Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 199 National exposure to the international economy Rising Falling State's difficulty mobilizing locally abundant resources Increases Decreases State's difficulty mobilizing locally Decreases Increases scarce resources FIGURE 1.Predicted changes in the difficulty of mobilizing locally abundant and locally scarce resources (in this case,land)that were becoming less expensive under the impact of trade.s Third,slow turnover in the officer corps combined with the fact that militaries are only infrequently tested in war often impede change,allowing obsolete weapons and outmoded operational concepts to linger.9 These two assumptions,when combined with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, yield two sets of propositions about the ways in which changing national exposure to the internationaleconomy affects the economic constraints on a state's security.First, increasing exposure to the international economy will increase the state's difficulty of mobilizing resources in which the economy is abundantly endowed while decreas- ing the difficulty of mobilizing resources in which it is scarce.Declining exposure reverses these effects(see Figure 1).Second,increasing exposure to the international economy will cause states in which militarily relevant resources are locally abundant to experience a general tightening of economic constraints on their security,states in which these resources are locally scarce to experience a general relaxing of eco- nomic constraints,and states in which some militarily relevant resources are locally abundant but others locally scarce to experience a mixed movement of constraints. For this last group,the overall consequences of growing exposure to the international economy will be determined by the extent to which they can substitute locally scarce resources for those that are locally abundant.Again,declining exposure reverses these effects(see Figure 2). Preliminary Evidence:European Security Prior to World War I To probe the plausibility of my theory,I explore how well it captures the experiences of the five European great powers-Austria-Hungary,Britain,France,Germany,and 8.This second point also suggests that trade can affect the security interests of similarly endowed economies differently.depending on exogenous strategic circumstances.I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these points. 9.Rosen 1991
(in this case, land) that were becoming less expensive under the impact of trade.8 Third, slow turnover in the officer corps combined with the fact that militaries are only infrequently tested in war often impede change, allowing obsolete weapons and outmoded operational conceptsto linger.9 These two assumptions, when combined with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, yield two sets of propositions about the ways in which changing national exposure to the international economy affects the economic constraints on a state’s security. First, increasing exposure to the international economy will increase the state’s difficulty of mobilizing resources in which the economy is abundantlyendowed while decreasing the difficulty of mobilizing resources in which it is scarce. Declining exposure reverses these effects (see Figure 1). Second, increasing exposure to the international economy will cause statesin which militarily relevant resources are locally abundant to experience a general tightening of economic constraints on their security,states in which these resources are locally scarce to experience a general relaxing of economic constraints, and states in which some militarily relevant resources are locally abundant but others locally scarce to experience a mixed movement of constraints. For thislast group, the overall consequences of growing exposure to the international economy will be determined by the extent to which they can substitute locally scarce resources for those that are locally abundant. Again, declining exposure reverses these effects (see Figure 2). Preliminary Evidence: European Security Prior to World War I To probe the plausibility of my theory, I explore how well it capturesthe experiences of the ve European great powers—Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, and 8. This second point also suggests that trade can affect the security interests of similarly endowed economies differently, depending on exogenous strategic circumstances. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these points. 9. Rosen 1991. FIGURE 1. Predicted changes in the diffõculty of mobilizing locally abundant and locally scarce resources Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 199
200 International Organization National exposure to the international economy Falling Rising Militarily relevant resources are Tightening of Relaxing of locally abundant economic economic constraints on constraints on the state's the state's security security Some militarily relevant resources Mixed Mixed are locally abundant,others are movement of movement of locally scarce constraints constraints Overall Overall movement of movement of constraints constraints determined by determined by the extent to the extent to which state can which state can substitute substitute locally scarce locally for locally abundant for abundant locally scarce resources resources Militarily relevant resources are Relaxing of Tightening of locally scarce economic economic constraints on constraints on the state's the state's security security FIGURE 2.Predicted changes in economic constraints on the state's security Russia-in the decades prior to World War I.During this period,technological revo- lutions in communications and transportation,combined with international political stability,significantly lowered the costs and risks associated with international ex- change and led to a dramatic and sustained expansion of the volume and range of goods,services,and capital being exchanged on world markets.Between 1870 and 1900,world trade almost doubled,and in the remaining years before World War I it
Russia—in the decades prior to World War I. During this period, technologicalrevolutions in communications and transportation, combined with international political stability, signi cantly lowered the costs and risks associated with international exchange and led to a dramatic and sustained expansion of the volume and range of goods, services, and capital being exchanged on world markets. Between 1870 and 1900, world trade almost doubled, and in the remaining years before World War I it FIGURE 2. Predicted changes in economic constraints on the state’s security 200 International Organization
Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 201 Abundant in labor Land poor Land rich Capital locally abundant Britain,France, Germany None Capital locally scarce Austria-Hungary Russia Source:Rogowski 1989. FIGURE 3.Economic endowments of the European great powers grew by nearly half again.10 This expansion of trade led to the growing exposure of regional and national markets to the world economy-a development that pro- foundly affected almost every aspect of European economic,social,and political life. To generate specific predictions about this development for the security politics of the European great powers requires a model of the economy and knowledge about the importance and substitutability of various resources in European military compe- tition.To address the first issue,I follow Ronald Rogowski's study on the effects of trade on domestic political alignments and classify each power according to its rela- tive endowment in a three-factor model of land,labor,and capital,yielding a pattern in which the European powers occupied three niches in the world economy.2 Britain, France,and Germany were abundant in labor and capital but scarce in land relative to the rest of the world;Russia was abundant in labor and land but scarce in capital;and Austria-Hungary was abundant in labor but scarce in land and capital(see Figure 3).3 Second,each of these economic factors differed in its importance to military com- petition in Europe.Land was the least valuable factor and,except for the peasantry (the intensive users of this resource)as a source of military labor,contributed little to the military strength of a great power.4 More important were capital and labor,al- though the relative weight of each varied as to whether the issue was one of naval or land warfare.Key to naval competition was the state's ability to muster the eco- nomy's industrial capacity to build heavier,faster,and ever more technologically 10.Rogowski 1989,21. 11.Gourevitch 1986,chap.3. 12.Rogowski 1989.Modeling always involves a tradeoff between parsimony and accuracy.I believe the advantages provided by a three-factor model-parsimony.simplicity,and tractability-outweigh any potential loss in accuracy.Midford seeks to improve the accuracy of Rogowski's work by using a more disaggregated model.Midford 1993. 13.Rogowski1989,25-30. 14.Clearly,land and geography matter in military competition.States that possess vast swaths of land can use it as a defensive strategic asset.But given the perceived advantages of offensive warfare in the nineteenth century,land mattered less than either capital or labor,which were key to building and pro- jecting mobile armies
grew by nearly half again.10 This expansion of trade led to the growing exposure of regional and national markets to the world economy—a development that profoundly affected almost every aspect of European economic, social, and political life.11 To generate speci c predictions about this developmentfor the security politics of the European great powers requires a model of the economy and knowledge about the importance and substitutabilityof variousresources in European military competition. To address the rst issue, I follow Ronald Rogowski’s study on the effects of trade on domestic political alignments and classify each power according to its relative endowment in a three-factor model of land, labor, and capital, yielding a pattern in which the European powers occupied three nichesin the world economy.12 Britain, France, and Germany were abundant in labor and capital butscarce in land relative to the rest of the world; Russia was abundant in labor and land butscarce in capital; and Austria-Hungary was abundant in labor butscarce in land and capital(see Figure 3).13 Second, each of these economic factors differed in its importance to military competition in Europe. Land was the least valuable factor and, except for the peasantry (the intensive users of thisresource) as a source of military labor, contributed little to the military strength of a great power.14 More important were capital and labor, although the relative weight of each varied as to whether the issue was one of naval or land warfare. Key to naval competition was the state’s ability to muster the economy’s industrial capacity to build heavier, faster, and ever more technologically 10. Rogowski 1989, 21. 11. Gourevitch 1986, chap. 3. 12. Rogowski 1989. Modeling always involves a tradeoff between parsimony and accuracy. I believe the advantages provided by a three-factor model—parsimony, simplicity, and tractability—outweigh any potential loss in accuracy. Midford seeks to improve the accuracy of Rogowski’s work by using a more disaggregated model. Midford 1993. 13. Rogowski 1989, 25–30. 14. Clearly, land and geography matter in military competition. States that possess vast swaths of land can use it as a defensive strategic asset. But given the perceived advantages of offensive warfare in the nineteenth century, land mattered less than either capital or labor, which were key to building and projecting mobile armies. FIGURE 3. Economic endowments of the European great powers Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 201
202 International Organization sophisticated warships.15 On land,the individualsoldier was the basic unit of a state's military strength.The standardization and mass production of weaponry meant that individual soldiers could now be outfitted much more cheaply,and increases in the accuracy,range,and firepower of their weapons made them much more lethal,and vulnerable,in combat,thus requiring the use of large forces to absorb combat casual- ties.16 As a consequence,hardware comprised a relatively small component of a state's landward military power before 1914;more important was the sheer number of soldiers a state could field in battle.17 Finally,the substitutability between these factors was limited.Ships,not sailors, were the key ingredient of naval power.Adding extra personnel to a ship once it was fully staffed simply would not increase its war-fighting abilities.On shore,it was muscle,not machines,that mattered most.The ability to substitute capital for labor was sharply limited by the fact that Europe's armies had not yet solved the problem of battlefield mobility. We can now predict that the expanding world economy will generate three pattems of shifting economic constraints on the European great powers(see Figure 4).First, Britain,France,and Germany will confront a general tightening of economic con- straints on their security.Each will experience growing difficulties in mobilizing those resources most critical to military competition-capital and labor-into the military.They will also find the peasantry(the intensive users of land)to be a shrink- ing source of military labor as labor-intensive export sectors attract lower wage labor out of land-intensive agriculture.Second,Austria-Hungary will experience a mixed movement of constraints:increasing difficulties in mobilizing labor but a growing ease in mobilizing capital.It,too,will find the peasantry to be a fleeting source of military labor.Third,Russia will also experience a mixed movement of constraints: increasing difficulties in mobilizing both labor and the peasantry (the holders and intensive users of Russia's other abundant resource-land)into the military and an increasing ability to mobilize capital.s And,although both Austria-Hungary and Russia will experience a growing ease in mobilizing capital for security purposes,the continental geographic positions of these states,the critical importance of land-based armies to their security,and the limited ability to substitute capital for labor in land warfare imply that the net effect of an expanding world economy will be to tighten the economic constraints on the security of these capital-poor states as well. Keeping in mind that these changing constraints will manifest themselves in differ- ent ways under different institutional settings,I submit that these hypotheses capture succinctly the changing political economy of security in pre-World War I Europe.I will consider,first,whether the predicted patterns of shifting constraints are evident in the security politics of the great powers and,second,whether and how these shifting constraints may have affected European security. 15.See McNeil 1982;Sumida 1989;and Stevenson 1996,10,n.15. 16.Posen1993,83-84. 17.See Stevenson 1996,62;and Herrmann 1996,228. 18.By World War I,most of Russia's productive agricultural land was in the hands of the peasantry. Lieven 1983.18
sophisticatedwarships.15 On land, the individualsoldier was the basic unit of a state’s military strength. The standardization and mass production of weaponry meant that individualsoldiers could now be out tted much more cheaply, and increases in the accuracy, range, and repower of their weapons made them much more lethal, and vulnerable, in combat, thus requiring the use of large forces to absorb combat casualties.16 As a consequence, hardware comprised a relatively small component of a state’s landward military power before 1914; more important was the sheer number of soldiers a state could eld in battle.17 Finally, the substitutability between these factors was limited. Ships, not sailors, were the key ingredient of naval power. Adding extra personnel to a ship once it was fully staffed simply would not increase its war- ghting abilities. On shore, it was muscle, not machines, that mattered most. The ability to substitute capital for labor was sharply limited by the fact that Europe’s armies had not yet solved the problem of battle eld mobility. We can now predict that the expandingworld economy will generate three patterns of shifting economic constraints on the European great powers (see Figure 4). First, Britain, France, and Germany will confront a general tightening of economic constraints on their security. Each will experience growing difficulties in mobilizing those resources most critical to military competition—capital and labor—into the military. They will also nd the peasantry (the intensive users of land) to be a shrinking source of military labor as labor-intensive export sectors attract lower wage labor out of land-intensive agriculture. Second, Austria-Hungary will experience a mixed movement of constraints: increasing difficulties in mobilizing labor but a growing ease in mobilizing capital. It, too, will nd the peasantry to be a eeting source of military labor. Third, Russia will also experience a mixed movement of constraints: increasing difficulties in mobilizing both labor and the peasantry (the holders and intensive users of Russia’s other abundant resource—land) into the military and an increasing ability to mobilize capital.18 And, although both Austria-Hungary and Russia will experience a growing ease in mobilizing capitalfor security purposes, the continentalgeographic positions of these states, the critical importance of land-based armies to their security, and the limited ability to substitute capital for labor in land warfare imply that the net effect of an expanding world economy will be to tighten the economic constraints on the security of these capital-poorstates as well. Keeping in mind that these changing constraintswill manifest themselvesin different ways under different institutionalsettings, I submit that these hypotheses capture succinctly the changing political economy of security in pre–World War I Europe. I will consider, rst, whether the predicted patterns of shifting constraints are evident in the security politics of the great powers and, second, whether and how these shifting constraints may have affected European security. 15. See McNeil 1982; Sumida 1989; and Stevenson 1996, 10, n.15. 16. Posen 1993, 83–84. 17. See Stevenson 1996, 62; and Herrmann 1996, 228. 18. By World War I, most of Russia’s productive agricultural land was in the hands of the peasantry. Lieven 1983, 18. 202 International Organization
Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 203 Abundant in labor Land poor Land rich Capital abundant Britain,France, None Germany General tightening of constraints Increasing difficulty mobilizing labor Increasing difficulty mobilizing capital Reliable peasantry Capital scarce Austria-Hungary Russia Mixed movement of Mixed movement of constraints constraints Increasing difficulty Increasing difficulty mobilizing labor mobilizing labor Decreasing difficulty Decreasing difficulty mobilizing capital mobilizing capital Reliable peasantry Unreliable peasantry FIGURE 4.Predicted changes in economic constraints on the European great powers prior to World War I Britain,France,Germany-Tightening Constraints Ample evidence suggests that Britain,France,and Germany experienced increasing difficulty in mobilizing their locally abundant resources,labor and capital,prior to World War I.I turn first to labor.Unique among the European powers,Britain used voluntary enlistment to recruit military labor.Although Britain doubled the net pay of army recruits in the latter half of the nineteenth century,army wages lagged be- hind civilian wages,causing chronic shortages of recruits.Between 1910and 1913. Britain needed to recruit 34,000 new soldiers each year but managed to attract an 19.See Spiers 1980.54-55;and Skelley 1977.181-218
Britain, France, Germany—Tightening Constraints Ample evidence suggests that Britain, France, and Germany experienced increasing difficulty in mobilizing their locally abundant resources, labor and capital, prior to World War I. I turn rst to labor. Unique among the European powers, Britain used voluntary enlistment to recruit military labor. Although Britain doubled the net pay of army recruits in the latter half of the nineteenth century, army wages lagged behind civilian wages, causing chronic shortages of recruits.19 Between 1910 and 1913, Britain needed to recruit 34,000 new soldiers each year but managed to attract an 19. See Spiers 1980, 54–55; and Skelley 1977, 181–218. FIGURE 4. Predicted changes in economic constraints on the European great powers prior to World War I Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 203