Exports and American Intervention in World War I 287 There is ample documentary evidence that President Wilson was aware of the economic stakes.The most detailed historical account of American decision mak- ing,Arthur S.Link's multivolume biography of Woodrow Wilson,argues that the principal American foreign policy goal once the war had begun was "to win the largest possible freedom of trade with all belligerents for American citizens,within the bounds of neutrality."3 Link's history provides many examples of Wilson's concern with the impact of the war on American trade.Among other things,he points out that Wilson met with congressional leaders to discuss the economic implications of the war as early as 31 July 1914,even before most of the major powers had officially declared war.4 This evidence is difficult to square with claims that Wilson did not understand the economic dimensions of his foreign policy.4 Evidence on the regional impact of the export boom,which I consider in detail in the next section,indicates that failure to protect wartime exports would have endangered Wilson's chance for reelection in 1916.Wilson had won the 1912 elec- tion mainly because the Republican vote had been split between incumbent Pres- ident William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt,a former Republican president running as a third-party candidate.Wilson's electoral fortunes were secure only in the solidly Democratic South,which benefited less from the export boom than any other region of the country.Southern support was not sufficient for reelection. Wilson could not afford to ignore the interests of states that benefited from the export boom.These benefits were greatest in the heavily populated northeastern and Great Lakes states,which made up 237 of the 266 electoral votes required to win the election.Wilson's 1912 vote total was lower than the combination of Taft and Roosevelt in every one of these states,so remaining competitive promised to be difficult.The economic impact of failing to protect these states'considerable interest in exports to the Allies would have made this task even harder.Because of the success of his diplomacy through the November 1916 election,Wilson was able to run as the candidate who"kept us out of war"while maintaining the boom- ing American trade with the Allies.The president still had only limited success in the Northeast,but he managed to win in Ohio and New Hampshire.This result was crucial to the outcome of the election.Even though Wilson dominated the electoral vote in the rest of the country,Republican Charles Evans Hughes would have been elected president in 1916 if he had carried Ohio. Export income did not alter Wilson's preference for neutrality and a prompt, negotiated end to the war.Wilson complained in late 1916 that the war had "checked and diverted"industries in neutral countries,and that "their energies are drawn off into temporary and novel channels."42 In spite of his doubts about the long- term benefits of the export boom,it is not surprising that Wilson took risks to 39.Link1960,105. 40.Ibid,82-83. 41.See,for example,Smith 1994,93;and Kennedy 2001,23-24. 42.Link1965,197
There is ample documentary evidence that President Wilson was aware of the economic stakes+ The most detailed historical account of American decision making, Arthur S+ Link’s multivolume biography of Woodrow Wilson, argues that the principal American foreign policy goal once the war had begun was “to win the largest possible freedom of trade with all belligerents for American citizens, within the bounds of neutrality+” 39 Link’s history provides many examples of Wilson’s concern with the impact of the war on American trade+ Among other things, he points out that Wilson met with congressional leaders to discuss the economic implications of the war as early as 31 July 1914, even before most of the major powers had officially declared war+ 40 This evidence is difficult to square with claims that Wilson did not understand the economic dimensions of his foreign policy+ 41 Evidence on the regional impact of the export boom, which I consider in detail in the next section, indicates that failure to protect wartime exports would have endangered Wilson’s chance for reelection in 1916+ Wilson had won the 1912 election mainly because the Republican vote had been split between incumbent President William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, a former Republican president running as a third-party candidate+ Wilson’s electoral fortunes were secure only in the solidly Democratic South, which benefited less from the export boom than any other region of the country+ Southern support was not sufficient for reelection+ Wilson could not afford to ignore the interests of states that benefited from the export boom+ These benefits were greatest in the heavily populated northeastern and Great Lakes states, which made up 237 of the 266 electoral votes required to win the election+ Wilson’s 1912 vote total was lower than the combination of Taft and Roosevelt in every one of these states, so remaining competitive promised to be difficult+ The economic impact of failing to protect these states’ considerable interest in exports to the Allies would have made this task even harder+ Because of the success of his diplomacy through the November 1916 election, Wilson was able to run as the candidate who “kept us out of war” while maintaining the booming American trade with the Allies+ The president still had only limited success in the Northeast, but he managed to win in Ohio and New Hampshire+ This result was crucial to the outcome of the election+ Even though Wilson dominated the electoral vote in the rest of the country, Republican Charles Evans Hughes would have been elected president in 1916 if he had carried Ohio+ Export income did not alter Wilson’s preference for neutrality and a prompt, negotiated end to the war+ Wilson complained in late 1916 that the war had “checked and diverted” industries in neutral countries, and that “their energies are drawn off into temporary and novel channels+” 42 In spite of his doubts about the longterm benefits of the export boom, it is not surprising that Wilson took risks to 39+ Link 1960, 105+ 40+ Ibid+, 82–83+ 41+ See, for example, Smith 1994, 93; and Kennedy 2001, 23–24+ 42+ Link 1965, 197+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 287
288 International Organization 1000- Third submarine campaign February 1917-November 1918500 900- B 450 (spuesnou)suol 800- 400 700 350 U.S.exports 600 300 Second submarine 500 campaign 250 February-May 1916 400 ●一 200 First submarine campaign 300 February-August 1915 150 200 100 Value of U.S.exports,1913 dollars (millions) Submarine sinkings 100 50 L0 FIGURE 2.The export boom and the submarine campaign protect it.Its immediate importance to the American economy,as well as to his electoral prospects,was enormous.Moreover,although Wilson's strategy carried the risk of war,it did not embrace this outcome as a certainty.Wilson successfully contained the German submarine campaign without war for two years and contin- ued to hope he could avoid American belligerency until the last moment.The evo- lution of Wilson's foreign policy makes sense in light of the growth of the export boom,and the emergence of the German submarine threat.Figure 2 charts the monthly progress of the export boom and the German submarine campaign against Allied commerce. American policy was most resolutely neutral during the early months of the war,when American trade was generally disrupted.Wilson urged Americans to be "neutral in thought as well as in action"and argued that the war was "one with which we have nothing to do,whose causes cannot touch us."43 At the suggestion of his secretary of state,William Jennings Bryan,Wilson also officially discour- aged lending to belligerent states.44 During this period,the United States came into conflict with Britain more often than with the Central Powers.The British refused to accept the relatively narrow definition of contraband set out in the 1909 Declaration of London,which would have permitted American exports of cotton and copper,among other things,to the Central Powers.The United States repeat- 43.See Devlin 1975,143-44;and Link 1960,66. 44.Link1960.62-64
protect it+ Its immediate importance to the American economy, as well as to his electoral prospects, was enormous+ Moreover, although Wilson’s strategy carried the risk of war, it did not embrace this outcome as a certainty+ Wilson successfully contained the German submarine campaign without war for two years and continued to hope he could avoid American belligerency until the last moment+ The evolution of Wilson’s foreign policy makes sense in light of the growth of the export boom, and the emergence of the German submarine threat+ Figure 2 charts the monthly progress of the export boom and the German submarine campaign against Allied commerce+ American policy was most resolutely neutral during the early months of the war, when American trade was generally disrupted+ Wilson urged Americans to be “neutral in thought as well as in action” and argued that the war was “one with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us+” 43 At the suggestion of his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, Wilson also officially discouraged lending to belligerent states+ 44 During this period, the United States came into conflict with Britain more often than with the Central Powers+ The British refused to accept the relatively narrow definition of contraband set out in the 1909 Declaration of London, which would have permitted American exports of cotton and copper, among other things, to the Central Powers+ The United States repeat- 43+ See Devlin 1975, 143– 44; and Link 1960, 66+ 44+ Link 1960, 62– 64+ FIGURE 2. The export boom and the submarine campaign 288 International Organization