《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of Foreign Investment）Competing for Capital. Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Competing for Capital:The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties,1960-2000 Zachary Elkins,Andrew T.Guzman, and Beth A.Simmons Abstract Over the past forty-five years,bilateral investment treaties (BITs)have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment.The proliferation of BITs during the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal.These intergovernmental treaties typ- ically grant extensive rights to foreign investors,including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute. How can we explain the widespread adoption of BITs?We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries-typically developing countries-for foreign direct investment.We propose a set of hypotheses that derive from such an explanation and develop a set of empirical tests that rely on network measures of economic competition as well as more indirect evidence of com- petitive pressures on the host to sign BITs.The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so.We find some evidence that coercion and learning play a role,but less support for cultural expla- nations based on emulation.Our main finding is that the diffusion of BITs is associ- ated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment.We are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development. The global market for productive capital is more integrated than ever before.The growth of foreign direct investment(FDI)is a clear example.According to World Bank data,gross FDI as a percentage of total world production increased seven- fold from 1.2 percent to 8.9 percent between 1970 and 2000.Though such invest- ments tend to be highly skewed across jurisdictions-developed countries account For useful comments on earlier drafts of this article,we thank Bill Bernhard,Bear Braumoeller, Frank Dobbin,Robert Franzese,Jeffry Frieden,Geoffrey Garrett,Tom Ginsburg,Jude Hays,Lisa Mar- tin,Bob Pahre,Mark Ramsayer,Steven Ratner,Susan Rose-Ackerman,and John Sides.For research assistance,we thank Elizabeth Burden.Raechel Groom,and Alexander Noonan. International Organization 60,Fall 2006,pp.811-846 2006 by The IO Foundation. D0L:10.1017/S0020818306060279

Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960 – 2000 Zachary Elkins, Andrew T+ Guzman, and Beth A+ Simmons Abstract Over the past forty-five years, bilateral investment treaties ~BITs! have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment+ The proliferation of BITs during the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal+ These intergovernmental treaties typ￾ically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute+ How can we explain the widespread adoption of BITs? We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries—typically developing countries—for foreign direct investment+ We propose a set of hypotheses that derive from such an explanation and develop a set of empirical tests that rely on network measures of economic competition as well as more indirect evidence of com￾petitive pressures on the host to sign BITs+ The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so+ We find some evidence that coercion and learning play a role, but less support for cultural expla￾nations based on emulation+ Our main finding is that the diffusion of BITs is associ￾ated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment+ We are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development+ The global market for productive capital is more integrated than ever before+ The growth of foreign direct investment ~FDI! is a clear example+ According to World Bank data, gross FDI as a percentage of total world production increased seven￾fold from 1+2 percent to 8+9 percent between 1970 and 2000+ Though such invest￾ments tend to be highly skewed across jurisdictions—developed countries account For useful comments on earlier drafts of this article, we thank Bill Bernhard, Bear Braumoeller, Frank Dobbin, Robert Franzese, Jeffry Frieden, Geoffrey Garrett, Tom Ginsburg, Jude Hays, Lisa Mar￾tin, Bob Pahre, Mark Ramsayer, Steven Ratner, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and John Sides+ For research assistance, we thank Elizabeth Burden, Raechel Groom, and Alexander Noonan+ International Organization 60, Fall 2006, pp+ 811–846 © 2006 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818306060279

812 International Organization for more than 93 percent of outflows and 68 percent of inflows-foreign capital has come to play a much more visible role in many more countries worldwide. It is widely recognized that economic globalization requires market-supporting institutions to flourish.But unlike trade and monetary relations,virtually no multi- lateral rules for FDI exist.?Direct investments in developing countries are over- whelmingly governed by bilateral investment treaties(BITs).BITs are agreements establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and com- panies of one country in the jurisdiction of another.Virtually all BITs cover four substantive areas:FDI admission,treatment,expropriation,and the settlement of disputes.These bilateral arrangements have proliferated over the past forty-five years,and especially in the past two decades,even as political controversies have plagued efforts to establish a multilateral regime for FDI. Why the profusion of bilateral agreements?The popularity of BITs contrasts sharply with the collective resistance developing countries have shown toward pro- investment principles under customary international law and the failure of the inter- national community to make progress on a multilateral investment agreement.3 On its face,this seems to suggest that BITs do not simply reflect the ready accep- tance of dominant international property rights norms.Our theory and findings support the competitive economic explanations described in the introduction to this symposium:the proliferation of BITs-and the liberal property rights regime they embody-is propelled in good part by the competition among potential host countries for credible property rights protections that direct investors require. The article is organized as follows.The first section describes the spread of BITs in some detail.The second section presents a model of competition for invest- ment that could lead to diffusion among competitors.The third section discusses the methods we use to test our propositions (and a range of alternatives),and the fourth section discusses our findings.Our data are consistent with competitive pres- sures for BIT proliferation:governments are influenced by competitors'policies and by the mobility of FDI in manufactures,which tends to intensify competition among hosts.We interpret our findings as evidence of pressure for certain govern- ments to adopt capital-friendly policies in highly competitive global capital markets. Securing Investors'Legal Rights From Customary Law to Bilateral Investment Treaties FDI has always been subject to contractual and political hazards that raise the expected costs of investing.5 Before the use of BITs,few mechanisms existed to 1.UNCTAD.FDI/TNC Database.Available at (http://www.unctad.org).Accessed 20 June 2006. 2.For a review of the relevant legal literature,see Dolzer 1981;Minor 1994;Sornarajah 1994;and Vagts 1987. 3.Guzman 1998. 4.Simmons,Dobbin,and Garrett,this volume. 5.Henisz 2000

for more than 93 percent of outflows and 68 percent of inflows1 —foreign capital has come to play a much more visible role in many more countries worldwide+ It is widely recognized that economic globalization requires market-supporting institutions to flourish+ But unlike trade and monetary relations, virtually no multi￾lateral rules for FDI exist+ 2 Direct investments in developing countries are over￾whelmingly governed by bilateral investment treaties ~BITs!+ BITs are agreements establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and com￾panies of one country in the jurisdiction of another+ Virtually all BITs cover four substantive areas: FDI admission, treatment, expropriation, and the settlement of disputes+ These bilateral arrangements have proliferated over the past forty-five years, and especially in the past two decades, even as political controversies have plagued efforts to establish a multilateral regime for FDI+ Why the profusion of bilateral agreements? The popularity of BITs contrasts sharply with the collective resistance developing countries have shown toward pro￾investment principles under customary international law and the failure of the inter￾national community to make progress on a multilateral investment agreement+ 3 On its face, this seems to suggest that BITs do not simply reflect the ready accep￾tance of dominant international property rights norms+ Our theory and findings support the competitive economic explanations described in the introduction to this symposium: 4 the proliferation of BITs—and the liberal property rights regime they embody—is propelled in good part by the competition among potential host countries for credible property rights protections that direct investors require+ The article is organized as follows+ The first section describes the spread of BITs in some detail+ The second section presents a model of competition for invest￾ment that could lead to diffusion among competitors+ The third section discusses the methods we use to test our propositions ~and a range of alternatives!, and the fourth section discusses our findings+ Our data are consistent with competitive pres￾sures for BIT proliferation: governments are influenced by competitors’ policies and by the mobility of FDI in manufactures, which tends to intensify competition among hosts+ We interpret our findings as evidence of pressure for certain govern￾ments to adopt capital-friendly policies in highly competitive global capital markets+ Securing Investors’ Legal Rights From Customary Law to Bilateral Investment Treaties FDI has always been subject to contractual and political hazards that raise the expected costs of investing+ 5 Before the use of BITs, few mechanisms existed to 1+ UNCTAD+ FDI0TNC Database+ Available at ^http:00www+unctad+org&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+ 2+ For a review of the relevant legal literature, see Dolzer 1981; Minor 1994; Sornarajah 1994; and Vagts 1987+ 3+ Guzman 1998+ 4+ Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, this volume+ 5+ Henisz 2000+ 812 International Organization

Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 813 make state promises about the treatment of foreign investment credible.Custom- ary international law,expressed succinctly in the "Hull Rule,"held that "no gov- ernment is entitled to expropriate private property,for whatever purpose,without provision for prompt,adequate,and effective payment therefore."7 Apart from the obvious problem of enforcement,this approach did not allow potential hosts to voluntarily signal their intent to contract in good faith. Both customary international law and its practice were under attack by developing country hosts by the 1950s.The nationalization of British oil assets by Iran in 1951, the expropriation of Liamco's concessions in Libya in 1955,and the nationaliza- tion of the Suez Canal by Egypt a year later served notice of a new militancy on the part of investment hosts.The nationalization of sugar interests by Cuba in the 1960s further undercut assumptions about the security of international investments.3 Mean- while,collective resistance to the Hull Rule in the United Nations was on the rise. In 1962,the UN General Assembly adopted the "Resolution on Permanent Sover- eignty over Natural Resources"that provided for merely "appropriate"compensa- tion in the event of expropriation.Several more UN resolutions followed in the 1970s,along with a string of undercompensated expropriations around the world.10 Bilateral treaties made their debut in the late 1950s,just as consensus on cus- tomary rules began to erode.BITs were innovative in a number of respects.They 6.For a discussion of the historical protection of foreign investment,see Lipson 1985 7.See Cordell Hull's note to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs during a 1938 dispute over land expropriations,reprinted in Green H.Hackworth,Digest of International Law v.3,228 (1942). The Rule itself predates Cordell Hull's statement,and various statements of it can be found in deci- sions from the early part of the twentieth century.See Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger.v. Pol.),1926-29 P.C.IL.(ser.A),Nos.7,9,17,19;and Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration (U.S.v.Nor.)1 Rep.Int'l Arb.Awards 307 (1922). 8.Guzman 1998. 9.These are discussed in Lipson 1985.In 1966 the General Assembly reaffirmed states'rights to nationalize resources without reference to international legal principles.In 1972,the UN General Assem- bly passed Resolution 3041(XXVII),which contained an endorsement of the Trade and Development Board's resolution 88(XII)of 19 October 1972,regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and claimed that compensation for natural resource nationalization cases was to be fixed by the nation- alizing state,with jurisdiction for such cases falling within the sole jurisdiction of the nationalizing country's courts.The 1973 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources(Resolution 3171)stated that in the event of nationalization "each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment."The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States [GA Res.3281(xxix),UN GAOR,29th Sess.,Supp.No.31,50]specified the right of each state"To nationalize,expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property,in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures,taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent,"with national courts taking jurisdiction in case of disputes [Art.2(c)]. 10.See Kobrin 1980. 11.Other mechanisms have been used to try to protect foreign investment,of course.One possibil- ity since 1988 is to apply for insurance through the World Bank's Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA).MIGA covers risks associated with transfer restriction,expropriation,breach of con- tract,and risks relating to war and civil disturbances.See (http://www.miga.org/).Accessed 20 June 2006.U.S.businesses can also insure against risks associated with currency inconvertibility,expropri- ation,and political violence by applying for investment insurance from the Overseas Private Invest- ment Corporation (OPIC),a U.S.government agency.See (http://www.opic.gov/Insurance/).Accessed 20June2006

make state promises about the treatment of foreign investment credible+ 6 Custom￾ary international law, expressed succinctly in the “Hull Rule,” held that “no gov￾ernment is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore+”7 Apart from the obvious problem of enforcement, this approach did not allow potential hosts to voluntarily signal their intent to contract in good faith+ Both customary international law and its practice were under attack by developing country hosts by the 1950s+ The nationalization of British oil assets by Iran in 1951, the expropriation of Liamco’s concessions in Libya in 1955, and the nationaliza￾tion of the Suez Canal by Egypt a year later served notice of a new militancy on the part of investment hosts+ The nationalization of sugar interests by Cuba in the 1960s further undercut assumptions about the security of international investments+ 8 Mean￾while, collective resistance to the Hull Rule in the United Nations was on the rise+ In 1962, the UN General Assembly adopted the “Resolution on Permanent Sover￾eignty over Natural Resources” that provided for merely “appropriate” compensa￾tion in the event of expropriation+ Several more UN resolutions followed in the 1970s, 9 along with a string of undercompensated expropriations around the world+ 10 Bilateral treaties made their debut in the late 1950s, just as consensus on cus￾tomary rules began to erode+ BITs were innovative in a number of respects+ 11 They 6+ For a discussion of the historical protection of foreign investment, see Lipson 1985+ 7+ See Cordell Hull’s note to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs during a 1938 dispute over land expropriations, reprinted in Green H+ Hackworth, Digest of International Law v+ 3, § 228 ~1942!+ The Rule itself predates Cordell Hull’s statement, and various statements of it can be found in deci￾sions from the early part of the twentieth century+ See Concerning the Factory at Chorzow ~Ger+ v+ Pol+!, 1926–29 P+C+I+L+ ~ser+ A!, Nos+ 7, 9, 17, 19; and Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration ~U+S+ v+ Nor+! 1 Rep+ Int’l Arb+ Awards 307 ~1922!+ 8+ Guzman 1998+ 9+ These are discussed in Lipson 1985+ In 1966 the General Assembly reaffirmed states’ rights to nationalize resources without reference to international legal principles+ In 1972, the UN General Assem￾bly passed Resolution 3041 ~XXVII!, which contained an endorsement of the Trade and Development Board’s resolution 88 ~XII! of 19 October 1972, regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and claimed that compensation for natural resource nationalization cases was to be fixed by the nation￾alizing state, with jurisdiction for such cases falling within the sole jurisdiction of the nationalizing country’s courts+ The 1973 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources ~Resolution 3171! stated that in the event of nationalization “each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment+” The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States @GA Res+ 3281~xxix!, UN GAOR, 29th Sess+, Supp+ No+ 31, 50# specified the right of each state “To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent,” with national courts taking jurisdiction in case of disputes @Art+ 2~c!#+ 10+ See Kobrin 1980+ 11+ Other mechanisms have been used to try to protect foreign investment, of course+ One possibil￾ity since 1988 is to apply for insurance through the World Bank’s Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency ~MIGA!+ MIGA covers risks associated with transfer restriction, expropriation, breach of con￾tract, and risks relating to war and civil disturbances+ See ^http:00www+miga+org0&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+ U+S+ businesses can also insure against risks associated with currency inconvertibility, expropri￾ation, and political violence by applying for investment insurance from the Overseas Private Invest￾ment Corporation ~OPIC!, a U+S+ government agency+ See ^http:00www+opic+gov0Insurance0&+ Accessed 20 June 2006+ Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 813

814 International Organization require an explicit commitment on the part of the potential host government and involve direct negotiations with the government of potential investors.In this way, BITs up the political ante for the host government and raise expectations of per- formance.The typical BIT offers a wider array of substantive protections than did the customary rule.For example,BITs typically require national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment of foreign investments in the host country,2 pro- tect contractual rights,3 guarantee the right to transfer profits in hard currency to the home country,and prohibit or restrict the use of performance requirements.14 Finally,and perhaps most importantly,BITs provide for international arbitration of disputes between the investor and the host country,5 typically through the Inter- national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)or the UN Com- mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Spread of BITs Despite the aggressive campaign waged by some developing countries against the relevant customary international law,BITs were embraced by many potential host governments.6 Figure 1 documents the geometric growth of both investment trea- ties and mean inflows of FDI as a percentage of GDP from 1960 to 2000.Early BITs typically involved a midsized European power and one of the least devel- oped countries,often in Africa(see Table 1).The negotiation of BITs proceeded at a moderate pace until the mid-1980s,rarely exceeding twenty new treaties per year.Late in the decade,however,the rate of signings accelerated dramatically, with an average of more than one hundred new treaties a year throughout the 1990s. The United States embraced BITs later than did its West European counterparts. Between 1962 and 1972,during which time West Germany entered into forty-six BITs and Switzerland entered into twenty-seven,the United States eschewed such treaties and signed only two Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaties-with Togo and Thailand.7 One reason for the delayed U.S.participation in bilateral arrangements may have been the hope of retaining a multilateral approach.The United States was one of the most aggressive proponents of the Hull Rule and 12.For example,the 1994 U.S.Prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty,Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce,U.S.Department of Commerce;Article 2(1),2(2)(a).For convenience, throughout this article we label the more developed partner in a BIT the "home"country (meaning the home of investors)and the less-developed partner the "host."The treaty obligations bind both parties, but in the vast majority of treaties there is a developed country that will be the source of most FDI and a developing country that will be the recipient. 13.For example,1994 U.S.Prototype BIT,Article I(d)(ii). 14.For example,ibid.,Article V(1-2). 15.For example,ibid.,Article IX. 16.It is interesting to note,however,that some of the most vociferous opponents of the Hull Rule were in fact latecomers to the BITs movement.As of the late 1990s,Mexico for example had signed only two BITs,with Spain and Switzerland.Brazil did not sign a BIT until 1994,and as of the late 1990s none of its 10 bilateral agreements had entered into force.India's pattern is similar to that of Brazil.See (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm).Accessed 10 December 2003. 17.Vandevelde 1988

require an explicit commitment on the part of the potential host government and involve direct negotiations with the government of potential investors+ In this way, BITs up the political ante for the host government and raise expectations of per￾formance+ The typical BIT offers a wider array of substantive protections than did the customary rule+ For example, BITs typically require national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment of foreign investments in the host country, 12 pro￾tect contractual rights, 13 guarantee the right to transfer profits in hard currency to the home country, and prohibit or restrict the use of performance requirements+ 14 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, BITs provide for international arbitration of disputes between the investor and the host country, 15 typically through the Inter￾national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ~ICSID! or the UN Com￾mission on International Trade Law ~UNCITRAL!+ The Spread of BITs Despite the aggressive campaign waged by some developing countries against the relevant customary international law, BITs were embraced by many potential host governments+ 16 Figure 1 documents the geometric growth of both investment trea￾ties and mean inflows of FDI as a percentage of GDP from 1960 to 2000+ Early BITs typically involved a midsized European power and one of the least devel￾oped countries, often in Africa ~see Table 1!+ The negotiation of BITs proceeded at a moderate pace until the mid-1980s, rarely exceeding twenty new treaties per year+ Late in the decade, however, the rate of signings accelerated dramatically, with an average of more than one hundred new treaties a year throughout the 1990s+ The United States embraced BITs later than did its West European counterparts+ Between 1962 and 1972, during which time West Germany entered into forty-six BITs and Switzerland entered into twenty-seven, the United States eschewed such treaties and signed only two Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaties—with Togo and Thailand+ 17 One reason for the delayed U+S+ participation in bilateral arrangements may have been the hope of retaining a multilateral approach+ The United States was one of the most aggressive proponents of the Hull Rule and 12+ For example, the 1994 U+S+ Prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty, Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U+S+ Department of Commerce; Article 2~1!, 2~2!~a!+ For convenience, throughout this article we label the more developed partner in a BIT the “home” country ~meaning the home of investors! and the less-developed partner the “host+” The treaty obligations bind both parties, but in the vast majority of treaties there is a developed country that will be the source of most FDI and a developing country that will be the recipient+ 13+ For example, 1994 U+S+ Prototype BIT, Article I~d!~ii!+ 14+ For example, ibid+, Article V~1-2!+ 15+ For example, ibid+, Article IX+ 16+ It is interesting to note, however, that some of the most vociferous opponents of the Hull Rule were in fact latecomers to the BITs movement+ As of the late 1990s, Mexico for example had signed only two BITs, with Spain and Switzerland+ Brazil did not sign a BIT until 1994, and as of the late 1990s none of its 10 bilateral agreements had entered into force+ India’s pattern is similar to that of Brazil+ See ^http:00www+worldbank+org0icsid0treaties0treaties+htm&+ Accessed 10 December 2003+ 17+ Vandevelde 1988+ 814 International Organization

Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 815 200 Number of treaties signed Average FDI Average 150- 6 100 inflows 50- GDP) 0- 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Year FIGURE 1.Number of bilateral investment treaties signed and mean global foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP,by year,1959-99 may have feared that BITs represented a threat to its claim that investment was already protected under customary international law.Moreover,potential hosts may have had incentives to resist the relatively onerous provisions the U.S.govern- ment typically tried to secure.One of the prime differences between the terms typically offered by the Europeans and the United States at this time was the former's emphasis on investment protection and the latter's additional insistence on liberalization.18 It was not until 1981 that the United States changed its view on BITs.There is evidence that some officials in the administration of U.S.President Ronald Reagan viewed BITs as an alternative way to protect the principles contained in the embat- tled Hull Rule.Secretary of State George Schultz argued that BITs were designed "to protect investment not only by treaty but also by reinforcing traditional inter- national legal principles and practice regarding foreign direct private invest- 18."Multilateral or Bilateral Investment Negotiations:Where Can Developing Countries Make Them- selves Heard"Briefing Paper No.9.Available at (http://cuts-international.org/9-2002.pdf).Accessed 12 July 2006.Some observers note that the insistence on liberalization explains the inability of the United States to secure agreements with East and Southeast Asian countries until quite recent years; see Reading 1992

may have feared that BITs represented a threat to its claim that investment was already protected under customary international law+ Moreover, potential hosts may have had incentives to resist the relatively onerous provisions the U+S+ govern￾ment typically tried to secure+ One of the prime differences between the terms typically offered by the Europeans and the United States at this time was the former’s emphasis on investment protection and the latter’s additional insistence on liberalization+ 18 It was not until 1981 that the United States changed its view on BITs+ There is evidence that some officials in the administration of U+S+ President Ronald Reagan viewed BITs as an alternative way to protect the principles contained in the embat￾tled Hull Rule+ Secretary of State George Schultz argued that BITs were designed “to protect investment not only by treaty but also by reinforcing traditional inter￾national legal principles and practice regarding foreign direct private invest- 18+ “Multilateral or Bilateral Investment Negotiations: Where Can Developing Countries Make Them￾selves Heard” Briefing Paper No+ 9+ Available at ^http:00cuts-international+org09-2002+pdf&+ Accessed 12 July 2006+ Some observers note that the insistence on liberalization explains the inability of the United States to secure agreements with East and Southeast Asian countries until quite recent years; see Reading 1992+ FIGURE 1. Number of bilateral investment treaties signed and mean global foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP, by year, 1959–99 Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 815