634 International Organization that more democratic regimes are likely to fall back on more opaque forms of protection,because these are less likely to lead to reactions among constituents, and thus are less likely of being seized upon by the opposition,which looks for messages that can be delivered in a sound bite.7 Examining the point of view of enforcers,Davis demonstrates that countries initiate WTO disputes to credibly con- vey to domestic industries that they are serving their interests.8 Filing thus amounts to pandering to an export-oriented audience.Examples of work resting on similar individual-level assumptions are not limited to trade.A wave of domestic-level theorizing has also taken over the study of human rights treaties,where scholars argue that countries join human rights treaties not so much as a gesture to other states,but rather as a credible signal to their domestic audience.9 There too,the premise is that human rights agreements accrue significance as citizens become more likely to react to reports of violations.The same reasoning has been applied to environmental treaties.European countries'compliance with the 1985 Sulfur Protocol is said to have been due to the electoral leverage of domestic constituen- cies likely to act on information about compliance with the protocol.20 In the face of domestic political apathy,all these models fall apart. Thus far,the only means of knowing whether the underlying individual-level behavioral assumptions are sound has been through surveys.Yet surveys come up against some of the very problems that are grounds for skepticism toward treaty- making models in the first place.The average respondent tends to know little about specifics of the political questions they are asked about-in this case,international rules.1 Low response rates are thus endemic.And as Milner and Tingley point out in work that seeks to improve on the design of these surveys,"forcing a response to a question introduces noise into the analysis."22 Wide variation in polling results for the same issue during the same period speaks to the potential significance of framing in questions'formulation.?3 While one would hope that any potential framing would have a consistent effect across all respon- dents,there is considerable evidence to suggest that less-knowledgeable respon- dents tend to be more vulnerable to framing,24 entailing not only considerable noise in the data,but also biased findings.So in making up for respondents'lack of information,surveys become more vulnerable to another,equally serious problem. By comparison,the method employed in this study is premised precisely on the notion that individuals are not initially likely to have all the necessary infor- 17.Kono2006. 18.Davis2012. 19.Simmons 2000. 20.Dai2007. 21.Berinsky 2004.As a result,surveys often preface questions with facts about the underlying issues,or a series of talking points,potentially magnifying framing effects. 22.Milner and Tingley 2010,22. 23.For a swatch of WTO-related survey results over two decades,see (http://www.americans- world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/data_wto.htm),accessed 28 April 2013. 24.Hiscox 2006
that more democratic regimes are likely to fall back on more opaque forms of protection, because these are less likely to lead to reactions among constituents, and thus are less likely of being seized upon by the opposition, which looks for messages that can be delivered in a sound bite+ 17 Examining the point of view of enforcers, Davis demonstrates that countries initiate WTO disputes to credibly convey to domestic industries that they are serving their interests+ 18 Filing thus amounts to pandering to an export-oriented audience+ Examples of work resting on similar individual-level assumptions are not limited to trade+ A wave of domestic-level theorizing has also taken over the study of human rights treaties, where scholars argue that countries join human rights treaties not so much as a gesture to other states, but rather as a credible signal to their domestic audience+ 19 There too, the premise is that human rights agreements accrue significance as citizens become more likely to react to reports of violations+ The same reasoning has been applied to environmental treaties+ European countries’ compliance with the 1985 Sulfur Protocol is said to have been due to the electoral leverage of domestic constituencies likely to act on information about compliance with the protocol+ 20 In the face of domestic political apathy, all these models fall apart+ Thus far, the only means of knowing whether the underlying individual-level behavioral assumptions are sound has been through surveys+ Yet surveys come up against some of the very problems that are grounds for skepticism toward treatymaking models in the first place+ The average respondent tends to know little about specifics of the political questions they are asked about—in this case, international rules+ 21 Low response rates are thus endemic+ And as Milner and Tingley point out in work that seeks to improve on the design of these surveys, “forcing a response to a question introduces noise into the analysis+”22 Wide variation in polling results for the same issue during the same period speaks to the potential significance of framing in questions’ formulation+ 23 While one would hope that any potential framing would have a consistent effect across all respondents, there is considerable evidence to suggest that less-knowledgeable respondents tend to be more vulnerable to framing, 24 entailing not only considerable noise in the data, but also biased findings+ So in making up for respondents’ lack of information, surveys become more vulnerable to another, equally serious problem+ By comparison, the method employed in this study is premised precisely on the notion that individuals are not initially likely to have all the necessary infor- 17+ Kono 2006+ 18+ Davis 2012+ 19+ Simmons 2000+ 20+ Dai 2007+ 21+ Berinsky 2004+ As a result, surveys often preface questions with facts about the underlying issues, or a series of talking points, potentially magnifying framing effects+ 22+ Milner and Tingley 2010, 22+ 23+ For a swatch of WTO-related survey results over two decades, see ^http:00www+americansworld+org0digest0global_issues0intertrade0data_wto+htm&, accessed 28 April 2013+ 24+ Hiscox 2006+ 634 International Organization
Googling the WTO 635 mation to process signals from an international institution about their government's (non)compliance,but that if they care sufficiently,they will seek that information out. Individuals Seeking Information As an alternative means of testing individual-level behavioral assumptions in domes- tic models of political economy,the novel approach here uses search-engine data. Although such data did not exist until very recently,25 they have already proven invaluable in,among other applications,tracking and predicting outbreaks in pub- lic health.Mohebbi and colleagues show how Google search data can be an ear- lier and equally accurate predictor of flu outbreaks in the United States compared to the data collected by the Center for Disease Control from hospitals around the country on a weekly basis.26 Similar applications have shown web queries to be equally valuable in predicting listeria,chickenpox,and a host of other diseases and medical conditions.27 These epidemiological applications rely on one simple idea.Because more than 90 million Americans search the web for information about medical conditions every year,28 and because data are available on where and when these searches occur,a sudden uptick in the volume of searches relating to a specific condition in a given area may be a first clue of an increase in that condition's occurrence in the area.Similarly,economists have used web queries to predict trends in the volume of unemployment claims because individuals likely to file them are also more likely to seek information on such claims before they file.The main application of web data thus far has consisted of"predicting the present,"29 that is,producing early forecasts of measures that we learn about sub- sequently through traditional means.And while these applications hold great prom- ise for public policy,where obtaining highly detailed,continuous data days or weeks in advance can improve decision making considerably,such gains in time hold less value for analysis.Rather,their true potential from the standpoint of social science research lies in providing measures that are difficult to obtain through other means:in this case,charting the reaction of constituents to information about their country's violation of international law.Search-engine data may thus become as useful to political economy applications as they have already proven themselves to be for epidemiology and economics. 25.Google Insights,the data source used both here and in most of these applications,went online in August 2008.Available at (www.google.com/insights/search),accessed 20 July 2012.In Septem- ber 2012,Google Insights was succeeded by Google Trends.Available at (http://www.google.com /trends/),accessed 1 February 2013. 26.Mohebbi et al.2011. 27.See Breyer et al.2011;Askitas and Zimmermann 2009;Ginsberg et al.2009;and Da,Engel- berg,and Gao 2011. 28.Mohebbi et al.2011. 29.See Choi and Varian 2009 for the article that inspired the term
mation to process signals from an international institution about their government’s ~non!compliance, but that if they care sufficiently, they will seek that information out+ Individuals Seeking Information As an alternative means of testing individual-level behavioral assumptions in domestic models of political economy, the novel approach here uses search-engine data+ Although such data did not exist until very recently, 25 they have already proven invaluable in, among other applications, tracking and predicting outbreaks in public health+ Mohebbi and colleagues show how Google search data can be an earlier and equally accurate predictor of flu outbreaks in the United States compared to the data collected by the Center for Disease Control from hospitals around the country on a weekly basis+ 26 Similar applications have shown web queries to be equally valuable in predicting listeria, chickenpox, and a host of other diseases and medical conditions+ 27 These epidemiological applications rely on one simple idea+ Because more than 90 million Americans search the web for information about medical conditions every year, 28 and because data are available on where and when these searches occur, a sudden uptick in the volume of searches relating to a specific condition in a given area may be a first clue of an increase in that condition’s occurrence in the area+ Similarly, economists have used web queries to predict trends in the volume of unemployment claims because individuals likely to file them are also more likely to seek information on such claims before they file+ The main application of web data thus far has consisted of “predicting the present,”29 that is, producing early forecasts of measures that we learn about subsequently through traditional means+ And while these applications hold great promise for public policy, where obtaining highly detailed, continuous data days or weeks in advance can improve decision making considerably, such gains in time hold less value for analysis+ Rather, their true potential from the standpoint of social science research lies in providing measures that are difficult to obtain through other means: in this case, charting the reaction of constituents to information about their country’s violation of international law+ Search-engine data may thus become as useful to political economy applications as they have already proven themselves to be for epidemiology and economics+ 25+ Google Insights, the data source used both here and in most of these applications, went online in August 2008+ Available at ^www+google+com0insights0search&, accessed 20 July 2012+ In September 2012, Google Insights was succeeded by Google Trends+ Available at ^http:00www+google+com 0trends0&, accessed 1 February 2013+ 26+ Mohebbi et al+ 2011+ 27+ See Breyer et al+ 2011; Askitas and Zimmermann 2009; Ginsberg et al+ 2009; and Da, Engelberg, and Gao 2011+ 28+ Mohebbi et al+ 2011+ 29+ See Choi and Varian 2009 for the article that inspired the term+ Googling the WTO 635
636 International Organization The social science concept that comes closest to what web-search data cap- ture is public attention,or attentiveness,defined as the scarce resources that indi- viduals dedicate toward a political issue.30 Scholars of public attentiveness are adamant about differentiating it from public opinion,which bears repeating in the context of web searches:the data capture not opinion or preferences,but behavior. The heroic homo economicus assumption of perfectly informed individuals is largely obsolete.There has long been a recognition among economists themselves that rationality is bounded by limited information,and limited capacity to process it:in short,a"bottleneck of attention."31 Crucially,however, recent evidence suggests that the means by which individuals make up for the information they lack can usefully be modeled as resting on a premise of rationality. Information-seeking involves a decision:What piece of information must be pursued at the cost of what other bit of information to make a decision?As Simon, the scholar at the origin of attention economics,put it succinctly,"a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that atten- tion efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it."32 In this regard,lab experiments have shown that subjects access more information to make a decision concerning two centrist candidates than two candidates of extreme positions,the implication being that the information- seeking behavior itself has rational underpinnings,in this case because it takes additional information to distinguish choices that are very similar.33 Seeking information involves a trade-off.For instance,national news outlets come at the expense of local news sources,with corresponding implications for political behavior:a recent finding shows how the penetration of the New York Times in local markets was correlated with decreased political participation in local elections.34 Web searches allow one to observe something political scientists have lacked access to until recently:individuals seeking information.Given what one knows about the cost of,and the strategic behavior individuals display in seeking infor- mation,the existence of data on web searches allows one to ask the very question needed to test the assumptions of treaty-making models in the international political economy:do individuals care sufficiently about signals concerning their governments'violations that they react by seeking related information? 30.See Newig 2004;Ripberger 2011;and Jones 1994. 31.Simon1985,302. 32.Simon1971,40-41. 33.Herstein 1981. 34.George and Waldfogel 2006.Kaid(2002)finds that online information seeking among voters, as compared with exposure to the same information through passive media channels such as televi- sion,was associated with significantly greater political activity
The social science concept that comes closest to what web-search data capture is public attention, or attentiveness, defined as the scarce resources that individuals dedicate toward a political issue+ 30 Scholars of public attentiveness are adamant about differentiating it from public opinion, which bears repeating in the context of web searches: the data capture not opinion or preferences, but behavior+ The heroic homo economicus assumption of perfectly informed individuals is largely obsolete+ There has long been a recognition among economists themselves that rationality is bounded by limited information, and limited capacity to process it: in short, a “bottleneck of attention+”31 Crucially, however, recent evidence suggests that the means by which individuals make up for the information they lack can usefully be modeled as resting on a premise of rationality+ Information-seeking involves a decision: What piece of information must be pursued at the cost of what other bit of information to make a decision? As Simon, the scholar at the origin of attention economics, put it succinctly, “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it+”32 In this regard, lab experiments have shown that subjects access more information to make a decision concerning two centrist candidates than two candidates of extreme positions, the implication being that the informationseeking behavior itself has rational underpinnings, in this case because it takes additional information to distinguish choices that are very similar+ 33 Seeking information involves a trade-off+ For instance, national news outlets come at the expense of local news sources, with corresponding implications for political behavior: a recent finding shows how the penetration of the New York Times in local markets was correlated with decreased political participation in local elections+ 34 Web searches allow one to observe something political scientists have lacked access to until recently: individuals seeking information+ Given what one knows about the cost of, and the strategic behavior individuals display in seeking information, the existence of data on web searches allows one to ask the very question needed to test the assumptions of treaty-making models in the international political economy: do individuals care sufficiently about signals concerning their governments’ violations that they react by seeking related information? 30+ See Newig 2004; Ripberger 2011; and Jones 1994+ 31+ Simon 1985, 302+ 32+ Simon 1971, 40– 41+ 33+ Herstein 1981+ 34+ George and Waldfogel 2006+ Kaid ~2002! finds that online information seeking among voters, as compared with exposure to the same information through passive media channels such as television, was associated with significantly greater political activity+ 636 International Organization
Googling the WTO 637 Expectations:The Case of Trade Violations Treaty-making models in a range of issue areas,from international trade and human rights to the environment,rest on a common set of assumptions about individual behavior.I test these assumptions in the issue area of trade for three reasons.First, trade constitutes a harder test of the models'assumptions:it appears more plausi- ble that constituents will react forcefully to news of a government's violation of human rights agreements,or of an environmental treaty,than a trade agreement. This is because trade agreements tend to be more technical in nature,and because violations of trade agreements have a less immediate impact on the daily life of constituents than water pollution or a regime torturing members of the opposition. Second,trade is contained within a highly coherent regime,with a single multilat- eral organization,the WTO.As a result,the great majority of violation claims will come through a single institution,and there is less need to account for the relative importance of alternative forums.35 By comparison,there are dozens of multilat- eral human rights agreements,varying in their degree of success,membership, and exact issues covered;the environmental regime looks much the same.Finally, trade allows one to separate normative and material objections to noncompliance in a way that would be impractical in other issue areas. The WTO is a decentralized enforcement institution-it does not pursue viola- tions itself,but merely provides information about possible noncompliance,through devices such as Trade Policy Reviews(TPRs),and precise tariff schedules outlin- ing every member's commitments.36 It is up to other members to pursue pur- ported violations of the rules by filing for consultations with the member at issue, the necessary first step to any WTO dispute.Every such filing is immediately made public,to both the WTO membership and domestic audiences.Most cases are set- tled before reaching a verdict,usually with concessions by the defendant.37 Cases that do make it to a verdict exhibit a pro-complainant bias,owing to the selection effect both in the filing of cases and in the escalation to litigation.In other words, because of the costs involved in filing,and the resulting process of selection,a majority of cases filed ostensibly represent some form of actual rule violation. Taken together,this reasoning leads to the following expectations.My first hypothesis is also the simplest.If constituents truly react to signals from the WTO about possible violations by their government,as presumed by treaty-making models such as in Mansfield,Milner and Rosendorff,38 one should be able to observe an increase in the number of WTO-related web searches following such announcements: 35.There is a growing number of regional trade agreements,but for the most part,these delegate dispute settlement to the WTO. 36.Pelc2011b. 37.Busch and Reinhardt 2001. 38.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002
Expectations: The Case of Trade Violations Treaty-making models in a range of issue areas, from international trade and human rights to the environment, rest on a common set of assumptions about individual behavior+ I test these assumptions in the issue area of trade for three reasons+ First, trade constitutes a harder test of the models’ assumptions: it appears more plausible that constituents will react forcefully to news of a government’s violation of human rights agreements, or of an environmental treaty, than a trade agreement+ This is because trade agreements tend to be more technical in nature, and because violations of trade agreements have a less immediate impact on the daily life of constituents than water pollution or a regime torturing members of the opposition+ Second, trade is contained within a highly coherent regime, with a single multilateral organization, the WTO+ As a result, the great majority of violation claims will come through a single institution, and there is less need to account for the relative importance of alternative forums+ 35 By comparison, there are dozens of multilateral human rights agreements, varying in their degree of success, membership, and exact issues covered; the environmental regime looks much the same+ Finally, trade allows one to separate normative and material objections to noncompliance in a way that would be impractical in other issue areas+ The WTO is a decentralized enforcement institution—it does not pursue violations itself, but merely provides information about possible noncompliance, through devices such as Trade Policy Reviews ~TPRs!, and precise tariff schedules outlining every member’s commitments+ 36 It is up to other members to pursue purported violations of the rules by filing for consultations with the member at issue, the necessary first step to any WTO dispute+ Every such filing is immediately made public, to both the WTO membership and domestic audiences+ Most cases are settled before reaching a verdict, usually with concessions by the defendant+ 37 Cases that do make it to a verdict exhibit a pro-complainant bias, owing to the selection effect both in the filing of cases and in the escalation to litigation+ In other words, because of the costs involved in filing, and the resulting process of selection, a majority of cases filed ostensibly represent some form of actual rule violation+ Taken together, this reasoning leads to the following expectations+ My first hypothesis is also the simplest+ If constituents truly react to signals from the WTO about possible violations by their government, as presumed by treaty-making models such as in Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 38 one should be able to observe an increase in the number of WTO-related web searches following such announcements: 35+ There is a growing number of regional trade agreements, but for the most part, these delegate dispute settlement to the WTO+ 36+ Pelc 2011b+ 37+ Busch and Reinhardt 2001+ 38+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ Googling the WTO 637
638 International Organization HI:Time periods during which the United States is accused by another country of fouting WTO commitments should be associated with a increase in WTO-related searches over the same period. Second,if dispute filing functions as a credible signal to export-oriented groups, as per Davis,39 then the presence of a material stake,denoted by employment asso- ciated with the products at issue in a dispute,should have an observable effect on web searches associated with filings.This leads to my second hypothesis: H2:The US filing against a trade parmner should be associated with a relatively greater increase in web searches in those geographical areas where there exists a material interest in the dispute in question. Third,if governments have an incentive to choose obfuscatory forms of protec- tion as a way to avoid adverse reactions by constituents,as per Kono's claims,40 then one should be able to observe lesser reactions to highly technical disputes about domestic legislation.Similarly,scholars know from research on public agenda setting that more complexity drives down salience,and that abstract issues are less likely to raise public attentiveness than more concrete ones.4 The disputes most representative of such complex and abstract issues are nonmerchandise dis- putes,which concern issues of domestic legislation and legal principle,rather than specific barriers on a given product.The effects of such nonmerchandise disputes are both more diffuse,and harder to measure.Accordingly,my third expectation is the following: H3:Initiation of disputes over nonmerchandise issues should lead to a lesser increase in WTO-related searches than the initiation of disputes concerning iden- tifable products. Together,these three hypotheses represent some of the assumptions underlying institutional models in political economy that ask a range of questions about who joins,and when;who complies;what form noncompliance takes in the alterna- tive;and who enforces in those events. Research Design I test the hypotheses using data about web queries in time and space.Specifi- cally,the unit of analysis is the amount of queries for a given term in Google's 39.Davis 2012 40.Kono2006. 41.See Soroka 2002;and Yagade and Dozier 1990
H1: Time periods during which the United States is accused by another country of flouting WTO commitments should be associated with a increase in WTO-related searches over the same period+ Second, if dispute filing functions as a credible signal to export-oriented groups, as per Davis, 39 then the presence of a material stake, denoted by employment associated with the products at issue in a dispute, should have an observable effect on web searches associated with filings+ This leads to my second hypothesis: H2: The US filing against a trade partner should be associated with a relatively greater increase in web searches in those geographical areas where there exists a material interest in the dispute in question+ Third, if governments have an incentive to choose obfuscatory forms of protection as a way to avoid adverse reactions by constituents, as per Kono’s claims, 40 then one should be able to observe lesser reactions to highly technical disputes about domestic legislation+ Similarly, scholars know from research on public agenda setting that more complexity drives down salience, and that abstract issues are less likely to raise public attentiveness than more concrete ones+ 41 The disputes most representative of such complex and abstract issues are nonmerchandise disputes, which concern issues of domestic legislation and legal principle, rather than specific barriers on a given product+ The effects of such nonmerchandise disputes are both more diffuse, and harder to measure+ Accordingly, my third expectation is the following: H3: Initiation of disputes over nonmerchandise issues should lead to a lesser increase in WTO-related searches than the initiation of disputes concerning identifiable products+ Together, these three hypotheses represent some of the assumptions underlying institutional models in political economy that ask a range of questions about who joins, and when; who complies; what form noncompliance takes in the alternative; and who enforces in those events+ Research Design I test the hypotheses using data about web queries in time and space+ Specifi- cally, the unit of analysis is the amount of queries for a given term in Google’s 39+ Davis 2012+ 40+ Kono 2006+ 41+ See Soroka 2002; and Yagade and Dozier 1990+ 638 International Organization