Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty

Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. Review of key definitions Recall our three payoff aggregation criteria: discounting, i.e (u2)≥1>(2 (also recall that the payoff profile corresponding to a stream (ut)is taken to be(1 8)2t18t-u(a)); limit of means

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

Introduction The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive games. It embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inherent in such a theor But, above all, it has proved to be extremely profitable in a variety of applications. More- over, it has spawned a huge theoretical literature which has attempted(often successfully

Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events(choices) which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its Representing the players information as the play unfolds is nontrivial: to some extent

1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory Zero-Sum games Marciano siniscalchi September 16, 1999 administrative stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 1021, Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment The big picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses You will probably be familiar with the

微积分运算(一)极限运算 微积分运算(二)求导数运算 微积分运算(三)求偏导数运算 微积分运算(四)积分运算等 微积分运算(五)重积分运算

实验36计算概率举例 问题1:设随机向量(n)的概率密度函数为:

实验35一元线性回归分析问题求解 求解一元线性回归方程的方法:(1)