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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）The Kantian Peace. The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992

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THE KANTIAN PEACE The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence,and International Organizations,1885-1992 By JOHN R.ONEAL and BRUCE RUSSETT* TUST over two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant suggested that"re- publican constitutions,"a"commercial spirit"of international trade, and a federation of interdependent republics would provide the basis for perpetual peace.The alternative,even starker in the nuclear era than in 1795,would be peace of a different sort:"a vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried." Consequently,Kant declared,we have a duty to work for peaceful in- ternational relations.Though he emphasized the absolute character of this moral imperative,he was no idealist;rather,he believed that natu- ral processes based on self-interest impelled individuals to act in ways that would eventually produce a lasting and just peace.Kant was also realistic.He acknowledged that war was inherent in the anarchic inter- national system and therefore cautioned that nations must act pru- dently until the federation of interdependent republics was established. But he also knew that the mechanisms of power politics produce only temporary respite from conflict,not lasting solutions. Over the past half century much of the world has been at peace.Un- derstanding that phenomenon,its causes and trajectory,is the funda- mental challenge for international relations scholars today.We seek to show that Kant's realistic statement of liberal theory provides useful guidance for this task.Most political scientists now agree that the con- temporary peacefulness can be traced in part to the so-called demo- cratic peace,wherein established democratic states have fought no We thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York,the Ford Foundation,and the National Sci- ence Foundation for financial support;Zeev Maoz for comments;and Jennifer Beam,Margit Buss- mann,Soo Yeon Kim,Yury Omelchenko,Brian Radigan,and Jacob Sullivan for data collection and management. 1Kant,Perpetual Peace:A Philosopbical Sketch,in Kant's Political Writings,ed.Hans Reiss (Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press,1970),105.See also James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bach- mann,eds.,Perpetual Peace:Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge:MIT Press,1997). World Politics 52(October 1999),1-37

THE KANTIAN PEACE The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992 By JOHN R. ONEAL and BRUCE RUSSETT* JUST over two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant suggested that "re publican constitutions," a "commercial spirit" of international trade, and a federation of interdependent republics would provide the basis for perpetual peace. The alternative, even starker in the nuclear era than in 1795, would be peace of a different sort: "a vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried."1 Consequently, Kant declared, we have a duty to work for peaceful in ternational relations. Though he emphasized the absolute character of this moral imperative, he was no idealist; rather, he believed that natu ral processes based on self-interest impelled individuals to act in ways that would eventually produce a lasting and just peace. Kant was also realistic. He acknowledged that war was inherent in the anarchic inter national system and therefore cautioned that nations must act pru dently until the federation of interdependent republics was established. But he also knew that the mechanisms of power politics produce only temporary respite from conflict, not lasting solutions. Over the past half century much of the world has been at peace. Un derstanding that phenomenon, its causes and trajectory, is the funda mental challenge for international relations scholars today. We seek to show that Kant s realistic statement of liberal theory provides useful guidance for this task. Most political scientists now agree that the con temporary peacefulness can be traced in part to the so-called demo cratic peace, wherein established democratic states have fought no * We thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, and the National Sci ence Foundation for financial support; Zeev Maoz for comments; and Jennifer Beam, Margit Buss mann, Soo Yeon Kim, Yury Omelchenko, Brian Radigan, and Jacob Sullivan for data collection and management. 1Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Kants Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 105. See also James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bach mann, eds., Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kants Cosmopolitan Zafe?/(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). World Politics 52 (October 1999), 1-37

2 WORLD POLITICS international wars with one another and the use or threat of force among them,even at low levels,has been rare.2 This view is incomplete, however,because it fails to recognize the pacific benefits of the other lib- eral elements of Kant's program for peace.Moreover,the term hides the vigorous theoretical controversy about the processes underlying this sep- arate peace-over whether democracy is really even its cause and over the degree to which the empirical phenomenon existed in other eras. These theoretical and empirical concerns are linked.If,for example, peaceful relations among democracies during the cold war era were simply a consequence of their shared security interests vis-a-vis the op- posing alliance system in a bipolar world,then their peacefulness would be spuriously related to the character of their regimes.The same con- clusion would result if the democratic peace could be attributed to the hegemonic power of the United States to suppress conflict among its allies or to East-West differences in preferences unrelated to underlying differences in regimes.3 One would not then expect to find a separate peace among democratic states in other periods evincing different pat- terns of interstate relations.We address these questions by reporting analyses covering 1885-1992,to show that peaceful relations among democracies existed throughout the twentieth century.4 Extending the historical domain also allows us to assess the effect of the changing character of the international system on interstate relations.5 2 By convention in the social science literature,war is defined as a conflict between two recognized sovereign members of the international system that results in at least one thousand battle deaths.The most complete data on militarized international disputes (MIDs),compiled by Stuart Bremer and his colleagues,are available at http://pss.la-psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM.The democracy data we employ were compiled by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr,"Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data,"Journal of Peace Research 32,no.4(1995),available at http://iscre.colorado.cdu- /pub/datasets/polity3/politymay96.data.Both data sets are produced independently from the demo- cratic peace research program,and the initial codings,from the 1980s,precede it.Reviews of the program include Steve Chan,"In Search of Democratic Peace:Problems and Promise,"Mershon Inter- national Studies Review 41,no.1(1997);James Lee Ray,"Does Democracy Cause Peace?"Annual Review of Political Science 1(1997);and Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr,"From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace:Democracy and Confict in the International System,"in Manus Midlarsky,ed.,Handboo ofWar Studies,2d ed.(Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,forthcoming). 3 Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa,"Common Interests or Common Polities?"Journal of Politics 57,no. 2(1997);Gowa,Ballots and Bullets:The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1999);Douglas Lemke and William Reed,"Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations,"International Interactions 22,no.2(1996);Erik Gartzke,"Kant We All Just Get Along?Opportunity,Willingness and the Origins of the Democratic Peace,"American Journal of Political Science 42,no.1 (1998). The MIDs data(fn.2)are unavailable after 1992,and data on dyadic trade are sparse and unreliable before 1885.In any event the further back one goes into the nineteenth century,the rarer are instances of democracy,intergovernmental organizations,and high levels of economic interdependence.The MIDs data include only disputes between recognized states and not,for example,extrasystemic(ie.,colonial) actions,covert operations,or domestic military interventions in support of a recognized government. s We will not here offer a new theory on why democracy produces peaceful relations.A recent state- ment is Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al,An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 93,no.4 (1999)

2 WORLD POLITICS international wars with one another and the use or threat of force among them, even at low levels, has been rare.2 This view is incomplete, however, because it fails to recognize the pacific benefits of the other lib eral elements of Kant s program for peace. Moreover, the term hides the vigorous theoretical controversy about the processes underlying this sep arate peace?over whether democracy is really even its cause and over the degree to which the empirical phenomenon existed in other eras. These theoretical and empirical concerns are linked. If, for example, peaceful relations among democracies during the cold war era were simply a consequence of their shared security interests vis-?-vis the op posing alliance system in a bipolar world, then their peacefulness would be spuriously related to the character of their regimes. The same con clusion would result if the democratic peace could be attributed to the hegemonic power of the United States to suppress conflict among its allies or to East-West differences in preferences unrelated to underlying differences in regimes.3 One would not then expect to find a separate peace among democratic states in other periods evincing different pat terns of interstate relations. We address these questions by reporting analyses covering 1885-1992, to show that peaceful relations among democracies existed throughout the twentieth century4 Extending the historical domain also allows us to assess the effect of the changing character of the international system on interstate relations.5 2 By convention in the social science literature, war is defined as a conflict between two recognized sovereign members of the international system that results in at least one thousand battle deaths. The most complete data on militarized international disputes (MIDs), compiled by Stuart Bremer and his colleagues, are available at http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM. The democracy data we employ were compiled by Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data,"Journalof* Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995), available at http://isere.colorado.edu /pub/datasets/polity3/politymay96.data. Both data sets are produced independently from the demo cratic peace research program, and the initial codings, from the 1980s, precede it. Reviews of the program include Steve Chan, "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," Mershon Inter national Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997); James Lee Ray, "Does Democracy Cause Peace?" Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1997); and Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, "From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International System," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies, 2d ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming). 3 Henry F?rber and Joanne Gowa, "Common Interests or Common Polities?" Journal of Politics 57, no. 2 (1997); Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Douglas Lemke and William Reed, "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations," International Interactions 22, no. 2 (1996); Erik Gartzke, "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness and the Origins of the Democratic Peace,"American JournalofPoliticalScience 42, no. 1 (1998). 4 The MIDs data (fn. 2) are unavailable after 1992, and data on dyadic trade are sparse and unreliable before 1885. In any event the further back one goes into the nineteenth century, the rarer are instances of democracy, intergovernmental organizations, and high levels of economic interdependence. The MIDs data include only disputes between recognized states and not, for example, extrasystemic (i.e., colonial) actions, covert operations, or domestic military interventions in support of a recognized government. 5 We will not here offer a new theory on why democracy produces peaceful relations. A recent state ment is Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (1999)

KANTIAN PEACE 3 In keeping with the Kantian perspective,we expand our analysis be- yond the democratic peace,incorporating the influence of economically important trade and joint memberships in international organizations. The classical liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ex- pected interdependence as well as popular control of government to have important pacific benefits.Commercial relations draw states into a web of mutual self-interest that constrains them from using force against one another.Thus interdependence and democracy contribute to what we have called the"liberal peace."Kant emphasized,in addi- tion,the benefits of international law and organization.Our previous analyses of the cold war era indicate that,during those years at least, trade and networks of intergovernmental organizations did reduce the number of militarized interstate disputes;these effects were on top of the benefits of democracy.6 We show here that they also operated in earlier and later years. OUR OBJECTIVES AND METHOD Although the liberal and realist perspectives are often considered anti- thetical,in keeping with Kant's philosophical analysis we conduct our tests of the Kantian peace while taking into account important realist influences.We believe,as Kant did,that both perspectives matter,as 6 John R.Oneal and Bruce Russett,"The Classical Liberals Were Right:Democracy,Interdepen- dence,and Conflict,1950-1985,"International Studies Quarterly 40,no.2(1997);Russett,Oneal,and David R.Davis,"The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod:International Organizations and Militarized Disputes,1950-85,"International Organization 52,no.3(1998);Oneal and Russett,"Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications:Trade Still Reduces Conflict,"Journal of Peace Researcb 36,no.4(1999).Here we extend this line of research in three ways:(1)providing a conceptual syn- thesis of Kantian and realist theories that treats conflict as inherent but subject to important con- straints;(2)extending the temporal domain for trade and IGos into the nineteenth century;and(3) assessing realist theories regarding the role of the hegemon and Kantian theories about systemic influ- ences in a way that addresses,among others,constructivist and evolutionary perspectives on the inter- national system.Note that the Kantian influences may be mutually reinforcing in a dynamic system of feedback loops,as suggested by Wade Huntley,"Kant's Third Image:Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace,"International Studies Quarterly 40,no.4(1996);and Russett,"A Neo-Kantian Perspective:De- mocracy,Interdependence,and International Organizations in Building Security Communities,"in Emanuel Adler and Michacl Barnett,eds.,Security Communities in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press,1998). We and others have begun to address some of these links,such as greater trade between democra- cies,the possibility that trade is diminished between conflicting states,the effect of democracy,trade, and peace in increasing membership in international organizations,and the effect of conflict on de- mocracy.On the first,see Harry Bliss and Russett,"Democratic Trading Partners:The Liberal Con- nection,"Journal of Politics 58,no.4(1998),and James Morrow,Randolph Siverson,and Tessa Tabares, "The Political Determinants of International Trade:The Major Powers,1907-90,"American Political Science Review 92,no.3(1998);on the second,see Soo Yeon Kim,"Ties That Bind:The Role of Trade in International Conflict Processes"(Ph.D.diss.,Yale University,1998);on the third,see Russett,Oneal, and Davis(this fn.);and on the last,see Oneal and Russett,"Why 'An Identified Systemic Model of the Democratic Peace Nexus'Does Not Persuade,"Defence and Peace Economics 11,no.2(2000)

KANTIAN PEACE 3 In keeping with the Kantian perspective, we expand our analysis be yond the democratic peace, incorporating the influence of economically important trade and joint memberships in international organizations. The classical liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ex pected interdependence as well as popular control of government to have important pacific benefits. Commercial relations draw states into a web of mutual self-interest that constrains them from using force against one another. Thus interdependence and democracy contribute to what we have called the "liberal peace." Kant emphasized, in addi tion, the benefits of international law and organization. Our previous analyses of the cold war era indicate that, during those years at least, trade and networks of intergovernmental organizations did reduce the number of militarized interstate disputes; these effects were on top of the benefits of democracy.6 We show here that they also operated in earlier and later years. Our Objectives and Method Although the liberal and realist perspectives are often considered anti thetical, in keeping with Kant s philosophical analysis we conduct our tests of the Kantian peace while taking into account important realist influences. We believe, as Kant did, that both perspectives matter, as 6 John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdepen dence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1997); Russett, Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85," International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998); Oneal and Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," fournal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999). Here we extend this line of research in three ways: (1) providing a conceptual syn thesis of Kantian and realist theories that treats conflict as inherent but subject to important con straints; (2) extending the temporal domain for trade and IGOs into the nineteenth century; and (3) assessing realist theories regarding the role of the hegemon and Kantian theories about systemic influ ences in a way that addresses, among others, constructivist and evolutionary perspectives on the inter national system. Note that the Kantian influences may be mutually reinforcing in a dynamic system of feedback loops, as suggested by Wade Hundey, "Kant's Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996); and Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: De mocracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations in Building Security Communities," in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities in Comparative Perspective (New York Cambridge University Press, 1998). We and others have begun to address some of these links, such as greater trade between democra cies, the possibility that trade is diminished between conflicting states, the effect of democracy, trade, and peace in increasing membership in international organizations, and the effect of conflict on de mocracy. On the first, see Harry Bliss and Russett, "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Con nection,"fournal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1998), and James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Tessa Tabares, "The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-90," American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (1998); on the second, see Soo Yeon Kim, "Ties That Bind: The Role of Trade in International Conflict Processes" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1998); on the third, see Russett, Oneal, and Davis (this fn.); and on the last, see Oneal and Russett, "Why An Identified Systemic Model of the Democratic Peace Nexus' Does Not Persuade," Defence and Peace Economics 11, no. 2 (2000)

WORLD POLITICS both consider conflict and the threat of violence to be inherent in an anarchic world of sovereign states.The Hobbesian element of this un- derstanding is central to realist theory,but it is also deeply embedded in the liberal tradition.Kant accepted Hobbes's description of a state of war among nations and believed that a balance of power could prevent war;but history has shown all too clearly,as most realists acknowledge, that this peace"is tenuous.Kant,however,was convinced that a gen- uine,positive peace could be developed within a"federation"of liberal republics that rested more on the three Kantian supports-democracy, interdependence,and international law and organizations-than on power politics.The pacific federation envisioned by Kant is not a world state but a federation whose members remain sovereign,linked only by confederational or collective security arrangements.Liberalism,that is, sees democratic governance,economic interdependence,and interna- tional law as the means by which to supersede the security dilemma rooted in the anarchy of the international system.For states not much linked by these ties,however,the threat of violence remains.In addi- tion,liberal states must fear those illiberal states that remain outside the Kantian confederation.? Thus we begin by assuming that the international system is anarchic and power is important.Yet despite the inherent possibility of violence, states do not fight all others or at all times even where realist principles dominate.Rather,they are constrained by power,alliances,and dis- tance.States must be concerned with the balance of power and the co- incidence of national interests expressed in alliances.Many states, moreover,are irrelevant to these calculations:in general,the farther apart two states are,the fewer are the issues over which to fight and the less the threat they pose to one another.Ultimately therefore realists are concerned only with states that have the opportunity and incentive to engage in conflict.8 Accordingly because these constraints provide a baseline against which to assess the additional impact of the Kantian influences,we incorporate them as central features of our theoretical model.To the realist variables we add measures for the three Kantian constraints,hypothesizing that(1)democracies will use force less fre- quently,especially against other democracies;(2)economically impor- tant trade creates incentives for the maintenance of peaceful relations; Michael W.Doyle,Ways of War and Peace (New York:W.W.Norton,1997),chap.8;David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists:Democratic States and War,"American Political Science Review 86,no.4(1992). Birger Heldt,"Inherency,Contingency,and Theories of Conflict and Peace"(Manuscript,Yale University,1998);Benjamin Most and Harvey Start,Inguiry,Logic,and International Politics(Colum- bia:University of South Carolina Press,1989),chap.2

4 WORLD POLITICS both consider conflict and the threat of violence to be inherent in an anarchic world of sovereign states. The Hobbesian element of this un derstanding is central to realist theory, but it is also deeply embedded in the liberal tradition. Kant accepted Hobbes's description of a state of war among nations and believed that a balance of power could prevent war; but history has shown all too clearly, as most realists acknowledge, that this "peace" is tenuous. Kant, however, was convinced that a gen uine, positive peace could be developed within a "federation" of liberal republics that rested more on the three Kantian supports?democracy, interdependence, and international law and organizations?than on power politics. The pacific federation envisioned by Kant is not a world state but a federation whose members remain sovereign, linked only by confederation^ or collective security arrangements. Liberalism, that is, sees democratic governance, economic interdependence, and interna tional law as the means by which to supersede the security dilemma rooted in the anarchy of the international system. For states not much linked by these ties, however, the threat of violence remains. In addi tion, liberal states must fear those illiberal states that remain outside the Kantian confederation.7 Thus we begin by assuming that the international system is anarchic and power is important. Yet despite the inherent possibility of violence, states do not fight all others or at all times even where realist principles dominate. Rather, they are constrained by power, alliances, and dis tance. States must be concerned with the balance of power and the co incidence of national interests expressed in alliances. Many states, moreover, are irrelevant to these calculations: in general, the farther apart two states are, the fewer are the issues over which to fight and the less the threat they pose to one another. Ultimately therefore realists are concerned only with states that have the opportunity and incentive to engage in conflict.8 Accordingly because these constraints provide a baseline against which to assess the additional impact of the Kantian influences, we incorporate them as central features of our theoretical model. To the realist variables we add measures for the three Kantian constraints, hypothesizing that (1) democracies will use force less fre quently, especially against other democracies; (2) economically impor tant trade creates incentives for the maintenance of peaceful relations; 7 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York W. W. Norton, 1997), chap. 8; David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War " American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (1992). 8 Birger Heldt, "Inherency, Contingency, and Theories of Conflict and Peace" (Manuscript, Yale University, 1998); Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Colum bia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 2

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