Lawyer Sperling, Alec Stone Sweet, the participants in seminars at the Global Peace and Con ict Studies program of the University of California, Irvine, and the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University, and the anonymousreviewers for comments on previous drafts. I alone am responsible for any errors. I also thank Kenyon College for the gracious use of its library resources while I was an affiliated scholar at that institution.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, grant no. SBR–9709556. 1. See Gourevitch 1978 and 1986; Rogowski 1987 and 1989; Frieden 1991; Keohane and Milner 1996; and Alt et al. 1996. International Organization 53, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 195–231 r 1999 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

196 International Organization I build on the fundamental insights of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem from inter- national economics to argue that exogenous changes in the costs and risks of interna- tional economic exchange can powerfully affect the economic constraints that under- lie the security behavior of states and that these effects will vary predictably across states with different factor endowments.2 As preliminary evidence,I submit that the theory accords surprisingly well with the experiences of the European great powers in the rapidly expanding world economy prior to World War I and that many of the factors that contributed most to the breakdown of international relations in 1914 follow directly from the changing pattern of economic constraints that the theory predicts.By raising the economic returns that flowed to those resources most critical to military power in Europe prior to World War I,especially labor,the expansion of world trade progressively constrained the abilities of the European powers to mobi- lize these resources for security purposes.The growing difficulties of mobilizing resources raised international tensions and undermined stability by fueling anxieties in each state that it was declining relative to its rivals,which,in turn,generated powerful,systemwide incentives to go to war before one's own position became untenable.The rapid expansion of the world economy thus unleashed its own di- lemma for pre-World War I Europe,for the more Europe prospered from the deepen- ing integration of world markets,the more fragile became the security foundations on which that prosperity ultimately rested. Clearly,the relationship between the international economy and the security poli- tics of states has generated a substantial literature in international relations,from debates between liberals and realists over the consequences of economic interdepen- dence to the economic dynamics underlying internationalhegemony and the rise and fall of great powers.I seek to contribute to this literature in at least four ways.First, by extending a widely accepted theory about the economic consequences of interna- tional trade-the Stolper-Samuelson theorem-to the realm of security,I seek to specify more precisely the causal mechanisms by which a changing world economy affects a state's security.Second,by focusing on the domestic distributional conse- quences of internationaleconomic exchange,I depart from the widespread belief that trade influences security primarily through its effects on aggregate national income (rising levels of trade increase a state's military potential by raising national income; falling levels of trade lower it).This departure enables me to make important and counterintuitive propositions.Contrary to conventional wisdom,I argue that the ex- pansion of trade can impair the military power of some states even as it makes them more prosperous.Third,I offer a new interpretation of the origins of World War I that traces many of its causes to the expansion of the world economy.Finally,by showing how world economic expansion undermined European security,I directly challenge the conventional wisdom that the expansion of trade necessarily and unambiguously enhances the prospects for international peace. I must also stress,however,that my argument is preliminary and that my empirical evidence only demonstrates its plausibility.Nor do I imply that changing economic 2.See Stolper and Samuelson 1941/42;and Rogowski 1987 and 1989

I build on the fundamental insights of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem from international economicsto argue that exogenous changesin the costs and risks of international economic exchange can powerfully affect the economic constraintsthat underlie the security behavior of states and that these effects will vary predictably across states with different factor endowments.2 As preliminary evidence, I submit that the theory accords surprisingly well with the experiences of the European great powers in the rapidly expanding world economy prior to World War I and that many of the factors that contributed most to the breakdown of international relations in 1914 follow directly from the changing pattern of economic constraints that the theory predicts. By raising the economic returns that owed to those resources most critical to military power in Europe prior to World War I, especially labor, the expansion of world trade progressively constrained the abilities of the European powers to mobilize these resources for security purposes. The growing difficulties of mobilizing resources raised international tensions and undermined stability by fueling anxieties in each state that it was declining relative to its rivals, which, in turn, generated powerful, systemwide incentives to go to war before one’s own position became untenable. The rapid expansion of the world economy thus unleashed its own dilemma for pre–World War I Europe, for the more Europe prospered from the deepening integration of world markets, the more fragile became the security foundations on which that prosperity ultimately rested. Clearly, the relationship between the international economy and the security politics of states has generated a substantial literature in international relations, from debates between liberals and realists over the consequences of economic interdependence to the economic dynamics underlying internationalhegemony and the rise and fall of great powers. I seek to contribute to this literature in at least four ways. First, by extending a widely accepted theory about the economic consequences of international trade—the Stolper-Samuelson theorem—to the realm of security, I seek to specify more precisely the causal mechanisms by which a changing world economy affects a state’s security. Second, by focusing on the domestic distributional consequences of international economic exchange,I depart from the widespread beliefthat trade in uences security primarily through its effects on aggregate national income (rising levels of trade increase a state’s military potential by raising national income; falling levels of trade lower it). This departure enables me to make important and counterintuitive propositions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that the expansion of trade can impair the military power of some states even as it makes them more prosperous.Third, I offer a new interpretation of the origins of World War I that traces many of its causes to the expansion of the world economy. Finally, by showing how world economic expansion undermined European security, I directly challenge the conventional wisdom that the expansion of trade necessarily and unambiguously enhancesthe prospects for international peace. I must also stress, however, that my argument is preliminary and that my empirical evidence only demonstrates its plausibility. Nor do I imply that changing economic 2. See Stolper and Samuelson 1941/42; and Rogowski 1987 and 1989. 196 International Organization

Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 197 constraints are the only,or even the most important,factor in determining the secu- rity politics of states or that I offer a general explanation of international security and conflict.Yet the ability of this theory to link important empirical and theoretical issues-ranging from the growing fragility of the European state system prior to World War I,to the impact of trade on international stability,to the dynamics of hegemonic theory-suggests that it taps a rich vein of inquiry of central relevance to scholars of international affairs. The Economics of Security and Changing National Exposure to the International Economy All states confront a significant economic problem.Security is costly.To build mili- tary establishments capable of defending vital national interests,states must draw resources out of the national economy and employ them in the security sector.3 For example,industrial capital is necessary to build warships,tanks,and aircraft;human capital is necessary to develop new military technologies and the doctrines that gov- ern the use of military force;labor is necessary for troops.This economic aspect of security implies that states may be vulnerable to externally induced changes in the costs and risks of international exchange.Because these changes alter the relative prices of domestic economic resources,they also alter the cost of using these re- sources for security purposes.In this way,a changing world economy may fundamen- tally shape the economic constraints on a state's security policies. To explore this idea,I develop a simple framework that builds on the Stolper- Samuelson theorem from international trade theory.This theorem holds that increas- ing exposure of the national economy to international trade benefits the owners and intensive users of those resources in which the economy is abundantly endowed relative to the rest of the world,while harming the owners and intensive users of those resources in which the economy is poorly endowed.For example,in an economy abundant in labor but scarce in capital,increasing exposure to international trade benefits labor and harms capital.Decreasing exposure to the international economy reverses these effects,so that owners and users of the economy's abundant resources suffer,while the owners and users of the economy's scarce resources gain. I link these domestic consequences of a changing world economy to changes in the underlying economic constraints on a state's security behavior by making two assump- tions.I assume,first,that the state's difficulty in mobilizing specific resources for security purposes will be directly related to the returns that those resources earn elsewhere in the national economy.The more that resources eamn in nonsecurity sectors of the national economy,the more difficult it becomes for the state to use them for security.This assumption follows directly from the fact that scarcity is 3.Tily1990. 4.Although built on assumptions that almost never hold,the theorem's central insight appears robust. See Corden 1974,93-104;Leamer 1984;Ethier 1984;and Rogowski 1989,16-20

constraints are the only, or even the most important, factor in determining the security politics of states or that I offer a general explanation of internationalsecurity and con ict. Yet the ability of this theory to link important empirical and theoretical issues—ranging from the growing fragility of the European state system prior to World War I, to the impact of trade on international stability, to the dynamics of hegemonic theory—suggests that it taps a rich vein of inquiry of central relevance to scholars of international affairs. The Economics of Security and Changing National Exposure to the International Economy All states confront a signi cant economic problem. Security is costly. To build military establishments capable of defending vital national interests, states must draw resources out of the national economy and employ them in the security sector.3 For example, industrial capital is necessary to build warships, tanks, and aircraft; human capital is necessary to develop new military technologies and the doctrinesthat govern the use of military force; labor is necessary for troops. This economic aspect of security implies that states may be vulnerable to externally induced changes in the costs and risks of international exchange. Because these changes alter the relative prices of domestic economic resources, they also alter the cost of using these resources for security purposes.In this way, a changingworld economy may fundamentally shape the economic constraints on a state’s security policies. To explore this idea, I develop a simple framework that builds on the StolperSamuelson theorem from internationaltrade theory.4 Thistheorem holdsthat increasing exposure of the national economy to international trade bene ts the owners and intensive users of those resources in which the economy is abundantly endowed relative to the rest of the world, while harming the owners and intensive users of those resourcesin which the economy is poorly endowed. For example, in an economy abundant in labor but scarce in capital, increasing exposure to international trade bene ts labor and harms capital. Decreasing exposure to the international economy reverses these effects, so that owners and users of the economy’s abundantresources suffer, while the owners and users of the economy’s scarce resources gain. I link these domestic consequences of a changingworld economy to changesin the underlying economic constraints on a state’ssecurity behavior by making two assumptions. I assume, rst, that the state’s difficulty in mobilizing speci c resources for security purposes will be directly related to the returns that those resources earn elsewhere in the national economy. The more that resources earn in nonsecurity sectors of the national economy, the more difficult it becomes for the state to use them for security. This assumption follows directly from the fact that scarcity is 3. Tilly 1990. 4. Although built on assumptions that almost never hold, the theorem’s central insight appears robust. See Corden 1974, 93–104; Leamer 1984; Ethier 1984; and Rogowski 1989, 16–20. Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 197

198 International Organization ubiquitous in economic life,forcing the state to compete with other actors for the use of economic resources.Thus,as the number of potential claimants to a particular resource grows (that is,the higher the demand for that resource),the more difficult becomes the state's task of procuring it for security purposes. How these difficulties become manifested in a state's security politics will be determined by the institutions and practices used to mobilize resources from the national economy.Where the state simply pays for the use of a resource,these diffi- culties will be reflected in the military budget.To prevent resources from being bid away to other users,the state must pay higher prices for resources in high demand (and thus enjoy fewer budgetary degrees of freedom)than for resources in low de- mand.Should its compensation fail to keep pace with the demand for resources elsewhere in the economy,the state will experience either shortages in the quantity or deficiencies in the quality of those resources it procures.Where the state compels the supply of resources (conscription,for example),the holders of those resources will invest greater efforts in evading state directives,the greater the potential returns from employing those resources in alternative uses.5 In this instance,the state's difficulties will manifest themselves not as budgetary pressures,but more subtly,such as through resource holders evading or shirking military duties,raising demands for better com- pensation or,in the extreme,engaging in political resistance.6 Second,I assume that not all resources contribute equally to military power.Con- sequently,the state's ability to respond to changing relative prices by effortlessly substituting toward resources whose prices are falling will be limited by the extent to which these less costly resources are militarily useful.I make this assumption for three reasons.First,existing military technologies may not permit substituting cheaper resources for dearer ones.Prior to World War I,mechanized forms of transportation could not replace muscle power as the critical means of battlefield mobility.This reality both necessitated the use of large field armies to concentrate force against the enemy and limited the degree to which European militaries could make their armies more "weapons(that is,capital)intensive."As William McNeil notes,"an army that sought to achieve mobility in the field,as all European armies did before 1914. simply lacked the transport capacity to supply more than a token population of guns that spat forth bullets at the rate of 600 a minute."7 Second,the state's ability to substitute among various resources is often limited by exogenous strategic circum- stances.Pre-World War I Britain,for example,required a(capital-intensive)navy to protect its empire and home islands.This strategic necessity prevented it from respond- ing to a rise in the relative price of capital by using more intensively those resources 5.These effects will be mitigated where the state directly holds the particular resource.Even here it seems plausible that the state's use of the resource is more likely to be contested,either by factions within the state or by social elites who would capture the returns from alternative uses,the greater the potential returns of those uses. 6.The translation of shifting opportunity costs of compulsory military service into political activity is straightforward.The more the opportunity costs of military service rise,the more likely are resource holders to demand policies that offset them. 7.McNeil 1982,273.See also Storz 1992,295-97

ubiquitousin economic life, forcing the state to compete with other actors for the use of economic resources. Thus, as the number of potential claimants to a particular resource grows (that is, the higher the demand for that resource), the more difficult becomes the state’s task of procuring it for security purposes. How these difficulties become manifested in a state’s security politics will be determined by the institutions and practices used to mobilize resources from the national economy. Where the state simply pays for the use of a resource, these difficulties will be re ected in the military budget. To prevent resources from being bid away to other users, the state must pay higher prices for resources in high demand (and thus enjoy fewer budgetary degrees of freedom) than for resources in low demand. Should its compensation fail to keep pace with the demand for resources elsewhere in the economy, the state will experience eithershortagesin the quantity or de cienciesin the quality of those resources it procures. Where the state compels the supply of resources (conscription, for example), the holders of those resources will invest greater efforts in evading state directives, the greater the potentialreturns from employing those resources in alternative uses.5 In thisinstance, the state’s difficulties will manifest themselves not as budgetary pressures, but more subtly,such as through resource holders evading or shirking military duties, raising demands for better compensation or, in the extreme, engaging in politicalresistance.6 Second, I assume that not all resources contribute equally to military power. Consequently, the state’s ability to respond to changing relative prices by effortlessly substituting toward resources whose prices are falling will be limited by the extent to which these less costly resources are militarily useful. I make this assumption for three reasons. First, existingmilitary technologiesmay not permitsubstitutingcheaper resources for dearer ones. Prior to World War I, mechanized forms of transportation could not replace muscle power as the critical means of battle eld mobility. This reality both necessitated the use of large eld armies to concentrate force against the enemy and limited the degree to which European militaries could make their armies more ‘‘weapons(that is, capital) intensive.’’As William McNeil notes, ‘‘an army that sought to achieve mobility in the eld, as all European armies did before 1914, simply lacked the transport capacity to supply more than a token population of guns that spat forth bullets at the rate of 600 a minute.’’ 7 Second, the state’s ability to substitute among various resources is often limited by exogenous strategic circumstances. Pre–World War I Britain, for example, required a (capital-intensive) navy to protect its empire and home islands.Thisstrategic necessity prevented it from responding to a rise in the relative price of capital by using more intensively those resources 5. These effects will be mitigated where the state directly holds the particular resource. Even here it seems plausible that the state’s use of the resource is more likely to be contested, either by factions within the state or by social elites who would capture the returns from alternative uses, the greater the potential returns of those uses. 6. The translation of shifting opportunity costs of compulsory military service into political activity is straightforward. The more the opportunity costs of military service rise, the more likely are resource holders to demand policies that offset them. 7. McNeil 1982, 273. See also Storz 1992, 295–97. 198 International Organization

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