《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）Revisionism Reconsidered. Exports and American Intervention in World War I

Revisionism Reconsidered:Exports and American Intervention in World War I Benjamin O.Fordham Abstract Why did the United States intervene in World War I,breaking with its long tradition of noninvolvement in European political and military conflicts?Dur- ing the 1920s and 1930s,many"revisionist"historians argued that American efforts to protect its trade with the Allies ultimately led to intervention.The logic of the revisionist position closely parallels the contemporary liberal case that interdepen- dence promotes peace but arrives at different conclusions about the relationship between trade and conflict.Historians have largely abandoned this economic inter- pretation of American intervention,but data on the impact of the wartime export boom on the United States suggest that it should be reconsidered.The export boom was so large that it would have been difficult to ignore,and its progress corresponds to the timing of important decisions leading to American belligerency.An analysis of congressional voting on war-related measures also suggests that export income helped shape politicians'views of the war. Looking backward today on these endless disputes between our government and the belligerents over neutral rights,it seems hard to understand how we could have attached so much importance to them.They irritated both bellig- erents and burdened our relations with them,and I find it hard to believe they involved our national honor. -George F.Kennan! I would like to thank Katherine Barbieri,John Coogan,David Clark,Jeffry Frieden,Jack Levy, Brian Lai,Timothy McKeown,David Painter,Strom Thacker,and participants in the world politics workshop at Binghamton University,the political economy workshop at Harvard University,and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin,Madison,for their many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article.Lisa Martin and several anonymous reviewers at International Organization also made many valuable suggestions.I am especially grateful to Thomas Walker,whose good-natured skepticism prompted me to write this paper.An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.Any remaining errors and misinterpretations are my responsibility. 1.Kennan1951,64. International Organization 61,Spring 2007,pp.277-310 2007 by The IO Foundation. D0L:10.1017/S0020818307070105

Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I Benjamin O+ Fordham Abstract Why did the United States intervene in World War I, breaking with its long tradition of noninvolvement in European political and military conflicts? Dur￾ing the 1920s and 1930s, many “revisionist” historians argued that American efforts to protect its trade with the Allies ultimately led to intervention+ The logic of the revisionist position closely parallels the contemporary liberal case that interdepen￾dence promotes peace but arrives at different conclusions about the relationship between trade and conflict+ Historians have largely abandoned this economic inter￾pretation of American intervention, but data on the impact of the wartime export boom on the United States suggest that it should be reconsidered+ The export boom was so large that it would have been difficult to ignore, and its progress corresponds to the timing of important decisions leading to American belligerency+ An analysis of congressional voting on war-related measures also suggests that export income helped shape politicians’ views of the war+ Looking backward today on these endless disputes between our government and the belligerents over neutral rights, it seems hard to understand how we could have attached so much importance to them+ They irritated both bellig￾erents and burdened our relations with them, and I find it hard to believe they involved our national honor+ —George F+ Kennan1 I would like to thank Katherine Barbieri, John Coogan, David Clark, Jeffry Frieden, Jack Levy, Brian Lai, Timothy McKeown, David Painter, Strom Thacker, and participants in the world politics workshop at Binghamton University, the political economy workshop at Harvard University, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for their many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article+ Lisa Martin and several anonymous reviewers at International Organization also made many valuable suggestions+ I am especially grateful to Thomas Walker, whose good-natured skepticism prompted me to write this paper+ An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association+ Any remaining errors and misinterpretations are my responsibility+ 1+ Kennan 1951, 64+ International Organization 61, Spring 2007, pp+ 277–310 © 2007 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818307070105

278 International Organization Why did the United States intervene in World War I?The immediate impetus behind the decision to declare war is clear enough,but its deeper roots are more puzzling.In defiance of American threats,Germany launched a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.President Woodrow Wilson was not eager for war but both contemporary observers and subsequent historians gen- erally agree that failure to carry out his earlier threats would have caused an unacceptable loss of prestige and credibility.On the other hand,as Kennan's com- ments suggest,the reasons Wilson made the threats that led to war in 1917 are far less obvious.The risk of war was apparent at the time.As early as mid-1915, many observers,including Wilson's secretary of state,William Jennings Bryan, worried that the president's response to the German submarine campaign could eventually lead to intervention.The submarine threat to American lives does not offer a very convincing explanation on its own.German submarine activity had cost only 236 American lives by April 1917,all but fourteen embarked on ships flying the flags of belligerent states.2 From the perspective of 7 December 1941, or 11 September 2001-not to mention the 53,402 American combat deaths sus- tained after intervention-these losses are not especially large.They hardly seem sufficient to explain the abandonment of the long-standing American policy of avoiding entanglement in conflicts among the European powers. Debate among historians about American intervention has focused on filling this explanatory gap.Some have stressed broader strategic considerations,particularly the need to prevent Germany from dominating the European continent or eroding British control of the seas.3 Others have argued that Wilson's policies arose from his ideological commitments to democracy and international law.Still others have focused on the psychology of Wilson and his closest advisers to explain his choices.5 One potential explanation is almost universally dismissed by contemporary his- torians of U.S.foreign relations:that the war-induced boom in exports to the Allies prompted the Wilson administration to take a strong stand against German sub- marine warfare,ultimately leading to intervention.This explanation was widely accepted during the interwar period and provided the intellectual justification for the neutrality legislation of the 1930s.Largely for this reason,it became deeply unfashionable after Pearl Harbor.Today,the "revisionist"historians who advanced this line of argument during the 1920s and 1930s,when they are remembered at all,tend to be lumped together with the isolationist politicians who resisted Amer- ican intervention in World War II.This article will make a case for reconsidering their argument about the influence of economic interests on American involve- ment in the war.The economic explanation offered by most academic revisionists was subtler and more convincing than the conspiracy theories about influential 2.Grattan1929,163. 3.See,for example,Buehrig 1955;May 1959;Kennedy 2001;and Hannigan 2002. 4.See,for example,Ambrosius 1991;Calhoun 1986;Knock 1992;and Smith 1994. 5.See,for example,Devlin 1975;and George and George 1964

Why did the United States intervene in World War I? The immediate impetus behind the decision to declare war is clear enough, but its deeper roots are more puzzling+ In defiance of American threats, Germany launched a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917+ President Woodrow Wilson was not eager for war but both contemporary observers and subsequent historians gen￾erally agree that failure to carry out his earlier threats would have caused an unacceptable loss of prestige and credibility+ On the other hand, as Kennan’s com￾ments suggest, the reasons Wilson made the threats that led to war in 1917 are far less obvious+ The risk of war was apparent at the time+ As early as mid-1915, many observers, including Wilson’s secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, worried that the president’s response to the German submarine campaign could eventually lead to intervention+ The submarine threat to American lives does not offer a very convincing explanation on its own+ German submarine activity had cost only 236 American lives by April 1917, all but fourteen embarked on ships flying the flags of belligerent states+ 2 From the perspective of 7 December 1941, or 11 September 2001—not to mention the 53,402 American combat deaths sus￾tained after intervention—these losses are not especially large+ They hardly seem sufficient to explain the abandonment of the long-standing American policy of avoiding entanglement in conflicts among the European powers+ Debate among historians about American intervention has focused on filling this explanatory gap+ Some have stressed broader strategic considerations, particularly the need to prevent Germany from dominating the European continent or eroding British control of the seas+ 3 Others have argued that Wilson’s policies arose from his ideological commitments to democracy and international law+ 4 Still others have focused on the psychology of Wilson and his closest advisers to explain his choices+ 5 One potential explanation is almost universally dismissed by contemporary his￾torians of U+S+ foreign relations: that the war-induced boom in exports to the Allies prompted the Wilson administration to take a strong stand against German sub￾marine warfare, ultimately leading to intervention+ This explanation was widely accepted during the interwar period and provided the intellectual justification for the neutrality legislation of the 1930s+ Largely for this reason, it became deeply unfashionable after Pearl Harbor+ Today, the “revisionist” historians who advanced this line of argument during the 1920s and 1930s, when they are remembered at all, tend to be lumped together with the isolationist politicians who resisted Amer￾ican intervention in World War II+ This article will make a case for reconsidering their argument about the influence of economic interests on American involve￾ment in the war+ The economic explanation offered by most academic revisionists was subtler and more convincing than the conspiracy theories about influential 2+ Grattan 1929, 163+ 3+ See, for example, Buehrig 1955; May 1959; Kennedy 2001; and Hannigan 2002+ 4+ See, for example, Ambrosius 1991; Calhoun 1986; Knock 1992; and Smith 1994+ 5+ See, for example, Devlin 1975; and George and George 1964+ 278 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 279 "merchants of death"that publicists and politicians promoted during the interwar period.It also bears directly on recent scholarly debates about the effect of trade on international conflict.An analysis of data on the wartime export boom and congressional voting on war-related measures offers substantial evidence that eco- nomic factors influenced political actors'positions on the war. This article proceeds in four sections.The first reviews the revisionist argument and its relationship to current scholarship on trade and conflict.The second eval- uates the plausibility of the revisionists'claims by examining data on the aggre- gate economic impact of the war on the United States before intervention.The third section tests the influence of economic considerations on the positions of political actors more rigorously using congressional roll-call votes on war-related measures.A final section summarizes and concludes. Trade,Conflict,and American Intervention in World War I The revisionists'theoretical claims are important not only for understanding Amer- ican intervention in World War I,but also for what they suggest about recent research concerning the impact of trade on interstate conflict.Most of this work concludes that trade increases cooperation and reduces the probability of militarized conflict between trading partners.As Oneal and Russett state,"militarized dis- putes are most likely when states are unhampered by important external economic relations and when their importance is declining."7The revisionist argument does not suggest that contemporary liberals are wrong but rather that their argument is incomplete.As liberals would expect,the benefits of trade induced the United States to avoid conflict with its major trading partners during World War I.However,it also led the United States to issue threats and ultimately to go to war to protect this source of national income against third parties.The same economic incen- tives that limit conflict between trading partners may lead to the expansion of mil- itary conflict in other cases. As Mansfield and Pollins point out in their review of this literature,the princi- pal theoretical mechanism proposed to account for this relationship concerns the opportunity cost of trade-disrupting conflict.s As Polachek states in his seminal contribution to contemporary research on the topic,"mutual dependence makes conflict more costly,thereby increasing the incentives toward cooperation,and hence toward peace."Conflictual foreign policies may make trade difficult or imposs- ible.The economic actors who benefit from trade thus tend to oppose such policies. 6.See,for example,Polachek 1980;and Oneal and Russett 1997. 7.Oneal and Russett 1997,288. 8.Mansfield and Pollins 2003.3. 9.Polachek 1980.56

“merchants of death” that publicists and politicians promoted during the interwar period+ It also bears directly on recent scholarly debates about the effect of trade on international conflict+ An analysis of data on the wartime export boom and congressional voting on war-related measures offers substantial evidence that eco￾nomic factors influenced political actors’ positions on the war+ This article proceeds in four sections+ The first reviews the revisionist argument and its relationship to current scholarship on trade and conflict+ The second eval￾uates the plausibility of the revisionists’ claims by examining data on the aggre￾gate economic impact of the war on the United States before intervention+ The third section tests the influence of economic considerations on the positions of political actors more rigorously using congressional roll-call votes on war-related measures+ A final section summarizes and concludes+ Trade, Conflict, and American Intervention in World War I The revisionists’ theoretical claims are important not only for understanding Amer￾ican intervention in World War I, but also for what they suggest about recent research concerning the impact of trade on interstate conflict+ Most of this work concludes that trade increases cooperation and reduces the probability of militarized conflict between trading partners+ 6 As Oneal and Russett state, “militarized dis￾putes are most likely when states are unhampered by important external economic relations and when their importance is declining+” 7 The revisionist argument does not suggest that contemporary liberals are wrong but rather that their argument is incomplete+ As liberals would expect, the benefits of trade induced the United States to avoid conflict with its major trading partners during World War I+ However, it also led the United States to issue threats and ultimately to go to war to protect this source of national income against third parties+ The same economic incen￾tives that limit conflict between trading partners may lead to the expansion of mil￾itary conflict in other cases+ As Mansfield and Pollins point out in their review of this literature, the princi￾pal theoretical mechanism proposed to account for this relationship concerns the opportunity cost of trade-disrupting conflict+ 8 As Polachek states in his seminal contribution to contemporary research on the topic, “mutual dependence makes conflict more costly, thereby increasing the incentives toward cooperation, and hence toward peace+” 9 Conflictual foreign policies may make trade difficult or imposs￾ible+ The economic actors who benefit from trade thus tend to oppose such policies+ 6+ See, for example, Polachek 1980; and Oneal and Russett 1997+ 7+ Oneal and Russett 1997, 288+ 8+ Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3+ 9+ Polachek 1980, 56+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 279

280 International Organization State leaders have reasons to heed these concerns both because they need to sus- tain economic growth and because commercial interests often wield substantial domestic political power. Support for the liberal argument about trade and conflict is broad but not uni- versal.Some critics reject entirely the claim that conflict is less likely between trading partners.0 However,most question the causal logic of the liberal argu- ment about the opportunity costs of conflict without necessarily rejecting the empirical association between trade and peace.Simmons points out that the opportunity-cost argument assumes that traders influence state decisions,a condi- tion that will not hold in every case.Morrow and Gartzke,Li,and Boehmer suggest that trade may have contradictory effects on the likelihood of conflict by reducing a state's willingness to fight but also affecting its estimate of its trading partner's resolve in a military confrontation.2 Instead,the pacifying effect of trade may stem from its effect on states'abilities to send costly signals about their resolve. Mansfield and Pevehouse and Bearce argue that the institutional arrangements set up to govern international trade,rather than the effect of interdependence on the opportunity cost of conflict,account for trade's pacifying effects.13 The theoretical argument of the interwar revisionists differs from most contem- porary critiques of liberal claims about trade and conflict in that it rejects neither their empirical claims about peaceful relations among trading partners nor the causal logic of the opportunity-cost argument.Instead,it focuses on the effect of com- mercial relationships on the behavior of third states.As Levy has pointed out, relatively little attention has been paid to this issue in the contemporary litera- ture.4 This omission is surprising because the imperative to protect trade against interference from third states or nonstate actors follows from the same opportunity- cost argument that motivates most contemporary claims about the liberal peace. Moreover,this line of argument has been discussed in other contexts.For exam- ple,Gallagher and Robinson argued that the expansion of the British Empire dur- ing the mid-Victorian era was mainly a response to events in the periphery that threatened British trade.5 British decision makers preferred "informal empire," and moved toward formal colonial rule only when local authorities were unwill- ing or unable to maintain the peace and order necessary for commerce.Similarly, in his account of the development of European states,Tilly listed the protection of commercial interests operating under its authority as a basic function.16 The fact that the state receives a portion of the income from commercial activity gives it a stake in continued trade. 10.See,for example,Barbieri 2002;and Ripsman and Blanchard 1996. 11.Simmons 2003. 12.See Morrow 1999:and Gartzke.Li.and Boehmer 2001. 13.See Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000:and Bearce 2003. 14.Levy2003,139. 15.Gallagher and Robinson 1953. 16.Tilly1985

State leaders have reasons to heed these concerns both because they need to sus￾tain economic growth and because commercial interests often wield substantial domestic political power+ Support for the liberal argument about trade and conflict is broad but not uni￾versal+ Some critics reject entirely the claim that conflict is less likely between trading partners+ 10 However, most question the causal logic of the liberal argu￾ment about the opportunity costs of conflict without necessarily rejecting the empirical association between trade and peace+ Simmons points out that the opportunity-cost argument assumes that traders influence state decisions, a condi￾tion that will not hold in every case+ 11 Morrow and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer suggest that trade may have contradictory effects on the likelihood of conflict by reducing a state’s willingness to fight but also affecting its estimate of its trading partner’s resolve in a military confrontation+ 12 Instead, the pacifying effect of trade may stem from its effect on states’ abilities to send costly signals about their resolve+ Mansfield and Pevehouse and Bearce argue that the institutional arrangements set up to govern international trade, rather than the effect of interdependence on the opportunity cost of conflict, account for trade’s pacifying effects+ 13 The theoretical argument of the interwar revisionists differs from most contem￾porary critiques of liberal claims about trade and conflict in that it rejects neither their empirical claims about peaceful relations among trading partners nor the causal logic of the opportunity-cost argument+ Instead, it focuses on the effect of com￾mercial relationships on the behavior of third states+ As Levy has pointed out, relatively little attention has been paid to this issue in the contemporary litera￾ture+ 14 This omission is surprising because the imperative to protect trade against interference from third states or nonstate actors follows from the same opportunity￾cost argument that motivates most contemporary claims about the liberal peace+ Moreover, this line of argument has been discussed in other contexts+ For exam￾ple, Gallagher and Robinson argued that the expansion of the British Empire dur￾ing the mid-Victorian era was mainly a response to events in the periphery that threatened British trade+ 15 British decision makers preferred “informal empire,” and moved toward formal colonial rule only when local authorities were unwill￾ing or unable to maintain the peace and order necessary for commerce+ Similarly, in his account of the development of European states, Tilly listed the protection of commercial interests operating under its authority as a basic function+ 16 The fact that the state receives a portion of the income from commercial activity gives it a stake in continued trade+ 10+ See, for example, Barbieri 2002; and Ripsman and Blanchard 1996+ 11+ Simmons 2003+ 12+ See Morrow 1999; and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001+ 13+ See Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; and Bearce 2003+ 14+ Levy 2003, 139+ 15+ Gallagher and Robinson 1953+ 16+ Tilly 1985+ 280 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 281 Although academic revisionists of the interwar period came to different conclu- sions about the impact of trade on conflict,the logic of their argument about the U.S.role in World War I closely resembles the contemporary liberal opportunity- cost argument.Unfortunately,these historians have often been lumped together with those who contended that arms manufacturers and the bankers who financed them brought about U.S.intervention to reap the benefits of wartime military spend- ing and the munitions trade,as well as to facilitate repayment of their loans to Allied governments.Writers such as Engelbrecht and Hanighen,authors of the memorably titled Merchants of Death,helped to publicize this line of argument.7 Perhaps the most important of those who took this position was Senator Gerald Nye(R-N.D.),whose hearings on the role of the munitions industry in promoting American entry into the war led to the adoption of the neutrality legislation of the 1930s.Nye claimed that Americans had been duped into supporting a war in which they were "fighting to save the skins of American bankers who had bet too boldly on the outcome of the war and had two billions of dollars of loans to the Allies in jeopardy."Nye's investigation sought to sustain this position by uncov- ering evidence that bankers and industrialists financed groups that favored inter- vention,and that they were able to influence decision making within the Wilson administration. Most academic revisionists rejected this line of argument.9 Indeed,Charles Beard,perhaps the best-known academic revisionist,sought to discredit this"devil theory of war"in his 1936 book of that name.20 The causal process proposed by Beard and others,such as Grattan,Millis,Birdsall,and Tansill,resembled that suggested by contemporary liberals more than it does the merchants-of-death hypothesis.21 Although they did not use the term,the revisionist argument focused on the opportunity cost of lost trade to the American economy.The revisionists claimed that the wartime boom in exports to the Allied powers made this cost very large.They held that much of the American economy benefited from trade with the Allied powers,not just a narrow set of bankers and munitions makers.In one of the earliest revisionist accounts focused principally on the United States, Grattan listed a wide range of goods not directly related to military action that were exported in large quantities to the Allied powers.22 Beard argued forcefully that efforts to blame narrow special interests for promoting the war were misguided 17.Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1935. 18.Buehrig1955,95. 19.The most important exception to this generalization is Harry Elmer Barnes,who wrote a pref- ace to Merchants of Death.Although Barnes was more careful than many who adopted this line of argument,the chapter of his 1926 book devoted to American intervention emphasizes the role of busi- ness interests and pro-British politicians in American intervention.Barnes's stress on lobbying and the discretion available to the Wilson administration more closely resembles the merchants of death hypoth- esis than the argument of most other academic revisionists. 20.Beard1936. 21.See Grattan 1929;Millis 1935;Birdsall 1939;and Tansill 1938. 22.Grattan1929.132

Although academic revisionists of the interwar period came to different conclu￾sions about the impact of trade on conflict, the logic of their argument about the U+S+ role in World War I closely resembles the contemporary liberal opportunity￾cost argument+ Unfortunately, these historians have often been lumped together with those who contended that arms manufacturers and the bankers who financed them brought about U+S+ intervention to reap the benefits of wartime military spend￾ing and the munitions trade, as well as to facilitate repayment of their loans to Allied governments+ Writers such as Engelbrecht and Hanighen, authors of the memorably titled Merchants of Death, helped to publicize this line of argument+ 17 Perhaps the most important of those who took this position was Senator Gerald Nye ~R-N+D+!, whose hearings on the role of the munitions industry in promoting American entry into the war led to the adoption of the neutrality legislation of the 1930s+ Nye claimed that Americans had been duped into supporting a war in which they were “fighting to save the skins of American bankers who had bet too boldly on the outcome of the war and had two billions of dollars of loans to the Allies in jeopardy+” 18 Nye’s investigation sought to sustain this position by uncov￾ering evidence that bankers and industrialists financed groups that favored inter￾vention, and that they were able to influence decision making within the Wilson administration+ Most academic revisionists rejected this line of argument+ 19 Indeed, Charles Beard, perhaps the best-known academic revisionist, sought to discredit this “devil theory of war” in his 1936 book of that name+ 20 The causal process proposed by Beard and others, such as Grattan, Millis, Birdsall, and Tansill, resembled that suggested by contemporary liberals more than it does the merchants-of-death hypothesis+ 21 Although they did not use the term, the revisionist argument focused on the opportunity cost of lost trade to the American economy+ The revisionists claimed that the wartime boom in exports to the Allied powers made this cost very large+ They held that much of the American economy benefited from trade with the Allied powers, not just a narrow set of bankers and munitions makers+ In one of the earliest revisionist accounts focused principally on the United States, Grattan listed a wide range of goods not directly related to military action that were exported in large quantities to the Allied powers+ 22 Beard argued forcefully that efforts to blame narrow special interests for promoting the war were misguided 17+ Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1935+ 18+ Buehrig 1955, 95+ 19+ The most important exception to this generalization is Harry Elmer Barnes, who wrote a pref￾ace to Merchants of Death+ Although Barnes was more careful than many who adopted this line of argument, the chapter of his 1926 book devoted to American intervention emphasizes the role of busi￾ness interests and pro-British politicians in American intervention+ Barnes’s stress on lobbying and the discretion available to the Wilson administration more closely resembles the merchants of death hypoth￾esis than the argument of most other academic revisionists+ 20+ Beard 1936+ 21+ See Grattan 1929; Millis 1935; Birdsall 1939; and Tansill 1938+ 22+ Grattan 1929, 132+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 281