《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）Revisionism Reconsidered. Exports and American Intervention in World War I

282 International Organization because the entire economy was implicated."In the pursuit of peace,people are doing things that have a direct bearing on war."23 For the revisionists,the opportunity cost of lost trade greatly influenced the Wilson administration's foreign policy choices,ultimately involving the United States on the Allied side in spite of President Wilson's efforts to remain neutral. The revisionists pointed out that the value of trade with the Allied powers under- cut the credibility of the administration's efforts to enforce American neutral rights against British violations.The British navy effectively prevented the export even of noncontraband items to Germany and its allies.Although the administration protested British actions,it shrank from threatening the munitions embargo that some members of Congress demanded.24 Indeed,the administration steadily lifted its restrictions on American lending to finance trade with the Allies. At the same time,the value of wartime trade prompted the administration to take a hard line on German submarine warfare.Because the British blockade of Germany permitted little trade between the United States and Germany during the war,there was no economic stake to inhibit American action against German vio- lations of neutral rights.The administration ultimately settled on a strategy of threat- ening American intervention to persuade the Germans to accept rules of engagement that would not undermine American trade.This approach carried an obvious risk of war,but it was largely successful until January 1917,when the Germans elected to gamble that they could do more damage to the Allies through unrestricted sub- marine warfare than they would suffer through American belligerency.As Bird- sall summarized the American path to war,"the administration yielded to pressures no administration is likely to withstand.The alternative policy of strict adherence to its earlier standards of neutrality meant economic depression on a national scale."25 This line of argument tended to undercut efforts to blame the Wilson adminis- tration for involving the United States in the war.During the interwar period,some proponents of neutrality blamed the administration's pro-Allied sympathies for the decision to intervene.26 In contrast,the academic revisionist position did not depend on any special argument about Wilson's intentions or sympathies.For Beard,the effort to blame particular politicians was simply another variant of the"devil theory of war."Like Birdsall,Beard stressed that politicians simply responded in a pre- dictable way to overwhelming societal pressure to protect American trade.27 Aca- demic revisionists did not argue that Wilson sought to maximize American profits 23.Beard1936,21. 24.Coogan argues persuasively that because the United States failed to enforce its rights equally against all the belligerent powers,it was not really "neutral"in terms of the legal definition prevailing at the time;see Coogan 1981 and 1994.Although Coogan stops short of attributing the U.S.position to the value of trade with the Allies,he points out that "non-belligerent non-neutrality provide a tre- mendous boon for American political and economic interests";Coogan 1994,81. 25.Birdsall1939.225. 26.See,for example,Borchard and Lage 1940,34-37,57,82. 27.Beard1936.22-23

because the entire economy was implicated+ “In the pursuit of peace, people are doing things that have a direct bearing on war+” 23 For the revisionists, the opportunity cost of lost trade greatly influenced the Wilson administration’s foreign policy choices, ultimately involving the United States on the Allied side in spite of President Wilson’s efforts to remain neutral+ The revisionists pointed out that the value of trade with the Allied powers under￾cut the credibility of the administration’s efforts to enforce American neutral rights against British violations+ The British navy effectively prevented the export even of noncontraband items to Germany and its allies+ Although the administration protested British actions, it shrank from threatening the munitions embargo that some members of Congress demanded+ 24 Indeed, the administration steadily lifted its restrictions on American lending to finance trade with the Allies+ At the same time, the value of wartime trade prompted the administration to take a hard line on German submarine warfare+ Because the British blockade of Germany permitted little trade between the United States and Germany during the war, there was no economic stake to inhibit American action against German vio￾lations of neutral rights+ The administration ultimately settled on a strategy of threat￾ening American intervention to persuade the Germans to accept rules of engagement that would not undermine American trade+ This approach carried an obvious risk of war, but it was largely successful until January 1917, when the Germans elected to gamble that they could do more damage to the Allies through unrestricted sub￾marine warfare than they would suffer through American belligerency+ As Bird￾sall summarized the American path to war, “the administration yielded to pressures no administration is likely to withstand+ The alternative policy of strict adherence to its earlier standards of neutrality meant economic depression on a national scale+” 25 This line of argument tended to undercut efforts to blame the Wilson adminis￾tration for involving the United States in the war+ During the interwar period, some proponents of neutrality blamed the administration’s pro-Allied sympathies for the decision to intervene+ 26 In contrast, the academic revisionist position did not depend on any special argument about Wilson’s intentions or sympathies+ For Beard, the effort to blame particular politicians was simply another variant of the “devil theory of war+” Like Birdsall, Beard stressed that politicians simply responded in a pre￾dictable way to overwhelming societal pressure to protect American trade+ 27 Aca￾demic revisionists did not argue that Wilson sought to maximize American profits 23+ Beard 1936, 21+ 24+ Coogan argues persuasively that because the United States failed to enforce its rights equally against all the belligerent powers, it was not really “neutral” in terms of the legal definition prevailing at the time; see Coogan 1981 and 1994+ Although Coogan stops short of attributing the U+S+ position to the value of trade with the Allies, he points out that “non-belligerent non-neutrality provide a tre￾mendous boon for American political and economic interests”; Coogan 1994, 81+ 25+ Birdsall 1939, 225+ 26+ See, for example, Borchard and Lage 1940, 34–37, 57, 82+ 27+ Beard 1936, 22–23+ 282 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 283 from the war,but only that he was constrained by the need to protect a substantial part of the American economy,regardless of his personal feelings about its ori- gins.This position is compatible with later evidence that he was eager to remain neutral even after breaking diplomatic relations with Germany in February 1917.28 The need to preserve American honor and credibility may have led him to carry out his threat to declare war,but the need to preserve American trade with the Allies led him to make the threats that put these concerns in jeopardy in the first place.9 Because the administration had so little real policy discretion,lobbying and agi- tation by bankers and munitions makers is also superfluous in the academic revi- sionist account.Contact between the Wilson administration and economic actors with important stakes in the war undeniably took place,but it had little causal importance.The House of Morgan was intimately involved in the British effort to obtain a wide range of exports from the United States.From January 1915 through the American entry into the war,the Morgan Bank arranged financing and acted as the primary purchasing agent for the British government,and eventually its allies as well.30 Beard and Tansill used the records published by the Nye Commit- tee in 1935 to show that Morgan representatives had successfully asked the admin- istration to lift its restrictions on lending to belligerent states.However,what made these contacts successful was not the Morgan representatives'extraordinary influ- ence,but the fact that they pointed out genuine economic stakes that the adminis- tration could not ignore.Without expanded American lending after Allied financial resources were exhausted,further trade would not have been possible.The eco- nomic importance of the trade,not the political influence of the lenders,carried the day with the Wilson administration.Indeed,Beard suggested that Wilson might well have acted as he did even if the letters published by the Nye committee had never been sent."They did not have to 'see'him personally about the issue.Since President Wilson was a man of intelligence and knowledge,it is reasonably cer- tain that he was then aware of the economic dilemma before him."31 Trade with Allies played an indispensable role in the revisionist explanation for American intervention,but revisionists did not focus exclusively on this consider- ation.Their differences from other historians writing at the same time come across more starkly in later historiographical essays than in the actual narrative histories. For example,revisionists such as Birdsall pointed out the importance of strategic interaction between German and American decision making in the run-up to the war,something contemporary critics of the revisionists,such as Charles Seymour, emphasized.32 American decisions about trade with the Allies contributed to the German decision to gamble on unrestricted submarine warfare,which led in turn to the U.S.declaration of war.Conversely,although Seymour denied that the 28.See,for example,Link 1965,291-97,391-400. 29.See,for example,May 1959,416-18. 30.Burk1985,6. 31.Beard1936.97. 32.Birdsall1939.218

from the war, but only that he was constrained by the need to protect a substantial part of the American economy, regardless of his personal feelings about its ori￾gins+ This position is compatible with later evidence that he was eager to remain neutral even after breaking diplomatic relations with Germany in February 1917+ 28 The need to preserve American honor and credibility may have led him to carry out his threat to declare war, but the need to preserve American trade with the Allies led him to make the threats that put these concerns in jeopardy in the first place+ 29 Because the administration had so little real policy discretion, lobbying and agi￾tation by bankers and munitions makers is also superfluous in the academic revi￾sionist account+ Contact between the Wilson administration and economic actors with important stakes in the war undeniably took place, but it had little causal importance+ The House of Morgan was intimately involved in the British effort to obtain a wide range of exports from the United States+ From January 1915 through the American entry into the war, the Morgan Bank arranged financing and acted as the primary purchasing agent for the British government, and eventually its allies as well+ 30 Beard and Tansill used the records published by the Nye Commit￾tee in 1935 to show that Morgan representatives had successfully asked the admin￾istration to lift its restrictions on lending to belligerent states+ However, what made these contacts successful was not the Morgan representatives’ extraordinary influ￾ence, but the fact that they pointed out genuine economic stakes that the adminis￾tration could not ignore+ Without expanded American lending after Allied financial resources were exhausted, further trade would not have been possible+ The eco￾nomic importance of the trade, not the political influence of the lenders, carried the day with the Wilson administration+ Indeed, Beard suggested that Wilson might well have acted as he did even if the letters published by the Nye committee had never been sent+ “They did not have to ‘see’ him personally about the issue+ Since President Wilson was a man of intelligence and knowledge, it is reasonably cer￾tain that he was then aware of the economic dilemma before him+” 31 Trade with Allies played an indispensable role in the revisionist explanation for American intervention, but revisionists did not focus exclusively on this consider￾ation+ Their differences from other historians writing at the same time come across more starkly in later historiographical essays than in the actual narrative histories+ For example, revisionists such as Birdsall pointed out the importance of strategic interaction between German and American decision making in the run-up to the war, something contemporary critics of the revisionists, such as Charles Seymour, emphasized+ 32 American decisions about trade with the Allies contributed to the German decision to gamble on unrestricted submarine warfare, which led in turn to the U+S+ declaration of war+ Conversely, although Seymour denied that the 28+ See, for example, Link 1965, 291–97, 391– 400+ 29+ See, for example, May 1959, 416–18+ 30+ Burk 1985, 6+ 31+ Beard 1936, 97+ 32+ Birdsall 1939, 218+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 283

284 International Organization significance of the submarine attacks was principally economic,he conceded that economic interests ruled out serious action to enforce American neutral rights against the British through trade sanctions. Such an embargo would have blighted the prosperity not merely of munitions makers and bankers,but all of our industries,small and large,thrown back our laboring classes into unemployment,and ruined the farmers.There would have been so many protests to Congress from the various sections of the coun- try that the maintenance of such restrictions is inconceivable.33 Assessing the Revisionist Argument However interesting the theoretical implications of the revisionist argument,the historiography of U.S.intervention in World War I offers little support for it.The claim that American trade with the Allied powers pulled the country into World War I was widely dismissed after World War II.The fate of the revisionist argu- ment is almost certainly linked to the highly visible political stand that prominent revisionists like Charles Beard took against American entry into World War II.34 Even during the 1960s and 1970s,when economic interpretations of the Cold War were common,there was little resurgence in support for the revisionist interpreta- tion of American intervention in 1917.At the conclusion of his careful and bal- anced history of the revisionists,Cohen acknowledged that "[t]oday,when the revisionist interpretation of American intervention is in disrepute,the revisionist studies of America's road to war from 1914 to 1917 are considered of little use to students of American diplomatic history."35 The revisionist position receives little attention in reviews of recent writing on the topic,which are generally focused on the relative importance of ideological and strategic concerns in Wilson's thinking.36 Although the incorrectness of the revisionist position is conventional wisdom, specific efforts to debunk their central arguments are difficult to find.One prob- lem is that the revisionists'most important claims concerned the size of the eco- nomic stake and the tendency of major political actors to support the economic interests of their constituents rather than the motives and actions of particular indi- viduals.These claims are not easy to test using the documentary record of Amer- ican decision making.To be sure,there is archival evidence indicating that the Wilson administration was aware of the economic pressures that the revisionists emphasized.However,the principal testable implications of their argument con- 33.Seymour1964,172. 34.Cohen1967. 35.Ibid.,240.Examples of historians'dismissals of the revisionist argument include Cooper 1969, 7;as well as Stromberg 1977,441,who quips that"[o]nce the essential accessory of the well-equipped mind,the 'economic interpretation'has become as antiquated as monophonic recording";and Bemis 1947,55,who blames the revisionists for the American failure to respond to the Nazi threat in the 1930s. 36.See,for example,Kennedy 2001;and Steigerwald 2000

significance of the submarine attacks was principally economic, he conceded that economic interests ruled out serious action to enforce American neutral rights against the British through trade sanctions+ Such an embargo would have blighted the prosperity not merely of munitions makers and bankers, but all of our industries, small and large, thrown back our laboring classes into unemployment, and ruined the farmers+ There would have been so many protests to Congress from the various sections of the coun￾try that the maintenance of such restrictions is inconceivable+ 33 Assessing the Revisionist Argument However interesting the theoretical implications of the revisionist argument, the historiography of U+S+ intervention in World War I offers little support for it+ The claim that American trade with the Allied powers pulled the country into World War I was widely dismissed after World War II+ The fate of the revisionist argu￾ment is almost certainly linked to the highly visible political stand that prominent revisionists like Charles Beard took against American entry into World War II+ 34 Even during the 1960s and 1970s, when economic interpretations of the Cold War were common, there was little resurgence in support for the revisionist interpreta￾tion of American intervention in 1917+ At the conclusion of his careful and bal￾anced history of the revisionists, Cohen acknowledged that “@t#oday, when the revisionist interpretation of American intervention is in disrepute, the revisionist studies of America’s road to war from 1914 to 1917 are considered of little use to students of American diplomatic history+” 35 The revisionist position receives little attention in reviews of recent writing on the topic, which are generally focused on the relative importance of ideological and strategic concerns in Wilson’s thinking+ 36 Although the incorrectness of the revisionist position is conventional wisdom, specific efforts to debunk their central arguments are difficult to find+ One prob￾lem is that the revisionists’ most important claims concerned the size of the eco￾nomic stake and the tendency of major political actors to support the economic interests of their constituents rather than the motives and actions of particular indi￾viduals+ These claims are not easy to test using the documentary record of Amer￾ican decision making+ To be sure, there is archival evidence indicating that the Wilson administration was aware of the economic pressures that the revisionists emphasized+ However, the principal testable implications of their argument con- 33+ Seymour 1964, 172+ 34+ Cohen 1967+ 35+ Ibid+, 240+ Examples of historians’ dismissals of the revisionist argument include Cooper 1969, 7; as well as Stromberg 1977, 441, who quips that “@o#nce the essential accessory of the well-equipped mind, the ‘economic interpretation’ has become as antiquated as monophonic recording”; and Bemis 1947, 55, who blames the revisionists for the American failure to respond to the Nazi threat in the 1930s+ 36+ See, for example, Kennedy 2001; and Steigerwald 2000+ 284 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 285 cerned the volume of trade,and thus the political consequences of ignoring it,as well as the tendency of major political actors to take positions that support the economic interests of their constituents.These general patterns are easier to test through statistical analysis than by searching the archival record.The remainder of this section will examine the dimensions of the export boom,and whether or not political leaders'positions on neutrality and intervention reflected their con- stituents'interests in it. The Export Boom and American Decision Making A first step in assessing the revisionist argument is to examine the impact of the wartime export boom on the American economy.Neither the revisionists of the 1930s nor any of their critics presented much more than a few aggregate trade statistics.These sufficed to show that American exports to the Allies increased substantially during the war but did not put this increase in the perspective of historical trading patterns or the size of the U.S.economy.Was the export boom really large enough to have had the political effects the revisionists claimed? Figure 1 shows the export and import share of U.S.gross national product(GNP) from 1869 through 2004.The export boom associated with World War I is easy to 14- Wartime peak in 1916: Total trade,17.1%of GNP 12 Exports,11.9%of GNP Imports 0 Exports 1869187818871896190519141923193219411950195919681977198619952004 Year Sources:GNP,1869-1928:Balke and Gordon,1989;1929-2004:U.S.Department of Commerce.Exports and Imports,1869-1966:NBER Macrohistory Database,series m7023 and m7028:1967-2004:U.S.Department of Commerce. FIGURE 1.Trade and the American economy,1869-2004

cerned the volume of trade, and thus the political consequences of ignoring it, as well as the tendency of major political actors to take positions that support the economic interests of their constituents+ These general patterns are easier to test through statistical analysis than by searching the archival record+ The remainder of this section will examine the dimensions of the export boom, and whether or not political leaders’ positions on neutrality and intervention reflected their con￾stituents’ interests in it+ The Export Boom and American Decision Making A first step in assessing the revisionist argument is to examine the impact of the wartime export boom on the American economy+ Neither the revisionists of the 1930s nor any of their critics presented much more than a few aggregate trade statistics+ These sufficed to show that American exports to the Allies increased substantially during the war but did not put this increase in the perspective of historical trading patterns or the size of the U+S+ economy+ Was the export boom really large enough to have had the political effects the revisionists claimed? Figure 1 shows the export and import share of U+S+ gross national product ~GNP! from 1869 through 2004+ The export boom associated with World War I is easy to FIGURE 1. Trade and the American economy, 1869–2004 Exports and American Intervention in World War I 285

286 International Organization TABLE 1.The destination of American exports,1910-20 Allied Powers Central Powers Other destinations Year Volume Share Volume Share Volume Share 1910-13 average $1.330 63% $318 15% $522 25% 1914 1,472 62 361 15 567 24 1915 2.277 82 29 / 486 18 1916 4.569 83 0 943 17 1917 5,156 83 0 0 1,139 18 1918 5,135 84 0 0 1,169 19 1919 5.701 2 163 , 2,434 1 1920 5,235 64 356 2,919 35 Source:U.S.Department of Commerce 1921. Notes:The volume of exports is given in millions of current dollars.The Central Powers are Germany,Austria- Hungary,Bulgaria,and Turkey.The Allied Powers are Great Britain,France,Russia,Italy,Belgium,Rumania,Grecce, and Japan.Exports to colonies are included with the metropolitan state.Although not all these states were members of these alliances in every year,all are included for all years for the sake of continuity. locate.It is enormous in relation to the economy as a whole.Merchandise exports constituted nearly 12 percent of gross national product in 1916,roughly double their share in 1914,and more than in any other year for which data are available. This generalization includes even the globalization of the past thirty years,although the United States currently brings in substantially more imports,as well as main- taining an extensive trade in services,something for which no early-twentieth- century data are available.The export boom was also associated with the longest economic expansion since the Civil War,lasting forty-four months from Decem- ber 1914 to August 1918.37 The size of the export boom demonstrates the plausi- bility of the revisionist argument.It is difficult to believe that any president's assessment of the submarine threat would be unaffected by the fact that it men- aced such a substantial part of the American economy.Subsequent economic events, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s,are universally regarded as seminal events that triggered strong political responses,even though they involved a smaller share of the economy. The great majority of these exports went to the Allies,especially Britain.As Table 1 indicates,the share of American exports going to the Allies rose from 63 percent before the war to more than 80 percent during the war.By November 1916,40 percent of British military expenditures were taking place in the United States.38 At the same time,British control of the seas allowed them to reduce Amer- ican trade with the Central Powers to almost nothing. 37.National Bureau of Economic Research 2006. 38.Burk1984.5

locate+ It is enormous in relation to the economy as a whole+ Merchandise exports constituted nearly 12 percent of gross national product in 1916, roughly double their share in 1914, and more than in any other year for which data are available+ This generalization includes even the globalization of the past thirty years, although the United States currently brings in substantially more imports, as well as main￾taining an extensive trade in services, something for which no early-twentieth￾century data are available+ The export boom was also associated with the longest economic expansion since the Civil War, lasting forty-four months from Decem￾ber 1914 to August 1918+ 37 The size of the export boom demonstrates the plausi￾bility of the revisionist argument+ It is difficult to believe that any president’s assessment of the submarine threat would be unaffected by the fact that it men￾aced such a substantial part of the American economy+ Subsequent economic events, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, are universally regarded as seminal events that triggered strong political responses, even though they involved a smaller share of the economy+ The great majority of these exports went to the Allies, especially Britain+ As Table 1 indicates, the share of American exports going to the Allies rose from 63 percent before the war to more than 80 percent during the war+ By November 1916, 40 percent of British military expenditures were taking place in the United States+ 38 At the same time, British control of the seas allowed them to reduce Amer￾ican trade with the Central Powers to almost nothing+ 37+ National Bureau of Economic Research 2006+ 38+ Burk 1984, 5+ TABLE 1. The destination of American exports, 1910–20 Allied Powers Central Powers Other destinations Year Volume Share Volume Share Volume Share 1910–13 average $1,330 63% $318 15% $522 25% 1914 1,472 62 361 15 567 24 1915 2,277 82 29 1 486 18 1916 4,569 83 2 0 943 17 1917 5,156 83 0 0 1,139 18 1918 5,135 84 0 0 1,169 19 1919 5,701 72 163 2 2,434 31 1920 5,235 64 356 4 2,919 35 Source: U+S+ Department of Commerce 1921+ Notes: The volume of exports is given in millions of current dollars+ The Central Powers are Germany, Austria￾Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey+ The Allied Powers are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Rumania, Greece, and Japan+ Exports to colonies are included with the metropolitan state+ Although not all these states were members of these alliances in every year, all are included for all years for the sake of continuity+ 286 International Organization