《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest

650 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION prisingly,conquerors often avoid targets that are hard to subdue.In the end,therefore, Liberman's (1996)sample of cases appears to be biased toward examining countries that are less likely to put up much active resistance both before and after conquest.For example,some of the very factors that made France easy for the Nazis to conquer in World War II likely also made it easy for the Nazis to occupy France.Consequently,it is not entirely surprising that Liberman finds that the Nazis were able to easily sup- press resistance and extract significant economic gains from France.By contrast,one wonders about the counterfactual example of how easy it would have been for the Nazis to suppress popular resistance in Britain if the Nazis had actually been able to successfully overcome stiff British opposition to invasion.One suspects that some of the very factors that made it possible for the British to resist Nazi aggression so suc- cessfully likely also would have translated into significant resistance efforts following a hypothetical Nazi conquest. In addition to concerns about potential selection bias,it is worth noting that although the evidence from World War II and earlier that Liberman(1996)examines matches up well with his underlying argument,his only case from the post-World War II period(the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe)is highly problematic for his thesis. Showing that the Soviets'East European empire was a net benefit obviously is a tough case to make given the predominant view that it was a huge drain on Soviet economic resources.For example,a prominent RAND study estimates that the costs of the Soviet empire reached as high as 3%of Soviet gross national product in 1980,of which 64% of this total was spent in Eastern Europe (Wolf 1987,134-35).The best researched account of Soviet-Warsaw Pact economic relations,which was published contempo- raneously with Liberman's study,concludes that"what had been a serious problem [for the Soviets]in the early 1970s had grown into a crisis of threatening proportions by the mid-1980s"(Stone 1996,43).Recent analysis also indicates that Soviet deci- sion makers themselves viewed the empire as an expensive burden (Levesque 1997). Liberman(1996)ultimately is forced to confront the Soviet case for two reasons. First,this case is essentially the only recent example of empire that he can discuss given that most of the colonial empires have long been dismantled.Certainly,it is the only recent example of conquest of any economically modern country,although East- ern Europe obviously lagged far behind the West in terms of economic modernization, and one certainly can question whether it is reasonable to classify certain parts of the Soviet empire,in particular Bulgaria and Romania,as"modern"during any point of the Soviet occupation.Second,it is exactly because of the widespread view that the Soviet empire was not profitable that Liberman must address this case and show that this conclusion is misguided.In the end,he does not succeed. Liberman(1996)does demonstrate that the Soviets were able to transfer substantial resources from East Germany immediately after World War II.But these short-term gains from East Germany seem to have been largely offset by the fact that the Soviets were not able to extract much of anything from the other East European countries they occupied after the war(p.129).In turn,Liberman shows that the Soviets generally were able to suppress popular resistance effectively and that East European workers did not engage in very many strikes.But this does not necessarily mean that we should

650 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION prisingly, conquerors often avoid targets that are hard to subdue. In the end, therefore, Liberman's (1996) sample of cases appears to be biased toward examining countries that are less likely to put up much active resistance both before and after conquest. For example, some of the very factors that made France easy for the Nazis to conquer in World War II likely also made it easy for the Nazis to occupy France. Consequently, it is not entirely surprising that Liberman finds that the Nazis were able to easily sup￾press resistance and extract significant economic gains from France. By contrast, one wonders about the counterfactual example of how easy it would have been for the Nazis to suppress popular resistance in Britain if the Nazis had actually been able to successfully overcome stiff British opposition to invasion. One suspects that some of the very factors that made it possible for the British to resist Nazi aggression so suc￾cessfully likely also would have translated into significant resistance efforts following a hypothetical Nazi conquest. In addition to concerns about potential selection bias, it is worth noting that although the evidence from World War II and earlier that Liberman (1996) examines matches up well with his underlying argument, his only case from the post-World War II period (the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe) is highly problematic for his thesis. Showing that the Soviets' East European empire was a net benefit obviously is a tough case to make given the predominant view that it was a huge drain on Soviet economic resources. For example, a prominent RAND study estimates that the costs of the Soviet empire reached as high as 3% of Soviet gross national product in 1980, of which 64% of this total was spent in Eastern Europe (Wolf 1987, 134-35). The best researched account of Soviet-Warsaw Pact economic relations, which was published contempo￾raneously with Liberman's study, concludes that "what had been a serious problem [for the Soviets] in the early 1970s had grown into a crisis of threatening proportions by the mid-1980s" (Stone 1996, 43). Recent analysis also indicates that Soviet deci￾sion makers themselves viewed the empire as an expensive burden (Levesque 1997). Liberman (1996) ultimately is forced to confront the Soviet case for two reasons. First, this case is essentially the only recent example of empire that he can discuss given that most of the colonial empires have long been dismantled. Certainly, it is the only recent example of conquest of any economically modern country, although East￾ern Europe obviously lagged far behind the West in terms of economic modernization, and one certainly can question whether it is reasonable to classify certain parts of the Soviet empire, in particular Bulgaria and Romania, as "modern" during any point of the Soviet occupation. Second, it is exactly because of the widespread view that the Soviet empire was not profitable that Liberman must address this case and show that this conclusion is misguided. In the end, he does not succeed. Liberman (1996) does demonstrate that the Soviets were able to transfer substantial resources from East Germany immediately after World War II. But these short-term gains from East Germany seem to have been largely offset by the fact that the Soviets were not able to extract much of anything from the other East European countries they occupied after the war (p. 129). In turn, Liberman shows that the Soviets generally were able to suppress popular resistance effectively and that East European workers did not engage in very many strikes. But this does not necessarily mean that we should

Brooks CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 651 conclude that the Soviet empire was profitable.For one thing,the East Europeans might have been fairly quiescent only because of the large Soviet troop presence in the region.The degree to which the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were designed for external security rather than to preserve internal order (and hence should count as occupation costs)is very difficult to assess.Liberman cites the fact that large-scale Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe was required only three times in support of the view that Soviet troops in the region were not significantly oriented toward pre- serving internal order(p.133).Looking at the same evidence,one can easily reach the opposite conclusion.Beyond total troop levels,Liberman states that"the number of administrators and spies remains uncertain but represented at most a small fraction of Soviet troops"(p.133).Why we should believe Liberman's assessment of the number of spies and administrators despite an admitted lack of data is unclear.Moreover,man- power figures only partially reflect total expenditures on monitoring and administra- tion.In the end,Liberman might be right that Soviet costs of control in Eastern Europe were"not great,"(p.126)but we cannot reach this conclusion on the basis of the avail- able evidence that he presents. Furthermore,the East Europeans might have been fairly complacent only due to the large inflow of subsidies,both explicit and implicit,from the Soviet Union(Bunce 1985).Although difficult to estimate with exactitude,the size of these subsidies remained stubbornly high even after the Soviets strove to reduce them during the 1980s.Stone (1996,45)reveals that"the Soviet premier,Nikolai Ryzhkov,had been shocked as late as 1988 by a report which estimated the Soviet subsidy to the East European allies at $17 billion per year."Liberman(1996,132)does recognize that Soviet subsidies were very significant in size,but he argues that"the subsidies did not represent a net imperial deficit for the Soviet Union"because they were significantly lower than the money spent on military expenditures by the East European countries. Whether these military expenditures by East European countries should fall under Liberman's restrictive definition of the "economic"benefits of conquest,however,is not entirely clear.Moreover,by Liberman's own earlier admission,the "reliability of these [East European]forces,and thus their contribution to Soviet power,is hard to judge"(pp.130-31).Past Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hun- gary hardly ensured high levels of loyalty by these countries'military forces,and the same can be said about Polish military forces following the Soviet imposition of mar- tial law in 1981.Not only was the loyalty of these three countries highly suspect,but also the military capacity of East European military forces generally was relatively low.Within Eastern Europe,only the East German military might have been capable of effectively matching up against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)forces. But if a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war had ever occurred,it is unclear whether East German forces would have possessed sufficient loyalty to attack and kill their West German brethren. Ultimately,the East European armies might have contributed to Soviet security to some degree(although once the Soviets had an ensured"second strike"capability and mutual nuclear deterrence had developed,one certainly can question exactly how much of a contribution this might have entailed).But,it is hard to fathom that any con-

Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 651 conclude that the Soviet empire was profitable. For one thing, the East Europeans might have been fairly quiescent only because of the large Soviet troop presence in the region. The degree to which the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were designed for external security rather than to preserve internal order (and hence should count as occupation costs) is very difficult to assess. Liberman cites the fact that large-scale Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe was required only three times in support of the view that Soviet troops in the region were not significantly oriented toward pre￾serving internal order (p. 133). Looking at the same evidence, one can easily reach the opposite conclusion. Beyond total troop levels, Liberman states that "the number of administrators and spies remains uncertain but represented at most a small fraction of Soviet troops" (p. 133). Why we should believe Liberman's assessment of the number of spies and administrators despite an admitted lack of data is unclear. Moreover, man￾power figures only partially reflect total expenditures on monitoring and administra￾tion. In the end, Liberman might be right that Soviet costs of control in Eastern Europe were "not great;' (p. 126) but we cannot reach this conclusion on the basis of the avail￾able evidence that he presents. Furthermore, the East Europeans might have been fairly complacent only due to the large inflow of subsidies, both explicit and implicit, from the Soviet Union (Bunce 1985). Although difficult to estimate with exactitude, the size of these subsidies remained stubbornly high even after the Soviets strove to reduce them during the 1980s. Stone (1996, 45) reveals that "the Soviet premier, Nikolai Ryzhkov, had been shocked as late as 1988 by a report which estimated the Soviet subsidy to the East European allies at $17 billion per year." Liberman (1996, 132) does recognize that Soviet subsidies were very significant in size, but he argues that "the subsidies did not represent a net imperial deficit for the Soviet Union" because they were significantly lower than the money spent on military expenditures by the East European countries. Whether these military expenditures by East European countries should fall under Liberman's restrictive definition of the "economic" benefits of conquest, however, is not entirely clear. Moreover, by Liberman's own earlier admission, the "reliability of these [East European] forces, and thus their contribution to Soviet power, is hard to judge" (pp. 130-31). Past Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hun￾gary hardly ensured high levels of loyalty by these countries' military forces, and the same can be said about Polish military forces following the Soviet imposition of mar￾tial law in 1981. Not only was the loyalty of these three countries highly suspect, but also the military capacity of East European military forces generally was relatively low. Within Eastern Europe, only the East German military might have been capable of effectively matching up against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. But if a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war had ever occurred, it is unclear whether East German forces would have possessed sufficient loyalty to attack and kill their West German brethren. Ultimately, the East European armies might have contributed to Soviet security to some degree (although once the Soviets had an ensured "second strike" capability and mutual nuclear deterrence had developed, one certainly can question exactly how much of a contribution this might have entailed). But, it is hard to fathom that any con-

652 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ceivable security benefit these forces provided was worth the enormous long-term eco- nomic costs,in terms of both direct outlays and opportunity costs,that were associated with propping up the Soviet empire.This is,in fact,a principal reason why the Soviets decided to give up their East European empire during the late 1980s (Wohlforth 1994-95). In the end,Liberman's (1996)argument is simply not sufficient to reject the con- ventional wisdom that the Soviet empire was a huge economic albatross.This is a con- clusion that has only become stronger over time as evidence from Soviet sources has increased.3 Of course,the Soviet case is only one of five that Liberman examines.But the fact that this is his only case from the post-World War II period and is by far the weakest one for his thesis is very significant given that there are reasons to expect that the benefits of conquest might have declined during the post-World War II era. Despite these concerns,Liberman(1996)nevertheless has provided a very useful and compelling corrective to the quagmire view.Too many scholars have simply assumed that significant popular resistance will emerge following occupation in all modern states and,therefore,that conquest of such states by definition cannot be very profitable.Liberman clearly shows that whether popular resistance emerges and,in turn,whether it serves to constrain the gains from conquest are empirical questions that cannot simply be assumed away.In turn,he provides significant explanatory lev- erage in terms of understanding variation in the level of popular resistance.This is,in itself,an important contribution to the literature on resistance and collaboration. Where do we go from here?Liberman(1996)has effectively shown that the previ- ous conventional quagmire view is wanting.Does this mean that we should conclude that the conquest of a highly advanced state still can produce significant economic rewards?In Liberman's study,the degree to which the conquered population resists or collaborates is the essential determinant of the profitability of conquest (p.30).His focus on the level of popular resistance makes sense given the predominance of the quagmire perspective up to now in the literature.But increased nationalism is not the only change that has occurred in modern societies over the 20th century that might sig- nificantly reduce the benefits of conquest.In particular,might it be possible that the economies of the most advanced states have changed so much since World War II that conquest will not produce significant gains even if the vanquished country's populace does not engage in active popular resistance? Attention has so far been deflected away from this question because of the prevail- ing view that modern nationalism on its own greatly reduces the benefits of conquest. As a result,scholars so far have failed to pay much attention to how post-World War II economic transformations in the most advanced countries might lower the benefits of conquest.The principal arguments that have been advanced to this effect are so under- developed that Liberman (1996)not only is able to quickly reject most of them but actually ends up turning them on their heads.His other principal argument is that eco- nomic modernization during the post-World War II period has made it easier for con- 3.It should be noted that Liberman(1996,126)is very forthright that his conclusions about the prof- itability of the Soviet empire"can hardly be considered definitive since newly opened archives in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe promise to shed further light

652 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ceivable security benefit these forces provided was worth the enormous long-term eco￾nomic costs, in terms of both direct outlays and opportunity costs, that were associated with propping up the Soviet empire. This is, in fact, a principal reason why the Soviets decided to give up their East European empire during the late 1980s (Wohlforth 1994-95). In the end, Liberman's (1996) argument is simply not sufficient to reject the con￾ventional wisdom that the Soviet empire was a huge economic albatross. This is a con￾clusion that has only become stronger over time as evidence from Soviet sources has increased.3 Of course, the Soviet case is only one of five that Liberman examines. But the fact that this is his only case from the post-World War II period and is by far the weakest one for his thesis is very significant given that there are reasons to expect that the benefits of conquest might have declined during the post-World War II era. Despite these concerns, Liberman (1996) nevertheless has provided a very useful and compelling corrective to the quagmire view. Too many scholars have simply assumed that significant popular resistance will emerge following occupation in all modern states and, therefore, that conquest of such states by definition cannot be very profitable. Liberman clearly shows that whether popular resistance emerges and, in turn, whether it serves to constrain the gains from conquest are empirical questions that cannot simply be assumed away. In turn, he provides significant explanatory lev￾erage in terms of understanding variation in the level of popular resistance. This is, in itself, an important contribution to the literature on resistance and collaboration. Where do we go from here? Liberman (1996) has effectively shown that the previ￾ous conventional quagmire view is wanting. Does this mean that we should conclude that the conquest of a highly advanced state still can produce significant economic rewards? In Liberman's study, the degree to which the conquered population resists or collaborates is the essential determinant of the profitability of conquest (p. 30). His focus on the level of popular resistance makes sense given the predominance of the quagmire perspective up to now in the literature. But increased nationalism is not the only change that has occurred in modern societies over the 20th century that might sig￾nificantly reduce the benefits of conquest. In particular, might it be possible that the economies of the most advanced states have changed so much since World War II that conquest will not produce significant gains even if the vanquished country's populace does not engage in active popular resistance? Attention has so far been deflected away from this question because of the prevail￾ing view that modern nationalism on its own greatly reduces the benefits of conquest. As a result, scholars so far have failed to pay much attention to how post-World War II economic transformations in the most advanced countries might lower the benefits of conquest. The principal arguments that have been advanced to this effect are so under￾developed that Liberman (1996) not only is able to quickly reject most of them but actually ends up turning them on their heads. His other principal argument is that eco￾nomic modernization during the post-World War II period has made it easier for con- 3. It should be noted that Liberman (1996, 126) is very forthrighthat his conclusions about the prof￾itability of the Soviet empire "can hardly be considered definitive since newly opened archives in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe promise to shed further light

Brooks/CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 653 querors to successfully reap economic gains in the most advanced countries.This argument is perhaps the most provocative in his book. A much more detailed analysis of how recent economic changes in the most advanced states affect the benefits of conquest is now required.Although many eco- nomic transformations are worthy of investigation in this regard,I focus on the globali- zation of production.I describe four recent changes in the structure of global produc- tion and outline why each of these economic transformations appears to have reduced the benefits of conquest within the most advanced countries.Although none of the deductive arguments presented necessarily has a decisive influence,their combined impact strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have significantly declined within the most economically advanced countries.In this view,it likely is no accident that concerns about territorial revisionism have essentially vanished among the most economically advanced countries and that the only case of conquest of any moderately modern country during the post-World War II period,the Soviet empire,is by far the weakest case in Liberman's (1996)book. COMPARISON WITH LIBERAL AND TRANSNATIONALIST PERSPECTIVES Before proceeding with my argument,I should note briefly its distinction from two related literatures.First,liberal theorists have long stressed how increased trade link- ages make conquest less profitable.In the liberal view,engaging in conquest with a trading partner makes no sense because doing so destroys markets for the conqueror's exports and thereby reduces the conqueror's economic wealth (Rosecrance 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997;Angell 1910).Although my argument ultimately can be seen as complementary to the liberal perspective,it is important to recognize that my focus is on a different independent variable-changes in the structure of global production, not trade.My argument also does not focus on how conquest reduces consumer and firm welfare,as liberal arguments typically do;rather,it is concerned with the extent to which conquest has the capacity to increase the conqueror's relative power. It is interesting to speculate why liberal theory traditionally has focused on trade linkages while ignoring global production issues.The likely key reason is that there was very little FDI between the most economically advanced countries during the "golden age"of capitalism(1870-1914).5 Hence,the theorists writing at the time (e.g., Angell,Cobden)who developed the key liberal arguments about how international economic factors affect war and conflict had little reason to pay attention to global pro- duction issues. 4.Angell(1910,52-62)did not focus solely on trade interdependence;he also emphasized how capi- tal market interdependence reduces the benefits of conquest. 5.In 1914,76%of the foreign direct investment(FDI)stock was based outside of North America and Europe,with a scant 8%based in Western Europe itself (Jones 1996,31).By comparison,the geo- graphic distribution of FDI dramatically reversed itselfby 1993.The vast majority of FDI now is based in the developed world,with 43%of the total in Western Europe and 27%in North America (Jones 1996,54)

Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 653 querors to successfully reap economic gains in the most advanced countries. This argument is perhaps the most provocative in his book. A much more detailed analysis of how recent economic changes in the most advanced states affect the benefits of conquest is now required. Although many eco￾nomic transformations are worthy of investigation in this regard, I focus on the globali￾zation of production. I describe four recent changes in the structure of global produc￾tion and outline why each of these economic transformations appears to have reduced the benefits of conquest within the most advanced countries. Although none of the deductive arguments presented necessarily has a decisive influence, their combined impact strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have significantly declined within the most economically advanced countries. In this view, it likely is no accident that concerns about territorial revisionism have essentially vanished among the most economically advanced countries and that the only case of conquest of any moderately modern country during the post-World War II period, the Soviet empire, is by far the weakest case in Liberman's (1996) book. COMPARISON WITH LIBERAL AND TRANSNATIONALIST PERSPECTIVES Before proceeding with my argument, I should note briefly its distinction from two related literatures. First, liberal theorists have long stressed how increased trade link￾ages make conquest less profitable. In the liberal view, engaging in conquest with a trading partner makes no sense because doing so destroys markets for the conqueror's exports and thereby reduces the conqueror's economic wealth (Rosecrance 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997; Angell 1910). Although my argument ultimately can be seen as complementary to the liberal perspective, it is important to recognize that my focus is on a different independent variable-changes in the structure of global production, not trade. My argument also does not focus on how conquest reduces consumer and firm welfare, as liberal arguments typically do; rather, it is concerned with the extent to which conquest has the capacity to increase the conqueror's relative power. It is interesting to speculate why liberal theory traditionally has focused on trade linkages while ignoring global production issues.4 The likely key reason is that there was very little FDI between the most economically advanced countries during the "golden age" of capitalism (1870-1914).5 Hence, the theorists writing at the time (e.g., Angell, Cobden) who developed the key liberal arguments about how international economic factors affect war and conflict had little reason to pay attention to global pro￾duction issues. 4. Angell (1910,52-62) did not focus solely on trade interdependence; he also emphasized how capi￾tal market interdependence reduces the benefits of conquest. 5. In 1914, 76% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) stock was based outside of North America and Europe, with a scant 8% based in Western Europe itself (Jones 1996, 31). By comparison, the geo￾graphic distribution of FDI dramatically reversed itself by 1993. The vast majority of FDI now is based in the developed world, with 43% of the total in Western Europe and 27% in North America (Jones 1996, 54)