International Security 13:354 in chief of the Pacific fleet surmised that,if the situation in Korea became desperate,Congress and the public would demand the use of atomic weap- 0ns.14 The change of administrations in January 1953 strengthened official Wash- ington's belief that nuclear weapons were usable tools of statecraft.The new secretary of state,John Foster Dulles,had argued in 1948 that the public would demand a resort to nuclear arms if the situation appeared to require their use.15 His May 1952 Life magazine article,entitled "A Policy of Bold- ness,"prefigured the Eisenhower administration's "New Look"strategy by championing reliance on nuclear weapons and strong alliances as deterrents to future communist aggression.16 Thus the question confronting American statesmen as the war neared its end,just as at its beginning,was not whether, but how and when,to employ nuclear weapons for conflict management. Democratic and Republican statesmen looked back to the dispatch of two squadrons of B-29s to Western Europe during the Berlin Blockade of 1948- 49 for guidance on how best to use American nuclear superiority.Although the press described the flight of these aircraft,similar to those that had dropped atomic bombs in 1945 but not actually configured to do so,as a training mission,their deployment was widely interpreted as a demonstra- tion of resolve in the face of Soviet pressure.17 In fact,President Truman and his diplomatic advisers practiced restraint at the same time,rejecting Penta- gon requests for custody of nuclear weapons and avoiding negotiating tactics that might back Moscow into a corner from which there was no face-saving escape.18 In the summer of 1948,American statesmen doubted that the B-29 deployment contributed directly to settlement of the Berlin Blockade crisis.19 14.Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet(CINCPACFLT Radford)to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO Sherman),080941Z,July 8,1950,enclosure to JCS 1776/25 in Ops TS Korea file,Box 34a, section 14,cases 41-60,Assistant Chief of Staff,Operations,U.S.Army papers,RG 319,NA; Cabell memorandum,"Action to Prevent a Dunkirk in Korea,shown to General Norstad,July 12,1950,TS 189327,Cabell papers. 15.James V.Forrestal diary,October 10,1948,cited in Avi Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade,1948-1949 (Berkeley:University of California Press,1983),p.359. 16.John Foster Dulles,"A Policy of Boldness,"Life,May 19,1952,pp.151-158;Stephen E. Ambrose,Eisenhower,Vol.2 (New York:Simon and Schuster,1984),pp.33-34. 17.New York Times,June 19,1948,July 16,18,26,28,1948;Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade,pp.235-239,337-341;Harry Borowski,A Hollow Threat:Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport,Conn.:Greenwood,1982),pp.125-130. 18.Truman Public Papers,1948,p.415;AEC,"Weapons Custody and Use";Loper memorandum; Ronald Pruessen,John Foster Dulles:The Road to Power (New York:Free Press,1982),pp.376- 377. 19.Lilienthal,Journals,Vol.2,p.391;Robert Ferrell,ed.,Dear Bess (New York:Norton,1983), Pp.554-555. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 j 54 in chief of the Pacific fleet surmised that, if the situation in Korea became desperate, Congress and the public would demand the use of atomic weapons. 14 The change of administrations in January 1953 strengthened official Washington's belief that nuclear weapons were usable tools of statecraft. The new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had argued in 1948 that the public would demand a resort to nuclear arms if the situation appeared to require their use.15 His May 1952 Life magazine article, entitled "A Policy of Boldness," prefigured the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" strategy by championing reliance on nuclear weapons and strong alliances as deterrents to future communist aggression.16 Thus the question confronting American statesmen as the war neared its end, just as at its beginning, was not whether, but how and when, to employ nuclear weapons for conflict management. Democratic and Republican statesmen looked back to the dispatch of two squadrons of B-29s to Western Europe during the Berlin Blockade of 1948- 49 for guidance on how best to use American nuclear superiority. Although the press described the flight of these aircraft, similar to those that had dropped atomic bombs in 1945 but not actually configured to do so, as a training mission, their deployment was widely interpreted as a demonstration of resolve in the face of Soviet pressure.17 In fact, President Truman and his diplomatic advisers practiced restraint at the same time, rejecting Pentagon requests for custody of nuclear weapons and avoiding negotiating tactics that might back Moscow into a corner from which there was no face-saving escape.18 In the summer of 1948, American statesmen doubted that the B-29 deployment contributed directly to settlement of the Berlin Blockade crisis.19 14. Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT Radford) to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO Sherman), 080941Z, July 8, 1950, enclosure to JCS 1776/25 in Ops TS Korea file, Box 34a, section 14, cases 41-60, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Army papers, RG 319, NA; Cabell memorandum, "Action to Prevent a Dunkirk in Korea," shown to General Norstad, July 12, 1950, TS 189327, Cabell papers. 15. James V. Forrestal diary, October 10, 1948, cited in Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 359. 16. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, May 19, 1952, pp. 151-158; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 33-34. 17. New York Times, June 19, 1948, July 16, 18, 26, 28,- 1948; Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 235-239, 337-341; Harry Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982), pp. 125-130. 18. Truman Public Papers, 1948, p. 415; AEC, "Weapons Custody and Use"; Loper memorandum; Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982), pp. 376- 377. 19. Lilienthal, Journals, Vol. 2, p. 391; Robert Ferrell, ed., Dear Bess (New York: Norton, 1983), pp. 554-555. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 55 But as time hazed over the particulars of this episode,they came to believe that atomic arms could be instruments of "force without war."20 Their cred- ibility might even exceed their actual capability if they were used,without overt threats,for purposes of deterrence rather than compellence.21 Thus American statesmen and soldiers brought to the Korean War the conviction that atomic arms,if properly employed,could be extremely valuable tools for conflict management. From Resolve to Restraint,June 1950-June 1951 During the first year of the war,a pattern in the use of nuclear weapons took shape in Washington.Forced repeatedly by battlefield circumstance to consider their tactical use in and around Korea,the Truman administration time and again turned away from such action.Driven by the same circum- stances to consider how atomic weapons might help manage the political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict,the administration came to appreciate their utility in dealing with its enemies,the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China(PRC);with its principal ally,Britain;and with its partisan foes at home.How and why President Truman and his senior advisers developed what might even be termed a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons can be seen by analyzing their behavior at four moments of crisis during the first year of the Korean conflict.Two of those moments came early in the fighting,in July 1950.A third followed at the end of November, when massive Chinese intervention confronted the United States with "an entirely new war."22 The fourth and most serious of these crises struck Washington in April 1951. FIRST USE:BOMBERS TO BRITAIN The possibility of using nuclear weapons tactically came up during President Truman's very first wartime meeting with his senior advisers at Blair House on Sunday evening,June 25,1950.The president raised the issue by asking Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S.Vandenberg if American planes could "take out"Soviet bases near Korea.The general replied affirmatively,but said it 20.The phrase"force without war"is the title of a book by Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington,D.C.:Brookings,1978);Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade,p. 359. 21.John Lewis Gaddis,The Long Peace (New York:Oxford University Press,1987),pp.108-110. 22.FRUS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,p.1237. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy |55 But as time hazed over the particulars of this episode, they came to believe that atomic arms could be instruments of "force without war."20 Their credibility might even exceed their actual capability if they were used, without overt threats, for purposes of deterrence rather than compellence.21 Thus American statesmen and soldiers brought to the Korean War the conviction that atomic arms, if properly employed, could be extremely valuable tools for conflict management. From Resolve to Restraint, June 1950-June 1951 During the first year of the war, a pattern in the use of nuclear weapons took shape in Washington. Forced repeatedly by battlefield circumstance to consider their tactical use in and around Korea, the Truman administration time and again turned away from such action. Driven by the same circumstances to consider how atomic weapons might help manage the political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict, the administration came to appreciate their utility in dealing with its enemies, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC); with its principal ally, Britain; and with its partisan foes at home. How and why President Truman and his senior advisers developed what might even be termed a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons can be seen by analyzing their behavior at four moments of crisis during the first year of the Korean conflict. Two of those moments came early in the fighting, in July 1950. A third followed at the end of November, when massive Chinese intervention confronted the United States with "an entirely new war."22 The fourth and most serious of these crises struck Washington in April 1951. FIRST USE: BOMBERS TO BRITAIN The possibility of using nuclear weapons tactically came up during President Truman's very first wartime meeting with his senior advisers at Blair House on Sunday evening, June 25, 1950. The president raised the issue by asking Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg if American planes could "take out" Soviet bases near Korea. The general replied affirmatively, but said it 20. The phrase "force without war" is the title of a book by Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978); Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 359. 21. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 108-110. 22. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, p. 1237. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 56 would require atomic bombs.That response prompted Truman to order the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack in the event the Soviet Union entered the fighting.23 During the next three weeks,however,the president and his advisers came to see more diplomatic and political than military utility in nuclear weapons.That perception grew out of developments surrounding the first engagements between American and North Korean forces.Washington in- tervened in Korea to defend the principle of collective security and America's leadership of the non-communist world.24 Policy-makers hoped for "resound- ing military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power."25 But neither bombing North Korea nor blocking key roads slowed the enemy juggernaut plunging southward.In their first encounters,it was American troops rather than Pyongyang's soldiers who retreated.26 Alarmed by these results,General Douglas MacArthur begged Washington to double the force at his disposal so that he might hold at least the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.27 But his superiors were not prepared to make definitive choices at this point.Meeting with the Cabinet on July 7,1950,the president groped for some way to "let the world know we mean business."Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter proposed seeking United Na- tions sanction for use of the atomic bomb even if doing so could not guarantee that Moscow would restrain Pyongyang and Beijing.Although he remained skeptical of Soviet intentions,Truman declined to make so overt a threat. Downplaying the immediate danger,he insisted that the Soviets were "sev- enty percent bluffers."28 Then,making a Solomonic choice between the Pen- 23.Ibid.,pp.159-160.It should be noted that no one present voiced the slightest objection to the president's order. 24.Ernest R.May,"Lessons"of the Past (New York:Oxford University Press,1973),pp.75-78; William Stueck,Jr.,The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1981),pp.191-192,255-257. 25.FRLS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,p.278. 26.Roy K.Flint,"Task Force Smith and the 24th Division:Delay and Withdrawal,5-19 July 1950,"in Charles E.Heller and William A.Stofft,eds.,America's First Battles 1776-1965(Law- rence:University Press of Kansas,1986),pp.266-299;Clay Blair,Forgotten War:America in Korea 1950-1953(New York:Times Books,1987),pp.101-111. 27.D.Clayton James,The Years of MacArthur,Vol.3(Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1985),Pp.441- 442;James F.Schnabel and Robert J.Watson,The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,Volume 3,The Korean War,part I(Washington,D.C.:Joint Chiefs of Staf0CS],1978),pp.179-185. 28.Cabinet meeting notes,July 7,1950,Box 1,Matthew J.Connelly papers,Truman Library; "Memorandum on psychological use'of the Atomic bomb in Korea Conflict,"July 6,1950, This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 156 would require atomic bombs. That response prompted Truman to order the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack in the event the Soviet Union entered the fighting.23 During the next three weeks, however, the president and his advisers came to see more diplomatic and political than military utility in nuclear weapons. That perception grew out of developments surrounding the first engagements between American and North Korean forces. Washington intervened in Korea to defend the principle of collective security and America's leadership of the non-communist world.24 Policy-makers hoped for "resounding military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power."25 But neither bombing North Korea nor blocking key roads slowed the enemy juggernaut plunging southward. In their first encounters, it was American troops rather than Pyongyang's soldiers who retreated.26 Alarmed by these results, General Douglas MacArthur begged Washington to double the force at his disposal so that he might hold at least the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.27 But his superiors were not prepared to make definitive choices at this point. Meeting with the Cabinet on July 7, 1950, the president groped for some way to "let the world know we mean business." Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter proposed seeking United Nations sanction for use of the atomic bomb even if doing so could not guarantee that Moscow would restrain Pyongyang and Beijing. Although he remained skeptical of Soviet intentions, Truman declined to make so overt a threat. Downplaying the immediate danger, he insisted that the Soviets were "seventy percent bluffers."28 Then, making a Solomonic choice between the Pen- 23. Ibid., pp. 159-160. It should be noted that no one present voiced the slightest objection to the president's order. 24. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 75-78; William Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 191-192, 255-257. 25. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, p. 278. 26. Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 266-299; Clay Blair, Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 101-111. 27. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 441- 442; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume 3, The Korean War, part I (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 1978), pp. 179-185. 28. Cabinet meeting notes, July 7, 1950, Box 1, Matthew J. Connelly papers, Truman Library; "Memorandum on psychological use' of the Atomic bomb in Korea Conflict," July 6, 1950, This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy 57 tagon's desire to call one hundred thousand men to arms and the Treasury's fear of the economic effects of full-scale mobilization,he let it be known that the Defense Department could exceed its current budget and use the draft.29 Two days later,the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS)postponed a decision on General MacArthur's troop request and set aside Chairman Omar Bradley's suggestion to put atomic weapons at MacArthur's disposal.30 Their choice reflected doubts about MacArthur's judgment,unwillingness to allow Korea to disrupt Europe-first strategic priorities,and hesitancy to use nuclear weap- ons in a manner that seemed less than likely to be decisive.31 They then decided that two of their number should visit General MacArthur in Tokyo and the battlefield in Korea before further decisions on force levels and deployments were made.32 In the interim,the Truman administration decided that nuclear strength must be used to demonstrate its determination to prevail in Korea.On July 8,1950,SAC Commander Curtis LeMay was ordered to repeat,in effect,the Berlin Blockade B-29 feint of 1948.33 The order grew out of General Vanden- berg's desire to do something to counter the impression of ineffectiveness conveyed by the meager results of American bombing in Korea.3 Sending aircraft to Britain carrying "Russian target materials"also implemented Pres- ident Truman's previously expressed desire for expedited planning for at- tacks against the Soviet Union.LeMay,hoping to improve the readiness of his force still further,proposed that the B-29s carry everything but the fis- sionable cores of nuclear weapons.35 If they did,and if this deployment was rounded out by the dispatch of ten nuclear-configured B-29s across the Pacific Hillenkoetter memorandum to the president,July 7,1950,intelligence file,PSF,Box 249,Truman papers,HSTL. 29.New York Times,July 8,1950. 30.Schnabel and Watson,JCS History,Vol.3,pp.185-186;July 9,1950 memorandum,Historical Record,June-July 1950 folder,Box 16,Matthew B.Ridgway papers,U.S.Army Military History Institute,Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania. 31.Ibid.;Gruenther to Bolte,July 9,1950,CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45),section 23,Joint Chiefs of Staff papers,RG 218,NA;James,MacArthur,Vol.3,p.443;Schnabel and Watson,JCS History, Vol.3,p.185. 32.Ibid.,Pp.185-186. 33.LeMay telecon with Commanding General,3rd Air Division,July 8,1950,summarized in LeMay diary,July 8,1950,Curtis E.LeMay papers,Library of Congress.(A telecon was an exchange of teletype messages,flashed upon a screen so that they might be viewed simulta- neously by more than one person. 34.Memorandum of Norstad-LeMay telephone conversation,July 2,1950,Box 7/10,Lauris Norstad papers,Modern Military Records Branch,NA. 35.LeMay diary,July 8,1950,LeMay papers."Russian target materials"presumably referred to maps and charts,prioritized target lists,radar scope information,etc. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Atomic Diplomacy |57 tagon's desire to call one hundred thousand men to arms and the Treasury's fear of the economic effects of full-scale mobilization, he let it be known that the Defense Department could exceed its current budget and use the draft.29 Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) postponed a decision on General MacArthur's troop request and set aside Chairman Omar Bradley's suggestion to put atomic weapons at MacArthur's disposal.30 Their choice reflected doubts about MacArthur's judgment, unwillingness to allow Korea to disrupt Europe-first strategic priorities, and hesitancy to use nuclear weapons in a manner that seemed less than likely to be decisive.31 They then decided that two of their number should visit General MacArthur in Tokyo and the battlefield in Korea before further decisions on force levels and deployments were made.32 In the interim, the Truman administration decided that nuclear strength must be used to demonstrate its determination to prevail in Korea. On July 8, 1950, SAC Commander Curtis LeMay was ordered to repeat, in effect, the Berlin Blockade B-29 feint of 1948.33 The order grew out of General Vandenberg's desire to do something to counter the impression of ineffectiveness conveyed by the meager results of American bombing in Korea.34 Sending aircraft-o Britain carrying "Russian target materials" also implemented President Truman's previously expressed desire for expedited planning for attacks against the Soviet Union. LeMay, hoping to improve the readiness of his force still further, proposed that the B-29s carry everything but the fissionable cores of nuclear weapons.35 If they did, and if this deployment was rounded out by the dispatch of ten nuclear-configured B-29s across the Pacific Hillenkoetter memorandum to the president, July 7, 1950, intelligence file, PSF, Box 249, Truman papers, HSTL. 29. New York Times, July 8, 1950. 30. Schnabel and Watson, JCS History, Vol. 3, pp. 185-186; July 9, 1950 memorandum, Historical Record, June-July 1950 folder, Box 16, Matthew B. Ridgway papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 31. Ibid.; Gruenther to Bolte, July 9, 1950, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), section 23, Joint Chiefs of Staff papers, RG 218, NA; James, MacArthur, Vol. 3, p. 443; Schnabel and Watson, JCS History, Vol. 3, p. 185. 32. Ibid., pp. 185-186. 33. LeMay telecon with Commanding General, 3rd Air Division, July 8, 1950, summarized in LeMay diary, July 8, 1950, Curtis E. LeMay papers, Library of Congress. (A telecon was an exchange of teletype messages, flashed upon a screen so that they might be viewed simultaneously by more than one person.) 34. Memorandum of Norstad-LeMay telephone conversation, July 2, 1950, Box 7/10, Lauris Norstad papers, Modern Military Records Branch, NA. 35. LeMay diary, July 8, 1950, LeMay papers. "Russian target materials" presumably referred to maps and charts, prioritized target lists, radar scope information, etc. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 58 and the overseas prepositioning of tankers and support aircraft,the time needed to commence and wage atomic war against the Soviet Union would be dramatically reduced.36 The JCS gave only qualified approval to the medified proposal,probably out of fear that its nuclear aspect might create diplomatic difficulties.Initial British reactions confirmed that concern,for the Royal Air Force,arguing that the proposed deployment had "wide consequences"and might be re- garded as "an unfriendly act"by Moscow,refused to accede to the American request without prior agreement at the political level.37 By nightfall on July 9,1950,however,Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad had persuaded Air Marshal Lord Tedder,who headed the British Joint Liaison Mission in Washington,to support the proposal;Norstad had also obtained clearance "at the highest level"to seek the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff for t.38 Much more significantly,Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved the deployment as a demonstration of resolve.While he may have shared Soviet expert Charles Bohlen's belief that "some measure"beyond military and economic mobilization was necessary to keep the Soviets from intervening in Korea or stirring up trouble elsewhere,39 Acheson was more immediately concerned to impress the British with America's determination to prevail in Korea.The secretary of state was unhappy with London's recognition of the PRC and its dissent from interposition of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.40 Although he had been assured that Britain would not seek a return to the status quo ante in Korea by letting the PRC have Taiwan, he worried lest London promote a peace settlement requiring withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula.His doubts were not dispelled by talks with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on Sunday afternoon,July 9.41 The next day Acheson sent London a note that rejected paying a price for disengagement in Korea and called for Anglo-American solidarity on ques- 36.Ibid.,July10,1950. 37.General Joseph Lawton Collins daily schedule,July 9,1950,Box 40,Collins papers,Eisen- hower Library;Norstad to LeMay,July 9,1950;Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Chief of Staff,U.S.Air Force,091200Z,July 9,1950,Box 86,Hoyt S.Vandenberg papers,Library of Congress. 38.Chief of Staff,USAF,to Commanding General 3rd Air Division,092016Z July 9,1950; Norstad to LeMay,July 9,1950,Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 39.FRIS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,.Pp.326-327. 40.Ibid,Pp.330-331,340. 41.Ibid.,pp.331,337;Acheson daily 'schedule,July 9,1950,Box 45,Dean G.Acheson papers, Truman Library. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 13:3 | 58 and the overseas prepositioning of tankers and support aircraft, the time needed to commence and wage atomic war against the Soviet Union would be dramatically reduced.36 The JCS gave only qualified approval to the modified proposal, probably out of fear that its nuclear aspect might create diplomatic difficulties. Initial British reactions confirmed that concern, for the Royal Air Force, arguing that the proposed deployment had "wide consequences" and might be regarded as "an unfriendly act" by Moscow, refused to accede to the American request without prior agreement at the political level.37 By nightfall on July 9, 1950, however, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad had persuaded Air Marshal Lord Tedder, who headed the British Joint Liaison Mission in Washington, to support the proposal; Norstad had also obtained clearance "at the highest level" to seek the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff for it.38 Much more significantly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved the deployment as a demonstration of resolve. While he may have shared Soviet expert Charles Bohlen's belief that "some measure" beyond military and economic mobilization was necessary to keep the Soviets from intervening in Korea or stirring up trouble elsewhere,39 Acheson was more immediately concerned to impress the British with America's determination to prevail in Korea. The secretary of state was unhappy with London's recognition of the PRC and its dissent from interposition of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.40 Although he had been assured that Britain would not seek a return to the status quo ante in Korea by letting the PRC have Taiwan, he worried lest London promote a peace settlement requiring withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula. His doubts were not dispelled by talks with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on Sunday afternoon, July 9.41 The next day Acheson sent London a note that rejected paying a price for disengagement in Korea and called for Anglo-American solidarity on ques- 36. Ibid., July 10, 1950. 37. General Joseph Lawton Collins daily schedule, July 9, 1950, Box 40, Collins papers, Eisenhower Library; Norstad to LeMay, July 9, 1950; Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 091200Z, July 9, 1950, Box 86, Hoyt S. Vandenberg papers, Library of Congress. 38. Chief of Staff, USAF, to Commanding General 3rd Air Division, 092016Z July 9, 1950; Norstad to LeMay, July 9, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 39. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, pp. 326-327. 40. Ibid., pp. 330-331, 340. 41. Ibid., pp. 331, 337; Acheson daily schedule, July 9, 1950, Box 45, Dean G. Acheson papers, Truman Library. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions