FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 513 Zhou Enlai explained,'[the US]sticks to arms race and belligerent policies,and because of its fear of losing control in [economic]competition,it is afraid of the resumption of trade [between China and other countries].To advocate world peace and,at the same time,strive for international trade,China could 'form a united front 165 with the Western [European]countries'in order to sever the US policy of political isolation and economic embargo.15 A first step for China's diplomatic offensive,then,was to construct a new identity in Asia.To Mao,China could stress several benevolent,not belligerent,'images'in its persuasion campaigns with its Asian neighbours.First,China was a backward country, 170 thus having no capability to expand externally.Speaking to a delegation of the British Labour Party in August 1954,he made it clear that'China is an agrarian country and it will take China many years to get industrialized';and it was imperative that 'we must continue our efforts toward constructing a peaceful environment16 Second,China's economy was internally oriented,thus having no need to acquire external markets 175 through either economic or military means.To the same British delegation,Mao explained that China had 'only two [strategic]assets,namely,'a vast land and a huge population.Much the same as Russia,China was economically 'relying on domestic market,not foreign market'and had no incentive to expand.7 Third,China had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism,thus 180 tolerating no more foreign bullies.Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 19 October 1954,Mao pointed out that 'all the Orientals have in the past been bullied by Western imperialists'and 'we are emotionally attached to one another and have the same feelings toward self-defence.Although adopting different political and economic systems,'we have one thing in common,that is,we all must deal with 185 imperialism Fourth,China as a nation was culturally conciliatory and tolerant. Citing traditional Chinese philosopher Mentze's saying that 'diversity and difference represents the very nature of the world,Mao told Nehru that he completely agreed and thus would respect cultural,social,and political diversity.9 With this new image,China could participate in the norm-building of international 190 relations.Meeting with an Indian delegation in Beijing on New Year's Eve of 1953, Zhou pointed out that 'we have already established several basic principles in the Sino- Indian relations:they include mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression,non-interference in each other's internal affairs,equality and mutual benefit,and peaceful coexistence.20 These soon became Zhou's famous 'five principles' 195 of international relations.Meeting with Nehru in October 1954,Mao urged the Indian prime minister that the two countries should work together to 'popularize the five principles,so that,hopefully,they would become widely acceptable norms 'to govern all aspects of international relations:21 200 II A much celebrated effort of the Beijing diplomatic offensive was its participation in the Geneva Conference of 1954.At Geneva,the CCP aimed to demonstrate that the PRC
Zhou Enlai explained, ‘[the US] sticks to arms race and belligerent policies, and because of its fear of losing control in [economic] competition, it is afraid of the resumption of trade [between China and other countries].’ To advocate world peace and, at the same time, strive for international trade, China could ‘form a united front with the Western [European] countries’ in order to sever the US policy of political isolation and economic embargo.15 A first step for China’s diplomatic offensive, then, was to construct a new identity in Asia. To Mao, China could stress several benevolent, not belligerent, ‘images’ in its persuasion campaigns with its Asian neighbours. First, China was a backward country, thus having no capability to expand externally. Speaking to a delegation of the British Labour Party in August 1954, he made it clear that ‘China is an agrarian country and it will take China many years to get industrialized’; and it was imperative that ‘we must continue our efforts toward constructing a peaceful environment’.16 Second, China’s economy was internally oriented, thus having no need to acquire external markets through either economic or military means. To the same British delegation, Mao explained that China had ‘only two [strategic] assets’, namely, ‘a vast land and a huge population’. Much the same as Russia, China was economically ‘relying on domestic market, not foreign market’ and had no incentive to expand.17 Third, China had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism, thus tolerating no more foreign bullies. Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 19 October 1954, Mao pointed out that ‘all the Orientals have in the past been bullied by Western imperialists’ and ‘we are emotionally attached to one another and have the same feelings toward self-defence’. Although adopting different political and economic systems, ‘we have one thing in common, that is, we all must deal with imperialism’.18 Fourth, China as a nation was culturally conciliatory and tolerant. Citing traditional Chinese philosopher Mentze’s saying that ‘diversity and difference represents the very nature of the world’, Mao told Nehru that he completely agreed and thus would respect cultural, social, and political diversity.19 With this new image, China could participate in the norm-building of international relations. Meeting with an Indian delegation in Beijing on New Year’s Eve of 1953, Zhou pointed out that ‘we have already established several basic principles in the SinoIndian relations: they include mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence’.20 These soon became Zhou’s famous ‘five principles’ of international relations. Meeting with Nehru in October 1954, Mao urged the Indian prime minister that the two countries should work together to ‘popularize the five principles’, so that, hopefully, they would become widely acceptable norms ‘to govern all aspects of international relations’.21 II A much celebrated effort of the Beijing diplomatic offensive was its participation in the Geneva Conference of 1954. At Geneva, the CCP aimed to demonstrate that the PRC FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 513 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 514 S.G.Zhang was a serious and responsible player in international politics.Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow's proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China)conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.22 On 9 January 1954,Zhou Enlai called upon all 'the big powers'involved in the 205 military conflicts in Asia to 'consult'one another on how to restore peace.Later that month,Soviet Foreign Minister V.M.Molotov followed Zhou's call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea.Echoed by Britain and France,the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.23 210 Excited at being a participant in the process,Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao's approval,Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference.In early March,Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document 'Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation This document pointed out that 'the United States,France and Britain 215 disagree with each other,especially on the Indochina issue,and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views';the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further 'exploited to our advantage.The instructions then directed that 'our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British,the French,and the neutral [countries]..[so as]to make our 220 positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes.To this end,'we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them.We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result.24 Shortly after 225 the Chinese delegation was formed in April,the CCP's central leadership charged Zhou Enlai,the head of the delegation to exercise 'active diplomacy'at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China.Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements 'so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power 230 consultations25 The Geneva team worked 'day and night making all kinds of preparations'for the PRC's first attendance at an international conference.As spokesman for the Chinese delegation,for example,Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-and- answer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with international 235 standards'before doing it in front of world media.Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva,in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks.During their three meetings with Zhou,both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference.Zhou, however,argued differently:That China,[North]Korea,and Vietnam can jointly 240 participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic]victories.It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.26
was a serious and responsible player in international politics. Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow’s proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China) conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.22 On 9 January 1954, Zhou Enlai called upon all ‘the big powers’ involved in the military conflicts in Asia to ‘consult’ one another on how to restore peace. Later that month, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov followed Zhou’s call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea. Echoed by Britain and France, the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.23 Excited at being a participant in the process, Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao’s approval, Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference. In early March, Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document ‘Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation’. This document pointed out that ‘the United States, France and Britain disagree with each other, especially on the Indochina issue, and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views’; the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further ‘exploited to our advantage’. The instructions then directed that ‘our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British, the French, and the neutral [countries]... [so as] to make our positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them’. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes. To this end, ‘we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them. We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result’.24 Shortly after the Chinese delegation was formed in April, the CCP’s central leadership charged Zhou Enlai, the head of the delegation to exercise ‘active diplomacy’ at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China. Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements ‘so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power consultations’.25 The Geneva team worked ‘day and night making all kinds of preparations’ for the PRC’s first attendance at an international conference. As spokesman for the Chinese delegation, for example, Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-andanswer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with ‘international standards’ before doing it in front of world media. Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva, in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks. During their three meetings with Zhou, both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference. Zhou, however, argued differently: ‘That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can jointly participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.’26 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 514 S. G. Zhang 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240