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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest

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The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest STEPHEN G.BROOKS Department of Political Science Yale University This article examines the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards.Scholars have largely focused on how the level of popular resistance within the vanquished country influences the benefits of conquest.What needs to be scrutinized in greater depth is how post-World War II economic transformations within the most advanced countries affect the benefits of conquest.This article focuses on examining one particular economic change that has been neglected for the most part in the secu- rity and peace literature:the globalization of production.The article delineates four recent changes in the structure of global production and outlines how each of these economic transformations alters the benefits of conquest.The collective impact of the arguments strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have declined significantly in recent years within the most economically advanced countries. The promise of capturingmbenefits from nqred territory historically has been a significant motivating force for war.Unfortunately,wars of conquest still occur,as Irag's recent invasion of Kuwait amply demonstrates.Yet,the conditions under which conquest can produce significant economic gains have not received much sustained analysis in recent years.There are a number of reasons for this neglect.The key reason likely is the widespread assumption that conquering a highly advanced state no longer can produce meaningful economic benefits due to high levels of mod- ern nationalism.In this"quagmire"perspective,conquering a highly advanced state is seen as producing few economic gains because it is assumed that the conqueror inevi- tably will have to devote great resources to suppressing nationalist uprisings and,in turn,that the defeated populace will actively seek to reduce the economic surplus available to the invader. In his recent provocative book,Does Conquest Pay?,Liberman (1996)directly challenges this conventional quagmire perspective and argues forcefully that it is inac- curate.Liberman's conclusion is that the conquest of modern societies still can pay so long as the conqueror is ruthless.Moreover,he asserts that economic modernization AUTHOR'S NOTE:This article is based on work supported by graduate fellowships from the National Science Foundation and the Institute for the Study of World Politics.I thank David Bach,Jon DiCicco, Daniel Markey,Geoffrey Garrett,Susan Rose-Ackerman,Allan Stam,Bradford Westerfield,William Wohlforth,the members of Yale University's International Relations Reading Group,and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION,Vol.43 No.5,October 1999 646-670 1999 Sage Publications,Inc. 646

The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest STEPHEN G. BROOKS Department of Political Science Yale University This article examines the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards. Scholars have largely focused on how the level of popular resistance within the vanquished country influences the benefits of conquest. What needs to be scrutinized in greater depth is how post-World War II economic transformations within the most advanced countries affect the benefits of conquest. This article focuses on examining one particular economic change that has been neglected for the most part in the security and peace literature: the globalization of production. The article delineates four recent changes in the structure of global production and outlines how each of these economic transformations alters the benefits of conquest. The collective impact of the arguments strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have declined significantly in recent years within the most economically advanced countries. The promise of capturing economic benefits from conquered territory historically has been a significant motivating force for war. Unfortunately, wars of conquest still occur, as Iraq's recent invasion of Kuwait amply demonstrates. Yet, the conditions under which conquest can produce significant economic gains have not received much sustained analysis in recent years. There are a number of reasons for this neglect. The key reason likely is the widespread assumption that conquering a highly advanced state no longer can produce meaningful economic benefits due to high levels of modern nationalism. In this "quagmire" perspective, conquering a highly advanced state is seen as producing few economic gains because it is assumed that the conqueror inevitably will have to devote great resources to suppressing nationalist uprisings and, in turn, that the defeated populace will actively seek to reduce the economic surplus available to the invader. In his recent provocative book, Does Conquest Pay?, Liberman (1996) directly challenges this conventional quagmire perspective and argues forcefully that it is inaccurate. Liberman's conclusion is that the conquest of modern societies still can pay so long as the conqueror is ruthless. Moreover, he asserts that economic modernization AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article is based on work supported by graduate fellowships from the National Science Foundation and the Institute for the Study of World Politics. I thank David Bach, Jon DiCicco, Daniel Markey, Geoffrey Garrett, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Allan Stam, Bradford Westerfield, William Wohlforth, the members of Yale University's International Relations Reading Group, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 43 No. 5, October 1999 646-670 C 1999 Sage Publications, Inc. 646

Brooks CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 647 actually enhances the profitability of conquest.If Liberman is correct,then the incen- tives for aggression in the developed world might actually be increasing over time. In this article,I further analyze the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards.Because Liberman's (1996)book is the key work on this topic,I begin by reviewing the main elements of his analysis.I then argue that more extensive analysis of the economic benefits of conquest is greatly needed;in par- ticular,it is necessary to look at factors other than the level of popular resistance that may affect the benefits of conquest.Although it is abundantly clear that there have been dramatic economic transformations during the post-World War II period,espe- cially in the most advanced countries,scholars have so far failed to devote sustained attention to whether any of these economic changes can significantly alter the benefits of conquest.I analyze in detail how one recent economic change,the globalization of production,affects the benefits of conquest. I draw on analyses and findings from the recent literature on the globalization of production.This literature,developed primarily by economists and management scholars,has been neglected for the most part by security and peace scholars.I stress that the structure of global production has changed dramatically during the post-World War II period,especially over the past 25 years.Four economic transfor- mations are highlighted here:(a)the increased geographic dispersion of production, (b)the greatly enhanced significance of interfirm alliances,(c)the increased ease of engaging in foreign direct investment(FDI),and (d)the general shift toward "knowledge-based"economies in the most advanced countries.Only the last of these four changes has so far received much attention in the literature.The bulk of my analy- sis is not devoted to reviewing exactly how the structure of global production has changed in recent years.Rather,it advances a series of deductive arguments about why these transformations appear to have reduced the economic benefits of conquest. Although none of these individual arguments has a decisive impact,their collective impact strongly indicates that the benefits have significantly declined,but only among those highly advanced countries in which these economic transformations have so far had a substantial impact. WHY MORE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONQUEST IS NEEDED What exactly do the"economic"benefits of conquest consist of?Liberman(1996) carves out a very useful definition in his book.He brackets all other factors that do not directly affect the economic benefits of conquest:"the balance sheets evaluated in this book do not consider the costs of military conflict or economic sanctions imposed by states outside the empire,the benefits of neutralizing potentially hostile neighbors,or the utility of strategic territory"(p.4).There are several reasons for not considering these four other factors.First,they do not affect the economic benefits of conquest; rather,all of them involve either costs associated with war or strategic benefits from seizing territory.Second,Liberman points out that scholars already have extensively studied how these four other factors affect the cost-benefit ratio for war.Third,bring-

Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 647 actually enhances the profitability of conquest. If Liberman is correct, then the incentives for aggression in the developed world might actually be increasing over time. In this article, I further analyze the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards. Because Liberman's (1996) book is the key work on this topic, I begin by reviewing the main elements of his analysis. I then argue that more extensive analysis of the economic benefits of conquest is greatly needed; in particular, it is necessary to look at factors other than the level of popular resistance that may affect the benefits of conquest. Although it is abundantly clear that there have been dramatic economic transformations during the post-World War II period, especially in the most advanced countries, scholars have so far failed to devote sustained attention to whether any of these economic changes can significantly alter the benefits of conquest. I analyze in detail how one recent economic change, the globalization of production, affects the benefits of conquest. I draw on analyses and findings from the recent literature on the globalization of production. This literature, developed primarily by economists and management scholars, has been neglected for the most part by security and peace scholars. I stress that the structure of global production has changed dramatically during the post-World War II period, especially over the past 25 years. Four economic transformations are highlighted here: (a) the increased geographic dispersion of production, (b) the greatly enhanced significance of interfirm alliances,(c) the increased ease of engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI), and (d) the general shift toward "knowledge-based" economies in the most advanced countries. Only the last of these four changes has so far received much attention in the literature. The bulk of my analysis is not devoted to reviewing exactly how the structure of global production has changed in recent years. Rather, it advances a series of deductive arguments about why these transformations appear to have reduced the economic benefits of conquest. Although none of these individual arguments has a decisive impact, their collective impact strongly indicates that the benefits have significantly declined, but only among those highly advanced countries in which these economic transformations have so far had a substantial impact. WHY MORE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONQUEST IS NEEDED What exactly do the "economic" benefits of conquest consist of? Liberman (1996) carves out a very useful definition in his book. He brackets all other factors that do not directly affect the economic benefits of conquest: "the balance sheets evaluated in this book do not consider the costs of military conflict or economic sanctions imposed by states outside the empire, the benefits of neutralizing potentially hostile neighbors, or the utility of strategic territory" (p. 4). There are several reasons for not considering these four other factors. First, they do not affect the economic benefits of conquest; rather, all of them involve either costs associated with war or strategic benefits from seizing territory. Second, Liberman points out that scholars already have extensively studied how these four other factors affect the cost-benefit ratio for war. Third, bring-

648 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ing in these four other factors would not leave much of a puzzle to be solved;even Liberman is perfectly willing to admit that conquest typically does not pay when the costs of seizing territory and the actions of rival states are factored in (p.4).He argues that what is a puzzle is"whether the conquest of industrial economies pays,aside from the costs of conquering territory and the costs imposed by retaliating third parties"(p.3). Liberman (1996)points out two key reasons why it is important to specifically study the economic benefits of conquest.First,if conquest does pay economically, then there will exist higher incentives for expansionist states to upset the status quo, and the system consequently will become more unstable and vice versa.Second,if conquest does pay economically,then the only thing that will keep the peace will be the other factors that he excludes from his study such as military deterrence,a willingness to balance against aggression,and the costliness of modern warfare.In short,the eco- nomic benefits of conquest directly affect(a)the degree to which there are incentives to upset the territorial status quo and (b)the degree to which states must be militarily vigilant to maintain the peace. Despite the substantive importance of the economic benefits of conquest,this topic has been relatively neglected in recent years.International relations scholars,of course,routinely discuss the cost-benefit ratio of war as a key parameter in interna- tional relations.Yet,the focus of analysis invariably is on the cost side of this equation, and little attention is paid to the benefit side (e.g.,Zacher 1992,67-71).In recent years, international relations scholars have paid great attention to a number of different fac- tors that have increased the costs of conflict facing leaders of advanced states during the post-World War II period.They include the greatly increased potential destruction of war due to vastly more powerful modern weapons,both nuclear(Waltz 1993;Gaddis 1987)and conventional(Mueller 1988);higher levels of resistance to war on the part of domestic publics (Russett 1993;Rosenau 1990);high potential losses of economic benefits due to increased levels of trade interdependence (Oneal and Russett 1997; Rosecrance 1986);stronger international norms against the use of force (Mueller 1989;Ray 1989);and the dominance of the defense over the offense due to factors such as greatly improved reconnaissance capabilities (Jervis 1978;Van Evera 1990-91).By comparison,scant few pages have been devoted to forwarding arguments about how the economic benefits of conquest might have changed among the most advanced states during the post-World War II period. One possible reason for this neglect is that this subject simply falls between the cracks of international political economy and security studies (Kirshner 1998).The most likely reason is that many international relations scholars simply accept the wide- spread argument that conquering an advanced state no longer pays due to increased levels of nationalism (Rosecrance 1986,34;Gilpin 1981,142;Knorr 1975).In this conventional view,which Liberman (1996)aptly labels the quagmire perspective, empire is now seen as unprofitable due to the costs associated with suppressing upris- 1.A good portion of the references on this topic are noted by Liberman(1996)in note 29 (pp.161- 62)of his book.In addition to these citations listed here by Liberman,see also Ullman(1991,23-25), Singer and Wildavsky (1993,15-16),Van Evera (1990-91,14-15),Jervis (1991-92,49-50),and Rose- crance(1996,48,56).Very few existing analyses devote more than a page or two to the economic benefits of conquest

648 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION ing in these four other factors would not leave much of a puzzle to be solved; even Liberman is perfectly willing to admit that conquest typically does not pay when the costs of seizing territory and the actions of rival states are factored in (p. 4). He argues that what is a puzzle is "whether the conquest of industrial economies pays, aside from the costs of conquering territory and the costs imposed by retaliating third parties" (p. 3). Liberman (1996) points out two key reasons why it is important to specifically study the economic benefits of conquest. First, if conquest does pay economically, then there will exist higher incentives for expansionist states to upset the status quo, and the system consequently will become more unstable and vice versa. Second, if conquest does pay economically, then the only thing that will keep the peace will be the other factors that he excludes from his study such as military deterrence, a willingness to balance against aggression, and the costliness of modern warfare. In short, the economic benefits of conquest directly affect (a) the degree to which there are incentives to upset the territorial status quo and (b) the degree to which states must be militarily vigilant to maintain the peace. Despite the substantive importance of the economic benefits of conquest, this topic has been relatively neglected in recent years. International relations scholars, of course, routinely discuss the cost-benefit ratio of war as a key parameter in international relations. Yet, the focus of analysis invariably is on the cost side of this equation, and little attention is paid to the benefit side (e.g., Zacher 1992,67-71). In recent years, international relations scholars have paid great attention to a number of different factors that have increased the costs of conflict facing leaders of advanced states during the post-World War II period. They include the greatly increased potential destruction of war due to vastly more powerful modern weapons, both nuclear (Waltz 1993; Gaddis 1987) and conventional (Mueller 1988); higher levels of resistance to war on the part of domestic publics (Russett 1993; Rosenau 1990); high potential losses of economic benefits due to increased levels of trade interdependence (Oneal and Russett 1997; Rosecrance 1986); stronger international norms against the use of force (Mueller 1989; Ray 1989); and the dominance of the defense over the offense due to factors such as greatly improved reconnaissance capabilities (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1990-91). By comparison, scant few pages have been devoted to forwarding arguments about how the economic benefits of conquest might have changed among the most advanced states during the post-World War II period.' One possible reason for this neglect is that this subject simply falls between the cracks of international political economy and security studies (Kirshner 1998). The most likely reason is that many international relations scholars simply accept the widespread argument that conquering an advanced state no longer pays due to increased levels of nationalism (Rosecrance 1986, 34; Gilpin 1981, 142; Knorr 1975). In this conventional view, which Liberman (1996) aptly labels the quagmire perspective, empire is now seen as unprofitable due to the costs associated with suppressing upris- 1. A good portion of the references on this topic are noted by Liberman (1996) in note 29 (pp. 161- 62) of his book. In addition to these citations listed here by Liberman, see also Ullman (1991, 23-25), Singer and Wildavsky (1993, 15-16), Van Evera (1990-91, 14-15), Jervis (1991-92, 49-50), and Rosecrance (1996, 48, 56). Very few existing analyses devote more than a page or two to the economic benefits of conquest

Brooks /CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 649 ings by resistance fighters and a concomitant reduction in the extractable economic surplus in the conquered territory due to strikes,sabotage,and foot dragging by the defeated populace. Liberman (1996)directly confronts this conventional quagmire perspective and effectively shows that it is not nearly as compelling as many scholars currently assume. Liberman's first,essentially noncontroversial argument is that states with higher levels of economic development offer larger potential economic rewards to the conqueror; the richer a country,the more that can potentially be plundered from it.The key ques- tion then becomes whether the high levels of wealth in the most advanced countries can actually be extracted by the conqueror.If the quagmire view is correct,then these large levels of economic surplus in advanced states will not be available to the con- queror due to active resistance by the defeated populace.Liberman's key argument is that high levels of popular resistance are not a given in modern societies;rather,they vary inversely with the ruthlessness of the conqueror.He maintains that extremely ruthless conquerors,such as the Nazis in World War II,can effectively suppress popu- lar resistance and thereby are able to extract significant economic resources from the vanquished country.Liberman assesses his thesis through a detailed historical analysis of five occupations of industrial societies from the 20th century:Belgium and Luxem- bourg,1914-1918;Ruhr-Rhineland,1923-1924;the Japanese empire,1910-1945;the Nazi occupation of Western Europe,1940-1944;and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe,1945-1989.He finds significant support for his argument that those invaders who are ruthless can suppress popular resistance and thereby make conquest pay.2 There are several reasons,however,to question Liberman's(1996)findings.Two issues in particular are worth highlighting.First,Liberman's study suffers from poten- tial selection bias in his cases.He limits his sample of cases to examples in which con- quest has occurred and"there is attempted extraction"(p.14).As a result,for a case to count in his sample,the conqueror not only has to be able to vanquish the opponent but also must establish sufficient territorial control that extraction can actually be attempted.Two key variables that affect whether a country can be successfully con- quered to this degree are(a)the extent to which the population is willing to make sacri- fices to repel the invader and (b)the level of resolve and effectiveness of the defender's military units on the battlefield.States with highly nationalistic populations willing to make significant sacrifices to reject an invader and,in turn,whose military forces ardently and effectively oppose the conqueror in battle (e.g.,Vietnam from 1946 to 1975,Britain in World War II,Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989)will be difficult to con- quer and even harder to establish sufficient territorial control for extraction to be attempted.The converse also will be true (e.g.,France in 1940). The key point is that some of the very factors that make societies easy to conquer (e.g.,lack of significant popular resistance,low levels of resolve and effectiveness on the battlefield)also will make them easier to subdue once they are occupied.Not sur- 2.To be clear,Liberman (1996)does not claim that conquest produced significant gains in all of the historical cases he examines.He maintains that conquest did not pay significant rewards in two of the cases he investigates:Belgium during World War I and the first phase of the Ruhr-Rhineland occupation.In cach of these cases,however,he argues that this ultimately can be traced to a lack ofruthlessness on the part of the conquering power

Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 649 ings by resistance fighters and a concomitant reduction in the extractable economic surplus in the conquered territory due to strikes, sabotage, and foot dragging by the defeated populace. Liberman (1996) directly confronts this conventional quagmire perspective and effectively shows that it is not nearly as compelling as many scholars currently assume. Liberman's first, essentially noncontroversial argument is that states with higher levels of economic development offer larger potential economic rewards to the conqueror; the richer a country, the more that can potentially be plundered from it. The key question then becomes whether the high levels of wealth in the most advanced countries can actually be extracted by the conqueror. If the quagmire view is correct, then these large levels of economic surplus in advanced states will not be available to the conqueror due to active resistance by the defeated populace. Liberman's key argument is that high levels of popular resistance are not a given in modern societies; rather, they vary inversely with the ruthlessness of the conqueror. He maintains that extremely ruthless conquerors, such as the Nazis in World War II, can effectively suppress popular resistance and thereby are able to extract significant economic resources from the vanquished country. Liberman assesses his thesis through a detailed historical analysis of five occupations of industrial societies from the 20th century: Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918; Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924; the Japanese empire, 1910-1945; the Nazi occupation of Western Europe, 1940-1944; and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989. He finds significant support for his argument that those invaders who are ruthless can suppress popular resistance and thereby make conquest pay.2 There are several reasons, however, to question Liberman's (1996) findings. Two issues in particular are worth highlighting. First, Liberman's study suffers from potential selection bias in his cases. He limits his sample of cases to examples in which conquest has occurred and "there is attempted extraction" (p. 14). As a result, for a case to count in his sample, the conqueror not only has to be able to vanquish the opponent but also must establish sufficient territorial control that extraction can actually be attempted. Two key variables that affect whether a country can be successfully conquered to this degree are (a) the extent to which the population is willing to make sacrifices to repel the invader and (b) the level of resolve and effectiveness of the defender's military units on the battlefield. States with highly nationalistic populations willing to make significant sacrifices to reject an invader and, in turn, whose military forces ardently and effectively oppose the conqueror in battle (e.g., Vietnam from 1946 to 1975, Britain in World War II, Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989) will be difficult to conquer and even harder to establish sufficient territorial control for extraction to be attempted. The converse also will be true (e.g., France in 1940). The key point is that some of the very factors that make societies easy to conquer (e.g., lack of significant popular resistance, low levels of resolve and effectiveness on the battlefield) also will make them easier to subdue once they are occupied. Not sur- 2. To be clear, Liberman (1996) does not claim that conquest produced significant gains in all of the historical cases he examines. He maintains that conquest did not pay significant rewards in two of the cases he investigates: Belgium during World War I and the first phase of the Ruhr-Rhineland occupation. In each of these cases, however, he argues that this ultimately can be traced to a lack of ruthlessness on the part of the conquering power

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