Googling the WTO:What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions Krzysztof J.Pelc Abstract How does international law affect state behavior?Existing models addressing this issue rest on individual preferences and voter behavior,yet these assumptions are rarely questioned.Do citizens truly react to their governments being taken to court over purported violations?I propose a novel approach to test the prem- ise behind models of international treaty-making,using web-search data.Such data are widely used in epidemiology:in this article I claim that they are also well suited to applications in political economy.Web searches provide a unique proxy for a fun- damental political activity that we otherwise have little sense of:information seek- ing.Information seeking by constituents can be usefully examined as an instance of political mobilization.Applying web-search data to international trade disputes,I pro- vide evidence for the belief that US citizens are concerned about their country being branded a violator of international law,even when they have no direct material stake in the case at hand.This article constitutes a first attempt at utilizing web-search data to test the building blocks of political economy theory. How does international law affect state behavior?A vast and still growing body of work has been looking to domestic politics for an answer.These scholars have looked past traditional international-level factors such as state power,country rep- utation,and reciprocity,focusing instead on the role of constituents and interest groups to explain why countries join international treaties in the first place,and how they behave within treaties subsequently.Such theories rest on a common set of highly specific assumptions about individual behavior.Yet strikingly,these often elaborate premises have been left largely unexamined. The puzzle of why countries would commit to international binding rules in trade,investment,or human rights agreements has led to increasingly rich theoriz- ing.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff believe that countries join trade agree- I thank Marc L.Busch,Stephen Chaudoin,Betsy Levy Paluck,Stuart Soroka,and Erik Voeten,as well as the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.Yanick Touchette provided excel- lent research assistance.I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds de recherche sur la societe et la culture and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.All remain- ing errors are my own. International Organization 67,Summer 2013,pp.629-55 2013 by The IO Foundation. do:10.1017/S0020818313000179
Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions Krzysztof J+ Pelc Abstract How does international law affect state behavior? Existing models addressing this issue rest on individual preferences and voter behavior, yet these assumptions are rarely questioned+ Do citizens truly react to their governments being taken to court over purported violations? I propose a novel approach to test the premise behind models of international treaty-making, using web-search data+ Such data are widely used in epidemiology; in this article I claim that they are also well suited to applications in political economy+ Web searches provide a unique proxy for a fundamental political activity that we otherwise have little sense of: information seeking+ Information seeking by constituents can be usefully examined as an instance of political mobilization+ Applying web-search data to international trade disputes, I provide evidence for the belief that US citizens are concerned about their country being branded a violator of international law, even when they have no direct material stake in the case at hand+ This article constitutes a first attempt at utilizing web-search data to test the building blocks of political economy theory+ How does international law affect state behavior? A vast and still growing body of work has been looking to domestic politics for an answer+ These scholars have looked past traditional international-level factors such as state power, country reputation, and reciprocity, focusing instead on the role of constituents and interest groups to explain why countries join international treaties in the first place, and how they behave within treaties subsequently+ Such theories rest on a common set of highly specific assumptions about individual behavior+ Yet strikingly, these often elaborate premises have been left largely unexamined+ The puzzle of why countries would commit to international binding rules in trade, investment, or human rights agreements has led to increasingly rich theorizing+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff believe that countries join trade agreeI thank Marc L+ Busch, Stephen Chaudoin, Betsy Levy Paluck, Stuart Soroka, and Erik Voeten, as well as the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments+ Yanick Touchette provided excellent research assistance+ I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council+ All remaining errors are my own+ International Organization 67, Summer 2013, pp+ 629–55 © 2013 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818313000179
630 International Organization ments in order to credibly convey to voters that economic downturns,when they occur,are not due to leaders'offering distortionary protection to industries.Kono argues that democratic leaders are more likely to offer protection through convo- luted policy instruments,because these are less likely to be seized upon by the opposition.2 Looking at the human rights regime,Simmons and Danner claim that countries ratify the International Criminal Court(ICC)statute as a means of rais- ing expectations among the general populace about the government's will to find peaceful solutions to potential domestic conflicts:"the frustration of these expec- tations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support."3 In all these instances,theoretical claims rest on a common premise:when inter- national legal institutions inform constituents of their governments'violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support,whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent.It is precisely because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents that leaders make those international com- mitments.As with all audience cost models,4 the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents'forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments. But do constituents really care about their governments flouting international agreements?These models'validity rests on this being the case,yet scholars have little way of knowing one way or the other.The premise that constituents would know and care enough to punish their government over the highly technical rul- ings of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization(WTO)can easily appear far-fetched.Thus far,the only means of assessing the soundness of these individual-level assumptions has been through surveys. However surveys do poorly on questions that put high demands on timing,such as the study of repeated events or emerging trends.More importantly,they come up against a consistent problem,which is intimately related to skepticism over the very assumptions in question:typical respondents often know little about the issues they are asked about.High rates of respondent ignorance can bias survey results.5 Further evidence shows that in the absence of prior knowledge,respondents become highly vulnerable to framing effects.Such effects grow even more likely given that these surveys often find it necessary to preface questions with information about the issue at hand.For these reasons,and because the problem of respondent ignorance is so closely linked to the very assumptions being tested,surveys fall short of a satisfactory means to assess an electorate's likely behavior in reaction to its government's (non)compliance with international rules. 1.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002. 2.Kono2006. 3.Simmons and Danner 2010.24. 4.Fearon 1998. 5.Berinsky 2004. 6.See Druckman 2001:and Hiscox 2006
ments in order to credibly convey to voters that economic downturns, when they occur, are not due to leaders’ offering distortionary protection to industries+ 1 Kono argues that democratic leaders are more likely to offer protection through convoluted policy instruments, because these are less likely to be seized upon by the opposition+ 2 Looking at the human rights regime, Simmons and Danner claim that countries ratify the International Criminal Court ~ICC! statute as a means of raising expectations among the general populace about the government’s will to find peaceful solutions to potential domestic conflicts: “the frustration of these expectations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support+”3 In all these instances, theoretical claims rest on a common premise: when international legal institutions inform constituents of their governments’ violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support, whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent+ It is precisely because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents that leaders make those international commitments+ As with all audience cost models, 4 the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents’ forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments+ But do constituents really care about their governments flouting international agreements? These models’ validity rests on this being the case, yet scholars have little way of knowing one way or the other+ The premise that constituents would know and care enough to punish their government over the highly technical rulings of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization ~WTO! can easily appear far-fetched+ Thus far, the only means of assessing the soundness of these individual-level assumptions has been through surveys+ However surveys do poorly on questions that put high demands on timing, such as the study of repeated events or emerging trends+ More importantly, they come up against a consistent problem, which is intimately related to skepticism over the very assumptions in question: typical respondents often know little about the issues they are asked about+ High rates of respondent ignorance can bias survey results+ 5 Further evidence shows that in the absence of prior knowledge, respondents become highly vulnerable to framing effects+ 6 Such effects grow even more likely given that these surveys often find it necessary to preface questions with information about the issue at hand+ For these reasons, and because the problem of respondent ignorance is so closely linked to the very assumptions being tested, surveys fall short of a satisfactory means to assess an electorate’s likely behavior in reaction to its government’s ~non!compliance with international rules+ 1+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ 2+ Kono 2006+ 3+ Simmons and Danner 2010, 24+ 4+ Fearon 1998+ 5+ Berinsky 2004+ 6+ See Druckman 2001; and Hiscox 2006+ 630 International Organization
Googling the WTO 631 To remedy this shortcoming,I turn to a novel approach,relying on search- engine data.Web-search data have recently been fruitfully exploited in public health research to predict outbreaks of diseases ranging from influenza and listeria to chickenpox and kidney stone incidence;and in economic applications,to chart activity such as foreign travel,unemployment claims,and stock price move- ments.?In this article,I claim that web-search data may be of equal value to polit- ical economists,because such data are particularly well adapted to assessing many of the otherwise untestable behavioral assumptions underlying the majority of schol- arly models. I focus on the behavior of individuals with regards to purported violations within trade agreements.By their technical nature,trade agreements constitute a hard test of expectations about constituents'response to noncompliance with inter- national rules.It is more plausible that citizens react forcefully to information about their government's violation of laws against torture than to purported abuse of antidumping provisions.Indeed,the saliency of trade agreements among voters has been thrown in doubt in the past.The other reason for examining trade agree- ments is that one can identify the material interests at stake more easily than in other issue areas,and thus distinguish the reactions of constituents concerned about noncompliance itself,either for normative or for reputational reasons,from the reaction of groups or individuals who stand to gain or lose materially from such noncompliance. The key aspect of web-query data is that it measures not preferences,but behav- ior.Seeking information is a crucial political activity,yet it has been widely over- looked because until recently scholars had little means of observing it.If constituents possess insufficient information to make decisions,rational-actor mod- els predict that they will expend resources trying to gather that information. Yet information seeking is costly:constituents cannot gather and process infi- nite amounts;they must decide what issue to spend scarce resources seeking infor- mation about.It is such scarcity of resources,and the necessary choice it entails, that renders web-search volumes informative from the standpoint of political econ- omy.Web searches related to political events are a form of mobilization on the basis of preferences over those events. I expect that if constituents care about their government being found in breach of international law,as models of treaty making assume,they will expend efforts to seek related information.Using data about Google searches across time and space, I test the effect of the United States being taken to WTO dispute settlement by other WTO members,or its taking another country to dispute settlement,on the volume of WTO-related search terms.The findings provide measured support for assump- 7.See Mohebbi et al.2011;Breyer et al.2011;Askitas and Zimmermann 2009;and Ginsberg et al. 2009. 8.Guisinger 2009. 9.North 1990
To remedy this shortcoming, I turn to a novel approach, relying on searchengine data+ Web-search data have recently been fruitfully exploited in public health research to predict outbreaks of diseases ranging from influenza and listeria to chickenpox and kidney stone incidence; and in economic applications, to chart activity such as foreign travel, unemployment claims, and stock price movements+ 7 In this article, I claim that web-search data may be of equal value to political economists, because such data are particularly well adapted to assessing many of the otherwise untestable behavioral assumptions underlying the majority of scholarly models+ I focus on the behavior of individuals with regards to purported violations within trade agreements+ By their technical nature, trade agreements constitute a hard test of expectations about constituents’ response to noncompliance with international rules+ It is more plausible that citizens react forcefully to information about their government’s violation of laws against torture than to purported abuse of antidumping provisions+ Indeed, the saliency of trade agreements among voters has been thrown in doubt in the past+ 8 The other reason for examining trade agreements is that one can identify the material interests at stake more easily than in other issue areas, and thus distinguish the reactions of constituents concerned about noncompliance itself, either for normative or for reputational reasons, from the reaction of groups or individuals who stand to gain or lose materially from such noncompliance+ The key aspect of web-query data is that it measures not preferences, but behavior+ Seeking information is a crucial political activity, yet it has been widely overlooked because until recently scholars had little means of observing it+ If constituents possess insufficient information to make decisions, rational-actor models predict that they will expend resources trying to gather that information+ 9 Yet information seeking is costly: constituents cannot gather and process infi- nite amounts; they must decide what issue to spend scarce resources seeking information about+ It is such scarcity of resources, and the necessary choice it entails, that renders web-search volumes informative from the standpoint of political economy+ Web searches related to political events are a form of mobilization on the basis of preferences over those events+ I expect that if constituents care about their government being found in breach of international law, as models of treaty making assume, they will expend efforts to seek related information+ Using data about Google searches across time and space, I test the effect of the United States being taken to WTO dispute settlement by other WTO members, or its taking another country to dispute settlement, on the volume of WTO-related search terms+ The findings provide measured support for assump- 7+ See Mohebbi et al+ 2011; Breyer et al+ 2011; Askitas and Zimmermann 2009; and Ginsberg et al+ 2009+ 8+ Guisinger 2009+ 9+ North 1990+ Googling the WTO 631
632 International Organization tions of treaty-making models.I find considerable evidence demonstrating that US constituents react strongly to their country being filed against by seeking WTO- related information.I also examine how material interests figure into the equation, weighing geographical regions by the commercial stake they hold in a given dis- pute,as proxied by employment.I find little evidence that material interests mag- nify the reaction to US filings against trade partners.Yet a material stake does significantly magnify reactions to signals about US violations.This should be cause for concern,since it implies that filing against the United States may"awaken"pre- cisely those groups most likely to oppose swift US compliance. I further consider constituents'reaction to a category of disputes that concern not specific traded goods,but domestic regulation.These "nonmerchandise dis- putes"can have a significant impact on the trade regime,yet they usually pertain to no identifiable trade volume,and generally deal with more abstract legal issues than do merchandise disputes.In another finding that should trouble institutional- ist scholars,I demonstrate that constituents fail to react to their government's pur- ported violations over such abstract issues by seeking related information,which bolsters the view that increasing complexity can play an obfuscating function. To test these beliefs,I begin by taking a simple regression approach,trying to predict the volume of search by looking at the occurrence of disputes.I then reexam- ine my main hypothesis using a method borrowed from financial econometrics. My intuition is that the relation between political events and search volumes for related terms should be analogous to that between stock prices of firms and events that may affect those firms'valuation.This method allows me to effectively ask whether a given event leads to a higher search volume in US states than one would expect had that event not occurred. As a first step in testing the individual-level assumptions underlying political economy models of treaty making using search-engine data,the approach holds important implications for future research.Political scientists know much about the supply side of information-one can measure money spent on television ads, or the number of billboards put up by an electoral campaign-but comparatively less about the demand side of political information,which is likely to be a more telling indicator of behavior.Web-search data may allow us an unprecedented look into an overlooked political activity:information seeking. The Assumptions Underlying Treaty-Making Models The institutional literature's recent focus on the domestic level serves as a solu- tion to an enforcement problem.If institutions such as the WTO have "no bail bondsmen,no blue helmets,no truncheons or tear gas,"how do they hold coun- 10.Kono2006. 11.Belo1996.417
tions of treaty-making models+ I find considerable evidence demonstrating that US constituents react strongly to their country being filed against by seeking WTOrelated information+ I also examine how material interests figure into the equation, weighing geographical regions by the commercial stake they hold in a given dispute, as proxied by employment+ I find little evidence that material interests magnify the reaction to US filings against trade partners+ Yet a material stake does significantly magnify reactions to signals about US violations+ This should be cause for concern, since it implies that filing against the United States may “awaken” precisely those groups most likely to oppose swift US compliance+ I further consider constituents’ reaction to a category of disputes that concern not specific traded goods, but domestic regulation+ These “nonmerchandise disputes” can have a significant impact on the trade regime, yet they usually pertain to no identifiable trade volume, and generally deal with more abstract legal issues than do merchandise disputes+ In another finding that should trouble institutionalist scholars, I demonstrate that constituents fail to react to their government’s purported violations over such abstract issues by seeking related information, which bolsters the view that increasing complexity can play an obfuscating function+ 10 To test these beliefs, I begin by taking a simple regression approach, trying to predict the volume of search by looking at the occurrence of disputes+ I then reexamine my main hypothesis using a method borrowed from financial econometrics+ My intuition is that the relation between political events and search volumes for related terms should be analogous to that between stock prices of firms and events that may affect those firms’ valuation+ This method allows me to effectively ask whether a given event leads to a higher search volume in US states than one would expect had that event not occurred+ As a first step in testing the individual-level assumptions underlying political economy models of treaty making using search-engine data, the approach holds important implications for future research+ Political scientists know much about the supply side of information—one can measure money spent on television ads, or the number of billboards put up by an electoral campaign—but comparatively less about the demand side of political information, which is likely to be a more telling indicator of behavior+ Web-search data may allow us an unprecedented look into an overlooked political activity: information seeking+ The Assumptions Underlying Treaty-Making Models The institutional literature’s recent focus on the domestic level serves as a solution to an enforcement problem+ If institutions such as the WTO have “no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas,”11 how do they hold coun- 10+ Kono 2006+ 11+ Bello 1996, 417+ 632 International Organization
Googling the WTO 633 tries to their commitments?It is generally agreed upon that a key function of the institution in this regard is to provide reliable information about whether or not country behavior is in contravention of its commitments.Who is the intended audi- ence for this information?Traditionally,under the cast of theories that portrayed states as unitary actors,scholars envisioned the audience as other country mem- bers.But another belief has proven dominant in the past two decades,which sees domestic constituents as the intended audience.2 In this telling,the enforcement of governments'commitments flows not as much from the threat of other states'sanctions as it does from a government's own con- stituents.As one observer puts it,these agreements are predicated on "the avail- ability of [domestic]victims of noncompliance as low-cost monitors."13 In the case of trade,protection is distortionary and hampers economic growth.While import-competing industries gain,the median voter loses.Countries signing inter- national trade agreements capitalize on this loss:it is precisely because of the threat of discontented constituents removing a government from office that international trade commitments are credible,and thus beneficial to signatories who are held to Pareto-improving policy changes.As with audience-cost models of any sort,what lends credibility to the commitment is an ex post cost.4 In the case of trade,the expectation is that constituents will react to information about their government offering distortionary protection to interest groups. Since the existence of an ex post cost relies on constituents reacting forcefully to information about breached commitments,these theories hinge on constituents not only noticing,but also caring enough about information concerning breaches by their government to act on their discontent,be it through voting at the polls, withdrawing campaign support,or popular forms of dissent.>It is easy to be skep- tical of this premise.In the face of widespread reports of voter apathy,political igno- rance,and information saturation,should scholars really be constructing models that hinge on constituents acting against leaders on the basis of purported viola- tions of,say,the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosani- tary Measures? Yet this assumption is the lynchpin not only of treaty-making models that ask who joins,16 but also of a number of related questions.In this way,Kono finds 12.See Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002;Kono 2006;Davis 2012;and Pelc 2010 and 2011a. 13.Dai2007,42. 14.See Fearon 1994 and 1998. 15.In fact,a prior individual-level assumption is made,but is it at once more plausible and more widely discussed than the assumption examined here.Namely,voters are thought to be more likely of being informed about policy reversals when these constitute breaches of international commitments than if the government had made the same initial commitments unilaterally,of its own accord.Mans- field,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002.This assumption is plausible since the purpose of institutions is to provide information,and one can point to concrete ways by which institutions do this.As Mansfield, Milner,and Rosendorff(2002,480)put it,"accusations of bad behavior are more newsworthy than are unilateral changes in trade policy." 16.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002
tries to their commitments? It is generally agreed upon that a key function of the institution in this regard is to provide reliable information about whether or not country behavior is in contravention of its commitments+ Who is the intended audience for this information? Traditionally, under the cast of theories that portrayed states as unitary actors, scholars envisioned the audience as other country members+ But another belief has proven dominant in the past two decades, which sees domestic constituents as the intended audience+ 12 In this telling, the enforcement of governments’ commitments flows not as much from the threat of other states’ sanctions as it does from a government’s own constituents+ As one observer puts it, these agreements are predicated on “the availability of @domestic# victims of noncompliance as low-cost monitors+”13 In the case of trade, protection is distortionary and hampers economic growth+ While import-competing industries gain, the median voter loses+ Countries signing international trade agreements capitalize on this loss: it is precisely because of the threat of discontented constituents removing a government from office that international trade commitments are credible, and thus beneficial to signatories who are held to Pareto-improving policy changes+ As with audience-cost models of any sort, what lends credibility to the commitment is an ex post cost+ 14 In the case of trade, the expectation is that constituents will react to information about their government offering distortionary protection to interest groups+ Since the existence of an ex post cost relies on constituents reacting forcefully to information about breached commitments, these theories hinge on constituents not only noticing, but also caring enough about information concerning breaches by their government to act on their discontent, be it through voting at the polls, withdrawing campaign support, or popular forms of dissent+ 15 It is easy to be skeptical of this premise+ In the face of widespread reports of voter apathy, political ignorance, and information saturation, should scholars really be constructing models that hinge on constituents acting against leaders on the basis of purported violations of, say, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures? Yet this assumption is the lynchpin not only of treaty-making models that ask who joins, 16 but also of a number of related questions+ In this way, Kono finds 12+ See Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002; Kono 2006; Davis 2012; and Pelc 2010 and 2011a+ 13+ Dai 2007, 42+ 14+ See Fearon 1994 and 1998+ 15+ In fact, a prior individual-level assumption is made, but is it at once more plausible and more widely discussed than the assumption examined here+ Namely, voters are thought to be more likely of being informed about policy reversals when these constitute breaches of international commitments than if the government had made the same initial commitments unilaterally, of its own accord+ Mans- field, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ This assumption is plausible since the purpose of institutions is to provide information, and one can point to concrete ways by which institutions do this+ As Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff ~2002, 480! put it, “accusations of bad behavior are more newsworthy than are unilateral changes in trade policy+” 16+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ Googling the WTO 633