《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Marxism and Constructivism in Political Economy）Introduction-Constructing the International Economy

Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University 厂 Introduction Constructing the International Economy Rawi Abdelal,Mark Blyth,and Craig Parsons We have,as a rule,only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts.Now the whole object of the accumulation of wealth is to produce results,or potential results,at a comparatively distant,and sometimes an infinitely distant date Thus the fact that our knowledge of the world is fluctuating,vague,and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable topic for the methods of classical economic theory....About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form a calcu- lable probability whatever.We simply do not know. John Maynard Keynes.1937 he world is.as they say.complicated.The world econom is especiall so.Unpredicted events often influence markets in improbable ways.Individu- als and organizations-firms,governments-surprise observers by behaving in ways that appear contrary to their presumed material interests as events defy the categories and concepts we construct to contain them.Crises recur with worri- some frequency.As the world internationalizes,these complications become more profound.Yet it would be difficult to find evidence of these complica- tions in much of the scholarly study of international political economy (IPE). Scholars of IPE have arrived at a comfortable certainty about how the world works.Most see the environment in which firms and governments operate as predominantly material.The incentives,they argue,that actors derive from the material structure of the economy determine what firms and governments do. These scholarly constructs are generally presumed by their constructors to cor- respond to reality rather than to represent stylizations of the heuristics that,we assume,inform decision making within organizations(Blyth 2007a).As their materialist theories and rationalist models become more sophisticated,these scholars have hoped that the world will become more knowable.And to some extent,progress has,in fact,been made.We grow more and more satisfied with our ability to explain the world to ever more detailed degrees. Tremendous gaps in our understanding still exist,however,because scholar- ship based on the connection between observer-deduced material incentives E L 1 3050-544_01Intro.indd 1 1125/20098:4609AM

1 Introduction Constructing the International Economy Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons We have, as a rule, only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts. Now the whole object of the accumulation of wealth is to produce results, or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes an infi nitely distant date. Thus the fact that our knowledge of the world is fl uctuating, vague, and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable topic for the methods of classical economic theory. . . . About these matters there is no scientifi c basis on which to form a calcu￾lable probability whatever. We simply do not know. John Maynard Keynes, 1937 The world is, as they say, complicated. The world economy is especially so. Unpredicted events often infl uence markets in improbable ways. Individu￾als and organizations—fi rms, governments—surprise observers by behaving in ways that appear contrary to their presumed material interests as events defy the categories and concepts we construct to contain them. Crises recur with worri￾some frequency. As the world internationalizes, these complications become more profound. Yet it would be diffi cult to fi nd evidence of these complica￾tions in much of the scholarly study of international political economy (IPE). Scholars of IPE have arrived at a comfortable certainty about how the world works. Most see the environment in which fi rms and governments operate as predominantly material. The incentives, they argue, that actors derive from the material structure of the economy determine what fi rms and governments do. These scholarly constructs are generally presumed by their constructors to cor￾respond to reality rather than to represent stylizations of the heuristics that, we assume, inform decision making within organizations (Blyth 2007a). As their materialist theories and rationalist models become more sophisticated, these scholars have hoped that the world will become more knowable. And to some extent, progress has, in fact, been made. We grow more and more satisfi ed with our ability to explain the world to ever more detailed degrees. Tremendous gaps in our understanding still exist, however, because scholar￾ship based on the connection between observer-deduced material incentives _S _E _L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 1 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University

Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University 2 Constructing the International Economy and observer-imputed rational responses leaves a great many empirical ques- tions unanswered.Some answers that seemed useful enough to many schol- ars,moreover,have over time been undermined by the wide diversity in the ways that firms and governments react to seemingly similar situations.The re- vealed rules of economic action seem to shift erratically across time and space. Increasingly,many scholars of international political economy have come to suspect that purely social phenomena intervene between actors and material structures.Structures do not come with instruction sheets for managers and policymakers(Blyth 2o03b).Instead,people can interpret their material en- vironments in very different ways.Indeed,so many "similar people"make so many "dissimilar choices"that our mainstream theories correspond,at best, only to time-and space-specific subsets of the world economy (Berman 2006; Vogel 1996). In this book we advance a strong version of the following claim:the assump- tion of a purely materialist view of theory is not-and never was-tenable.All political economy scholarship needs at least to consider,as a plausible hypoth- esis,that economies might vary substantially for nonmaterial reasons.In other words,the field needs to engage more systematically with constructivism,a the- oretical approach that emphasizes precisely those nonmaterial influences on both institutions and practices. The central insight of constructivism is that collectively held ideas shape the social,economic,and political world in which we live (Wendt 1999;Hacking 1999).That is,the world in which firms and governments act is neither trans- parent nor,in their own interpretations,similar across all cases.What objects mean to agents,how collectively held ideas differentially filter the environment for agents,how agents creatively respond to uncertainty,and how agents are coextensive and interdependent with the world in which they both act and ana- lyze all vary (and matter)too much for the assumptions of a simple material correspondence theory to hold.Building in diverse ways on this central insight, scholars across disciplines have increasingly embraced insights that either re- semble or are informed by constructivist theory. Beyond political science scholarship in international or comparative political economy,economic sociologists,for example,have for decades explored the influence of the social facts of the world on economic practices.'Increasingly, many economists believe that "cultural economics"and the influence of beliefs represent the cutting edge of research.2 Meanwhile,psychologists,anthropolo- gists,and (even some)political scientists continue to make progress in our un- derstanding of how identities and beliefs influence both individual preferences and societal practices.3 In political science,however,it is in the subfield of in- ternational relations where the revolution has cut most deeply.Today the study 1.See,for example,Swedberg 2003:Dobbin 2004a,2004b;Smelser and Swedberg 2005:and S Nee and Swedberg 2005. 2.See Di Tella and Dubra 2008:Greif 2006. E 3.See,for example,Geertz 1974;and Abdelal et al.2006. L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 2 1125/20098:4609AM

2 Constructing the International Economy and observer-imputed rational responses leaves a great many empirical ques￾tions unanswered. Some answers that seemed useful enough to many schol￾ars, moreover, have over time been undermined by the wide diversity in the ways that fi rms and governments react to seemingly similar situations. The re￾vealed rules of economic action seem to shift erratically across time and space. Increasingly, many scholars of international political economy have come to suspect that purely social phenomena intervene between actors and material structures. Structures do not come with instruction sheets for managers and policymakers (Blyth 2003b). Instead, people can interpret their material en￾vironments in very different ways. Indeed, so many “similar people” make so many “dissimilar choices” that our mainstream theories correspond, at best, only to time- and space-specifi c subsets of the world economy (Berman 2006; Vogel 1996). In this book we advance a strong version of the following claim: the assump￾tion of a purely materialist view of theory is not—and never was—tenable. All political economy scholarship needs at least to consider, as a plausible hypoth￾esis, that economies might vary substantially for nonmaterial reasons. In other words, the fi eld needs to engage more systematically with constructivism, a the￾oretical approach that emphasizes precisely those nonmaterial infl uences on both institutions and practices. The central insight of constructivism is that collectively held ideas shape the social, economic, and political world in which we live (Wendt 1999; Hacking 1999). That is, the world in which fi rms and governments act is neither trans￾parent nor, in their own interpretations, similar across all cases. What objects mean to agents, how collectively held ideas differentially fi lter the environment for agents, how agents creatively respond to uncertainty, and how agents are coextensive and interdependent with the world in which they both act and ana￾lyze all vary (and matter) too much for the assumptions of a simple material correspondence theory to hold. Building in diverse ways on this central insight, scholars across disciplines have increasingly embraced insights that either re￾semble or are informed by constructivist theory. Beyond political science scholarship in international or comparative political economy, economic sociologists, for example, have for decades explored the infl uence of the social facts of the world on economic practices.1 Increasingly, many economists believe that “cultural economics” and the infl uence of beliefs represent the cutting edge of research.2 Meanwhile, psychologists, anthropolo￾gists, and (even some) political scientists continue to make progress in our un￾derstanding of how identities and beliefs infl uence both individual preferences and societal practices.3 In political science, however, it is in the subfi eld of in￾ternational relations where the revolution has cut most deeply. Today the study 1. See, for example, Swedberg 2003; Dobbin 2004a, 2004b; Smelser and Swedberg 2005; and Nee and Swedberg 2005. 2. See Di Tella and Dubra 2008; Greif 2006. 3. See, for example, Geertz 1974; and Abdelal et al. 2006. S_ E_ L_ 3050-544_01Intro.indd 2 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University

Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University Introduction 3 of conflict,war,and peace is well nigh dominated by constructivist arguments, which increasingly appear as commonsensical notions in popular media. Scholarly insistence on the importance of social constructions is so prevalent as to border on the cliche.Identities,norms,beliefs,and symbols seem to be everywhere. Everywhere,that is,except in the mainstream of international political econ- omy,which has remained resistant to this trend.As used to be the case elsewhere, the view of the world that still informs much political economy scholarship is materialist and rationalist.That is,the vast majority of IPE scholars assert that we can derive sufficient explanations of action from some function of ratio- nal responses to objective and largely knowable and transparent environments (Rogowski 1987;Keohane and Milner 1996). A recent survey by Jeffry Frieden and Lisa Martin goes so far as to argue that the field of IPE has approached a "consensus on theories,methods,analytical frameworks,and important questions,"at least for "North American scholar- ship"and less so for "much European scholarship"(200g:119).Though their review charts the many impressive accomplishments of a flourishing field,no- tably absent are not only "European"ideas,but also the norms and identities that characterize economic sociology and constructivist political economy.Para- doxically,as some IPE scholars have converged to an understanding of the field that mimics the analytical language of economics,economists themselves are embracing culture and beliefs more systematically as essential elements in a use- ful theoretical tool kit.Thus the basic approach has become standard:"Scholars identify the socioeconomic interests at stake,how groups are organized,and how organized and general interests express themselves in the context of do- mestic electoral,legislative,and bureaucratic institutions.On this basis,other work focuses on the interaction of states at the international level,emphasizing especially the impact of the informational environment and the strategic setting on relations among states"(Frieden and Martin 2003:145). According to this traditional thinking,political action varies not with different interpretations of the world,but with the resources people hold and the relative position they inhabit in arenas like markets(Frieden 1991b),security competi- tions (Powell 1996),and contests for domestic political power (Snyder 1991). In other words,people select certain actions as a rational response to their place in an environment implicitly characterized as an "obstacle course,"in which payoffs may be opaque,but they are knowable;and it is this "correspondence theory of the world(plus a behavioral rule or two)that drives action. The classic versions of such thinking in international relations-Marxism, Liberalism,and Realism-share this vision of an obstacle course composed of an exogenously given distribution of resources and technology.Each of these schools offers a certain theoretical description of the obstacle course,and 4.Katzenstein 1996a,1996b. 5.See Katzenstein,Keohane,and Krasner 1998;and Ruggie 1998. E L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 3 1125/20098:46-09AM

Introduction 3 of confl ict, war, and peace is well nigh dominated by constructivist arguments, which increasingly appear as commonsensical notions in popular media.4 Scholarly insistence on the importance of social constructions is so prevalent as to border on the cliché. Identities, norms, beliefs, and symbols seem to be everywhere. Everywhere, that is, except in the mainstream of international political econ￾omy, which has remained resistant to this trend. As used to be the case elsewhere, the view of the world that still informs much political economy scholarship is materialist and rationalist.5 That is, the vast majority of IPE scholars assert that we can derive suffi cient explanations of action from some function of ratio￾nal responses to objective and largely knowable and transparent environments (Rogowski 1987; Keohane and Milner 1996). A recent survey by Jeffry Frieden and Lisa Martin goes so far as to argue that the fi eld of IPE has approached a “consensus on theories, methods, analytical frameworks, and important questions,” at least for “North American scholar￾ship” and less so for “much European scholarship” (2003:119). Though their review charts the many impressive accomplishments of a fl ourishing fi eld, no￾tably absent are not only “European” ideas, but also the norms and identities that characterize economic sociology and constructivist political economy. Para￾doxically, as some IPE scholars have converged to an understanding of the fi eld that mimics the analytical language of economics, economists themselves are embracing culture and beliefs more systematically as essential elements in a use￾ful theoretical tool kit. Thus the basic approach has become standard: “Scholars identify the socioeconomic interests at stake, how groups are organized, and how organized and general interests express themselves in the context of do￾mestic electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. On this basis, other work focuses on the interaction of states at the international level, emphasizing especially the impact of the informational environment and the strategic setting on relations among states” (Frieden and Martin 2003:145). According to this traditional thinking, political action varies not with different interpretations of the world, but with the resources people hold and the relative position they inhabit in arenas like markets (Frieden 1991b), security competi￾tions (Powell 1996), and contests for domestic political power (Snyder 1991). In other words, people select certain actions as a rational response to their place in an environment implicitly characterized as an “obstacle course,” in which payoffs may be opaque, but they are knowable; and it is this “correspondence theory of the world” (plus a behavioral rule or two) that drives action. The classic versions of such thinking in international relations—Marxism, Liberalism, and Realism—share this vision of an obstacle course composed of an exogenously given distribution of resources and technology. Each of these schools offers a certain theoretical description of the obstacle course, and 4. Katzenstein 1996a, 1996b. 5. See Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; and Ruggie 1998. _S _E _L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 3 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University

Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University 4 Constructing the International Economy argues that generally smart and resourceful actors figure out what the world "really"looks like and strategize accordingly.In comparative politics (and in some parts of international relations),more recent institutionalist scholarship emphasizes the man-made organizational aspects of the obstacle course (Pier- son 2004;Thelen and Streeck 2005).This focus on the man-made aspects of the environment leads to a stress on mechanisms of feedback and path depen- dence since it implies that actions at one point change the man-made con- straints for subsequent action,but otherwise both views are equally rationalist in downplaying interpretation.5 Both posit rational people responding to an obstacle course that any human being would perceive fairly similarly.From neo-Realists to rationalist institutionalists and back again,material or organi- zational features dictate the interests that explain actions.Ideas,norms,and their attendant uncertainties are conspicuous by their absence. This is so primarily because the context for choice is characterized as essen- tially asocial.In security studies,that context was defined by the fact of anarchy, that is,the absence of a world government,and the standard starting point was to deduce meaningful hypotheses about state behavior from that simple, asocial fact.In much of IPE,the basic context was seen as the market,albeit an unusually austere,utterly material market.Yet the "facts"of anarchy or of the market,scholars have repeatedly shown,have taken us not very far toward a richer understanding of how the world works. Change,however,is afoot,even within scholarship on the international po- litical economy.An increasing number of scholars have highlighted empirical puzzles and posed research questions during the past fifteen years that they see as answerable only through attention to the influence of social construc- tions.These have not been marginal issues or irrelevant findings.Such scholars have argued that the relationship between the welfare state and the interna- tional economy (Blyth 2002),the trade and financial practices of developed and developing countries(Duina 2006;MacKenzie 2006),the organization of the international monetary and financial system(Best 2005;Abdelal 2006 and 2007),the character and logic of European integration (Parsons 2003;Jabko 2006),or the policies underlying Eurasian disintegration (Abdelal 2001;Her- rera 2005)have all varied in major ways due to the influence of norms,identi- ties,and social interpretations. As highly regarded as many of these contributions are,though,their collec- tive impact on the field as a whole has not yet been transformative.Engagement with alternate constructivist hypotheses is still not an obligation for scholars publishing in leading journals or with university presses.International politi- cal economy is still regularly practiced and taught without serious analysis of the norms and identities that could provide the foundation for a more useful, convincing account of the empirical puzzles that drive research.Scholars whose S 6.Other"historical institutionalist"and "sociological institutionalist"scholars take the "institu- E tionalist"label in partly or fully constructivist directions. L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 4 1125/20098:4609AM

4 Constructing the International Economy argues that generally smart and resourceful actors fi gure out what the world “really” looks like and strategize accordingly. In comparative politics (and in some parts of international relations), more recent institutionalist scholarship emphasizes the man-made organizational aspects of the obstacle course (Pier￾son 2004; Thelen and Streeck 2005). This focus on the man-made aspects of the environment leads to a stress on mechanisms of feedback and path depen￾dence since it implies that actions at one point change the man-made con￾straints for subsequent action, but otherwise both views are equally rationalist in downplaying interpretation.6 Both posit rational people responding to an obstacle course that any human being would perceive fairly similarly. From neo-Realists to rationalist institutionalists and back again, material or organi￾zational features dictate the interests that explain actions. Ideas, norms, and their attendant uncertainties are conspicuous by their absence. This is so primarily because the context for choice is characterized as essen￾tially asocial. In security studies, that context was defi ned by the fact of anarchy, that is, the absence of a world government, and the standard starting point was to deduce meaningful hypotheses about state behavior from that simple, asocial fact. In much of IPE, the basic context was seen as the market, albeit an unusually austere, utterly material market. Yet the “facts” of anarchy or of the market, scholars have repeatedly shown, have taken us not very far toward a richer understanding of how the world works. Change, however, is afoot, even within scholarship on the international po￾litical economy. An increasing number of scholars have highlighted empirical puzzles and posed research questions during the past fi fteen years that they see as answerable only through attention to the infl uence of social construc￾tions. These have not been marginal issues or irrelevant fi ndings. Such scholars have argued that the relationship between the welfare state and the interna￾tional economy (Blyth 2002), the trade and fi nancial practices of developed and developing countries (Duina 2006; MacKenzie 2006), the organization of the international monetary and fi nancial system (Best 2005; Abdelal 2006 and 2007), the character and logic of European integration (Parsons 2003; Jabko 2006), or the policies underlying Eurasian disintegration (Abdelal 2001; Her￾rera 2005) have all varied in major ways due to the infl uence of norms, identi￾ties, and social interpretations. As highly regarded as many of these contributions are, though, their collec￾tive impact on the fi eld as a whole has not yet been transformative. Engagement with alternate constructivist hypotheses is still not an obligation for scholars publishing in leading journals or with university presses. International politi￾cal economy is still regularly practiced and taught without serious analysis of the norms and identities that could provide the foundation for a more useful, convincing account of the empirical puzzles that drive research. Scholars whose 6. Other “historical institutionalist” and “sociological institutionalist” scholars take the “institu￾tionalist” label in partly or fully constructivist directions. S_ E_ L_ 3050-544_01Intro.indd 4 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University

Uncorrected Proofs:Copyright Cornell University Introduction 5 work is informed by constructivism have uncovered a wealth of evidence for novel explanations of important aspects of the world economy,but given their diverse starting points and theoretical orientations,the relationships among them remain unclear.The collective force of a constructivist research agenda can be hard to see,and not only for the mainstream IPE theorists who have paid little heed so far.Even constructivists themselves have difficulty specifying the common ground and different emphases within this growing body of work. For constructivism to become a more systematic part of central debates in all of political economy,this diversity must be organized into a more coherent set of complementary positions. This book aims to effect that organization,but not by proposing a synthetic constructivist"theory of everything."Though one of constructivism's challenges is terminological confusion,there is also real,substantive diversity among con- structivists.Scholars can agree on the importance of socially constructed inter- pretation but still make a variety of distinct arguments about the world.From this mix of positions we propose to lay out what constructivism in IPE looks like, in three ways.First,we outline and relate several different arguments for why scholars might see reasons for attention to social construction,inviting the wid- est possible array of scholars to engage with constructivism.Second,we examine points of terminological or theoretical confusion that create unnecessary barri- ers to engagement between constructivist and nonconstructivist work,and also among styles of constructivism.Third,we articulate several substantively differ- ent varieties of constructivism,organizing the tool kit that both constructivists and their critics can use to debate how much and when social construction matters. Our inspiration for this book is the most important "first generation"con- structivist project,Peter Katzenstein's 1996 book The Culture of National Security. Some departures from that model underscore,however,that the challenges for "second generation"constructivists are somewhat different.Katzenstein and his collaborators chose the terrain of long-dominant rationalist-materialist realism in security studies to elaborate the core themes of a constructivist research pro- gram.A decade later,with constructivist arguments spreading across issue areas and diversifying in theoretical logics,we survey and organize constructivist work to suggest its implications for the major subfield it has penetrated least,IPE. In so doing we mean both to broaden and to sharpen debates in IPE,and to advance constructivist theorizing more generally. Speaking to Two Audiences without Being Janus-Faced In this book we seek to advance the debate over the place of constructivism in IPE scholarship in two directions.In this introduction we try not to sing to the choir.That is,we try to lay out the broadest possible case for taking construc- tivism seriously for skeptics of constructivism.Prior to the logical,epistemologi- cal,and empirical force of any given constructivist claim,we need to spell out E L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 5 1125/20098:4609AM

Introduction 5 work is informed by constructivism have uncovered a wealth of evidence for novel explanations of important aspects of the world economy, but given their diverse starting points and theoretical orientations, the relationships among them remain unclear. The collective force of a constructivist research agenda can be hard to see, and not only for the mainstream IPE theorists who have paid little heed so far. Even constructivists themselves have diffi culty specifying the common ground and different emphases within this growing body of work. For constructivism to become a more systematic part of central debates in all of political economy, this diversity must be organized into a more coherent set of complementary positions. This book aims to effect that organization, but not by proposing a synthetic constructivist “theory of everything.” Though one of constructivism’s challenges is terminological confusion, there is also real, substantive diversity among con￾structivists. Scholars can agree on the importance of socially constructed inter￾pretation but still make a variety of distinct arguments about the world. From this mix of positions we propose to lay out what constructivism in IPE looks like, in three ways. First, we outline and relate several different arguments for why scholars might see reasons for attention to social construction, inviting the wid￾est possible array of scholars to engage with constructivism. Second, we examine points of terminological or theoretical confusion that create unnecessary barri￾ers to engagement between constructivist and nonconstructivist work, and also among styles of constructivism. Third, we articulate several substantively differ￾ent varieties of constructivism, organizing the tool kit that both constructivists and their critics can use to debate how much and when social construction matters. Our inspiration for this book is the most important “fi rst generation” con￾structivist project, Peter Katzenstein’s 1996 book The Culture of National Security. Some departures from that model underscore, however, that the challenges for “second generation” constructivists are somewhat different. Katzenstein and his collaborators chose the terrain of long-dominant rationalist- materialist realism in security studies to elaborate the core themes of a constructivist research pro￾gram. A decade later, with constructivist arguments spreading across issue areas and diversifying in theoretical logics, we survey and organize constructivist work to suggest its implications for the major subfi eld it has penetrated least, IPE. In so doing we mean both to broaden and to sharpen debates in IPE, and to advance constructivist theorizing more generally. Speaking to Two Audiences without Being Janus-Faced In this book we seek to advance the debate over the place of constructivism in IPE scholarship in two directions. In this introduction we try not to sing to the choir. That is, we try to lay out the broadest possible case for taking construc￾tivism seriously for skeptics of constructivism. Prior to the logical, epistemologi￾cal, and empirical force of any given constructivist claim, we need to spell out _S _E _L 3050-544_01Intro.indd 5 11/25/2009 8:46:09 AM Uncorrected Proofs: Copyright Cornell University