《社会工作伦理》课程重要文献（英文）：Ethics with Character：Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker.pdf

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare It is about making the right decision and doing the right thing The NasW Code of Ethics, like the deontological codes(or codes of duty)of other professions, is an important tool for identify ing social work's core values, summarizing broad principles, and establishing specific ethical standards to guide practice These are standards to which NASW expects the general public to hold the profession accountable and to which, in principle, it holds its own members accountable--helping profession als identify and resolve ethical dilemmas, and socializing new practitioners(NASW, 1999) So much is this approach to professional ethics taken for granted that it is easy to overlook how different it is from the traditional understanding of ethics, no less in the classical and Christian West from Aristotle to Aquinas than in the east in he other main religions and ethical traditions of the world (Peterson Seligman, 2004). In that older view, ethics is fun damentally about happiness rather than obligation, and about character and the virtues rather than about resolving moral dilemmas(MacIntyre, 2006; Pinckaers, 1995). This is as true for applied professional ethics, such as those of Hippocrates in medicine, as of general philosophical ethics(Pellegrino Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008) This article draws on classical, medieval, and contempo- rary virtue-oriented ethics to address those habits of heart and mind(Tocqueville, 2000)critical for ethical practice. It analy- es the potential of what has come to be called virtue ethics, and in particular the classical Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of ethics(Aristotle, 2002; Aquinas, 1981, 2005)as developed by MacIntyre (1984, 1990)and other contemporary nec Aristotelian or virtue-ethicists( Crisp Slote, 1997; Darway 2003), to guide our understanding of the social work profession and the dispositions that its practice requires and develops Ethics' Loss of Character After the death of Aquinas in 1274, both philosophical ethics and moral theology underwent a fundamental shift away from character, virtues, and habits of the heart to a na rower focus on the rightness or wrongness of specific actions (Pinckaers, 1995). The result in modern professional as well

84 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare It is about making the right decision and doing the right thing. The NASWCode of Ethics, like the deontological codes (or codes of duty) of other professions, is an important tool for identifying social work's core values, summarizing broad principles, and establishing specific ethical standards to guide practice. These are standards to which NASW expects the general public to hold the profession accountable and to which, in principle, it holds its own members accountable—helping professionals identify and resolve ethical dilemmas, and socializing new practitioners (NASW, 1999). So much is this approach to professional ethics taken for granted that it is easy to overlook how different it is from the traditional understanding of ethics, no less in the classical and Christian West from Aristotle to Aquinas than in the East in the other main religions and ethical traditions of the world (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In that older view, ethics is fundamentally about happiness rather than obligation, and about character and the virtues rather than about resolving moral dilemmas (Maclntyre, 2006; Pinckaers, 1995). This is as true for applied professional ethics, such as those of Hippocrates in medicine, as of general philosophical ethics (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008). This article draws on classical, medieval, and contemporary virtue-oriented ethics to address those habits of heart and mind (Tocqueville, 2000) critical for ethical practice. It analyses the potential of what has come to be called virtue ethics, and in particular the classical Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of ethics (Aristotle, 2002; Aquinas, 1981, 2005) as developed by Maclntyre (1984, 1990) and other contemporary neoAristotelian or virtue-ethicists (Crisp & Slote, 1997; Darwall, 2003), to guide our understanding of the social work profession and the dispositions that its practice requires and develops. Ethics' Loss of Character After the death of Aquinas in 1274, both philosophical ethics and moral theology underwent a fundamental shift away from character, virtues, and habits of the heart to a narrower focus on the rightness or wrongness of specific actions (Pinckaers, 1995). The result in modern professional as well

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker as general ethics, descending from Kant(1724-1804)and to a lesser extent Mill( 1806-1873), is that ethical decision-making activity tends to be abstracted from the life, developmen and character of the decision-maker. The older tradition and modern virtue ethics, in contrast, conceive a human life as a history in which each choice we make disposes us to make similar choices in the future so that ethical conduct becomes a matter of dispositions or character-virtues and vices acquired by practice and lost by. disuse--rather than of episodic, purely rational choices The weakness of abstracting ethics as a decision-making activity from moral development and the character of the agent making the decision is sometimes recognized( Cohen Cohen 1998; Freeman, 2000; McBeath Webb, 2002)or implied in the professional literature. Corey, Corey, and Callanan(2003), for example, assert that, " Ethical conduct grows out of sound character that leads you to respond with maturity, judgment, discretion, wisdom, and prudence"(p. 11). That is, it requires the master virtue of phronesis(prudentia), which all those terms denote. The Council on Social Work Educations(CSWE)2001 Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards(epas)required as its second foundation program objective that graduates un derstand the professions values, standards, and principles, and that they practice accordingly; but the relation between understanding and practice is not specified. The link between understanding and action-that is, the character and virtues of the practitioner that are needed reliably to translate one into the other-is missing The psychoanalytic concept "professional use of self directed attention to qualities of the practitioner in linking knowledge and skills to practice. It was a required program objective for student learning under the previous accreditation standards. EPAS(CSWE, 2001), however, dropped this objec tive, presumably because there was no longer a shared unde standing of what it meant or how to achieve it. No comparable focus on the practitioner has replaced it

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 85 as general ethics, descending from Kant (1724-1804) and to a lesser extent Mill (1806-1873), is that ethical decision-making activity tends to be abstracted from the life, development, and character of the decision-maker. The older tradition and modem virtue ethics, in contrast, conceive a human life as a history in which each choice we make disposes us to make similar choices in the future, so that ethical conduct becomes a matter of dispositions or character—virtues and vices acquired by practice and lost by disuse—rather than of episodic, purely rational choices. The weakness of abstracting ethics as a decision-making activity from moral development and the character of the agent making the decision is sometimes recognized (Gohen & Gohen, 1998; Freeman, 2000; McBeath & Webb, 2002) or implied in the professional literature. Gorey, Gorey, and Gallanan (2003), for example, assert that, "Ethical conduct grows out of sound character that leads you to respond with maturity, judgment, discretion, wisdom, and prudence" (p. 11). That is, it requires the master virtue of phronesis (prudentia), which all those terms denote. The Gouncil on Social Work Education's (GSWE) 2001 Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards (EPAS) required as its second foundation program objective that graduates understand the profession's values, standards, and principles, and that they practice accordingly; but the relation between understanding and practice is not specified. The link between understanding and action—that is, the character and virtues of the practitioner that are needed reliably to translate one into the other—is missing. The psychoanalytic concept "professional use of self" directed attention to qualities of the practitioner in linking knowledge and skills to practice. It was a required program objective for student learning under the previous accreditation standards. EPAS (GSWE, 2001), however, dropped this objective, presumably because there was no longer a shared understanding of what it meant or how to achieve it. No comparable focus on the practitioner has replaced it

Journal of Sociology Social Welfare Limitations of Decision Procedures ahighlyinfluentialarticleon"Modern Moral Philosophy, Anscombe(1958)argued that the "law conception of ethics was focused overwhelmingly on obligation and duty, drawin on abstract, universally applicable principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative or Mill,s Greatest Happiness principle, to serve as a test for maxims. The result of both Kant's deontol- ogy(or duty-based ethics)and Mills utilitarianism is an un- helpfully inflexible moral code and, in Kant's case, a concept of law and obligation that was meaningless in the absence of an authoritative lawgiver. The force of those moral"musts"and shoulds"of deontology were unexplained and lacked theoret ical justification. At the same time, Kupperman( 1991)argues, the resulting emphasis on decision procedures is indeterminate in the results it yields. For example, does Kant's deontology universally rule out suicide, lying, or theft? Utilitarianism, in its reliance on the maximization of happiness--understood as pleasure--to judge an action or rule of action, seems to make it possible to justify the most monstrous acts, such as torture of detainees or murder of children, if one reasonably calculates that the expected consequence of not doing those acts is likely to be worse(Anscombe, 1958) With their focus on making decisions about how to act y applying universal principles, decision trees typically (though not always) neglect the decision-maker and the de- cision-maker's character, culture, history, and all that shapes the person who is to make the decision, as well as how the particular decision relates to other decisions in the individuals life(see, for example, the discussion of guidelines for ethical decision making in social work in Dolgoff, Loewenberg,& Harrington, 2008). It is as if each of us were a computer with a rogram for deciding moral questions(Kupperman, 1991).But determining what inputs from the environment are relevant or salient as an ethical decision-maker must do, is not a neutral task. How practitioners assess an ethically problematic social situation depends, in Kupperman's terms, on their moral sen- sitivity, training, and experience-in short, on their character Traits of character not only suit us for life, " but shape our vision of life, helping to determine not only who we are but what

86 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Limitations of Decision Procedures In a highly influential article on "Modern Moral Philosophy, " Anscombe (1958) argued that the "law conception of ethics" was focused overwhelmingly on obligation and duty, drawing on abstract, universally applicable principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative or Mill's Greatest Happiness principle, to serve as a test for maxims. The result of both Kant's deontology (or duty-based ethics) and Mill's utilitarianism is an imhelpfuUy inflexible moral code and, in Kant's case, a concept of law and obligation that was meaningless in the absence of an authoritative lawgiver. The force of those moral "musts" and "shoulds" of deontology were unexplained and lacked theoretical justification. At the same time, Kupperman (1991) argues, the resulting emphasis on decision procedures is indeterminate in the results it yields. For example, does Kant's deontology universally rule out suicide, lying, or theft? Utilitarianism, in its reliance on the maximization of happiness—understood as pleasure—to judge an action or rule of action, seems to make it possible to justify the most monstrous acts, such as torture of detainees or murder of children, if one reasonably calculates that the expected consequence of not doing those acts is likely to be worse (Anscombe, 1958). With their focus on making decisions about how to act by applying universal principles, decision trees typically (though not always) neglect the decision-maker and the decision-maker's character, culture, history, and all that shapes the person who is to make the decision, as well as how the particular decision relates to other decisions in the individual's life (see, for example, the discussion of guidelines for ethical decision making in social work in Dolgoff, Loewenberg, & Harrington, 2008). It is as if each of us were a computer with a program for deciding moral questions (Kupperman, 1991). But determining what inputs from the environment are relevant or salient, as an ethical decision-maker must do, is not a neutral task. How practitioners assess an ethically problematic social situation depends, in Kupperman's terms, on their moral sensitivity, training, and experience—in short, on their character. Traits of character not only suit us for life, "but shape our vision of life, helping to determine not only who we are but what

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker world we see, "as Meilaender (1984, p. 11)puts it. The ability to apply a decision procedure, as Aristotle(2002)warned in different terms, thus presupposes moral education and experi- ence. It requires, in particular, the virtue of prudence or prac ical wisdom (phronesis), which develops only with maturity and cannot be acquired at one's mother's knee or by a clever fifteen-year-old The decision-procedure approach to professional ethics orients the teaching of values and ethics to the identification of quandaries or"ethical issues, "and to applying consistent, rational decision procedures to their resolution. It addresses itself, then, to individual decisions, without attention to pattern and continuity of character, or to the stable dispositions of the actor that make for virtuous professional conduct as a matter of conscious habit and will, whether or not a particular ethical quandary or dilemma is involved Virtue ethics Considerations like these led to a revival over the last half- century of the classical tradition of ethics that extends in the West from the Greek world of Aristotle to the high Middle Ages of Aquinas. This tradition understands ethics as about ethos(a Greek word for habit leaning toward the sense of char- acter)and the virtues that are necessar for flourishing and well-being or happiness(eudaimonia) of individuals and com munities. Virtues in this context are stable and firm disposi- tions to do the good, to act, for example, with practical judg ment or wisdom (prudence, phronesis), courage(fortitude), moderation(temperance), and justice. These are the cardinal or"hinge"virtues shared by ancient Greeks and Romans and integrated into the Christian ethical tradition as part of a list that added the grace-dependent or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. They are habits of the heart and mind. a virtue in this sense is a character trait--that is, a disposition that in volves the will and is part of the stable core of the human being in question, as distinct from an automatic habit like fastening one s seat belt in a car However, such a disposition, like courage or wisdom, is not an isolated or single(even conscious or rational)tendency

Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 87 world we see," as Meilaender (1984, p. 11) puts it. The ability to apply a decision procedure, as Aristotle (2002) warned in different terms, thus presupposes moral education and experience. It requires, in particular, the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom {phronesis), which develops orily with maturity and carmot be acquired at one's mother's knee or by a clever fifteen-year-old. The decision-procedure approach to professional ethics orients the teaching of values and ethics to the identification of quandaries or "ethical issues," and to applying consistent, rational decision procedures to their resolution. It addresses itself, then, to individual decisions, without attention to pattern and continuity of character, or to the stable dispositions of the actor that make for virtuous professional conduct as a matter of conscious habit and will, whether or not a particular ethical quandary or dilemma is involved. Virtue Ethics Considerations like these led to a revival over the last halfcentury of the classical tradition of ethics that extends in the West from the Greek world of Aristotle to the high Middle Ages of Aquinas. This tradition understands ethics as about ethos (a Greek word for habit leaning toward the sense of character) and the virtues that are necessary for flourishing and well-being or happiness {eudaimonia) of individuals and communities. Virtues in this context are stable and firm dispositions to do the good, to act, for example, with practical judgment or wisdom (prudence, phronesis), courage (fortitude), moderafion (temperance), and justice. These are the cardinal or "hinge" virtues shared by ancient Greeks and Romans and integrated into the Christian ethical tradition as part of a list that added the grace-dependent or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. They are habits of the heart and mind. A virtue in this sense is a character trait—that is, a disposition that involves the will and is part of the stable core of the human being in question, as distinct from an automatic habit like fastening one's seat belt in a car. However, such a disposition, like courage or wisdom, is not an isolated or single (even conscious or rational) tendency