《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）Economic Structure and International Security.The Limits of the Liberal Case.pdf

Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case Barry Buzan The theory that a liberal international economy is a necessary factor in sustaining an international security system which avoids major conflict and war is widespread.The economic theory of security rests on arguments that connect economic structure to the use of force:specifically,that a liberal economic system substantially discourages the use of force among states, while a mercantilist economic structure stimulates it. In this article I shall challenge the validity of this theory on two levels. First,I shall argue that the theory is seriously unbalanced in its attempt to associate liberal structures exclusively with benign effects on the use of force, and mercantilist structures exclusively with malign ones.Liberal structures can also,and in their own terms,stimulate the use of force,while mercantilist structures can be benign.Second,I shall argue that the whole attempt to link economic structure,whether liberal or mercantilist,to international se- curity overrates the determining role of economic factors in the broader issues of peace and war.Noneconomic factors provide much more powerful explanations than do economic ones for the major phenomena that are usually cited as supporting the theory. The immediate relevance of these arguments is to the current concern that the decline of American hegemony will lead to a collapse of the liberal economic system and therefore to a renewed cycle of conflict and war along the lines of events during the 1930s.If the arguments made here are correct, then this concern is misplaced.The current liberal system does not have to be maintained for security reasons,and security reasons are not a convincing motive for opposing a transition to some form of mercantilist economic system. I start by examining the intellectual origins of the liberal case,and by identifying which of its supporting arguments still plausibly connect economic I would like to thank Charles Jones,Robert Skidelsky,Chris Farrands,and the reviewers for International Organization for their comments on various drafts of this article. International Organization 38,4,Autumn 1984 0020-8183/84/040597-28 $1.50 1984 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case Barry Buzan The theory that a liberal international economy is a necessary factor in sustaining an international security system which avoids major conflict and war is widespread. The economic theory of security rests on arguments that connect economic structure to the use of force: specifically, that a liberal economic system substantially discourages the use of force among states, while a mercantilist economic structure stimulates it. In this article I shall challenge the validity of this theory on two levels. First, I shall argue that the theory is seriously unbalanced in its attempt to associate liberal structures exclusively with benign effects on the use of force, and mercantilist structures exclusively with malign ones. Liberal structures can also, and in their own terms, stimulate the use of force, while mercantilist structures can be benign. Second, I shall argue that the whole attempt to link economic structure, whether liberal or mercantilist, to international security overrates the determining role of economic factors in the broader issues of peace and war. Noneconomic factors provide much more powerful explanations than do economic ones for the major phenomena that are usually cited as supporting the theory. The immediate relevance of these arguments is to the current concern that the decline of American hegemony will lead to a collapse of the liberal economic system and therefore to a renewed cycle of conflict and war along the lines of events during the 1 930s. If the arguments made here are correct, then this concern is misplaced. The current liberal system does not have to be maintained for security reasons, and security reasons are not a convincing motive for opposing a transition to some form of mercantilist economic system. I start by examining the intellectual origins of the liberal case, and by identifying which of its supporting arguments still plausibly connect economic I would like to thank Charles Jones, Robert Skidelsky, Chris Farrands, and the reviewers for International Organization for their comments on various drafts of this article. International Organization 38, 4, Autumn 1984 0020-8183/84/040597-28 $1.50 ? 1984 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

598 International Organization structure to the use of force within the context of the international system since 1945.Section 2 outlines the nature of the decline in the use of force associated with the post-1945 liberal system,and it argues that noneconomic factors provide more convincing explanations for the observed phenomena than do economic ones.Section 3 argues that the liberal case against mer- cantilism on security grounds is not credible under the conditions of the 1980s and that a good case can be made for a benign view of mercantilism. Section 4 makes the case that liberal systems contain a severe structural instability,which means that they,like mercantilist systems,can stimulate as well as constrain the use of force. 1.The liberal case The essence of the liberal case is that a liberal economic order makes a substantial and positive contribution to the maintenance of international security.Where a liberal economic order prevails,states will be less inclined to use force in their relations with each other than would otherwise be the case.Economics thus gives rise to a structural theory ofinternational security, which posits an unspecified,but significant,level of causal linkage between the structure (basic ordering principle)of international economic relations and the noneconomic behavior of states(the use of force).'The theory is politically influential precisely because the arguments are structural:a liberal system in any historical period should generate significant restraint on the use of force. The intellectual foundations of the liberal case are closely linked to the revolution in economics triggered by Adam Smith.The new political-eco- nomics reflected the interests of the rising commercial class.Its proponents, among them Bentham and Paine,looked forward to a society based on individual rights,in which public opinion would play a major role and the state would be minimal.They believed that a natural harmony of interest both within and between states could be obtained by these reforms and that free trade was the key mechanism by which this harmony could be realized. They opposed the existing system of mercantilism,in which economic and individual interests were subordinated to the pursuit of state power and international relations were corrupted by secret diplomacy.They saw this system as serving the narrow class interests of the aristocracy,and they 1.Some writers,for example,Richard K.Ashley,The Political Economy of War and Peace (London:Pinter,1980),pp.269-86,and Immanuel Wallerstein,"The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System,"Comparative Studies in Society and History 16,4(1974),pp. 387-415,would take the view that this is too narrow a conception of economic structure:that it represents at best a substructure within a larger framework.Of other theories about the relationship between economic structure and the use of force,Marxism-Leninism is an obvious example.For a summary and critique of the Marxist view,see Robert Gilpin,War and Change in World Politics(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1981),pp.75-84

598 International Organization structure to the use of force within the context of the international system since 1945. Section 2 outlines the nature of the decline in the use of force associated with the post-1945 liberal system, and it argues that noneconomic factors provide more convincing explanations for the observed phenomena than do economic ones. Section 3 argues that the liberal case against mercantilism on security grounds is not credible under the conditions of the 1 980s and that a good case can be made for a benign view of mercantilism. Section 4 makes the case that liberal systems contain a severe structural instability, which means that they, like mercantilist systems, can stimulate as well as constrain the use of force. 1. The liberal case The essence of the liberal case is that a liberal economic order makes a substantial and positive contribution to the maintenance of international security. Where a liberal economic order prevails, states will be less inclined to use force in their relations with each other than would otherwise be the case. Economics thus gives rise to a structural theory of international security, which posits an unspecified, but significant, level of causal linkage between the structure (basic ordering principle) of international economic relations and the noneconomic behavior of states (the use of force).' The theory is politically influential precisely because the arguments are structural: a liberal system in any historical period should generate significant restraint on the use of force. The intellectual foundations of the liberal case are closely linked to the revolution in economics triggered by Adam Smith. The new political-economics reflected the interests of the rising commercial class. Its proponents, among them Bentham and Paine, looked forward to a society based on individual rights, in which public opinion would play a major role and the state would be minimal. They believed that a natural harmony of interest both within and between states could be obtained by these reforms and that free trade was the key mechanism by which this harmony could be realized. They opposed the existing system of mercantilism, in which economic and individual interests were subordinated to the pursuit of state power and international relations were corrupted by secret diplomacy. They saw this system as serving the narrow class interests of the aristocracy, and they 1. Some writers, for example, Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace (London: Pinter, 1980), pp. 269-86, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16,4 (1974), pp. 387-415, would take the view that this is too narrow a conception of economic structure: that it represents at best a substructure within a larger framework. Of other theories about the relationship between economic structure and the use of force, Marxism-Leninism is an obvious example. For a summary and critique of the Marxist view, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 75-84

Economics and security 599 castigated it for both its economic inefficiency and its encouragement of unnecessary conflict.The classical liberal case thus amalgamated political and economic reforms.Free trade was central to the case,but only its most extreme advocates argued that free trade alone was a sufficient condition for peace.2 The great free-trade campaigner Richard Cobden probably represents the high point in the making of the classical liberal case.Liberal assumptions about harmony of interest lead naturally to the conclusion that a liberal economic system would be substantially less war-prone than a mercantilist one.But Cobden connected the two politically during the 1840s by bringing the peace movement into the free-trade coalition.This alliance sealed the connection between free trade and peace,a connection that still underlies the economic theory of international security.The belief that free trade was good for peace as well as good for prosperity was bolstered by the subsequent half-century experience of the Pax Britannica.So strongly embedded did it become that even the catastrophe of the First World War did not greatly diminish its intellectual and political appeal.3 The economic crisis of the interwar years finally destroyed the political reign of free trade in Britain.But the experience of neomercantilism during the 1930s,and of the world war that seemed to result from it,stimulated a powerful revival of the free-trade and peace connection in the United States. Whatever the historical merits of this interpretation,Cordell Hull and others in the Roosevelt administration were strongly committed to the liberal case, believing that "If goods can't cross borders,soldiers will."4 With America finally acting as heir to Britain's role,Hull and his colleagues had both the will and the means to create an international order in which the hope for peace was strongly tied to the rebuilding of an open trading system among countries that were either democratic by tradition or else made so as a result of occupation and reform. This orthodoxy has dominated and legitimized American hegemony for the past four decades.Commitment to it underlies the current sense of crisis created by America's inability to maintain the liberal order.Protectionism, and the demand for it,is everywhere on the rise,creating the fear that another neomercantilist revival will once again set the world on the path to war. The arguments used to support the liberal case have not remained constant 2.The extreme liberal position has already been adequately dismissed,for example,in Lord Robbins,Money,Trade and International Relations (London:Macmillan,1971),chaps.9 and 11. 3.On the intellectual history of liberal thinking,and its connection to free trade,see F.H. Hinsley,Power and the Pursuit ofPeace(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1963),chaps. 5 and 6.On the history of free trade up to the 1930s,see Norman McCord,ed.,Free Trade: Theory and Practice from Adam Smith to Keynes (Newton Abbot:David Charles,1970). 4.Richard N.Gardner,Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy:The Origins and Prospects of Our Inter- national Economic Order (New York:Columbia University Press,1980),pp.7-9.See also pp. 101-12,382-84

Economics and security 599 castigated it for both its economic inefficiency and its encouragement of unnecessary conflict. The classical liberal case thus amalgamated political and economic reforms. Free trade was central to the case, but only its most extreme advocates argued that free trade alone was a sufficient condition for peace.2 The great free-trade campaigner Richard Cobden probably represents the high point in the making of the classical liberal case. Liberal assumptions about harmony of interest lead naturally to the conclusion that a liberal economic system would be substantially less war-prone than a mercantilist one. But Cobden connected the two politically during the 1 840s by bringing the peace movement into the free-trade coalition. This alliance sealed the connection between free trade and peace, a connection that still underlies the economic theory of international security. The belief that free trade was good for peace as well as good for prosperity was bolstered by the subsequent half-century experience of the Pax Britannica. So strongly embedded did it become that even the catastrophe of the First World War did not greatly diminish its intellectual and political appeal.3 The economic crisis of the interwar years finally destroyed the political reign of free trade in Britain. But the experience of neomercantilism during the 1 930s, and of the world war that seemed to result from it, stimulated a powerful revival of the free-trade and peace connection in the United States. Whatever the historical merits of this interpretation, Cordell Hull and others in the Roosevelt administration were strongly committed to the liberal case, believing that "If goods can't cross borders, soldiers will."4 With America finally acting as heir to Britain's role, Hull and his colleagues had both the will and the means to create an international order in which the hope for peace was strongly tied to the rebuilding of an open trading system among countries that were either democratic by tradition or else made so as a result of occupation and reform. This orthodoxy has dominated and legitimized American hegemony for the past four decades. Commitment to it underlies the current sense of crisis created by America's inability to maintain the liberal order. Protectionism, and the demand for it, is everywhere on the rise, creating the fear that another neomercantilist revival will once again set the world on the path to war. The arguments used to support the liberal case have not remained constant 2. The extreme liberal position has already been adequately dismissed, for example, in Lord Robbins, Money, Trade and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1971), chaps. 9 and 11. 3. On the intellectual history of liberal thinking, and its connection to free trade, see F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit ofPeace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), chaps. 5 and 6. On the history of free trade up to the 1930s, see Norman McCord, ed., Free Trade: Theory and Practice from Adam Smith to Keynes (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1970). 4. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 7-9. See also pp. 101-12, 382-84

600 International Organization over the two centuries of its existence.Central to the economic side of the theory is the assumption that we have only two choices about the form of economic structure:liberal,based on free trade,and mercantilist,based on protection.Because the relationship between the two is mutually exclusive, only limited possibilities exist for policies that combine elements of both. Within this very restricted framework of choice,arguments connecting eco- nomic structure to the use of force have been made on two levels:domestic and international. In the period leading up to the triumph of free trade,arguments on the domestic level dominated the liberal case.Mercantilism was seen to arise from the nature of aristocratic states,and therefore the political priority of liberals was to topple the interventionist,power-seeking state structures that were the legacy of the eighteenth century.Liberals envisaged states that, because the bourgeoisie dominated national politics,would be both inherently disinclined to seek power and anxious to avoid war. The classical liberal view was,therefore,that the character of international relations was determined principally by the character of states.Liberal states would produce a harmonious system,mercantilist states a discordant one. Free trade straddled the domestic-and international-level arguments.It served on the one hand as a device for attacking the domestic bastions of the mercantilist state and on the other,as both the natural expression of the liberal state and the mechanism by which international harmony could be realized. Unfortunately,neither the minimal states nor the perfectly competitive markets envisaged by the classical liberals developed,and consequently nei- ther did the international harmony that they were supposed to generate. Instead,states moved toward nationalism and mass politics,and interven- tionist governments and highly distorted markets became everywhere the rule.s Because history did not unfold in line with liberal assumptions,the ar- guments about the relationship between domestic structure and the use of force have become confused and controversial.The image of the liberal state has been subtly usurped by mass democracies whose domestic structures are far removed from those envisaged by the early 19th-century liberals. Such states still derive some of their legitimacy from the carry-over of the classical liberal image,the principal connection between the two being the ideological primacy of individualism and democracy. But the rise of socialist and Marxist ideologies-a phenomenon associated with the absorption of the lower classes into the political life of the state- has raised all sorts of new perspectives on,and new controversies about, the impact of domestic structure on the use of force.Collectivists have 5.For a summary of this development,see E.H.Carr,Nationalism and after (1945;rpt. London:Macmillan,1968),pp.1-33

600 International Organization over the two centuries of its existence. Central to the economic side of the theory is the assumption that we have only two choices about the form of economic structure: liberal, based on free trade, and mercantilist, based on protection. Because the relationship between the two is mutually exclusive, only limited possibilities exist for policies that combine elements of both. Within this very restricted framework of choice, arguments connecting economic structure to the use of force have been made on two levels: domestic and international. In the period leading up to the triumph of free trade, arguments on the domestic level dominated the liberal case. Mercantilism was seen to arise from the nature of aristocratic states, and therefore the political priority of liberals was to topple the interventionist, power-seeking state structures that were the legacy of the eighteenth century. Liberals envisaged states that, because the bourgeoisie dominated national politics, would be both inherently disinclined to seek power and anxious to avoid war. The classical liberal view was, therefore, that the character of international relations was determined principally by the character of states. Liberal states would produce a harmonious system, mercantilist states a discordant one. Free trade straddled the domestic- and international-level arguments. It served on the one hand as a device for attacking the domestic bastions of the mercantilist state and on the other, as both the natural expression of the liberal state and the mechanism by which international harmony could be realized. Unfortunately, neither the minimal states nor the perfectly competitive markets envisaged by the classical liberals developed, and consequently neither did the international harmony that they were supposed to generate. Instead, states moved toward nationalism and mass politics, and interventionist governments and highly distorted markets became everywhere the rule.5 Because history did not unfold in line with liberal assumptions, the arguments about the relationship between domestic structure and the use of force have become confused and controversial. The image of the liberal state has been subtly usurped by mass democracies whose domestic structures are far removed from those envisaged by the early 19th-century liberals. Such states still derive some of their legitimacy from the carry-over of the classical liberal image, the principal connection between the two being the ideological primacy of individualism and democracy. But the rise of socialist and Marxist ideologies-a phenomenon associated with the absorption of the lower classes into the political life of the statehas raised all sorts of new perspectives on, and new controversies about, the impact of domestic structure on the use of force. Collectivists have 5. For a summary of this development, see E. H. Carr, Nationalism and after (1945; rpt. London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 1-33