《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions

This article was downloaded by:[Shanghai Jiaotong University] 0n:24June2013,At:02:27 Publisher:Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office:Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH,UK SECURITY Security Studies STUDIES Publication details,including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsst20 The microfoundations of economic sanctions Jonathan Kirshner a a Assistant professor of government,Cornell University, Published online:24 Dec 2007. To cite this article:Jonathan Kirshner (1997):The microfoundations of economic sanctions,Security Studies,6:3,32-64 To link to this article:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429314 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use:http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions This article may be used for research,teaching,and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction,redistribution, reselling,loan,sub-licensing,systematic supply,or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date.The accuracy of any instructions,formulae,and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources.The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions,claims,proceedings,demand,or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material

This article was downloaded by: [Shanghai Jiaotong University] On: 24 June 2013, At: 02:27 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Security Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsst20 The microfoundations of economic sanctions Jonathan Kirshner a a Assistant professor of government, Cornell University, Published online: 24 Dec 2007. To cite this article: Jonathan Kirshner (1997): The microfoundations of economic sanctions, Security Studies, 6:3, 32-64 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429314 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms￾and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material

THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS JONATHAN KIRSHNER HE DEBATE in political science about economic sanctions has too often devolved into unhelpful caricatures about whether or not sanctions "work,"and whether they can and will replace the use of force.Endist arguments about the disutility of force and the rise of the trading state are easily dismissed by security specialists who point to nu- aunf merous post-cold war military confrontations and to the paucity of evi- dence in support of the view that sanctions can substitute for force in ad- vancing state objectives.The question of whether sanctions work,however, is a false controversy that has inhibited progress in the understanding of crucial aspects of world politics.Economic coercion will be an increasingly 节 important tool of international statecraft in the coming years,and security specialists need to know not "if they work,"but rather "how they func- tion."This article introduces a microfoundations approach to explain how sanctions function.It argues further that sanctions are neither impotent nor 5 are they a panacea,but rather need to be reconceptualized as a technique of uojoe!f statecraft.The microfoundations approach advances this agenda by con- tributing to our understanding of the conditions under which different tac- tics will represent the most effective policy choices. rey3ueyS] Economic diplomacy will play an increasingly large role in the post-cold war era.Four principal factors contribute to this trend:First,although conflicts between participants in the anti-Soviet alliance are likely to in- 合 crease,they will almost certainly be fought with economic as opposed to papeoluMod military techniques of statecraft.Second,the collapse of communism and the greater number of small,market-sensitive economies in the interna- tional system has increased the number of states that are vulnerable to eco- nomic coercion.Third,many great powers in the system,such as the United States,Germany,and Japan,appear disinclined to use force to re- Jonathan Kirshner is assistant professor of government at Cornell University. For their helpful comments,I thank Tom Christensen,Jim Goldgeier,Peter Katzenstein, Karl Mueller,and two anonymous reviewers for Secrity Studies. SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 (spring 1997):32-64 Published by Frank Cass,London

THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS JONATHAN KIRSHNER T HE DEBATE in political science about economic sanctions has too often devolved into unhelpful caricatures about whether or not sanctions "work," and whether they can and will replace the use of force. Endist arguments about the disutility of force and the rise of the trading state are easily dismissed by security specialists who point to nu￾merous post—cold war military confrontations and to the paucity of evi￾dence in support of the view that sanctions can substitute for force in ad￾vancing state objectives. The question of whether sanctions work, however, is a false controversy that has inhibited progress in the understanding of crucial aspects of world politics. Economic coercion will be an increasingly important tool of international statecraft in the coming years, and security specialists need to know not "if they work," but rather "how they func￾tion." This article introduces a microfoundations approach to explain how sanctions function. It argues further that sanctions are neither impotent nor are they a panacea, but rather need to be reconceptualized as a technique of statecraft. The microfoundations approach advances this agenda by con￾tributing to our understanding of the conditions under which different tac￾tics will represent the most effective policy choices. Economic diplomacy will play an increasingly large role in the post-cold war era. Four principal factors contribute to this trend: First, although conflicts between participants in the anti-Soviet alliance are likely to in￾crease, they will almost certainly be fought with economic as opposed to military techniques of statecraft. Second, the collapse of communism and the greater number of small, market-sensitive economies in the interna￾tional system has increased the number of states that are vulnerable to eco￾nomic coercion. Third, many great powers in the system, such as the United States, Germany, and Japan, appear disinclined to use force to re￾Jonathan Kirshner is assistant professor of government at Cornell University. For their helpful comments, I thank Tom Christensen, Jim Goldgeier, Peter Katzenstein, Karl Mueller, and two anonymous reviewers for Security Studies. SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 (spring 1997): 32-64 Published by Frank Cass, London. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 33 solve many,if not most conflicts.Finally,even in those cases where force is ultimately introduced,the lack of urgency that was associated with many cold war crises means that states are likely to apply economic sanctions as an early method of influence in a conflict.Thus sanctions are often an im- portant intermediate form of statecraft that complement the use of force. Despite some notable advances in the past decade,our understanding of economic sanctions remains limited.One reason for this is that economic sanctions are principally discussed in aggregate terms.Typically,references are made to the sender,the target,and the sanction.This article argues that disaggregating these elements will enhance our understanding of how eco- nomic sanctions work.A microfoundations approach looks not at eco- aunf nomic sanctions in general,but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft.Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state,this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are af- fected differentially,and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.2 Further study of these microfoundations will increase the understanding of when and why economic sanctions will be successful.We must take care, however,with the issue of“success'”and“failure'”regarding economic 1.See David Baldwin,Economic Stateorgf (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1985); Klaus Knorr,The Power of Nations (New York:Basic Books,1975);Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J.Schott,and Kimberly Ann Elliot,Economic Sanctions Reconridered,vol.1,History and Current Polisy,vol.2,Supplemental Case Histories,2nd ed.Washington,D.C:Institute for Inter- national Economics,1990);David Leyton-Brown,cd.,The Utility of International Economie Sanctions New York:St.Martin's,1987);Robin Renwick,Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs,no.45,1981);Margaret P.Doxey,International Sane- tions in Contemporary Perspective (New York:St.Martin's,1987);and Doxey,Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York:Oxford University Press,1980);M.S.Daoudi and M. S.Dajani,Economic Sanctions:Ideals and Experience (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1983). This is not to say that there has been no disaggregation with regard to the study of eco- nomic sanctions.Although all of these works aggregate targets and senders,some distinc- tions between the forms of sanctions has been considered.Baldwin and Knorr each have separate chapters on aid and trade,although these are primarily in the service of general ar- guments regarding conomic statecraft.Hufbauer,Schott and Elliot distinguish between 'cxport,”“import''and“financial'”sanctions,but the analysis on this issue is limited:see Hirtory and Current Poligy,70-71,also the table on p.106 which notes greater success associ- ated with financial sanctions.In general,all of the studies contain passing references to ideas associated with disaggregation,but pause only momentarily to consider the consequences: see Leyton-Brown,The Utility of International Economic Sanctions,297,Renwick,Economic Sanc- io,37,Doxey,International Sanctions in Conter帅prary Perspectit说，37；Doxey,.Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement,145;Daoudi and Dajani,Economic Sanctions:Ideals and Experience, 164. 2.The sender state can also be disaggregated.This would show how different domestic political structures affect the ability of states to introduce certain types of sanctions.This paper will focus on disaggregating sanctions and targets,which will explain when sanctions will have their greatest chance of success,and not dwell on those factors which lead states to introduce sanctions in the first place

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 3 3 solve many, if not most conflicts. Finally, even in those cases where force is ultimately introduced, the lack of urgency that was associated with many cold war crises means that states are likely to apply economic sanctions as an early method of influence in a conflict. Thus sanctions are often an im￾portant intermediate form of statecraft that complement the use of force. Despite some notable advances in the past decade, our understanding of economic sanctions remains limited. One reason for this is that economic sanctions are principally discussed in aggregate terms. Typically, references are made to the sender, the target, and the sanction.1 This article argues that disaggregating these elements will enhance our understanding of how eco￾nomic sanctions work. A microfoundations approach looks not at eco￾nomic sanctions in general, but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft. Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state, this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are af￾fected differentially, and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.2 Further study of these microfoundations will increase the understanding of when and why economic sanctions will be successful. We must take care, however, with the issue of "success" and "failure" regarding economic 1. See David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, vol. 1, History and Current Policy, vol. 2, Supplemental Case Histories, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Inter￾national Economics, 1990); David Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 45, 1981); Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanc￾tions in Contemporary Perspective (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); and Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). This is not to say that there has been no disaggregation with regard to the study of eco￾nomic sanctions. Although all of these works aggregate targets and senders, some distinc￾tions between the forms of sanctions has been considered. Baldwin and Knorr each have separate chapters on aid and trade, although these are primarily in the service of general ar￾guments regarding economic statecraft. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot distinguish between "export," "import" and "financial" sanctions, but the analysis on this issue is limited: see History and Current Policy, 70-71, also the table on p. 106 which notes greater success associ￾ated with financial sanctions. In general, all of the studies contain passing references to ideas associated with disaggregation, but pause only momentarily to consider the consequences: see Leyton-Brown, The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, 297, Renwick, Economic Sanc￾tions, 37, Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, 37; Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 145; Daoudi and Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience, 164. 2. The sender state can also be disaggregated. This would show how different domestic political structures affect the ability of states to introduce certain types of sanctions. This paper will focus on disaggregating sanctions and targets, which will explain when sanctions will have their greatest chance of success, and not dwell on those factors which lead states to introduce sanctions in the first place. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

34 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 statecraft.This article is an exercise in comparative statics:the influence of changes in specific variables is considered,ceteris paribus.Consequentially, results will not show that certain factors will cause sanctions to work,but rather that the presence or absence of those factors will make success more or less likely.That this must be the case is shown by a consideration of the two principal sets of variables which this analysis holds constant. First,and most importantly,the context of the influence attempt is held constant.Any study of sanctions post-Baldwin's Economic Statecraf cannot ignore three contextual variables in evaluating success and failure.These are ≡ the full range of goals for which sanctions were enacted,the costs and benefits of sanctions compared with other forms of coercion,and the value that the target places on continued defiance.The fill range of goal refers to the fact that a state may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target,but to communicate its preferences,support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity,and dissuade the target from S expanding its objectionable activity.Sanctions may also be designed to punish,weaken,distract,or contain the adversary.Thus sanctions may fail to move the target,but may be successful along a number of other dimen- sions,complement other policies,and remain an appropriate policy instru- 5 ment.3 Attention to comparalive costr serves as a reminder that in choosing policy,statesmen must compare the costs,both political and economic,of introducing specific techniques with the benefits of expected outcomes.It must be remembered that the purpose of all forms of statecraft is to rey3ueyS] achieve political objectives.There will be many cases,then,where the costs of the use of force will outweigh the political benefits of achieving the de- sired outcome.In those cases,the use of force can never work.Success, 名 therefore,can only be calculated with regard to costs and benefits,and as compared with other options.Finally,the value the target places on continued defance eliminates the possibility of absolute claims regarding the success and failure of economic sanctions(or,for that matter,other forms of coer- cion).A given sanction(for example,the suspension of $500 million in aid) will be successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others,largely depend- ing on the target's ranking of the value of defiance and the cost of the sanction.Although it can be said that a suspension of $500 million in aid will be less effective than a $1 billion suspension and more effective than a $250 million suspension,ceteris paribus,no absolute claims can be made 3.The question for statecraft is not "will these measures work"(that is,change target behavior)but rather,"is my strategic position improved if I introduce these measures

34 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 statecraft. This article is an exercise in comparative statics: the influence of changes in specific variables is considered, ceteris paribus. Consequentially, results will not show that certain factors will cause sanctions to work, but rather that the presence or absence of those factors will make success more or less likely. That this must be the case is shown by a consideration of the two principal sets of variables which this analysis holds constant. First, and most importantly, the context of the influence attempt is held constant. Any study of sanctions post-Baldwin's Economic Statecraft cannot ignore three contextual variables in evaluating success and failure. These are the full range of goals for which sanctions were enacted, the costs and benefits of sanctions compared with other forms of coercion, and the value that the target places on continued defiance. The. full range of goals refers to the fact that a state may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target, but to communicate its preferences, support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity, and dissuade the target from expanding its objectionable activity. Sanctions may also be designed to punish, weaken, distract, or contain the adversary. Thus sanctions may fail to move the target, but may be successful along a number of other dimen￾sions, complement other policies, and remain an appropriate policy instru￾ment.3 Attention to comparative costs serves as a reminder that in choosing policy, statesmen must compare the costs, both political and economic, of introducing specific techniques wim the benefits of expected outcomes. It must be remembered that the purpose of all forms of statecraft is to achieve political objectives. There will be many cases, then, where the costs of the use of force will outweigh the political benefits of achieving the de￾sired outcome. In those cases, the use of force can never work. Success, therefore, can only be calculated with regard to costs and benefits, and as compared with other options. Finally, the value the target places on continued defiance eliminates the possibility of absolute claims regarding the success and failure of economic sanctions (or, for that matter, other forms of coer￾cion). A given sanction (for example, the suspension of $500 million in aid) will be successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others, largely depend￾ing on the target's ranking of the value of defiance and the cost of the sanction. Although it can be said that a suspension of $500 million in aid will be less effective than a $1 billion suspension and more effective than a $250 million suspension, ceteris paribus, no absolute claims can be made 3. The question for statecraft is not "will these measures 'work'" (that is, change target behavior) but rather, "is my strategic position improved if I introduce these measures." Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 35 about the success of cutting off any particular level of aid.Solely as a con- sequence of the goal of the sanction,there will be cases when a $250 mil- lion suspension will be successful and a $1 billion suspension unsuccessful. A second group of variables is also held constant.There are a number of identities,which have been explored by many scholars but can be associ- ated with the methodology of Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot's study Economi Sanctions Reconsidered.Three principal identities should be noted:those asso- ciated with size,exposure,and cooperation.5 Size simply means that the greater the disparity of power between the sender and the target,the greater the prospects for success.(Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,for example,use a 5100 10:1 ratio of target/sender GNP as a rule of thumb for potential sanction- ers.)Exposure measures the relative vulnerability of targets:with trade sanctions,this would mean that chances of success are increased the larger the target's ratio of trade/GNP.6 Cooperation refers to the fact that (once again,ceteris paribus),the more states that support the sanctions effort against the target,the greater the likelihood that the target will ultimately capitulate.As with the set of contextual variables,these influences are taken as given in the analysis below.?Together they explain why only relative (or comparative static)as opposed to absolute conclusions can be drawn about 5 the prospects for the success of economic sanctions.They also underscore the need to reconceptualize sanctions as a form of statecraft,just like the Suojoelf use of force.As with force,greater attention needs to be paid to practical questions of tactics,strategy,and contingency,and less on sweeping state- ments of whether statecraft works. reyueyS] 名 4.As one reviewer pointed out,even the apparent truism that a $1 billion suspension will be more "effective"than a $250 million one requires closer scrutiny.The larger sanction might result in a change of government,but the goal of the sanction could be to change the behavior of the existing regime without forcing it from power.In that case,the smaller sanc- tion would be more effective.This argument illustrates two fundamental aspects of the mi- crofoundations approach:the need to differentiate between the force of a sanction and its political consequence,and the difficulty of making noncontextualized claims about the pros- pects for success or failure of a given policy instrument. 5.See also Knorr,Power of Nations,156;P.A.G.van Bergeijk,"Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions,"Kyelos 42,no.3 (1989):385-404,esp.398;and Lisa Martin, "Credibility,Costs,and Institutions:Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,"WVorld Politics 45, no.3 (April 1993):406-32.For comparison of Baldwin and Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,see Stephanie Lenway,"Between War and Commerce:Economic Sanctions as a Tool of State- craft,"International Organization 42,no.2(spring 1988):397-426. 6.With aid,the target government's exposure can be measured by comparing the assis- tance with overall state revenue. 7.These variables are held constant to enhance the focus of this paper.Complementary paths of inquiry could explore the relationship between these variables and different forms of sanctions.Cooperation,for example,might be more important with trade sanctions than with sanctions involving aid or monetary relations

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 35 about the success of cutting off any particular level of aid.4 Solely as a con￾sequence of the goal of the sanction, there will be cases when a $250 mil￾lion suspension will be successful and a $1 billion suspension unsuccessful. A second group of variables is also held constant. There are a number of identities, which have been explored by many scholars but can be associ￾ated with the methodology of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot's study Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Three principal identities should be noted: those asso￾ciated with size, exposure, and cooperation.5 Size simply means that the greater the disparity of power between the sender and the target, the greater the prospects for success. (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, for example, use a 10:1 ratio of target/sender GNP as a rule of thumb for potential sanction￾ers.) Exposure measures the relative vulnerability of targets: with trade sanctions, this would mean that chances of success are increased the larger the target's ratio of trade/GNP.6 Cooperation refers to the fact that (once again, ceteris paribus), the more states that support the sanctions effort against the target, the greater the likelihood that the target will ultimately capitulate. As with the set of contextual variables, these influences are taken as given in the analysis below.7 Together they explain why only relative (or comparative static) as opposed to absolute conclusions can be drawn about the prospects for the success of economic sanctions. They also underscore the need to reconceptualize sanctions as a form of statecraft, just like the use of force. As with force, greater attention needs to be paid to practical questions of tactics, strategy, and contingency, and less on sweeping state￾ments of whether statecraft works. 4. As one reviewer pointed out, even the apparent truism that a $1 billion suspension will be more "effective" than a $250 million one requires closer scrutiny. The larger sanction might result in a change of government, but the goal of the sanction could be to change the behavior of the existing regime without forcing it from power. In that case, the smaller sanc￾tion would be more effective. This argument illustrates two fundamental aspects of the mi￾crofoundations approach: the need to differentiate between the force of a sanction and its political consequence, and the difficulty of making noncontextualized claims about the pros￾pects for success or failure of a given policy instrument. 5. See also Knorr, Power of Nations, 156; P. A. G. van Bergeijk, "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions," Kyklos 42, no. 3 (1989): 385-404, esp. 398; and Lisa Martin,4 "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," World Politics 45, no. 3 (April 1993): 406-32. For comparison of Baldwin and Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, see Stephanie Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of State￾craft," International Organisation 42, no. 2 (spring 1988): 397-426. 6. With aid, the target government's exposure can be measured by comparing the assis￾tance with overall state revenue. 7. These variables are held constant to enhance the focus of this paper. Complementary paths of inquiry could explore the relationship between these variables and different forms of sanctions. Cooperation, for example, might be more important with trade sanctions than with sanctions involving aid or monetary relations. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013