204 Interational Organization annual average of only 28,57720 Moreover,the quality of British recruits declined dramatically in the decades before the war.In 1861,for example,the minimum acceptable height for a recruit was 5'8",but by 1914 the minimum height was only 5'3"21 Between 1890 and 1898,over one-fourth of recruits failed to meet at least one of the army's minimum physical standards.22 As Margaret Levi notes,"The modal recruit was transformed from a tall,rural fellow who met relatively high physical standards to a shorter,younger,less healthy man,or even boy,from an urban environ- ment."23 A governmental inquiry in 1904 concluded that the cause of this trend was that increasingly only those "who have failed in civilian life offer themselves as recruits."24 Rising wages in the civilian sectors of the economy meant that ever fewer well-qualified candidates stepped forward,forcing military recruiters to scrape the bottom of the barrel to maintain numbers and leading them to lament that "good trade years meant lean recruiting."25 In the decade before the war,these problems fueled growing pressures for some system of compulsory,universal military training or conscription.2 Similar problems affected the Royal Navy.Although the navy's practice of recruit- ing boys and youth for fifteen-year engagements meant that it competed only periph- erally in the labor market,rising civilian wages exerted significant pressure on the navy.27 The growing disparity between a sailor's pay and civilian wages caused a growing shortage of experienced sailors and petty officers,because few reenlisted. And because sailors were bound by long-service contracts,their inability to benefit from rising civilian wages bred considerable resentment.According to the First Sea Lord,Winston Churchill,in 1912, 20.French1982.24. 21.Skelley1977,238 22.See Skelley 1977,238;and Spiers 1980,40. 23.Lei1997.54. 24.Cited in Skelley 1977,239. 25.See French 1982,24;and Spiers 1980.55.Hobson estimates the average military wage was approxi- mately 80 percent of the average civilian wage.Hobson 1993,491.n.62. 26.Adams and Poirer 1987,1-48. 27.The Royal Navy drew its recruits from three sources.Most were boys(ages 15 3/4 to 16 3/4)or youth(ages 16 3/4 to 18).These boys and youth were trained in seamanship until their eighteenth birth- days,after which they served a fifteen-year engagement.In 1903,the navy also began admitting some adults for five years of noncontinuous service.British Admiralty 1905,410.Recruiting boys and youth enabled the navy to bind its labor force to long-service commitments before they could be bid away by higher civilian wages.As one Royal Navy document states,"They [sailors]are fully aware that,but for the fact that they were caught as boys and bound to a fifteen years'engagement before they knew anything about the service,far greater inducements must have been offered them by the State:...there is nothing between them and the improved conditions which their comrades in civil life have won but their respect for naval discipline."British Admiralty 1912.2.An untitled draft document is even blunter:"These boys are put into the Navy by their parents,and have in a great majority of cases no choice as to their profession. The parents are glad to get the boy off their hands...and the boy himself is not able to appreciate the service into which he has been entered....[It]is not until they are grown men of 3 or 4 years'service in the Navy that they begin to look around them and find out how grossly inferior their conditions are to those of their equals in civil life.They are then already bound to serve for 12 years....This however is the only branch of the recruiting service which is really prosperous."British Admiralty n.d./1912?
annual average of only 28,577.20 Moreover, the quality of British recruits declined dramatically in the decades before the war. In 1861, for example, the minimum acceptable height for a recruit was 5889, but by 1914 the minimum height was only 5839.21 Between 1890 and 1898, over one-fourth of recruits failed to meet at least one of the army’s minimum physical standards.22 As Margaret Levi notes, ‘‘The modal recruit was transformed from a tall, rural fellow who met relatively high physical standardsto a shorter, younger, less healthyman, or even boy, from an urban environment.’’ 23 A governmental inquiry in 1904 concluded that the cause of this trend was that increasingly only those ‘‘who have failed in civilian life offer themselves as recruits.’’ 24 Rising wages in the civilian sectors of the economy meant that ever fewer well-quali ed candidatesstepped forward, forcing military recruiters to scrape the bottom of the barrel to maintain numbers and leading them to lament that ‘‘good trade years meant lean recruiting.’’ 25 In the decade before the war, these problems fueled growing pressures for some system of compulsory, universal military training or conscription.26 Similar problems affected the Royal Navy.Although the navy’s practice of recruiting boys and youth for fteen-year engagements meant that it competed only peripherally in the labor market, rising civilian wages exerted signi cant pressure on the navy.27 The growing disparity between a sailor’s pay and civilian wages caused a growing shortage of experienced sailors and petty officers, because few reenlisted. And because sailors were bound by long-service contracts, their inability to bene t from rising civilian wages bred considerable resentment. According to the First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, in 1912, 20. French 1982, 24. 21. Skelley 1977, 238. 22. See Skelley 1977, 238; and Spiers 1980, 40. 23. Levi 1997, 54. 24. Cited in Skelley 1977, 239. 25. See French 1982, 24; and Spiers 1980, 55. Hobson estimates the average military wage was approximately 80 percent of the average civilian wage. Hobson 1993, 491, n.62. 26. Adams and Poirer 1987, 1–48. 27. The Royal Navy drew its recruits from three sources. Most were boys (ages 15 3/4 to 16 3/4) or youth (ages 16 3/4 to 18). These boys and youth were trained in seamanship until their eighteenth birthdays, after which they served a fteen-year engagement. In 1903, the navy also began admitting some adults for ve years of noncontinuousservice. British Admiralty 1905, 410. Recruiting boys and youth enabled the navy to bind its labor force to long-service commitments before they could be bid away by higher civilian wages. As oneRoyal Navy documentstates, ‘‘They [sailors] are fully aware that, but for the fact that they were caught as boys and bound to a fteen years’ engagement before they knew anything about the service, far greater inducements must have been offered them by the State; . . . there is nothing between them and the improved conditions which their comrades in civil life have won but their respect for naval discipline.’’British Admiralty 1912, 2. An untitled draft document is even blunter: ‘‘These boys are put into the Navy by their parents, and have in a great majority of cases no choice as to their profession. The parents are glad to get the boy off their hands . . . and the boy himself is not able to appreciate the service into which he has been entered. . . . [It] is not until they are grown men of 3 or 4 years’service in the Navy that they begin to look around them and nd out how grossly inferiortheir conditionsare to those of their equals in civil life. They are then already bound to serve for 12 years. . . . This however is the only branch of the recruiting service which is really prosperous.’’British Admiralty n.d./1912?. 204 International Organization
Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 205 There is a deep and widespread sense of injustice and discontent throughout all ranks and ratings of the Navy.This discontent...is rendered more dangerous by every successful strike for higher wages which takes place on shore.It is ren- dered more legitimate by the social legislation upon which the Parliament is en- gaged....It is just this seamen class which was caught and bound to such a long contract so young,who cannot escape from it without severe punishment,and who are the best educated,among whom a serious explosion might occur....We have had great mutinies in the past in the British Navy,and we ought not to con- tinue to bear the responsibility of refusing all redress to grievances so obvious and so harsh.28 Nor did conscription insulate France and Germany from similar problems.29 In France,leftist pressures to ease the burdens of military service forced the govern- ment to progressively shorten the length of active duty from five years in the late 1880s to two years by 1905.30 The army also experienced a sharp rise in insubordina- tion,soldier riots,and desertion.In 1902,some 5,991 men were listed as missing, growing to 13,000 by 1912.In all,some 76,723 citizens shirked their military obliga- tions in the ten years prior to 1912,the equivalent of two army corps.31 Legal evasion was rampant.To counter the growing shortage,the government ordered conscription boards after 1905 to take recruits who would have been previously rejected as unfit- some 35,000 men in 1907 alone.32 Rising civilian wages also led many officers to resign or lose interest in their profession.According to France Militaire in 1912, "[Army]pay...does not compare,the statistics prove it,with the gains made by workers or most civil servants over the past ten years....As a consequence,the military ideal is devalued,submerged by a sort of bourgeois ideal,tied to the hard facts of everyday life."3 Likewise,eroding pay and working conditions caused a growing exodus of noncommissioned officers (NCOs).By 1913,the army was short some 6,000 career sergeants and 15,000 reenlisted corporals,and those that remained were second rate.The most qualified had entered the civilian economy.34 A 1912 government inquiry concluded that Those who believe themselves poorly treated and who can find a civilian job leave the army,these are generally the most intelligent.What is left are mediocre instructors who can do absolutely nothing else....The lower cadres lose little by little their best elements,their elite men,and slowly but surely the corps of NCOs will become what it was 20 years ago,that is,it will contain only NCOs of 28.British Admiralty 1912,4-5. 29.Remember that,in a time of shorter life expectancies,conscription imposed a considerable burden by taking men away from their civilian lives for up to four years.Stevenson 1996,6.Rates of pay were so poor in the continental armies that soldiers had to supplement their pay with external sources of income.A French private earned approximately I percent of the average civilian wage,a German private 8 percent, and a Russian private 7 percent.Hobson 1993,490-91. 30.On the translation of rising opportunity costs into political activity.see footnote 6. 31.Porch1981,11L. 32.Ibid.202-203. 33.Cited in ibid.,90. 34.bid,197
There is a deep and widespread sense of injustice and discontent throughout all ranks and ratings of the Navy. This discontent . . . is rendered more dangerous by every successful strike for higher wages which takes place on shore. It is rendered more legitimate by the social legislation upon which the Parliament is engaged. . . . It is just this seamen class which was caught and bound to such a long contract so young, who cannot escape from it without severe punishment, and who are the best educated, among whom a serious explosion might occur. . . . We have had great mutinies in the past in the British Navy, and we ought not to continue to bear the responsibility of refusing all redress to grievances so obvious and so harsh.28 Nor did conscription insulate France and Germany from similar problems.29 In France, leftist pressures to ease the burdens of military service forced the government to progressively shorten the length of active duty from ve years in the late 1880sto two years by 1905.30 The army also experienced a sharp rise in insubordination, soldier riots, and desertion. In 1902, some 5,991 men were listed as missing, growing to 13,000 by 1912.In all,some 76,723 citizensshirked their military obligationsin the ten years prior to 1912, the equivalent of two army corps.31 Legal evasion was rampant. To counter the growing shortage, the government ordered conscription boards after 1905 to take recruits who would have been previously rejected as un t— some 35,000 men in 1907 alone.32 Rising civilian wages also led many officers to resign or lose interest in their profession. According to France Militaire in 1912, ‘‘[Army] pay . . . does not compare, the statistics prove it, with the gains made by workers or most civil servants over the past ten years. . . . As a consequence, the military ideal is devalued, submerged by a sort of bourgeois ideal, tied to the hard facts of everyday life.’’ 33 Likewise, eroding pay and working conditions caused a growing exodus of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). By 1913, the army was short some 6,000 careersergeants and 15,000 reenlisted corporals, and those that remained were second rate. The most quali ed had entered the civilian economy.34 A 1912 government inquiry concluded that Those who believe themselves poorly treated and who can nd a civilian job leave the army, these are generally the most intelligent.What is left are mediocre instructors who can do absolutely nothing else. . . . The lower cadres lose little by little their best elements, their elite men, and slowly but surely the corps of NCOs will become what it was 20 years ago, that is, it will contain only NCOs of 28. British Admiralty 1912, 4–5. 29. Remember that, in a time of shorter life expectancies, conscription imposed a considerable burden by taking men away from their civilian lives for up to four years. Stevenson 1996, 6. Rates of pay were so poor in the continental armies that soldiers had to supplement their pay with external sources of income.A French private earned approximately 1 percent of the average civilian wage, a German private 8 percent, and a Russian private 7 percent. Hobson 1993, 490–91. 30. On the translation of rising opportunity costs into political activity, see footnote 6. 31. Porch 1981, 111. 32. Ibid., 202–203. 33. Cited in ibid., 90. 34. Ibid., 197. Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 205
206 Interational Organization limited intelligence,without education,and incapable of being good instruc- tors.35 Again,the rising opportunity costs of military service were a significant source of France's personnel problems.*6 According to the government inquiry,"The NCOs say that they leave the army with regret,and if pay were sufficient and promotion given on merit and impartially,they would not dream of leaving the army."37 In Germany,Chancellor Leo von Caprivi worried in the early 1890s that a labor shortage would leave that country unable to field an army-a constraint that tight- ened over time.38 The German army preferred to draw recruits from agricultural backgrounds,believing that urban workers would infect the ranks with democratic and socialist agitation.However,Germany's deepening integration into the world economy drew labor out of the economy's agricultural sectors and into its expanding industries,thus shrinking the pool of agricultural labor available for military use.39 Between 1888 and 1902,an increase of 5 million in the German population would increase wartime troop strength by 500,000;between 1902 and 1910 a similar in- crease in population would increase troop strength by only 175,000.40 Germany re- sponded by freezing the size of its active-duty forces.41 In 1908,more than half of the 10.4 million men between the ages of twenty and forty-five lacked military train- ing.2 And as late as 1911.Germany conscripted only 53 percent of available candi- dates(compared to 84 percent in France and 29 percent in Austria-Hungary),two- thirds of whom had rural origins.43 The army could not even draw enough troops to fulfill the requirements of the Schlieffen plan,which was designed to offset Germa- ny's strategic weaknesses with an offensive military strategy.44 As Graf Schlieffen complained,"We invented universal military service and the idea of a nation in arms, and we have proved to other nations the necessity for introducing these institutions. ..We keep on invoking our large population,the masses at our bidding-yet the able-bodied among these masses are neither trained nor armed to their full poten- tial."45 Helmuth von Moltke(the younger)echoed this sentiment in 1911,writing that Germany was "surrounded by enemies...[but]leaves thousands of its able- bodied men untrained each year,and consequently useless for national defense."4 35.Cited in ibid.,199. 36.Ibid.197. 37.Cited in ibid..199. 38.Calleo1978.19. 39.Stevenson 1996.47. 40.Kehr 1977,67.Germany also suffered a severe shortage of officers.See Berghahn 1973,8;and Kehr1977,65. 41.Between 1877 and 1889.Germany's peacetime strength was 468.000 soldiers,and gradually in- creased to 557,000in 1896.Over the next fourteen years,it grew by 50,000to 607,000.In 1912 and 1913, new army bills increased its numbers to 761.000.Ferguson 1992,734,and 1994,155. 42.Stevenson 1996.47. 43.See Ferguson1992,734,and1994,155:Posen1993,116-17:and Kitchen1968,14748. 44.See Ritter 1958 and 1970.219. 45.Ritter1970,215. 46.Cited in Herrmann 1996,170
limited intelligence, without education, and incapable of being good instructors.35 Again, the rising opportunity costs of military service were a signi cant source of France’s personnel problems.36 According to the government inquiry, ‘‘The NCOs say that they leave the army with regret, and if pay were sufficient and promotion given on merit and impartially, they would not dream of leaving the army.’’ 37 In Germany, Chancellor Leo von Caprivi worried in the early 1890s that a labor shortage would leave that country unable to eld an army—a constraint that tightened over time.38 The German army preferred to draw recruits from agricultural backgrounds, believing that urban workers would infect the ranks with democratic and socialist agitation. However, Germany’s deepening integration into the world economy drew labor out of the economy’s agriculturalsectors and into its expanding industries, thus shrinking the pool of agricultural labor available for military use.39 Between 1888 and 1902, an increase of 5 million in the German population would increase wartime troop strength by 500,000; between 1902 and 1910 a similar increase in population would increase troop strength by only 175,000.40 Germany responded by freezing the size of its active-duty forces.41 In 1908, more than half of the 10.4 million men between the ages of twenty and forty- ve lacked military training.42 And as late as 1911, Germany conscripted only 53 percent of available candidates (compared to 84 percent in France and 29 percent in Austria-Hungary), twothirds of whom had rural origins.43 The army could not even draw enough troops to ful ll the requirements of the Schlieffen plan, which was designed to offset Germany’s strategic weaknesses with an offensive military strategy.44 As Graf Schlieffen complained,‘‘We invented universal military service and the idea of a nation in arms, and we have proved to other nations the necessity for introducing these institutions. . . . We keep on invoking our large population, the masses at our bidding—yet the able-bodied among these masses are neither trained nor armed to their full potential.’’ 45 Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) echoed this sentiment in 1911, writing that Germany was ‘‘surrounded by enemies . . . [but] leaves thousands of its ablebodied men untrained each year, and consequently uselessfor national defense.’’ 46 35. Cited in ibid., 199. 36. Ibid., 197. 37. Cited in ibid., 199. 38. Calleo 1978, 19. 39. Stevenson 1996, 47. 40. Kehr 1977, 67. Germany also suffered a severe shortage of officers. See Berghahn 1973, 8; and Kehr 1977, 65. 41. Between 1877 and 1889, Germany’s peacetime strength was 468,000 soldiers, and gradually increased to 557,000 in 1896. Over the next fourteen years, it grew by 50,000 to 607,000.In 1912 and 1913, new army bills increased its numbers to 761,000.Ferguson 1992, 734, and 1994, 155. 42. Stevenson 1996, 47. 43. See Ferguson 1992, 734, and 1994, 155; Posen 1993, 116–17; and Kitchen 1968, 147–48. 44. See Ritter 1958 and 1970, 219. 45. Ritter 1970, 215. 46. Cited in Herrmann 1996, 170. 206 International Organization