Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1799 The important difference in this form of thinking about ethics is that virtue ethics, following Aristotle's(1954)philosophy, provides a natura- listic account of morality as something that inheres in our human nature rather than in abstract principles. However, one of the sticking points for those who are sceptical about virtue ethics is how virtues are defined. Aristotle believed that virtues could be discerned by looking at the character traits of the virtuous person or from observing what is needed for human flourishing For Aristotle, there was a direct connec tion between following virtues and human well-being. By attributing mor ality to human nature, rather than to differences between men and women. virtue ethics enables feminists to focus on fundamental human interests and needs. This fits well with social work 's view of itself as a profession, which helps people achieve their full potential by actualising their innate capacities However, Aristotle's naturalistic philosophy went beyond the individual to discerning the kind of society needed for human flourishing. This, too, fits well with social work's approach to human rights and social justice. These concerns are very different from those of non-natural ethics, like Kant's deontology, which ' depict ethics as something transcendentally pure and uncontaminated by the world of human desires'(Phoca and Wright, 1999, P. 124 ). However, when ethics are removed from this 'objec tive'level, they become closer to psychology or sociology or even biology, g which can be problematic for feminists. For example, by grounding ethics in feminine characteristics, as Noddings(2003)and others have done, femin ists depict relationships, empathy, care and so on as ' women's special virtues. As Phoca and Wright (1999)note, there is a danger in seeing women as innately supportive, non-competitive nurturers'(Phoca and Wright, 1999, P. 125)as this can all too easily lead to them being disregarded and feminist ethics once again being marginalised. Feminist virtue ethicists hus advocate a broader focus on character, disposition and the myriad T95≌9 factors needed for human flourishing Several writers have written about virtue ethics in relation to social work (Rhodes, 1986; Morelock, 1997; McBeath and Webb, 2002; Hugman, 2005; van den Bersselaar, 2005: Clark, 2006: Lovat and Gray, 2008). Some believe that virtue ethics can be enriched through an understanding of virtue as 8 developed through communication and dialogue. Seeing ethics and moral ity as culturally contingent, Rhodes(1986) was one of the first social work writers on virtue ethics to suggest the need for a dialogical process to reach shared understanding. More recently, writers have highlighted the rel- evance of habermas' s communicative action and discourse ethics to social work(Houston, 2003: Hugman, 2005; Gray and Lovat, 2007; Hayes and Houston, 2007: Lovat and Gray, 2008). They see in Habermas the means with which to achieve a balanced perspective on ethics that accords with Rhodes(1986)early emphasis on dialogue and shared under- standing. While Habermas offers a fairly structured rational approach
The important difference in this form of thinking about ethics is that virtue ethics, following Aristotle’s (1954) philosophy, provides a naturalistic account of morality as something that inheres in our human nature rather than in abstract principles. However, one of the sticking points for those who are sceptical about virtue ethics is how virtues are defined. Aristotle believed that virtues could be discerned by looking at the character traits of the virtuous person or from observing what is needed for human flourishing. For Aristotle, there was a direct connection between following virtues and human well-being. By attributing morality to human nature, rather than to differences between men and women, virtue ethics enables feminists to focus on fundamental human interests and needs. This fits well with social work’s view of itself as a profession, which helps people achieve their full potential by actualising their innate capacities. However, Aristotle’s naturalistic philosophy went beyond the individual to discerning the kind of society needed for human flourishing. This, too, fits well with social work’s approach to human rights and social justice. These concerns are very different from those of non-natural ethics, like Kant’s deontology, which ‘depict ethics as something transcendentally pure and uncontaminated by the world of human desires’ (Phoca and Wright, 1999, p. 124). However, when ethics are removed from this ‘objective’ level, they become closer to psychology or sociology or even biology, which can be problematic for feminists. For example, by grounding ethics in ‘feminine’ characteristics, as Noddings (2003) and others have done, feminists depict relationships, empathy, care and so on as ‘women’s special virtues’. As Phoca and Wright (1999) note, there is a danger in seeing women as ‘innately supportive, non-competitive nurturers’ (Phoca and Wright, 1999, p. 125) as this can all too easily lead to them being disregarded and feminist ethics once again being marginalised. Feminist virtue ethicists thus advocate a broader focus on character, disposition and the myriad factors needed for human flourishing. Several writers have written about virtue ethics in relation to social work (Rhodes, 1986; Morelock, 1997; McBeath and Webb, 2002; Hugman, 2005; van den Bersselaar, 2005; Clark, 2006; Lovat and Gray, 2008). Some believe that virtue ethics can be enriched through an understanding of virtue as developed through communication and dialogue. Seeing ethics and morality as culturally contingent, Rhodes (1986) was one of the first social work writers on virtue ethics to suggest the need for a dialogical process to reach shared understanding. More recently, writers have highlighted the relevance of Habermas’s communicative action and discourse ethics to social work (Houston, 2003; Hugman, 2005; Gray and Lovat, 2007; Hayes and Houston, 2007; Lovat and Gray, 2008). They see in Habermas the means with which to achieve a balanced perspective on ethics that accords with Rhodes’ (1986) early emphasis on dialogue and shared understanding. While Habermas offers a fairly structured rational approach Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1799 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from
1800 Me/ Gray complete with principles and rules of discourse, as does feminist writer Koehn(1998), his appeal lies in his attempt to devise an inclusive form of ethics-reliant on procedural processes within democratic institutional structures-wherein all people everywhere can participate. However, fem- inists are critical of Habermas's heavy reliance on rational principles, pro- cedural processes and unquestioning faith in democracy(Meehan, 1995 They advance a completely different theory and it is to this feminist ethics of care that we now turn Ethics of care Feminist ethics of care There are two main strands to the feminist ethics of care as it has been intro- duced to social work. One emanates from psychology, starting with the work of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan, and the other from the influence of political scientists Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen Gilligan's(1982) groundbreaking work on gender diferences in moral development has been influential in the development of the feminist ethics of care. Gilligan discerned that while men tended to be more rational, women tended to be more emotionally connected and nurturing Her care rspective involved seeing ourselves as connected to others within a web of relationships such that our sense of self becomes closely tied to others responsiveness to us and our responsiveness to others. Maintaining these relations of care is a key focus of the ethics of care, which, says Davion (1993), is epitomised in Noddings(1984) injunction to always meet the other as one caring(see below) Gilligan's research emerged at the time of what Faludi(1992) has called a backlash' against feminism in which one of its key progenitors, Betty 5望9 Friedan, author of the seminal The Feminist Mystique (1963), played a pivotal role. In her eagerly awaited The Second Stage(1981), Friedan appeared to renege on her earlier commitments andwalked right into the New Right's"pro-family"semantics trap..REferring women,s movement.. as"the feminist reaction".[she elevates the "relational "Beta mode and other distinctively "feminine "traits'(Faludi 1992, p. 358). Faludi(1992) notes how terms like women,s ways "womens special nature'and 'feminine caring entered into popular works in the 1980s, as did attacks onequal opportunity feminists'criticised for encouraging women to 'devalue caring work(Faludi, 1992, p. 359) However. Faludi claims that most feminist scholars had 'set out to investi gate the origins of mens and women,s differences, not to glorify them (Faludi, 1992, P. 359). In so doing, ' they hoped to find in women's"differ ence"a more humane model for public life'(Faludi, 1992, P. 359). But difference began to'defuse the feminist campaign for equality'(Faludi
complete with principles and rules of discourse, as does feminist writer Koehn (1998), his appeal lies in his attempt to devise an inclusive form of ethics—reliant on procedural processes within democratic institutional structures—wherein all people everywhere can participate. However, feminists are critical of Habermas’s heavy reliance on rational principles, procedural processes and unquestioning faith in democracy (Meehan, 1995). They advance a completely different theory and it is to this feminist ethics of care that we now turn. Ethics of care Feminist ethics of care There are two main strands to the feminist ethics of care as it has been introduced to social work. One emanates from psychology, starting with the work of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan, and the other from the influence of political scientists Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen. Gilligan’s (1982) groundbreaking work on gender differences in moral development has been influential in the development of the feminist ethics of care. Gilligan discerned that while men tended to be more rational, women tended to be more emotionally connected and nurturing. Her care perspective involved seeing ourselves as connected to others within a web of relationships such that our sense of self becomes closely tied to others’ responsiveness to us and our responsiveness to others. Maintaining these relations of care is a key focus of the ethics of care, which, says Davion (1993), is epitomised in Noddings’ (1984) injunction to always meet the other as one caring (see below). Gilligan’s research emerged at the time of what Faludi (1992) has called a ‘backlash’ against feminism in which one of its key progenitors, Betty Friedan, author of the seminal The Feminist Mystique (1963), played a pivotal role. In her eagerly awaited The Second Stage (1981), Friedan appeared to renege on her earlier commitments and ‘walked right into the New Right’s “pro-family” semantics trap ... [R]eferring to the women’s movement ... as “the feminist reaction” ... [she elevates] the “relational” Beta mode and other distinctively “feminine” traits’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 358). Faludi (1992) notes how terms like ‘women’s ways’, ‘women’s special nature’ and ‘feminine caring’ entered into popular works in the 1980s, as did attacks on ‘equal opportunity feminists’ criticised for encouraging women to ‘devalue caring work’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 359). However, Faludi claims that most feminist scholars had ‘set out to investigate the origins of men’s and women’s differences, not to glorify them’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 359). In so doing, ‘they hoped to find in women’s “difference” a more humane model for public life’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 359). But ‘difference’ began to ‘defuse the feminist campaign for equality’ (Faludi, 1800 Mel Gray at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from