《社会工作伦理》课程重要文献（英文）：Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work

British Journal of Social Work(2010)40, 1794-1811 .dvance Access publication September 22 2009 Moral Sources and emergent ethical Theories in social work Mel Gray Mel gr Professor of Social Work at the University of Newcastle in New South wales, Australia and Research Professor in The Australian Institute for Social Inclusion and Wellbeing. Her recent works include Indigenous Social Work around the World: Towards culturally relevant education and practice jointly edited with John Coates and Michael Yellow ird(Ashgate 2008), Social Work Theories and Methods, co-edited with Stephen A. Webb (Sage 2008), Evidence-based Social Work: A critical stance with Debbie Plath and Stephen A Vebb(routledge, 2009), Ethics and Value Perspectives in Social Work, co-edited with Stephen A. Webb(Palgrave 2010), and Sage Intemational Social Work (four volumes) ca edited with Stephen A. Webb(Sage 2010) Correspondence to Mel Gray, Ph. D, Professor of Social Work, The Australian Institute for Social Inclusion and Wellbeing (TAIsIW), The University of Newcastle, University Drive Callaghan 2308, New South Wales, Australia. E-mail: Mel Gray @newcastle.edu. Abstract This paper examines the feminist ethics of care as an emergent ethical theory that casts ethical dispositions in a different way to the deontological focus on duties and rules and onsequentialist-utilitarian focus on minimising harm. It is closer to, though different from, virtue ethics with its focus on moral character. The paper highlights the philoso phical tensions within and between these disparate theories, suggesting nevertheless 5望9 that discussions about ethics are enriched by these diverse influences. Since it is not poss- ible within the scope of this paper to deal with all of these ethical theories in depth, fo lowing a brief overview of the more established theory of deontology, virtue ethics and the ethics of care are discussed. while the feminist ethics of care attempts to provide a more complete view of morality and ethics in social work, there are important philoso- phical problems with which social work needs to engage in order to discern whether it offers a better understanding of morality than existing approaches in social work ethics and whether it can address the complexities of the problems social workers deal with and the harsh practice environments in which they work where the 'practice of value is becoming ever more difficult and strong reasons to care must be found Keywords: Social work ethics, feminist ethical theory, virtue ethics, ethics of care dialogical ethics C The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of

Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work Mel Gray Mel Gray is Professor of Social Work at the University of Newcastle in New South Wales, Australia and Research Professor in The Australian Institute for Social Inclusion and Wellbeing. Her recent works include Indigenous Social Work around the World: Towards culturally relevant education and practice jointly edited with John Coates and Michael Yellow Bird (Ashgate 2008), Social Work Theories and Methods, co-edited with Stephen A. Webb (Sage 2008), Evidence-based Social Work: A critical stance with Debbie Plath and Stephen A. Webb (Routledge, 2009), Ethics and Value Perspectives in Social Work, co-edited with Stephen A. Webb (Palgrave 2010), and Sage International Social Work (four volumes) co￾edited with Stephen A. Webb (Sage 2010). Correspondence to Mel Gray, Ph.D., Professor of Social Work, The Australian Institute for Social Inclusion and Wellbeing (TAISIW), The University of Newcastle, University Drive, Callaghan 2308, New South Wales, Australia. E-mail: Mel.Gray@newcastle.edu.au Abstract This paper examines the feminist ethics of care as an emergent ethical theory that casts ethical dispositions in a different way to the deontological focus on duties and rules and consequentialist–utilitarian focus on minimising harm. It is closer to, though different from, virtue ethics with its focus on moral character. The paper highlights the philoso￾phical tensions within and between these disparate theories, suggesting nevertheless that discussions about ethics are enriched by these diverse influences. Since it is not poss￾ible within the scope of this paper to deal with all of these ethical theories in depth, fol￾lowing a brief overview of the more established theory of deontology, virtue ethics and the ethics of care are discussed. While the feminist ethics of care attempts to provide a more complete view of morality and ethics in social work, there are important philoso￾phical problems with which social work needs to engage in order to discern whether it offers a better understanding of morality than existing approaches in social work ethics and whether it can address the complexities of the problems social workers deal with and the harsh practice environments in which they work where the ‘practice of value’ is becoming ever more difficult and strong reasons to care must be found. Keywords: Social work ethics, feminist ethical theory, virtue ethics, ethics of care, dialogical ethics # The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Association of Social Workers. All rights reserved. British Journal of Social Work (2010) 40, 1794–1811 doi:10.1093/bjsw/bcp104 Advance Access publication September 22, 2009 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from

Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1795 Introduction There has been an ongoing plea for social workers to have some grounding in moral philosophy, even though social work education has tended to steer way from this course. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was an emphasis on he importance of moral philosophy for social work education and practice (Ragg, 1977; Timms and Watson, 1978; Wilkes, 1981; Siporin, 1982, 1983, 1992: Timms, 1983; Clark with Asquith, 1985; Rhodes, 1986; Goldstein, 987). Goldstein(1987) referred to'the careful and sensitive regard for the moral and spiritual convictions of the client'(Goldstein, 1987, P. 182)as he 'neglected moral link in social work practice and went so far so as to say that all social work encounters have a moral component in that they concern and affect the welfare of others. He and Siporin(1982, 1983, 1992) ranged widely in their writing on ethics and its relationship to moral, political and religious philosophy, as did the work of Reamer (1995, 1998a, 1998b 1999), though he focused on ethical decision making, having developed his ethics audit in social work(Reamer, 2001). More recently, Houston(2003) observed that 'For far too long moral philosophy has not received the atten tion it rightly deserves by the social work academe and when learned sub- missions are made, they inevitably focus on the long standing, internecine ar between the Utilitarians and Deontologists'(Houston, 2003, p 819) However, the principles-based approach of deontology has worked along- side teleological-consequentialist and utilitarian -approaches as social their duty and following their values, principles and codesa workers have sought to maximise the good and minimise harm while doing Deontology's continuing value 9569 Kantian deontological ethics is a principle-based ethics wherein reason is central. Reasons motivate or predispose action. Kants ethical theory is grounded in the respect owed to individuals because they are rational moral agents. Reasons are seen as more reliable when making moral judge ments than emotions. This is not to say that Kant overlooks the importance of emotions, merely that they do not give the moral agent reason for action Moral motives are attached to moral principles that lead people to do the right thing. As Herman(1993) points out in her excellent book or Kantian ethics. Kantian motives are not non-moral incentives. such as desires, causes, practical interests or consequences, but reasons. While such incentives might be present, they are not the reasons or motives for acting. In other words, when a social worker respects the client, she does this because it is the right thing to do in terms of her professional values and code of ethics. Likewise, with the rule or principle of confidentiality the social worker's duty to the client provides the motive to act as this

Introduction There has been an ongoing plea for social workers to have some grounding in moral philosophy, even though social work education has tended to steer away from this course. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was an emphasis on the importance of moral philosophy for social work education and practice (Ragg, 1977; Timms and Watson, 1978; Wilkes, 1981; Siporin, 1982, 1983, 1992; Timms, 1983; Clark with Asquith, 1985; Rhodes, 1986; Goldstein, 1987). Goldstein (1987) referred to ‘the careful and sensitive regard for the moral and spiritual convictions of the client’ (Goldstein, 1987, p. 182) as the ‘neglected moral link’ in social work practice and went so far so as to say that all social work encounters have a moral component in that they concern and affect the welfare of others. He and Siporin (1982, 1983, 1992) ranged widely in their writing on ethics and its relationship to moral, political and religious philosophy, as did the work of Reamer (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), though he focused on ethical decision making, having developed his ethics audit in social work (Reamer, 2001). More recently, Houston (2003) observed that ‘For far too long moral philosophy has not received the atten￾tion it rightly deserves by the social work academe and when learned sub￾missions are made, they inevitably focus on the long standing, internecine war between the Utilitarians and Deontologists’ (Houston, 2003, p. 819). However, the principles-based approach of deontology has worked along￾side teleological—consequentialist and utilitarian—approaches as social workers have sought to maximise the good and minimise harm while doing their duty and following their values, principles and codes. Deontology’s continuing value Kantian deontological ethics is a principle-based ethics wherein reason is central. Reasons motivate or predispose action. Kant’s ethical theory is grounded in the respect owed to individuals because they are rational moral agents. Reasons are seen as more reliable when making moral judge￾ments than emotions. This is not to say that Kant overlooks the importance of emotions, merely that they do not give the moral agent reason for action. Moral motives are attached to moral principles that lead people to do the right thing. As Herman (1993) points out in her excellent book on Kantian ethics, Kantian motives are not non-moral incentives, such as desires, causes, practical interests or consequences, but reasons. While such incentives might be present, they are not the reasons or motives for acting. In other words, when a social worker respects the client, she does this because it is the right thing to do in terms of her professional values and code of ethics. Likewise, with the rule or principle of confidentiality, the social worker’s duty to the client provides the motive to act as this Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1795 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from

1796 Me/ Gray rule requires. The object of the action is to keep the client's confidence: her motive-reason-to maintain confidentiality accords with the rule that requires her to do so. Hence, this form of ethics is primarily concerned with finding objective moral rules and principles that apply to all people everywhere. Kant's principle of respect for persons, as an end in itself, tied to his view of individuals as rational beings with autonomy and the capacity to exercise choice(Gray and Stofberg, 2000). It is this condition of human agency that sets the object of moral requirement in place and places limitations on our actions. It is precisely this view of the individual that social work adopts. It leads to attention being paid to responsibility as the flipside of duty or obligation and to ethical decision making as a rational activity. Much attention is then focused on devising codes of ethics and ethical decision-making frameworks to guide ethical practice (e.g. Congress, 1999: Mattison, 2000; Robinson and Reeser, 2000; McAu- liffe and Chenoweth, 2008; Dolgoff et aL., 2009). Importantly, however what lies behind this is what Goldstein(1987) was at pains to emphasise and that is social workers' commitment to and seriousness about morality Once they understand the moral motivation behind what they do, they will appreciate the importance of following the rules and ethical codes of their ofession and exercise their freedom or autonomy to do s Deontological approaches create a logic whereby professionals are dut bound to follow their ethical code and where ethical practice without uiding principles is inconceivable. This allows for rational deliberation that comes into play when our routine moral judgements fail us, such as in cases of conflict or uncertainty. While there is no denying the importance of prin- ciples when difficult ethical decisions have to be made, the possibility exists that other factors are equally important. Hence, a new literature is emerging that offers more diverse approaches and appeals for social workers to have a deep understanding of morality and the ethical implications of their work(e.g Clark, 2000, 2006: Houston, 2003: Meagher and Parton, 2004: Hugman, 2005: 5望9 Banks, 2006, 2008: Bowles et al, 2006; Gray and Lovat, 2006, 2007: Lovat and Gray, 2008: Gray and Webb, 2008, 2009). In the harsh, risk-aversive, manage- rial environments of contemporary practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain an ethical perspective. There is an'anti-ethical tendency in the translation of principles into codes used to regulate practitioner behaviour, since they force practitioners into a narrowly prescriptive approach with little space for professional autonomy(Meagher and Parton, 2004; Orme and Rennie, 2006). In such an environment, the practice of value,, as Webb 2006)calls it, is much more difficult than social workers realise. This lowever, should not undermine the importance of principles and codes. It is mportant in the teaching of ethics to emphasise their usefulness despite the difficulties involved and challenges from several quarters: from researchers ith evidence that social workers do not use ethical codes in practice(McAu- fe, 1999; Rossiter et aL., 2000: Banks, 2008), postmodernists who point to ethical ambiguity and uncertainty(Dean and Rhodes, 1998; Parton, 2003;

rule requires. The object of the action is to keep the client’s confidence: her motive—reason—to maintain confidentiality accords with the rule that requires her to do so. Hence, this form of ethics is primarily concerned with finding objective moral rules and principles that apply to all people everywhere. Kant’s principle of respect for persons, as an end in itself, is tied to his view of individuals as rational beings with autonomy and the capacity to exercise choice (Gray and Stofberg, 2000). It is this condition of human agency that sets the object of moral requirement in place and places limitations on our actions. It is precisely this view of the individual that social work adopts. It leads to attention being paid to responsibility as the flipside of duty or obligation and to ethical decision making as a rational activity. Much attention is then focused on devising codes of ethics and ethical decision-making frameworks to guide ethical practice (e.g. Congress, 1999; Mattison, 2000; Robinson and Reeser, 2000; McAu￾liffe and Chenoweth, 2008; Dolgoff et al., 20091 ). Importantly, however, what lies behind this is what Goldstein (1987) was at pains to emphasise and that is social workers’ commitment to and seriousness about morality. Once they understand the moral motivation behind what they do, they will appreciate the importance of following the rules and ethical codes of their profession and exercise their freedom or autonomy to do so. Deontological approaches create a logic whereby professionals are duty￾bound to follow their ethical code and where ethical practice without guiding principles is inconceivable. This allows for rational deliberation that comes into play when our routine moral judgements fail us, such as in cases of conflict or uncertainty. While there is no denying the importance of prin￾ciples when difficult ethical decisions have to be made, the possibility exists that other factors are equally important. Hence, a new literature is emerging that offers more diverse approaches and appeals for social workers to have a deep understanding of morality and the ethical implications of their work (e.g. Clark, 2000, 2006; Houston, 2003; Meagher and Parton, 2004; Hugman, 2005; Banks, 2006, 2008; Bowles et al., 2006; Gray and Lovat, 2006, 2007; Lovat and Gray, 2008; Gray and Webb, 2008, 2009). In the harsh, risk-aversive, manage￾rial environments of contemporary practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain an ethical perspective. There is an ‘anti-ethical’ tendency in the translation of principles into codes used to regulate practitioner behaviour, since they force practitioners into a narrowly prescriptive approach with little space for professional autonomy (Meagher and Parton, 2004; Orme and Rennie, 2006). In such an environment, the ‘practice of value’, as Webb (2006) calls it, is much more difficult than social workers realise. This, however, should not undermine the importance of principles and codes. It is important in the teaching of ethics to emphasise their usefulness despite the difficulties involved and challenges from several quarters: from researchers with evidence that social workers do not use ethical codes in practice (McAu￾liffe, 1999; Rossiter et al., 2000; Banks, 2008), postmodernists who point to ethical ambiguity and uncertainty (Dean and Rhodes, 1998; Parton, 2003; 1796 Mel Gray at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from

Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1797 Rossiter, 2006)and feminists who question the gender neutrality of male dominated ethics(see below). For feminists and postmodernists, the universal or transcendent principles of a reason-based morality are deeply problematic Not only do they not take the differences between men and women into account, but they also disregard the importance of emotions, care, responsibil y, relationships and so on. Feminists wanting to avoid the difference route found the answer in virtue ethics, while those drawn to Gilligans(1982) work gravitated towards an ethics of care approach, as we shall see below Feminist-influenced ethical theories Virtue ethics For feminists. Virtue theory insists that it is misguided to expect reason to be able to estab lish some infallible moral doctrine which is compulsory and often counter to human nature and emotions. Perhaps morality is not about conforming to ales, but more about being trained to see problematic situations in a moral way. Morality may not be the rational control of the emotions but, more appropriately, the cultivation of desirable emotions(Phoca and Wright,1999,p.123) Phoca and Wright(1999)capture here the feminist critique of reason and rationality as the cornerstone of ethical behaviour. Feminists regard this approach as reductive in its presumptions about the overriding importance of duties and obligations, and rules and principles in moral behaviour. This implies that social workers keep clients'confidence, for example, merely because it is their duty to do so. For feminists, there is much more to mor ality than this. We keep confidentiality because we care about our clients There is something intrinsic to our relationships with clients centred on mutuality and trust. We behave in a trustworthy manner because we care 9 There is a give and take in the relationship that has nothing to do with con sciously and rationally applying rules and principles. Levinas(1998)and Bauman(1993) refer to it as the call of the other-a responsibility we feel not out of duty or obligation, but out of compassion and caring deeply. For some feminists, this something intrinsic'arises from a moral disposition, an innate tendency, something inherently human, that gets reinforced in the give and take of our relationships with others. Relation- ships are thus central to feminist thinking about ethics. As an aside, Herman(1993)argues that contrary to feminist ethicists'claims, Kantian moral theory can accommodate relationships. It is precisely the deliberative intersubjective aspects of Kants moral theory that Habermas develops his discourse ethics if one were to see the ethics of care in kantia erms, one would acknowledge that the fulfilment of human needs, includ ing the need for care, is necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being and

Rossiter, 2006) and feminists who question the gender neutrality of male￾dominated ethics (see below). For feminists and postmodernists, the universal or transcendent principles of a reason-based morality are deeply problematic. Not only do they not take the differences between men and women into account, but they also disregard the importance of emotions, care, responsibil￾ity, relationships and so on. Feminists wanting to avoid the difference route found the answer in virtue ethics, while those drawn to Gilligan’s (1982) work gravitated towards an ethics of care approach, as we shall see below. Feminist-influenced ethical theories Virtue ethics For feminists: Virtue theory insists that it is misguided to expect reason to be able to estab￾lish some infallible moral doctrine which is compulsory and often counter to human nature and emotions. Perhaps morality is not about conforming to rules, but more about being trained to see problematic situations in a moral way. Morality may not be the rational control of the emotions but, more appropriately, the cultivation of desirable emotions (Phoca and Wright, 1999, p. 123). Phoca and Wright (1999) capture here the feminist critique of reason and rationality as the cornerstone of ethical behaviour. Feminists regard this approach as reductive in its presumptions about the overriding importance of duties and obligations, and rules and principles in moral behaviour. This implies that social workers keep clients’ confidence, for example, merely because it is their duty to do so. For feminists, there is much more to mor￾ality than this. We keep confidentiality because we care about our clients. There is something intrinsic to our relationships with clients centred on mutuality and trust. We behave in a trustworthy manner because we care. There is a give and take in the relationship that has nothing to do with con￾sciously and rationally applying rules and principles. Le´vinas (1998) and Bauman (1993) refer to it as the call of the other—a responsibility we feel not out of duty or obligation, but out of compassion and caring deeply. For some feminists, this ‘something intrinsic’ arises from a moral disposition, an innate tendency, something inherently human, that gets reinforced in the give and take of our relationships with others. Relation￾ships are thus central to feminist thinking about ethics. As an aside, Herman (1993) argues that contrary to feminist ethicists’ claims, Kantian moral theory can accommodate relationships. It is precisely the deliberative intersubjective aspects of Kant’s moral theory that Habermas develops in his discourse ethics. If one were to see the ethics of care in Kantian terms, one would acknowledge that the fulfilment of human needs, includ￾ing the need for care, is necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being and Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1797 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from

1798 Me/ Gray that the rule in operation is one of beneficence. In terms of Kant's theory everyone's needs count because their fulfilment is an end that cannot be Unlike Kant's reasons as motives for virtue ethicists our innate ten dencies propel us to follow the virtues and thus find the 'moral way, as Phoca and Wright (1999)put it above. Murdoch(1970)emphasises the intrinsic nature of morality: it is good to be good merely because it is good to be good. We need no other reason than this-no universal prin- ciples or determining consequences. What we see evolving here is the casting of ethical dispositions and actions in a very different way to the deontological focus on duties, obligations and rules. Intrinsic virtues or traits of character and particular moral attitudes and dispositions can, according ng to feminist virtue ethicists, never ensue from simple rule following or the mechanical application of principles. They can, however, develop through training, experience and practice, that is through processes which teach that following the virtues produces good outcomes. However, it is not good outcomes that make actors moral, but their motivations and dis- itions. Hence, morality under virtue ethics has a motivational force that propels people to take action but, as McBeath and Webb(2002) put it, the individuals'moral character is the 'stable reference point, not the action (McBeath and Webb, 2002, p. 1026; see also Clark, 2006). They describe virtues as 'generalizable capacities of self(McBeath and Webb, 2002 1026). It is easy to see how this resonates for social workers who have long seen'use of self as pivotal to helping relationships(England, 1986) While within social work. some writers have linked virtue ethics to the ethics of care, they are, in fact, different. As Held(2006)notes, while care might bear some resemblance to virtue ethics, it is not reducible to dis ositions within a particular individual, since, by its very nature, care is oriented towards relationships that extend beyond individuals. Further- more, feminist virtue ethicists sought to distance themselves from'differ T95≌9 ence'feminism, which gave rise to the ethics of care, by seeing the virtues as distinctly human capacities. Both men and women are capable of ing and nurturing. Nevertheless, many care ethicists view moral sensi tivity towards, feelings of compassion for and the desire to care for others as the result of moral character, believing that it is one's virtuous attitude that to be se thers needs and not logic and rational argument alone(Gray and Lovat, 2007). In this vein, Tronto(1993)sees 'an ethic of care as. a set of moral sensibilities, issues and practices that arise from taking riously the fact that care is a central aspect of human existence.a pecies activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our world'so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web (Tronto, 1993

that the rule in operation is one of beneficence. In terms of Kant’s theory, everyone’s needs count because their fulfilment is an end that cannot be ignored. Unlike Kant’s reasons as motives, for virtue ethicists, our innate ten￾dencies propel us to follow the virtues and thus find the ‘moral way’, as Phoca and Wright (1999) put it above. Murdoch (1970) emphasises the intrinsic nature of morality: it is good to be good merely because it is good to be good. We need no other reason than this—no universal prin￾ciples or determining consequences. What we see evolving here is the casting of ethical dispositions and actions in a very different way to the deontological focus on duties, obligations and rules. Intrinsic virtues or traits of character and particular moral attitudes and dispositions can, according to feminist virtue ethicists, never ensue from simple rule￾following or the mechanical application of principles. They can, however, develop through training, experience and practice, that is through processes which teach that following the virtues produces good outcomes. However, it is not good outcomes that make actors moral, but their motivations and dis￾positions. Hence, morality under virtue ethics has a motivational force that propels people to take action but, as McBeath and Webb (2002) put it, the individuals’ moral character is the ‘stable reference point, not the action’ (McBeath and Webb, 2002, p. 1026; see also Clark, 2006). They describe virtues as ‘generalizable capacities of self’ (McBeath and Webb, 2002, p. 1026). It is easy to see how this resonates for social workers who have long seen ‘use of self’ as pivotal to helping relationships (England, 1986). While within social work, some writers have linked virtue ethics to the ethics of care, they are, in fact, different. As Held (2006) notes, while care might bear some resemblance to virtue ethics, it is not reducible to dis￾positions within a particular individual, since, by its very nature, care is oriented towards relationships that extend beyond individuals. Further￾more, feminist virtue ethicists sought to distance themselves from ‘differ￾ence’ feminism, which gave rise to the ethics of care, by seeing the virtues as distinctly human capacities. Both men and women are capable of caring and nurturing. Nevertheless, many care ethicists view moral sensi￾tivity towards, feelings of compassion for and the desire to care for others as the result of moral character, believing that it is one’s virtuous attitude that causes one to be sensitive to others’ needs, and not logic and rational argument alone (Gray and Lovat, 2007). In this vein, Tronto (1993) sees ‘an ethic of care’ as: ... a set of moral sensibilities, issues and practices that arise from taking seriously the fact that care is a central aspect of human existence ... a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web (Tronto, 1993, p. 103). 1798 Mel Gray at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from