1504 Gordon H.Chang and He Di Instead,the Chinese documentary record indicates that China's leaders,and local commanders of the People's Liberation Army(PLA)in particular,consid- ered the events of these nine months as little different in nature from what had transpired in the region since 1949 and not as a separate campaign;that is,they understood the events as an integral part of the continuing tensions of the Chinese civil war in the offshore area.The Nationalists had retained control of some thirty offshore islands,many just a few miles from shore,when they retreated from the mainland in 1949."The civil war against Chiang Kai-shek never ended in the coastal regions,"maintained a high-level,internal report of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)on July 24,1954.6 Because Nationalist and Communist military forces had frequently clashed in the southeastern China coastal area during and after the Korean War in 1953 and 1954,Beijing did not consider the September 3 shelling,though dramatic,to be a radical departure from the pattern or level of hostilities in the area.Other observers at the time,including forces friendly to the United States,also evaluated the September 3 shelling of Quemoy,and the subsequent events in the offshore island area,in a different light than did Washington.The British government saw the activity as part of the latest round of feuding between the Nationalists and the Communists that had broken out during the summer of 1954,and it was not convinced that the Communists intended to attack Quemoy or were even principally interested in the island.7 The Nationalist military high command also expressed in private its belief that the Communists were only probing U.S intentions with the shelling and were not about to launch an all-out assault on Quemoy.On September 10,the Chinese Nationalist Party organ,Central Daily News,dismissed the mainland's "Liberate Taiwan"campaign,which began in late July 1954,as simple propaganda and the Quemoy shelling as part of a political, rather than military,campaign.8 6 Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Central Committee Propaganda Department and the Political Department of the Central Military Commission,"Guanyu Taiwan Wenti de Junshi Baodao de Zhishi,"July 24,1954,Zhongyang Dang'anguan,comp.,Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Huibian:1954 (hereafter,Wenjian Huibian),2722-24.Also see Wang Yan,Mubiao-Yijiangshan (Beijing,1990),54; Han Huaizhi,Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui,256;interviews with Zhang Aiping,Ye Fei,Lei Yingfu; research into restricted archives. 7 Humphrey Trevelyan to Allen,January 22,1955,FO371/115038/FC1041/445,Public Records Office,Kew,England;ALUSNA,Taipei,to Secretary of State,September 3,1954,793.00/9-354, Record Group 59,National Archives,Washington,D.C.;Dockdrill,"Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis,1954-55,"173-96.Also see Zhai Qiang,"Britain,the United States,and the Jinmen-Mazu Crises 1954-55 and 1958,"Chinese Historians,2 (Fall 1992):25-48. s The Central Daily News reported that the Communist shelling killed three Nationalist soldiers and wounded seven others,but it also expressed full confidence in the capability of the Nationalist army. The purposes of the mainland's"Liberate Taiwan"political campaign,according to the newspaper, were to influence the UN,to influence the neutral nations of Asia,to make trouble for the United States,to divert attention from domestic unrest,and to split the free world;September 4,1954,p.1; September 5,p.1;September 10,p.6.Chiang Kai-shek also drew attention to the political purpose of Beijing's attack on the offshore islands."The purpose of the Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands is to undermine the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and the western Pacific security system."See Zhu,et al.,Zhonghua Minguo Shishi Jiyao,1954 (Taipei,1989),301.Although Chiang raised the issue of Quemoy with John Foster Dulles during a discussion in Taibei on September 9,1954,Chiang spent most of the time pressing Dulles for progress toward the treaty and U.S.support for a Nationalist "counter-offensive against the mainland."Chiang expressed no concern about an imminent loss of territory but spoke repeatedly about taking the initiative against the Communists.Shen,translated Memorandum of September 9 conversation between Chiang and AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1504 Gordon H. Chang and He Di Instead, the Chinese documentary record indicates that China's leaders, and local commanders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in particular, considered the events of these nine months as little different in nature from what had transpired in the region since 1949 and not as a separate campaign; that is, they understood the events as an integral part of the continuing tensions of the Chinese civil war in the offshore area. The Nationalists had retained control of some thirty offshore islands, many just a few miles from shore, when they retreated from the mainland in 1949. "The civil war against Chiang Kai-shek never ended in the coastal regions," maintained a high-level, internal report of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on July 24, 1954.6 Because Nationalist and Communist military forces had frequently clashed in the southeastern China coastal area during and after the Korean War in 1953 and 1954, Beijing did not consider the September 3 shelling, though dramatic, to be a radical departure from the pattern or level of hostilities in the area. Other observers at the time, including forces friendly to the United States, also evaluated the September 3 shelling of, Quemoy, and the subsequent events in the offshore island area, in a different light than did Washington. The British government saw the activity as part of the latest round of feuding between the Nationalists and the Communists that had broken out during the summer of 1954, and it was not convinced that the Communists intended to attack Quemoy or were even principally interested in the island.7 The Nationalist military high command also expressed in private its belief that the Communists were only probing U.S. intentions with the shelling and were not about to launch an all-out assault on Quemoy. On September 10, the Chinese Nationalist Party organ, Central Daily News, dismissed the mainland's "Liberate Taiwan" campaign, which began in late July 1954, as simple propaganda and the Quemoy shelling as part of a political, rather than military, campaign.8 6 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Propaganda Department and the Political Department of the Central Military Commission, "Guanyu Taiwan Wenti de Junshi Baodao de Zhishi," July 24, 1954, Zhongyang Dang'anguan, comp., Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Huibian: 1954 (hereafter, Wenjian Huibian), 2722-24. Also see Wang Yan, Mubiao-Yijiangshan (Beijing, 1990), 54; Han Huaizhi, Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui, 256; interviews with Zhang Aiping, Ye Fei, Lei Yingfu; research into restricted archives. 7 Humphrey Trevelyan to Allen, January 22, 1955, F0371/115038/FC1041/445, Public Records Office, Kew, England; ALUSNA, Taipei, to Secretary of State, September 3, 1954, 793.00/9-354, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Dockdrill, "Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis, 1954-55," 173-96. Also see Zhai Qiang, "Britain, the United States, and the Jinmen-Mazu Crises 1954-55 and 1958," Chinese Historians, 2 (Fall 1992): 25-48. 8 The Central Daily News reported that the Communist shelling killed three Nationalist soldiers and wounded seven others, but it also expressed full confidence in the capability of the Nationalist army. The purposes of the mainland's "Liberate Taiwan" political campaign, according to the newspaper, were to influence the UN, to influence the neutral nations of Asia, to make trouble for the United States, to divert attention from domestic unrest, and to split the free world; September 4, 1954, p. 1; September 5, p. 1; September 10, p. 6. Chiang Kai-shek also drew attention to the political purpose of Beijing's attack on the offshore islands. "The purpose of the Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands is to undermine the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and the western Pacific security system." See Zhu, et al., Zhonghua Minguo ShishiJiyao, 1954 (Taipei, 1989), 301. Although Chiang raised the issue of Quemoy with John Foster Dulles during a discussion in Taibei on September 9, 1954, Chiang spent most of the time pressing Dulles for progress toward the treaty and U.S. support for a Nationalist "counter-offensive against the mainland." Chiang expressed no concern about an imminent loss of territory but spoke repeatedly about taking the initiative against the Communists. Shen, translated Memorandum of September 9 conversation between Chiang and AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1505 Why,then,did the Eisenhower administration mistakenly assess the situation and consider the shelling the start of a deliberate military confrontation?In September 1954,U.S.antipathy toward the Chinese Communists and fear of their international ambitions ran high in the aftermath of the Korean War and the Vietnamese Communist defeat of the French in Indochina during the spring of 1954.The United States had steadily increased its attention to the South China Sea and China mainland offshore area for some time before September 3.U.S. ambassador to the Nationalists,Karl Rankin,and military intelligence had both warned of the possibility of trouble,including the danger of a Communist attack on Quemoy,months earlier.s And two U.S.men in uniform,members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group,had been killed in the Communist bombard- ment,which was more serious than previous sporadic shelling. In addition,and perhaps more important,the Eisenhower administration became alarmed because the September 3 attack apparently demonstrated the failure of previous U.S.efforts at deterrence.In the spring and summer of 1954, the United States had twice sent ships of the Seventh Fleet to the Dachens (offshore islands along the Zhejiang coast)in a show of force to impress the Communists.As late as August 20,less than two weeks before the Quemoy shelling,Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a strong message of reassur- ance to the U.S.ambassador to Japan,who had communicated to Washington his own and the Japanese government's worries about possible Communist military activity in the offshore area.Dulles pointed out that because of his recent article in Foreign Affairs,which advanced the doctrine that later became known as "massive retaliation,"he was certain that Beijing and Moscow fully appreciated the U.S.resolve to oppose Communist aggression."I do not think that the Japanese need be alarmed,"he wrote in his confidential letter,"because I do not believe that the Chinese Communists are in fact now prepared to challenge us in any major or sustained way and provoke further our sea and air power along their coast."In an August 24 press conference,Dulles pointedly warned the Commu- nists that an attack on Nationalist-held offshore islands might provoke a U.S. armed response.10 Thus the September 3 shelling most likely came as a rude shock for Washing- ton,considering Dulles's expressed confidence in the power of U.S.deterrent force.Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson Dulles,attached to Karl Rankin to State Department,September 16,1954,Chiang Kai-shek-1954, Box 23,Karl Rankin Papers,Seely Mudd Library,Princeton University.The U.S.ambassador on Taiwan reported to Washington on September 5 that he refused to "take the present fracas around Kinmen very seriously from a purely military standpoint";Karl Rankin,Offshore Islands Chronol- ogy,June 3,1955,Re:Offshore Islands,Box 28,Rankin Papers.Rankin,in his words,expressed "many times the opinion that there probably would be no major Communist assault"after the September 3 shelling because Beijing did not have the military capability.Karl Rankin,Memoran- dum of conversation with Chiang Kai-shek and others,May 4,1955,Re:Chiang Kai-shek,Box 26, Rankin Papers. 9 FRUS,1952-54,14:392-94,412-14,415-16. 10 FRUS,1952-54,14:545-47.Also see Brands,"Testing Massive Retaliation."American case studies that take September 3,1954,as the start of U.S.deterrent efforts begin,therefore,with an incorrect premise.Also see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein,When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?(Ottawa,1990). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1505 Why, then, did the Eisenhower administration mistakenly assess the situation and consider the shelling the start of a deliberate military confrontation? In September 1954, U.S. antipathy toward the Chinese Communists and fear of their international ambitions ran high in the aftermath of the Korean War and the Vietnamese Communist defeat of the French in Indochina during the spring of 1954. The United States had steadily increased its attention to the South China Sea and China mainland offshore area for some time before September 3. U.S. ambassador to the Nationalists, Karl Rankin, and military intelligence had both warned of the possibility of trouble, including the danger of a Communist attack on Quemoy, months earlier.9 And two U.S. men in uniform, members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, had been killed in the Communist bombardment, which was more serious than previous sporadic shelling. In addition, and perhaps more important, the Eisenhower administration became alarmed because the September 3 attack apparently demonstrated the failure of previous U.S. efforts at deterrence. In the spring and summer of 1954, the United States had twice sent ships of the Seventh Fleet to the Dachens (offshore islands along the Zhejiang coast) in a show of force to impress the Communists. As late as August 20, less than two weeks before the Quemoy shelling, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a strong message of reassurance to the U.S. ambassador to Japan, who had communicated to Washington his own and the Japanese government's worries about possible Communist military activity in the offshore area. Dulles pointed out that because of his recent article in Foreign Affairs, which advanced the doctrine that later became known as "massive retaliation," he was certain that Beijing and Moscow fully appreciated the U.S. resolve to oppose Communist aggression. "I do not think that the Japanese need be alarmed," he wrote in his confidential letter, "because I do not believe that the Chinese Communists are in fact now prepared to challenge us in any major or sustained way and provoke further our sea and air power along their coast." In an August 24 press conference, Dulles pointedly warned the Communists that an attack on Nationalist-held offshore islands might provoke a U.S. armed response.10 Thus the September 3 shelling most likely came as a rude shock for Washington, considering Dulles's expressed confidence in the power of U.S. deterrent force. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson Dulles, attached to Karl Rankin to State Department, September 16, 1954, Chiang Kai-shek-1954, Box 23, Karl Rankin Papers, Seely Mudd Library, Princeton University. The U.S. ambassador on Taiwan reported to Washington on September 5 that he refused to "take the present fracas around Kinmen very seriously from a purely military standpoint"; Karl Rankin, Offshore Islands Chronology, June 3, 1955, Re: Offshore Islands, Box 28, Rankin Papers. Rankin, in his words, expressed "many times the opinion that there probably would be no major Communist assault" after the September 3 shelling because Beijing did not have the military capability. Karl Rankin, Memorandum of conversation with Chiang Kai-shek and others, May 4, 1955, Re: Chiang Kai-shek, Box 26, Rankin Papers. 9 FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 392-94, 412-14, 415-16. 10 FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 545-47. Also see Brands, "Testing Massive Retaliation." American case studies that take September 3, 1954, as the start of U.S. deterrent efforts begin, therefore, with an incorrect premise. Also see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? (Ottawa, 1990). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1506 Gordon H.Chang and He Di AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1506 Gordon H. Chang and He Di qjTh .... _ Q~~~~~~~~;.C o 0. Vcu .....i. .. ..........:. .e U2 - AR ....... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -J. .. . . .. . .........~~.~ . 004 Z bO op CC2 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1507 explicitly interpreted events as a failure of deterrence in a September 4 memo to Dulles,arguing that the shelling had proved earlier U.S.efforts could "no longer be relied upon to deter Communist attacks"and that"more positive action by the United States [was]necessary if these [offshore]islands are not to be swallowed up by the Communists."Specifically,Robertson pressed for direct U.S.involvement in the event of a Communist assault on a major offshore island.11 WHAT WAS THE ACTUAL PURPOSE of the shelling that so disturbed U.S.officials? The memoir of General Ye Fei,the Communist commander of the Fujian forces responsible for the bombardment of Quemoy,reveals that orders Beijing sent on August 25 instructed Ye Fei to shell Quemoy,not as a preliminary to an assault on the island but as a specific and limited response to what was perceived as an increase in U.S.and Nationalist military provocations in the area and the rumored negotiation of a mutual defense treaty between Washington and Taibei.It was Ye Fei personally,not the central authorities,who recommended September 3 for the shelling for the simple reason,General Ye believed,that the Nationalists planned to supply the island by ship on that day.Communist shelling of Quemoy after September 3 in 1954 and 1955 was,in fact,infrequent and light.12 Supporting the contention that the Chinese did not consider the September 3 shelling a prelude to a coordinated assault on Quemoy,or even as a serious probe of the U.S.commitment to defend the island,are the recollections of Chinese officials and of the Communist military commanders in charge of forces in the offshore island area at the time.In addition to Ye Fei (who was also the field commander of a failed attack in October 1949 on Quemoy and commander of the PLA Navy in the 1980s),General Zhang Aiping,commander of the Zhejiang forces (minister of defense in the 1980s),and Lei Yingfu,military secretary to Zhou Enlai and an adviser to Mao Zedong,both independently confirm that the only military plan developed at the time was one to take the Dachens,an offshore island group far to the north of Quemoy and Matsu held by the Nationalists;the plan included neither Quemoy nor Matsu.13 11FRUS,1952-54,14:561-63. 12 Ye Fei,Huiyilu (Beijing,1988),643;Kalicki,Patterns of Sino-American Crises,130.The CIA speculated that the shelling may have been linked to the signing of the SEATO(South-East Asian Treaty Organization)treaty.CIA,"Chinese Offshore Islands."The shelling may also have served as a diversion from the mainland's campaign against the northern offshore islands;David G.Muller,Jr., China as a Maritime Power(Boulder,Colo.,1983),24;He Di,"Evolution of the People's Republic of China Policy toward Jinmen and Mazu,"224;and Chen Xiaolu,"China's Policy toward the United States,1949-1955,"in Harding and Yuan Ming,Sino-American Relations,194. s Interviews with Zhang Aiping,Ye Fei,and Lei Yingfu.The recollections of the Chinese officials are supported by a CIA intelligence report issued several days after the September 3 shelling. According to the CIA,"Communist naval and ground force activity in the [Quemoy]area"was "not unusual,"and they had given no indication "they were readying their forces for an attempted invasion of the Quemoys."The report also confirmed that Chinese naval and air capabilities in the Quemoy area were extremely poor,with no railway link to the Fujian coast nor jet fighters"close enough to provide effective cover for operations in the Quemoy area."CIA,"Chinese Offshore Islands."On September 15,1954,the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs summarized the intelligence information it had and concluded that"there is no evidence of a significant build-up"of landing craft around Quemoy,"no Communist air activity in the area,"and "all sources agree that there is now no indication that a Communist attack on the Chinmen [Quemoy]islands is imminent"; AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1507 explicitly interpreted events as a failure of deterrence in a September 4 memo to Dulles, arguing that the shelling had proved earlier U.S. efforts could "no longer be relied upon to deter Communist attacks" and- that "more positive action by the United States [was] necessary if these [offshore] islands are not to be swallowed up by the Communists." Specifically, Robertson pressed for direct U.S. involvement in the event of a Communist assault on a major offshore island." WHAT WAS THE ACTUAL PURPOSE of the shelling that so disturbed U.S. officials? The memoir of General Ye Fei, the Communist commander of the Fujian forces responsible for the bombardment of Quemoy, reveals that orders Beijing sent on August 25 instructed Ye Fei to shell Quemoy, not as a preliminary to an assault on the island but as a specific and limited response to what was perceived as an increase in U.S. and Nationalist military provocations in the area and the rumored negotiation of a mutual defense treaty between Washington and Taibei. It was Ye Fei personally, not the central authorities, who recommended September 3 for the shelling for the simple reason, General Ye believed, that the Nationalists planned to supply the island by ship on that day. Communist shelling of Quemoy after September 3 in 1954 and 1955 was, in fact, infrequent and light.'2 Supporting the contention that the Chinese did not consider the September 3 shelling a prelude to a coordinated assault on Quemoy, or even as a serious probe of the U.S. commitment to defend the island, are the recollections of Chinese officials and of the Communist military commanders in charge of forces in the offshore island area at the time. In addition to Ye Fei (who was also the field commander of a failed attack in October 1949 on Quemoy and commander of the PLA Navy in the 1980s), General Zhang Aiping, commander of the Zhejiang forces (minister of defense in the 1980s), and Lei Yingfu, military secretary to Zhou Enlai and an adviser to Mao Zedong, both independently confirm that the only military plan developed at the time was one to take the Dachens, an offshore island group far to the north of Quemoy and Matsu held by the Nationalists; the plan included neither Quemoy nor Matsu.'3 FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 561-63. 12 Ye Fei, Huiyilu (Beijing, 1988), 643; Kalicki, Patterns of Sino-American Crises, 130. The CIA speculated that the shelling may have been linked to the signing of the SEATO (South-East Asian Treaty Organization) treaty. CIA, "Chinese Offshore Islands." The shelling may also have served as a diversion from the mainland's campaign against the northern offshore islands; David G. Muller,Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colo., 1983), 24; He Di, "Evolution of the People's Republic of China Policy toward Jinmen and Mazu," 224; and Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy toward the United States, 1949-1955," in Harding and Yuan Ming, Sino-American Relations, 194. 13 Interviews with Zhang Aiping, Ye Fei, and Lei Yingfu.The recollections of the Chinese officials are supported by a CIA intelligence report issued several days after the September 3 shelling. According to the CIA, "Communist naval and ground force activity in the [Quemoy] area" was "not unusual," and they had given no indication "they were readying their forces for an attempted invasion of the Quemoys." The report also confirmed that Chinese naval and air capabilities in the Quemoy area were extremely poor, with no railway link to the Fujian coast nor jet fighters "close enough to provide effective cover for operations in the Quemoy area." CIA, "Chinese Offshore Islands." On September 15, 1954, the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs summarized the intelligence information it had and concluded that "there is no evidence of a significant build-up" of landing craft around Quemoy, "no Communist air activity in the area," and "all sources agree that there is now no indication that a Communist attack on the Chinmen [Quemoy] islands is imminent"; AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions