Atomic Diplomacy 59 tions "of the gravest importance"certain to arise when the"fiction"of Soviet and Chinese non-involvement wore thin.42 Sending B-29s to Britain was simply one more way to underline the gravity of the situation,demonstrate America's resolve,and elicit the cooperation of its most important ally. The next morning the American ambassador in London called Prime Min- ister Clement Attlee out of a Cabinet meeting to put the deployment proposal before him.Recalling the events of 1948,Attlee suspected that Washington wanted to make the B-29 movement a demonstration of strength for Mos- cow's benefit.He was convinced that it would be wrong to do so.When he asked if the planes would carry atomic bombs,the ambassador confessed that they would "probably"have everything but the nuclear cores aboard. Attlee then took the American proposal to his Cabinet colleagues who,after considerable debate,approved it with one proviso:London and Washington must coordinate publicity so as to make the deployment appear purely rou- tine.43 That requirement did not trouble President Truman,who readily gave formal approval to the proposed deployment on July 11.44 The president had every reason to do so.The movement of B-29s across the Atlantic would enhance strategic readiness as he had ordered on June 25.Already reported in that morning's New York Times as a "normal rotation,"45 the deployment might remind Moscow of America's nuclear strength without provoking the Soviets.Putting nuclear-configured B-29s in Britain also underlined the need for renewed Anglo-American solidarity.But the deployment neither risked a wider war nor loosened Truman's control over atomic weapons,for their nuclear cores would remain in the United States.46 Finally,the president may have perceived domestic political advantages in sending bombers to Britain. 42.FRuS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,PP.347-352. 43.Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Vice Chief of Staff,U.S.Air Force,July 10,1950, Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 44.Norstad to LeMay,XG 68/102205,July 10,1950,ibid.,indicated that the AEC and Defense Department had agreed to present to the president their request to send nuclear "hardware"to Britain;Truman schedule,July 11,1950,indicates that the president conferred early that morning with W.Averell Harriman,his newly designated special assistant for mutual security affairs. Harriman,a former ambassador to the Soviet Union,may have advised Truman on what to do at this point;Johnson schedule,July 11,1950,Louis A.Johnson papers,University of Virginia Library,Charlottesville,and Gordon A.Dean diary,July 11,1950,confirm their meeting with the president that afternoon;Norstad to Commanding General 3rd Air Division,111729Z,July 11,1950,Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 45.New York Times,July 11,1950. 46.Gordon Dean to Truman,July.10,1950,Box 4931,RG 326,U.S.Department of Energy Archives. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 159 tions "of the gravest importance" certain to arise when the "fiction" of Soviet and Chinese non-involvement wore thin.42 Sending B-29s to Britain was simply one more way to underline the gravity of the situation, demonstrate America's resolve, and elicit the cooperation of its most important ally. The next morning the American ambassador in London called Prime Minister Clement Attlee out of a Cabinet meeting to put the deployment proposal before him. Recalling the events of 1948, Attlee suspected that Washington wanted to make the B-29 movement a demonstration of strength for Moscow's benefit. He was convinced that it would be wrong to do so. When he asked if the planes would carry atomic bombs, the ambassador confessed that they would "probably" have everything but the nuclear cores aboard. Attlee then took the American proposal to his Cabinet colleagues who, after considerable debate, approved it with one proviso: London and Washington must coordinate publicity so as to make the deployment appear purely routine.43 That requirement did not trouble President Truman, who readily gave formal approval to the proposed deployment on July 11.44 The president had every reason to do so. The movement of B-29s across the Atlantic would enhance strategic readiness as he had ordered on June 25. Already reported in that morning's New York Times as a "normal rotation,"45 the deployment might remind Moscow of America's nuclear strength without provoking the Soviets. Putting nuclear-configured B-29s in Britain also underlined the need for renewed Anglo-American solidarity. But the deployment neither risked a wider war nor loosened Truman's control over atomic weapons, for their nuclear cores would remain in the United States.46 Finally, the president may have perceived domestic political advantages in sending bombers to Britain. 42. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, pp. 347-352. 43. Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, July 10, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 44. Norstad to LeMay, XG 68/102205, July 10, 1950, ibid., indicated that the AEC and Defense Department had agreed to present to the president their request to send nuclear "hardware" to Britain; Truman schedule, July 11, 1950, indicates that the president conferred early that morning with W. Averell Harriman, his newly designated special assistant for mutual security affairs. Harriman, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, may have advised Truman on what to do at this point; Johnson schedule, July 11, 1950, Louis A. Johnson papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, and Gordon A. Dean diary, July 11, 1950, confirm their meeting with the president that afternoon; Norstad to Commanding General 3rd Air Division, 111729Z, July 11, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 45. New York Times, July 11, 1950. 46. Gordon Dean to Truman, July 10, 1950, Box 4931, RG 326, U.S. Department of Energy Archives. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:360 Cooperation in this endeavor might ease frictions between his secretaries of state and defense and thus deprive Republican critics of grounds for attacking the administration's management of the war.47 DETERRING THE CHINESE-AND THE REPUBLICANS Less than three weeks after he sent nuclear-configured bombers across the Atlantic,Truman dispatched ten similar aircraft across the pacific to Guam. His decision to do so took shape at a moment of uncertainty and crisis.While his advisers pondered tactical use of atomic weapons in Korea,they were deeply divided over whether,when,and how to do so.One Pentagon staff study argued that the general deterrent value of atomic weapons unused far exceeded the benefits that might flow from their employment with indeter- minate results on the remote Korean peninsula.48 Yet senior Operations Division officers suggested that Army Chief of Staff J.Lawton Collins query General MacArthur about possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea.49 At the State Department,a Policy Planning Staff(PPS)study concluded that atomic bombs should be used in Korea only if Moscow or Beijing entered the fighting,and their employment promised decisive military success.50 But after hearing the director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project,which managed the nuclear stockpile,say that the bomb might be used to prevent American forces from being pushed off the peninsula by North Korean forces 47.Eben Ayers diary,June 29,1950,July 3,10,1950,Eben Ayers papers,Truman Library, indicates that the president knew that his defense secretary had telephoned congratulations to Republican Senator Robert A.Taft of Ohio on his speech calling for Secretary Acheson's resig- nation.Ayers on July 10 noted Truman's sensitivity to what he perceived as excessive Republican partisanship. 48.Report by an Ad Hoc Committee,Plans Division,"Employment of Atomic Bombs in Korea," July 12,1950,Ops 091 TS Korea (July 12,1950),RG 319,NA.Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Early made a similar argument,on grounds that the Soviet public would never be made aware of American use of the bomb in Korea.See Johnson to Truman,July 6,1950,CIA Memoranda 1950-52 folder,intelligence file,PSF,Box 249,Truman papers. 49.Bolte to Gruenther,July 25,Ops 091 TS Korea (July 24,1950),section 6;D.D.Dickson to Bolte,with enclosures,July 17,file 333 Pacific,case 3,Army General Staff Operations Division papers,RG 319,NA.The recommendation that Collins raise the question of tactical use of nuclear weapons with General MacArthur may have been designed to elicit the latter's opinions on arguments in a study titled "Employment of Atomic Weapons against Military Targets," prepared by Lt.Col.Harry L.Hillyard of the Joint War Plans Branch of the Army Operations Division,June 30,1950,Hot Files,Box 11,Army General Staff Operations Division papers,RG 319,NA.It argued that atomic attacks might soften up ports prior to an amphibious assault, and it called for the use of penetration-type bombs against enemy forward air bases. 50.Carleton Savage to Paul Nitze,July 15,1950,Atomic Energy-Armaments folder,1950,Box 7,Policy Planning Staff Papers,RG 59,NA. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 | 60 Cooperation in this endeavor might ease frictions between his secretaries of state and defense and thus deprive Republican critics of grounds for attacking the administration's management of the war.47 DETERRING THE CHINESE-AND THE REPUBLICANS Less than three weeks after he sent nuclear-configured bombers across the Atlantic, Truman dispatched ten similar aircraft across the Pacific to Guam. His decision to do so took shape at a moment of uncertainty and crisis. While his advisers pondered tactical use of atomic weapons in Korea, they were deeply divided over whether, when, and how to do so. One Pentagon staff study argued that the general deterrent value of atomic weapons unused far exceeded the benefits that might flow from their employment with indeterminate results on the remote Korean peninsula.48 Yet senior Operations Division officers suggested that Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins query General MacArthur about possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea.49 At the State Department, a Policy Planning Staff (PPS) study concluded that atomic bombs should be used in Korea only if Moscow or Beijing entered the fighting, and their employment promised decisive military success.50 But after hearing the director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, which managed the nuclear stockpile, say that the bomb might be used to prevent American forces from being pushed off the peninsula by North Korean forces 47. Eben Ayers diary, June 29, 1950, July 3, 10, 1950, Eben Ayers papers, Truman Library, indicates that the president knew that his defense secretary had telephoned congratulations to Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio on his speech calling for Secretary Acheson's resignation. Ayers on July 10 noted Truman's sensitivity to what he perceived as excessive Republican partisanship. 48. Report by an Ad Hoc Committee, Plans Division, "Employment of Atomic Bombs in Korea," July 12, 1950, Ops 091 TS Korea (July 12, 1950), RG 319, NA. Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Early made a similar argument, on grounds that the Soviet public would never be made aware of American use of the bomb in Korea. See Johnson to Truman, July 6, 1950, CIA Memoranda 1950-52 folder, intelligence file, PSF, Box 249, Truman papers. 49. Bolte to Gruenther, July 25, Ops 091 TS Korea (July 24, 1950), section 6; D.D. Dickson to Bolte, with enclosures, July 17, file 333 Pacific, case 3, Army General Staff Operations Division papers, RG 319, NA. The recommendation that Collins raise the question of tactical use of nuclear weapons with General MacArthur may have been designed to elicit the latter's opinions on arguments in a study titled "Employment of Atomic Weapons against Military Targets," prepared by Lt. Col. Harry L. Hillyard of the Joint War Plans Branch of the Army Operations Division, June 30, 1950, Hot Files, Box 11, Army General Staff Operations Division papers, RG 319, NA. It argued that atomic attacks might soften up ports prior to an amphibious assault, and it called for the use of penetration-type bombs against enemy forward air bases. 50. Carleton Savage to Paul Nitze, July 15, 1950, Atomic Energy-Armaments folder, 1950, Box 7, Policy Planning Staff Papers, RG 59, NA. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 61 alone,Paul Nitze,the new PPS director,hinted to Secretary of State Acheson that the door for tactical use of atomic weapons in Korea remained open.51 By the beginning of the last week of July,however,such divergence of opinion became an unaffordable luxury.Washington suddenly faced circum- stances that suggested that the atomic bomb might have to be used as a deterrent to limit the scope and determine the outcome of the fighting in Korea.There the enemy had squeezed American forces into a ninety-mile perimeter around Pusan.Within five days,despite General MacArthur's insistence that there be no further retreat,the North Koreans pushed Yankee and South Korean defenders back into an area that was two-thirds its pre- vious size.52 At the same time,it appeared that Washington's effort to isolate the Korean battlefield by interposing the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait might collapse.Its commander complained that he could not fight in Korea and stop a PRC invasion at the same time.53 When the CIA reported a buildup of Chinese amphibious and paratroop forces opposite Taiwan,President Truman rejected the pleas of Jiang Jieshi(Chiang Kai-shek)for a pre-emptive strike against them.54 Yet the NSC could not agree on providing military aid to the Nationalist leader.55 On top of all this,Dean Acheson's efforts to enlist Britain's sympathy,if not support,for denying Taiwan to PRC control proved fruitless.56 Amidst fears that the line that Washington had drawn across Korea and in the Taiwan Strait might crumble,a proposal to send nuclear-configured 51.Nitze to Acheson,July 17,1950,ibid.Nitze was reacting to both General Kenneth D.Nichols' thought that the bomb might have to be used short of a war with the Soviet Union,and Hanson Baldwin's New York Times column of July 17,1950,that argued that the bomb must not be used in Korea under any circumstances. 52.New York Times,July 26-30,1950;James,MacArthur,Vol.3,p.446. 53.Memorandum of Rusk-Burns-Orem meeting,July 24,1950,Box 18,Office of Chinese Affairs papers,RG 59,NA;Commander Seventh Fleet(Joy)to Chief of Naval Operations(Sherman), 250256Z,July 25,1950,Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet(Radford)to Chief of Naval Operations, 251224Z,July 25,1950,Navy Department Top Secret Message Files,reel 50,Naval Historical Center,Washington,D.C.;and Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE)to Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM In 15682,July 26,1950,cited in G-3 Operations Log,1950,tab 5,091 Korea TS,Section I-1, Book I,RG 319,NA;these detail the Army-Navy dispute on this matter;James A.Field,Jr.,The United States Navy in the Korean War (Washington,D.C.:U.S.GPO,1962),pp.108-110,115-116, 119-120,125. 54.CIA memorandum 312,July 26,1950,cited in Clubb to Rusk,August 3,1950,file 306.00111, Office of Chinese Affairs papers,RG 59,NA;Truman to Acheson,and Clubb to Rusk,ibid., Juy18,1950. 55.Acheson memorandum on NSC meeting,July 27,1950,Box 65,Acheson papers. 56.FRUS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,p.330;Dean G.Acheson,Present at the Creation (New York: Norton,1969),p.543. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy |61 alone, Paul Nitze, the new PPS director, hinted to Secretary of State Acheson that the door for tactical use of atomic weapons in Korea remained open.51 By the beginning of the last week of July, however, such divergence of opinion became an unaffordable luxury. Washington suddenly faced circumstances that suggested that the atomic bomb might have to be used as a deterrent to limit the scope and determine the outcome of the fighting in Korea. There the enemy had squeezed American forces into a ninety-mile perimeter around Pusan. Within five days, despite General MacArthur's insistence that there be no further retreat, the North Koreans pushed Yankee and South Korean defenders back into an area that was two-thirds its previous size.52 At the same time, it appeared that Washington's efforto isolate the Korean battlefield by interposing the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait might collapse. Its commander complained that he could not fight in Korea and stop a PRC invasion at the same time.53 When the CIA reported a buildup of Chinese amphibious and paratroop forces opposite Taiwan, President Truman rejected the pleas of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) for a pre-emptive strike against them.54 Yet the NSC could not agree on providing military aid to the Nationalist leader.55 On top of all this, Dean Acheson's efforts to enlist Britain's sympathy, if not support, for denying Taiwan to PRC control proved fruitless.56 Amidst fears that the line that Washington had drawn across Korea and in the Taiwan Strait might crumble, a proposal to send nuclear-configured 51. Nitze to Acheson, July 17, 1950, ibid. Nitze was reacting to both General Kenneth D. Nichols' thought that the bomb might have to be used short of a war with the Soviet Union, and Hanson Baldwin's New York Times column of July 17, 1950, that argued that the bomb must not be used in Korea under any circumstances. 52. New York Times, July 26-30, 1950; James, MacArthur, Vol. 3, p. 446. 53. Memorandum of Rusk-Burns-Orem meeting, July 24, 1950, Box 18, Office of Chinese Affairs papers, RG 59, NA; Commander Seventh Fleet (Joy) to Chief of Naval Operations (Sherman), 250256Z, July 25, 1950, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (Radford) to Chief of Naval Operations, 251224Z, July 25, 1950, Navy Department Top Secret Message Files, reel 50, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; and Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE) to Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM In 15682, July 26, 1950, cited in G-3 Operations Log, 1950, tab 5, 091 Korea TS, Section I-1, Book I, RG 319, NA; these detail the Army-Navy dispute on this matter; James A. Field, Jr., The United States Navy in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1962), pp. 108-110, 115-116, 119-120, 125. 54. CIA memorandum 312, July 26, 1950, cited in Clubb to Rusk, August 3, 1950, file 306.00111, Office of Chinese Affairs papers, RG 59, NA; Truman to Acheson, and Clubb to Rusk, ibid., July 18, 1950. 55. Acheson memorandum on NSC meeting, July 27, 1950, Box 65, Acheson papers. 56. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, p. 330; Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 543. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:362 bombers across the Pacific took shape.Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg was the driving force behind it.When he and General Collins met General MacArthur in Tokyo,the Army Chief of Staff declined to raise questions about possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea as his subordinates had suggested.But when Vandenberg asked MacArthur about how he might cut off Chinese communist forces if they entered the fighting,the old general replied that he saw "a unique use for the atomic bomb"in isolating them in North Korea.If Vandenberg would "sweeten up"the B-29 force at his dis- posal,the job could be done.The air force general immediately promised to d0s0.57 When Vandenberg returned to Washington,however,this scheme was modified to meet the needs of the increasingly desperate military situation. Convinced that"things were in a hell of a mess,"Vandenberg suggested to JCS Chairman Bradley that SAC B-29s should be sent to destroy North Korean cities.58 Cool to the idea at first,Bradley warmed to it when he met the chiefs on Friday July 28.His colleagues,who were increasingly concerned about the situation in the Taiwan Strait,recommended approval for Chinese Na- tionalist "offensive-defensive"actions there,despite President Truman's pre- vious rejection of that course of action.59 The next morning the chiefs added ten nuclear-configured B-29s to the SAC task force about to cross the Pacific.60 Doing so made perfect sense from their point of view.The deployment answered their subordinates'earlier call for prepositioning nuclear strike forces abroad.It probably seemed a more potent and less controversial response to the threat of Chinese action against Taiwan than allowing Jiang Jieshi to attack the mainland.The movement of the bombers implied agreement with General MacArthur's ideas;and even though he would not have operational control over them,their dispatch could be taken as an indication of resolve which would soften his unhappi- 57.Minutes of MacArthur-Collins-Vandenberg conference,July 13,1950,Ops 333 Pacific(1950- 1951),case3,RG319,NA. 58.Memoranda on LeMay-Norstad and Ramey-LeMay telephone conversations,July 29,1950, LeMay diary. 59.Ibid.;General Omar N.Bradley,Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,Diary (hereafter "Bradley schedule"),July 28-29,1950,Box 107,Omar N.Bradley papers,U.S.Military Academy Library, West Point,New York;Collins schedule,July 28-29,1950;Vandenberg daily diary (hereafter "Vandenberg schedule"),July 28-29,1950,Box 4,Vandenberg papers;Johnson schedule,July 29,1950;Acheson memorandum on NSC meeting,July 27,1950,Box 65,Acheson papers. 60.LeMay-Norstad and Ramey-LeMay telephone conversations,July 29,1950,LeMay diary. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 | 62 bombers across the Pacific took shape. Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg was the driving force behind it. When he and General Collins met General MacArthur in Tokyo, the Army Chief of Staff declined to raise questions about possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea as his subordinates had suggested. But when Vandenberg asked MacArthur about how he might cut off Chinese communist forces if they entered the fighting, the old general replied that he saw "a unique use for the atomic bomb" in isolating them in North Korea. If Vandenberg would "sweeten up" the B-29 force at his disposal, the job could be done. The air force general immediately promised to do so.57 When Vandenberg returned to Washington, however, this scheme was modified to meet the needs of the increasingly desperate military situation. Convinced that "things were in a hell of a mess," Vandenberg suggested to JCS Chairman Bradley that SAC B-29s should be sent to destroy North Korean cities.58 Cool to the idea at first, Bradley warmed to it when he met the chiefs on Friday July 28. His colleagues, who were increasingly concerned about the situation in the Taiwan Strait, recommended approval for Chinese Nationalist "offensive-defensive" actions there, despite President Truman's previous rejection of that course of action.59 The next morning the chiefs added ten nuclear-configured B-29s to the SAC task force about to cross the Pacific.60 Doing so made perfect sense from their point of view. The deployment answered their subordinates' earlier call for prepositioning nuclear strike forces abroad. It probably seemed a more potent and less controversial response to the threat of Chinese action against Taiwan than allowing Jiang Jieshi to attack the mainland. The movement of the bombers implied agreement with General MacArthur's ideas; and even though he would not have operational control over them, their dispatch could be taken as an indication of resolve which would soften his unhappi- 57. Minutes of MacArthur-Collins-Vandenberg conference, July 13, 1950, Ops 333 Pacific (1950- 1951), case 3, RG 319, NA. 58. Memoranda on LeMay-Norstad and Ramey-LeMay telephone conversations, July 29, 1950, LeMay diary. 59. Ibid.; General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Diary (hereafter "Bradley schedule"), July 28-29, 1950, Box 107, Omar N. Bradley papers, U.S. Military Academy Library, West Point, New York; Collins schedule, July 28-29, 1950; Vandenberg daily diary (hereafter "Vandenberg schedule"), July 28-29, 1950, Box 4, Vandenberg papers; Johnson schedule, July 29, 1950; Acheson memorandum on NSC meeting, July 27, 1950, Box 65, Acheson papers. 60. LeMay-Norstad and Ramey-LeMay telephone conversations, July 29, 1950, LeMay diary. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 63 ness over Washington's unwillingness to approve his Inchon counteroffen- sive.61 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson readily approved the chiefs'proposal for the deployment,and he may have told the president about it even before Truman boarded the Williamsburg for a weekend cruise.62 When the yacht returned on Sunday afternoon,July 30,Johnson met the president at the Navy Yard pier and made what must have been a potent argument for resorting to nuclear arms.63 Although he had publicly denied three days earlier that he was considering using the atomic bomb in Korea,Truman readily approved transfer of its nonnuclear components to military custody for deployment to Guam.64 Why did he do so?What did he expect to achieve through this action?In the absence of detailed records of this decision,answers to those questions must remain speculative.Truman may simply have seen the deployment as a contingent response to the North Korean offensive,launched that very day,which sought to force American troops out of Korea.65 He may have regarded it as an expression of resolve that,if known to Beijing,would deter the Chinese in Korea and the Taiwan Strait.Almost certainly,that was how Dean Acheson regarded the deployment.One of his China experts had previously suggested that "a calculated indiscretion"66 by the American am- bassador in New Delhi about the dire consequences of Chinese military action would be passed on to Beijing.67 Acheson had used that channel to emphasize Washington's hope that the PRC would stay out of the fighting.But now he reverted to the mode of communication used three weeks earlier and in 1948: Within hours after Acheson was informed of the proposed deployment,a New York Times reporter knew about it.The next day's newspaper printed 61.Ibid.,July 30,1950;James,MacArthur,Vol.3,pp.443-444;Schnabel and Watson,/CS History, Vol.3,PP.204-207. 62.Richard G.Hewlett and Francis Duncan,A History of the United States Atomic Energy Com- mission(University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press,1969),Vol.2,pp.524-525;Truman and Johnson schedules,July 29,1950 63.Johnson schedule,July 30,1950. 64.Truman Public Papers,1950,p.562;Hewlett and Duncan,History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,Vol.2,p.525. 65.New York Times,July 31,1950. 66.John Paton Davies memorandum,"Calculated Indiscretion by Ambassador Henderson, Box 19,Office of Chinese Affairs papers,RG 59,NA. 67.FRuS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,pp.488-489. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy |63 ness over Washington's unwillingness to approve his Inchon counteroffensive.61 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson readily approved the chiefs' proposal for the deployment, and he may have told the president about it even before Truman boarded the Williamsburg for a weekend cruise.62 When the yacht returned on Sunday afternoon, July 30, Johnson met the president at the Navy Yard pier and made what must have been a potent argument for resorting to nuclear arms.63 Although he had publicly denied three days earlier that he was considering using the atomic bomb in Korea, Truman readily approved transfer of its nonnuclear components to military custody for deployment to Guam.64 Why did he do so? What did he expect to achieve through this action? In the absence of detailed records of this decision, answers to those questions must remain speculative. Truman may simply have seen the deployment as a contingent response to the North Korean offensive, launched that very day, which sought to force American troops out of Korea.65 He may have regarded it as an expression of resolve that, if known to Beijing, would deter the Chinese in Korea and the Taiwan Strait. Almost certainly, that was how Dean Acheson regarded the deployment. One of his China experts had previously suggested that "a calculated indiscretion"66 by the American ambassador in New Delhi about the dire consequences of Chinese military action would be passed on to Beijing.67 Acheson had used that channel to emphasize Washington's hope that the PRC would stay out of the fighting. But now he reverted to the mode of communication used three weeks earlier and in 1948: Within hours after Acheson was informed of the proposed deployment, a New York Times reporter knew about it. The next day's newspaper printed 61. Ibid., July 30, 1950; James, MacArthur, Vol. 3, pp. 443-444; Schnabel and Watson, JCS History, Vol. 3, pp. 204-207. 62. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), Vol. 2, pp. 524-525; Truman and Johnson schedules, July 29, 1950. 63. Johnson schedule, July 30, 1950. 64. Truman Public Papers, 1950, p. 562; Hewlett and Duncan, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 2, p. 525. 65. New York Times, July 31, 1950. 66. John Paton Davies memorandum, "Calculated Indiscretion by Ambassador Henderson," Box 19, Office of Chinese Affairs papers, RG 59, NA. 67. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, pp. 488-489. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions