MICHAEL SHENG* The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949 The pivotal component of the "lost chance"interpretation is the belief that Mao and his colleagues were Chinese nationalists whose nationalism came into conflict with Stalin's desire to enhance Soviet security at the expense of Chinese interests.Thus,to counterbalance the Soviet menace,the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)sent friendly overtures to the Americans,only to be rebuffed by those in Washington who pursued a single-minded pro-Guomindang (GMD)policy.Consequently,the CCP was forced to join hands with Moscow,and the United States lost a chance to strike a favorable balance in postwar Asia against the Soviet Union;the tragedies in Korea and Vietnam followed.1 I have demonstrated elsewhere that the CCP's friendly overtures toward the United States were never indications of a genuine desire to form an alliance with Washington against Moscow;instead,they were designed to make use of the American factor to defeat the GMD,or to mislead the Americans in order to delay or prevent possible U.S.intervention on behalf of the GMD.Therefore,the CCP not only carefully concealed its intimate relations with Moscow but also spread misinformation to suggest the CCP- Moscow disharmony.There was never a chance for the United States to win over the CCP as a potential ally against Moscow;it was only a myth.2 This essay intends to show that it was not Chinese nationalism,but "proletarian internationalism,"that shaped the CCP's relations with Mos- cow."Internationalism"was not a rhetorical"empty word,"as Mao put it;it The author wishes to thank the Faculty Research Fund of Southwest Missouri State Univer- sity for funding his research trip to Beijing in the summer of 1993. 1.For examples,see Joseph W.Esherick,ed..Lost Chance in China:The World War II Despatches of bhn Service (New York,1974):Barbara W Tuchman,"If Mao Had Come to Washington:An Essay in Alternatives,"Foreign Affairs51 (October 1972):44-64;and Donald S.Zagoria,"Containment and China."in Caging the Bear.ed.Charles Gati (Indianapolis. 1974),109-27. 2.See Michael M.Sheng."America's Lost Chance in China?A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,"Australian.burnal of Chinese Affairs 29(January 1993):135-57;idem,"Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,'1948-1950."Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994):475-502: and idem."The United States,the Chinese Communist Party.and the Soviet Union,1948- 1950:A Reappraisal,"Pacific Historical Review 63(November 1994):521-36. DIPLOMATIC HIsToRY,Vol.21.No.1 (Winter 1997).1997 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishers,350 Main Street, Malden,MA,02148.USA,and 108 Cowley Road,Oxford,OX4 1JF,UK. 95
M I C H A E L S H E N G * The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949 The pivotal component of the “lost chance” interpretation is the belief that Mao and his colleagues were Chinese nationalists whose nationalism came into conflict with Stalin’s desire to enhance Soviet security at the expense of Chinese interests. Thus, to counterbalance the Soviet menace, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent friendly overtures to the Americans, only to be rebuffed by those in Washington who pursued a single-minded pro-Guomindang (GMD) policy. Consequently, the CCP was forced to join hands with Moscow, and the United States lost a chance to strike a favorable balance in postwar Asia against the Soviet Union; the tragedies in Korea and Vietnam followed.1 I have demonstrated elsewhere that the CCP’s friendly overtures toward the United States were never indications of a genuine desire to form an alliance with Washington against Moscow; instead, they were designed to make use of the American factor to defeat the GMD, or to mislead the Americans in order to delay or prevent possible U.S. intervention on behalf of the GMD. Therefore, the CCP not only carefully concealed its intimate relations with Moscow but also spread misinformation to suggest the CCPMoscow disharmony. There was never a chance for the United States to win over the CCP as a potential ally against Moscow; it was only a myth.2 This essay intends to show that it was not Chinese nationalism, but “proletarian internationalism,” that shaped the CCP’s relations with Moscow. “Internationalism” was not a rhetorical “empty word,” as Mao put it; it *The author wishes to thank the Faculty Research Fund of Southwest Missouri State University for funding his research trip to Beijing in the summer of 1993. 1. For examples, see Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John Service (New York, 1974); Barbara W. Tuchman, “If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives,” Foreign Affairs 51 (October 1972): 44–64; and Donald S. Zagoria, “Containment and China,” in Caging the Bear, ed. Charles Gati (Indianapolis, 1974), 109–27. 2. See Michael M. Sheng, “America’s Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (January 1993): 135–57; idem, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the ‘Lost Chance,’ 1948–1950,” Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994): 475–502; and idem, “The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948– 1950: A Reappraisal,” Pacific Historical Review 63 (November 1994): 521–36. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1997). q 1997 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. 95
96:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY actually reflected the intellectual-psychological,political-institutional,and military-strategic ties between the CCP and Moscow in the pre-1949 years.Thus,the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was not a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two nations.It was a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921. It is arguable that Mao and his colleagues started out as ardent Chinese nationalists early in the century.Once converted to Marxism-Leninism and a part of the Comintern,however,they distinguished themselves from other Chinese patriots and acquired a unique political identity.The core of the CCP's ideology was the theory of class struggle.As Stuart R.Schram points out,Mao was deeply intrigued by The Communist Manifesto,from which the essential message for him was "Jieji douzheng.jieji douzheng.jieji douzheng"(Class struggle,class struggle,and class struggle)!3 CCP leaders believed that people in all nations were divided into different sociopolitical classes and that the nation-state was only a tool of the ruling classes. Thus,they "recognizeld]the existence of only two 'nations,'the 'nation' of the capitalists and the 'nation'of the workers.At present the 'nation'of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union.Everywhere else we have the nation'of the capitalists."4 As a result,Mao and his generation of radicals disliked China as a“nation”ruled by the“state”of landlords and capitalists, "for all that which lay in the past [of Chinal was wrong and evil."In Mao's mind,China as a"nation-state"would deserve love and devotion only after the CCP revolution had succeeded,because "the decadence of the state,the suffering of humanity,and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme."Mao's revolutionary ideology was an antithesis to what the CCP called "bourgeois nationalism,"and he identified Lenin's Russia,not China, as"the number one civilized country in the world."Having refused to join many of his comrades in studying in the West,Mao decided to organize a delegation to go to Russia before Comintern agents came to China to help organize the CCP in 1921.5 It is abundantly clear that Mao and his comrades were attracted to a pro-Soviet position primarily because of their spiritual- ideological conversion,not as a result of their calculation of self-interest and material gain or loss.This explains why they remained loyal to the Moscow-led world revolution despite the scarcity of Soviet material aid to them,and the Jiangxi defeat,which is partially attributable to Comintern policy guidance in the 1920s and 1930s.6 3.Stuart R.Schram,ed..Mao's Road to Power:Revolutionary Writings,1912-1920 (New York.1992),xvii. 4.Quoted from Benjamin I.Schwartz.Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao(Cambridge. MA,1968).28 5.Schram.Mao's Road to Power:250.399.505. 6.Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao's alleged alienation from Moscow For instance,see John W.Garver,"The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident."Australian burnal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991):145-75.For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng."Mao.Stalin,and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front:1935-1937,"China Quarter/y 129 (March 1992):149-70
96 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y actually reflected the intellectual-psychological, political-institutional, and military-strategic ties between the CCP and Moscow in the pre-1949 years. Thus, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was not a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two nations. It was a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921. It is arguable that Mao and his colleagues started out as ardent Chinese nationalists early in the century. Once converted to Marxism-Leninism and a part of the Comintern, however, they distinguished themselves from other Chinese patriots and acquired a unique political identity. The core of the CCP’s ideology was the theory of class struggle. As Stuart R. Schram points out, Mao was deeply intrigued by The Communist Manifesto, from which the essential message for him was “Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng” (Class struggle, class struggle, and class struggle)!3 CCP leaders believed that people in all nations were divided into different sociopolitical classes and that the nation-state was only a tool of the ruling classes. Thus, they “recognize[d] the existence of only two ‘nations,’ the ‘nation’ of the capitalists and the ‘nation’ of the workers. At present the ‘nation’ of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we have the ‘nation’ of the capitalists.”4 As a result, Mao and his generation of radicals disliked China as a “nation” ruled by the “state” of landlords and capitalists, “for all that which lay in the past [of China] was wrong and evil.” In Mao’s mind, China as a “nation-state” would deserve love and devotion only after the CCP revolution had succeeded, because “the decadence of the state, the suffering of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme.” Mao’s revolutionary ideology was an antithesis to what the CCP called “bourgeois nationalism,” and he identified Lenin’s Russia, not China, as “the number one civilized country in the world.” Having refused to join many of his comrades in studying in the West, Mao decided to organize a delegation to go to Russia before Comintern agents came to China to help organize the CCP in 1921.5 It is abundantly clear that Mao and his comrades were attracted to a pro-Soviet position primarily because of their spiritualideological conversion, not as a result of their calculation of self-interest and material gain or loss. This explains why they remained loyal to the Moscow-led world revolution despite the scarcity of Soviet material aid to them, and the Jiangxi defeat, which is partially attributable to Comintern policy guidance in the 1920s and 1930s.6 3. Stuart R. Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1920 (New York, 1992), xvii. 4. Quoted from Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 28. 5. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, 250, 399, 505. 6. Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao’s alleged alienation from Moscow. For instance, see John W. Garver, “The Soviet Union and the Xi’an Incident,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991): 145–75. For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng, “Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935–1937,” China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 149–70
The Triumph of Internationalism 97 Influenced by the Maoist historiography in the post-Stalin era,many scholars in the West take it for granted that Mao advocated a "correct line' of rural strategy in opposition to Moscow's disastrous city-oriented strategy. and he was thus purged by Moscow's proxies known as the "returned students."It was not until 1935,so goes the conventional belief when the defeated CCP force lost its communication with Moscow,that the majority of CCP leaders supported Mao at the Zunyi conference,and the Mao leadership in the post-1935 era was thus politically and institutionally op- posed to Moscow.7 Recently released CCP materials,however,indicate that Mao was very much a part of the so-called left-deviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s,and Mao's rise to power in 1935 was a result of Moscow's promotion. For instance,when the so-called Li Lishan left-deviationist line was at its peak in the latter half of 1930,Mao led the 1st Army Corps to attack major cities,such as Ji'an,Nanchang,and Changsha.After the CCP had suffered a serious setback due to Li's ruthless policy.Moscow quickly removed Li as party chief in September.Because of the communication failure,however, Moscow's message did not reach Mao,and he thus continued to carry on Li's"adventurist"policy even after Moscow had condemned Li.At the end of 1930,Mao was still advocating a "final battle of class warfare"at home and abroad.Consequently,Mao was criticized at a CCP Center's meeting on 17 April 1931,where he admitted his "Li Lishan error."Nonetheless, Mao was not punished for following Li's policy,which was after all influ- enced by the Comintern radicalism of the "third period."Instead,Mao was promoted by Moscow as an alternate member of the Politburo.8 Mao's so-called demotion by the Comintern in the Jiangxi period was in fact a "sick leave"of Mao's own request in the fall of 1932,due to his disagreement with his comrades in the Jiangxi Central Bureau over a tactical matter.When Mao was having difficulties with his comrades at home,the Comintern intervened on his behalf,directing the CCP in March 1933 that the way in which Mao was treated"must be gentle and comrade-like,and Mao should be allowed to undertake a leading position."As a result,Mao's position was upgraded from an alternate to a full member of the Politburo in January 1934.9 Throughout 1934-35,Moscow consistently promoted Mao's reputation,which laid the foundation for his rise to power in 1935.Mao returned Moscow's favor with gratitude and enthusiasm.He made restoring 7.For examples,see John W Garver,"The Origins of the Second United Front:The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party"China Quarterly 113 (March 1988):29-59:and Harrison E.Salisbury.New Emperors,China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston,1992).84. 8.Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Maol.ed.Document Research Office of the CCP Center(Beijing,1993),1:311-27,339-40. 9.Ibid.,377-91,398.420.Influenced by the myth of Mao's own making.it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the "left-deviationist"policy line.See Garver."The Origins of the Second United Front";and Salisbury.New Emperor:84
The Triumph of Internationalism : 97 Influenced by the Maoist historiography in the post-Stalin era, many scholars in the West take it for granted that Mao advocated a “correct line” of rural strategy in opposition to Moscow’s disastrous city-oriented strategy, and he was thus purged by Moscow’s proxies known as the “returned students.” It was not until 1935, so goes the conventional belief, when the defeated CCP force lost its communication with Moscow, that the majority of CCP leaders supported Mao at the Zunyi conference, and the Mao leadership in the post-1935 era was thus politically and institutionally opposed to Moscow.7 Recently released CCP materials, however, indicate that Mao was very much a part of the so-called left-deviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and Mao’s rise to power in 1935 was a result of Moscow’s promotion. For instance, when the so-called Li Lishan left-deviationist line was at its peak in the latter half of 1930, Mao led the 1st Army Corps to attack major cities, such as Ji’an, Nanchang, and Changsha. After the CCP had suffered a serious setback due to Li’s ruthless policy, Moscow quickly removed Li as party chief in September. Because of the communication failure, however, Moscow’s message did not reach Mao, and he thus continued to carry on Li’s “adventurist” policy even after Moscow had condemned Li. At the end of 1930, Mao was still advocating a “final battle of class warfare” at home and abroad. Consequently, Mao was criticized at a CCP Center’s meeting on 17 April 1931, where he admitted his “Li Lishan error.” Nonetheless, Mao was not punished for following Li’s policy, which was after all influenced by the Comintern radicalism of the “third period.” Instead, Mao was promoted by Moscow as an alternate member of the Politburo.8 Mao’s so-called demotion by the Comintern in the Jiangxi period was in fact a “sick leave” of Mao’s own request in the fall of 1932, due to his disagreement with his comrades in the Jiangxi Central Bureau over a tactical matter. When Mao was having difficulties with his comrades at home, the Comintern intervened on his behalf, directing the CCP in March 1933 that the way in which Mao was treated “must be gentle and comrade-like, and Mao should be allowed to undertake a leading position.” As a result, Mao’s position was upgraded from an alternate to a full member of the Politburo in January 1934.9 Throughout 1934–35, Moscow consistently promoted Mao’s reputation, which laid the foundation for his rise to power in 1935. Mao returned Moscow’s favor with gratitude and enthusiasm. He made restoring 7. For examples, see John W. Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party,” China Quarterly 113 (March 1988): 29–59; and Harrison E. Salisbury, New Emperors, China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston, 1992), 84. 8. Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Mao], ed. Document Research Office of the CCP Center (Beijing, 1993), 1:311–27, 339–40. 9. Ibid., 377–91, 398, 420. Influenced by the myth of Mao’s own making, it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the “left-deviationist” policy line. See Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front”; and Salisbury, New Emperor, 84
98:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY radio communications between the CCP and Moscow a strategic priority and succeeded in the summer of 1936.Thereafter,Mao reported to Moscow every week on every important policy issue,and Moscow's directives were always closely heeded by Mao as well during the entire period of the Sino- Japanese war.10 Consequently,Stalin played an essential role in the CCP's policymaking process,and behind every major turn and twist in CCP policy a message from Moscow could be found.Mao's internationalistic outlook was evident when he stated at a party meeting in 1935 that "We are not an independent communist party,we are a branch of the Comintern,while our Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution."1 "Ideology"alone.however,cannot explain why Mao's loyalty to Moscow sustained for decades before 1949,since one's "idea"would change in the real course of life journey.The Chinese Communists needed to feel worth- while to identify themselves as a part of the Moscow-led world revolution on a continuous basis.Nonetheless,the CCP's sense of being gratified cannot be measured by the quantity of Soviet material aid,just like chil- dren's affection for their parents cannot be determined by how many toys they get.Moscow's aid to the CCP came in three categories:psychological support,political guidance,and military assistance. Once the Chinese Communists committed themselves to their revolu- tion,they were against the whole world surrounding them.To sustain their hard-won struggle,they needed to know that they belonged to an interna- tional common cause and Moscow was on their side and ready to help them. Mao was fully aware of the crucial value of Moscow's psychological support to the CCP's morale.For instance,Mao made a speech at a rally on 30 November 1935,after the remaining CCP troops won a small battle in Shaanbei against the GMD local force.Mao claimed that the CCP's recent victory at home assisted "brothers"in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mongolia (PRM).12 More than merely words of comfort,Mao's rhetoric actually conveyed his excitement over the receipt of Stalin's recent message.After the Jiangxi defeat,the CCP leadership was divided over where to locate their new base. Zhang Guotao wanted to go to western Sichuan,while Mao insisted on going to the Soviet-influenced northwest,close to either Xingjiang or Mon- golia.He reasoned that only with Soviet assistance could the CCP have a 10.For a more detailed discussion see Sheng."Mao.Stalin,"150-58;and idem,"Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations,1935-1949"(Ph.D.diss..York Univer- sity1991),21-196. 11.Huang Qijun,"The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935-36,"Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987):23.See also Sheng."Mao. Stalin,"159. 12.Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao's writings](Beijing.1993).1:363-71.While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence.Mao had good reasons,as we will see,to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s
98 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y radio communications between the CCP and Moscow a strategic priority and succeeded in the summer of 1936. Thereafter, Mao reported to Moscow every week on every important policy issue, and Moscow’s directives were always closely heeded by Mao as well during the entire period of the SinoJapanese war.10 Consequently, Stalin played an essential role in the CCP’s policymaking process, and behind every major turn and twist in CCP policy a message from Moscow could be found. Mao’s internationalistic outlook was evident when he stated at a party meeting in 1935 that “We are not an independent communist party, we are a branch of the Comintern, while our Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution.”11 “Ideology” alone, however, cannot explain why Mao’s loyalty to Moscow sustained for decades before 1949, since one’s “idea” would change in the real course of life journey. The Chinese Communists needed to feel worthwhile to identify themselves as a part of the Moscow-led world revolution on a continuous basis. Nonetheless, the CCP’s sense of being gratified cannot be measured by the quantity of Soviet material aid, just like children’s affection for their parents cannot be determined by how many toys they get. Moscow’s aid to the CCP came in three categories: psychological support, political guidance, and military assistance. Once the Chinese Communists committed themselves to their revolution, they were against the whole world surrounding them. To sustain their hard-won struggle, they needed to know that they belonged to an international common cause and Moscow was on their side and ready to help them. Mao was fully aware of the crucial value of Moscow’s psychological support to the CCP’s morale. For instance, Mao made a speech at a rally on 30 November 1935, after the remaining CCP troops won a small battle in Shaanbei against the GMD local force. Mao claimed that the CCP’s recent victory at home assisted “brothers” in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of Mongolia (PRM).12 More than merely words of comfort, Mao’s rhetoric actually conveyed his excitement over the receipt of Stalin’s recent message. After the Jiangxi defeat, the CCP leadership was divided over where to locate their new base. Zhang Guotao wanted to go to western Sichuan, while Mao insisted on going to the Soviet-influenced northwest, close to either Xingjiang or Mongolia. He reasoned that only with Soviet assistance could the CCP have a 10. For a more detailed discussion see Sheng, “Mao, Stalin,” 150–58; and idem, “Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935–1949” (Ph.D. diss., York University, 1991), 21–196. 11. Huang Qijun, “The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935–36,” Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987): 23. See also Sheng, “Mao, Stalin,” 159. 12. Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao’s writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:363–71. While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence, Mao had good reasons, as we will see, to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s
The Triumph of Internationalism 99 future.Stalin endorsed Mao's choice and sent back Zhang Hao,who reached Mao's headquarters a few days before his speech.From then until the end of 1936,the CCP's priority was to realize the Stalin-approved strategy to create a new base in the northwest.Mao requested extensive military aid from the Soviets,including heavy artillery and airplanes.Mos- cow promised that Soviet military aid would be delivered from Mongolia after the CCP seized northern Ningxia.However,Mao's Ningxia campaign was defeated.Mao then sent out the Western Expedition Army to go to Xingjiang.since Moscow promised to deliver aid from there.The WEA was again defeated. The CCP was unable to reach far enough to get the Soviet aid;nonethe- less,the promise of massive aid turned out to be the most crucial "political capital"for the CCP to win over the GMD local forces under Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.Zhang and Yang would not have allied them- selves secretly with the CCP had the CCP had no link with Moscow.The contemporaries all remembered that it was the CCP-GMD first united front with Moscow's blessing in the 1920s that laid the foundation for Jiang's military power in Guangdong.Why could not the Guangdong experience be repeated in the northwest with a Moscow-sponsored CCP-Zhang-Yang alliance?When the northwest strategy was militarily defeated by Jiang. Zhang and Yang kidnapped Jiang in December 1936,which served as a turning point for the establishment of the second CCP-GMD united front, and the CCP survived and grew in the following decade.The psychology of Soviet support not only sustained the CCP's morale,it also provided the Party invaluable political assets to strike a deal with other Chinese political and military forces at home.Without its Communist identity and Moscow connection,the CCP would have been reduced to the level of one more “warlord'”among many in China.ls Although massive Soviet military aid to the CCP did not come until the end of 1945,when the Red Army occupied Manchuria,Mao had sufficient reason to believe that Stalin was willing and prepared to aid the CCP,and that the Party could seek refuge under the Soviet umbrella whenever necessary. For instance,after the eruption of the German-Soviet war,Stalin suggested that in case of a Soviet-Japanese war,the CCP move to Outer Mongolia to receive Soviet military equipment and to engage the Japanese in southern Manchuria.The CCP leadership responded to Moscow's suggestion with enthusiasm.Zhou Enlai telegraphed Mao on 26 June 1941 that when the USSR was to be attacked by both Germany and Japan,the GMD would likely mount its pressure on the CCP.The Party,therefore,needed to be prepared to retreat into the USSR or the PRM.In order to prepare for this scenario,he suggested that the rank and file should start learning natural 13.The last two paragraphs are based on Mao's telegraphs and writings in 1935-36,Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao's military writings](Beijing.1993).1:398-655.See also Sheng."Mao,Stalin
The Triumph of Internationalism : 99 future. Stalin endorsed Mao’s choice and sent back Zhang Hao, who reached Mao’s headquarters a few days before his speech. From then until the end of 1936, the CCP’s priority was to realize the Stalin-approved strategy to create a new base in the northwest. Mao requested extensive military aid from the Soviets, including heavy artillery and airplanes. Moscow promised that Soviet military aid would be delivered from Mongolia after the CCP seized northern Ningxia. However, Mao’s Ningxia campaign was defeated. Mao then sent out the Western Expedition Army to go to Xingjiang, since Moscow promised to deliver aid from there. The WEA was again defeated. The CCP was unable to reach far enough to get the Soviet aid; nonetheless, the promise of massive aid turned out to be the most crucial “political capital” for the CCP to win over the GMD local forces under Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Zhang and Yang would not have allied themselves secretly with the CCP had the CCP had no link with Moscow. The contemporaries all remembered that it was the CCP-GMD first united front with Moscow’s blessing in the 1920s that laid the foundation for Jiang’s military power in Guangdong. Why could not the Guangdong experience be repeated in the northwest with a Moscow-sponsored CCP-Zhang-Yang alliance? When the northwest strategy was militarily defeated by Jiang, Zhang and Yang kidnapped Jiang in December 1936, which served as a turning point for the establishment of the second CCP-GMD united front, and the CCP survived and grew in the following decade. The psychology of Soviet support not only sustained the CCP’s morale, it also provided the Party invaluable political assets to strike a deal with other Chinese political and military forces at home. Without its Communist identity and Moscow connection, the CCP would have been reduced to the level of one more “warlord” among many in China.13 Although massive Soviet military aid to the CCP did not come until the end of 1945, when the Red Army occupied Manchuria, Mao had sufficient reason to believe thatStalin was willing and prepared to aid the CCP, and that the Party could seek refuge under the Soviet umbrella whenever necessary. For instance, after the eruption of the German-Soviet war, Stalin suggested that in case of a Soviet-Japanese war, the CCP move to Outer Mongolia to receive Soviet military equipment and to engage the Japanese in southern Manchuria. The CCP leadership responded to Moscow’s suggestion with enthusiasm. Zhou Enlai telegraphed Mao on 26 June 1941 that when the USSR was to be attacked by both Germany and Japan, the GMD would likely mount its pressure on the CCP. The Party, therefore, needed to be prepared to retreat into the USSR or the PRM. In order to prepare for this scenario, he suggested that the rank and file should start learning natural 13. The last two paragraphs are based on Mao’s telegraphs and writings in 1935–36, Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao’s military writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:398–655. See also Sheng, “Mao, Stalin