636 HANS VAN DE VEN been treated with honesty and sincerity'.But he nonetheless had decided to leave with his staff because 'were I to stay while all Ministers left Beijing,I could only cause problems for China'.13 He asked the Yamen to facilitate the departure of himself and other Customs employees because the railroad link with Tianjin had been cut and the roads had become unsafe.Hart's letter was not delivered because his courier abandoned his attempt to deliver it after the murder of Klemens von Ketteler(1853-1900),the German Minister.14 The Siege of the Legations began the next day and would last until 14 August.For four weeks,no messages passed between Hart and the Zongli Yamen.But on 21 July,Hart received a letter stating 'we have been deeply concerned about you but had no way to make enquiries as communications were impossible'.15 It asked whether he and Robert Bredon(1846-1918),Hart's brother-in-law and Deputy Inspector General,were safe and where they resided.Hart's reply informed the Yamen that he and his staff had fled to the British Legation,that the Commissioner for Postal Affairs,who was a member of the Customs Service,was dead,that two other members of his staff had been seriously wounded,that he himself and several others were ill,and that many of the offices of the Customs Service in Beijing and the Translators College (Tongwenguan)had been destroyed.Hart appended a copy of his undelivered 20 June letter to this reply.The Zongli Yamen informed Li Hongzhang,who then served as Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi in Canton,of these messages, allowing Li to make known that he hadhad reliable news of Hart's safety and thus contradicting an obituary that had appeared in The Times of London on 17July.A memorial service in St Paul's Cathedral was hastily abandoned.16 Several days later,in an obvious attempt to suggest good will,the Zongli Yamen sent several carts with provisions to the Legations to re-establish contact.A special allotment for Hart consisted of a case of vegetables,ten watermelons,two blocks of ice,and 100 pounds of white flour.17 These provisions accompanied a request by the Yamen to the Ministers in the Legations to send open telegrams back to their capitals to inform them that they were safe.This was no doubt a 1s Ibid. 4 Circular 961,in Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative,II,238. 15 To Their Excellences the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',21July 1900, Out Letters,2. 16 Circular 961,in Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative,II,238.Hart to Campbell', Letter 1173 (1o June 19oo),in Fairbank et al.,eds,The IG in Peking,p.1234,n.5. 7Circular 61,Wright,ed.Documents Illustrative,I,249
636 HANS VAN DE VEN been treated with honesty and sincerity’. But he nonetheless had decided to leave with his staff because ‘were I to stay while all Ministers left Beijing, I could only cause problems for China’.13 He asked the Yamen to facilitate the departure of himself and other Customs employees because the railroad link with Tianjin had been cut and the roads had become unsafe. Hart’s letter was not delivered because his courier abandoned his attempt to deliver it after the murder of Klemens von Ketteler (1853–1900), the German Minister.14 The Siege of the Legations began the next day and would last until 14 August. For four weeks, no messages passed between Hart and the Zongli Yamen. But on 21 July, Hart received a letter stating ‘we have been deeply concerned about you but had no way to make enquiries as communications were impossible’.15 It asked whether he and Robert Bredon (1846–1918), Hart’s brother-in-law and Deputy Inspector General, were safe and where they resided. Hart’s reply informed the Yamen that he and his staff had fled to the British Legation, that the Commissioner for Postal Affairs, who was a member of the Customs Service, was dead, that two other members of his staff had been seriously wounded, that he himself and several others were ill, and that many of the offices of the Customs Service in Beijing and the Translators College (Tongwenguan) had been destroyed. Hart appended a copy of his undelivered 20 June letter to this reply. The Zongli Yamen informed Li Hongzhang, who then served as Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi in Canton, of these messages, allowing Li to make known that he had had reliable news of Hart’s safety and thus contradicting an obituary that had appeared in The Times of London on 17 July. A memorial service in St Paul’s Cathedral was hastily abandoned.16 Several days later, in an obvious attempt to suggest good will, the Zongli Yamen sent several carts with provisions to the Legations to re-establish contact. A special allotment for Hart consisted of a case of vegetables, ten watermelons, two blocks of ice, and 100 pounds of white flour.17 These provisions accompanied a request by the Yamen to the Ministers in the Legations to send open telegrams back to their capitals to inform them that they were safe. This was no doubt a 13 Ibid. 14 Circular 961, in Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 238. 15 ‘To Their Excellences the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 21 July 1900, Out Letters, 2. 16 Circular 961, in Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 238. ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1173 (10 June 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, p.1234, n.5. 17 Circular 961, Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 249
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 637 desperate attempt to convince the Allies not to attack Beijing.Allied forces had won the Battle of Tianjin on 15July,following a month of intensive fighting.By late July,they were regrouping in preparation for a march on Beijing.The Ministers refused the Zongli Yamen's request.The Yamen then turned to Robert Hart,but he too declined, stating most diplomatically that 'were I to say the truth in an open telegram,no Minister of Foreign Affairs could believe it'.He added the earlier you agree to send telegrams in code on our behalf,the easier it will be to bring about a decisive change in direction'19 Arrangements for control of the Customs Service were a prominent issue in the messages between Hart and the Zongli Yamen.With the Inspectorate unable to function and Hart himself feared dead,ad hoc measures had been taken.Li Hongzhang had instructed all Customs Houses in Guangdong and Guangxi to report to Paul King,the Canton Commissioner,20 while Russians had taken over Customs Houses in Manchuria.21 The British Foreign Office had asked Campbell whether he would be willing to assume the Inspectorate Generalship in case of Hart's death.Campbell had declined and had suggested that Alfred E. Hippisley (1848-1937),who joined the Customs Service in 1867 and has become famous for inspiring the USA's Open Door notes,would be more suitable.22 In Shanghai,Francis E.Taylor (1848-1939),the Statistical Secretary,had set up a temporary Inspectorate General soon after the beginning of the Siege with the collaboration of Liu Kunyi (1830-1902),the Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports.The Zongli Yamen asked Hart on 21 July whether he approved of Liu Kunyi's and Taylor's arrangements.23 Hart had little option but to sanction them,but he noted testily in a Circular of 5 October that 24 June seemed a rather early date to arrange how I was to be replaced'.24 He instructed also that the temporary Inspectorate should be managed conjointly by Taylor and Francis Aglen(1869-1932),the Shanghai Commissioner,rather than Taylor alone,and stressed that they should ask for guidance when in 18Hart to Campbell;Letter 1173 (1o June 1go0),in Fairbank et al.,eds,The IG in Peking,1234,n.4. 19 Circular 961,in Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative,II,249. 20 Hart to Campbell',Letter 1175(12 September 1g00),in Fairbank et al,eds, The IG in Peking,p.1237,n.1. 21 Robert Campbell,Memoir,97. 22 Hart to Campbell,Letter 1178(14 October 1goo),in Fairbank et al,eds,The IG in Peking,1241,n.1. 23 To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',22July 1900, Out Letters,3. 24Circular 61,Wright,eds.Documents Illustrative,II,238
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 637 desperate attempt to convince the Allies not to attack Beijing. Allied forces had won the Battle of Tianjin on 15 July, following a month of intensive fighting. By late July, they were regrouping in preparation for a march on Beijing. The Ministers refused the Zongli Yamen’s request.18 The Yamen then turned to Robert Hart, but he too declined, stating most diplomatically that ‘were I to say the truth in an open telegram, no Minister of Foreign Affairs could believe it’. He added ‘the earlier you agree to send telegrams in code on our behalf, the easier it will be to bring about a decisive change in direction’.19 Arrangements for control of the Customs Service were a prominent issue in the messages between Hart and the Zongli Yamen. With the Inspectorate unable to function and Hart himself feared dead, ad hoc measures had been taken. Li Hongzhang had instructed all Customs Houses in Guangdong and Guangxi to report to Paul King, the Canton Commissioner,20 while Russians had taken over Customs Houses in Manchuria.21 The British Foreign Office had asked Campbell whether he would be willing to assume the Inspectorate Generalship in case of Hart’s death. Campbell had declined and had suggested that Alfred E. Hippisley (1848–1937), who joined the Customs Service in 1867 and has become famous for inspiring the USA’s Open Door notes, would be more suitable.22 In Shanghai, Francis E. Taylor (1848–1939), the Statistical Secretary, had set up a temporary Inspectorate General soon after the beginning of the Siege with the collaboration of Liu Kunyi (1830–1902), the Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports. The Zongli Yamen asked Hart on 21 July whether he approved of Liu Kunyi’s and Taylor’s arrangements.23 Hart had little option but to sanction them, but he noted testily in a Circular of 5 October that ‘24 June seemed a rather early date to arrange how I was to be replaced’.24 He instructed also that the temporary Inspectorate should be managed conjointly by Taylor and Francis Aglen (1869–1932), the Shanghai Commissioner, rather than Taylor alone, and stressed that they should ask for guidance when in 18 ‘Hart to Campbell; Letter 1173 (10 June 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1234, n. 4. 19 Circular 961, in Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 249. 20 ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1175 (12 September 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, p. 1237, n. 1. 21 Robert Campbell, Memoir, 97. 22 ‘Hart to Campbell, Letter 1178 (14 October 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1241, n. 1. 23 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 22 July 1900, Out Letters, 3. 24 Circular 961, Wright, eds., Documents Illustrative, II, 238
638 HANS VAN DE VEN doubt about what to do from the Zongli Yamen in Beijing through Liu Kunyi.25 This restored his ultimate authority.Even before the Siege ended,on 8 August,Hart wrote the Yamen that'since communications between Beijing and Shanghai have been restored,the affairs of the Inspectorate General should of course again be managed by me from my temporary offices at the Gaojingmiao Temple at the Chongwenmen Gate',more famous as Hatamen Street.26 He sent Robert Bredon,his brother-in-law,to take over the management of the temporary Inspectorate in Shanghai.Hart was obviously determined not to let control of the Customs Service slip from his grasp. On the 3oth,a few days after the Allied Expedition had set out from Tianjin,the Yamen turned to Hart asking his 'opinion about the aims of the various countries and the best way to discuss peace'27 Intense worry no doubt gripped the capital as it became clear that foreign forces would once more assault Beijing,as they had in 1860.Many then had feared the fall of the Qing,including Horatio Nelson Lay, the first Inspector General of the Customs Service.The Qing court had fled on that occasion as well.While Lay was out of the country, Prince Gong and Wenxiang had stayed behind,and had turned to Hart for advice.In 1900,when the Qing once more needed someone who could mediate between it and invading countries,they naturally turned to someone they knew could be a reliable and effective broker. Between War and Peace Several tense weeks followed the lifting of the Siege on 14 August, during which the resumption of fighting was a constant possibility. Robert Hart worked tirelessly in this period,which stretched well into October,making the case insistently to Qing officials that immediate peace negotiations were the only way to save the dynasty.With the court on the run and the military in disorder,chaos descended on Beijing and north China generally.The Allied advance to Beijing had been very quick,in part because the forces of different nations raced against each other,but also because the participating units had begun 25To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',22July 1900, Out Letters,3. 26To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',8 August 1900,Out Letters,7. 27 The letter is summarised in To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',8 August 19oo,Out Letters,8
638 HANS VAN DE VEN doubt about what to do from the Zongli Yamen in Beijing through Liu Kunyi.25 This restored his ultimate authority. Even before the Siege ended, on 8August, Hart wrote the Yamen that ‘since communications between Beijing and Shanghai have been restored, the affairs of the Inspectorate General should of course again be managed by me from my temporary offices at the Gaojingmiao Temple at the Chongwenmen Gate’, more famous as Hatamen Street.26 He sent Robert Bredon, his brother-in-law, to take over the management of the temporary Inspectorate in Shanghai. Hart was obviously determined not to let control of the Customs Service slip from his grasp. On the 30th, a few days after the Allied Expedition had set out from Tianjin, the Yamen turned to Hart asking his ‘opinion about the aims of the various countries and the best way to discuss peace’.27 Intense worry no doubt gripped the capital as it became clear that foreign forces would once more assault Beijing, as they had in 1860. Many then had feared the fall of the Qing, including Horatio Nelson Lay, the first Inspector General of the Customs Service. The Qing court had fled on that occasion as well. While Lay was out of the country, Prince Gong and Wenxiang had stayed behind, and had turned to Hart for advice. In 1900, when the Qing once more needed someone who could mediate between it and invading countries, they naturally turned to someone they knew could be a reliable and effective broker. Between War and Peace Several tense weeks followed the lifting of the Siege on 14 August, during which the resumption of fighting was a constant possibility. Robert Hart worked tirelessly in this period, which stretched well into October, making the case insistently to Qing officials that immediate peace negotiations were the only way to save the dynasty. With the court on the run and the military in disorder, chaos descended on Beijing and north China generally. The Allied advance to Beijing had been very quick, in part because the forces of different nations raced against each other, but also because the participating units had begun 25 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 22 July 1900, Out Letters, 3. 26 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 8 August 1900, Out Letters, 7. 27 The letter is summarised in ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 8 August 1900, Out Letters, 8
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 639 to run out of supplies.Expectations of bad weather,which would make the roads impassable,had driven the relief forces forward.In Beijing, these forces lost their discipline.On 8 September,Robert Hart wrote to James Campbell:'such a mixture of soldiers makes life difficult: their policy ought to be to restore order and confidence and induce people to bring in supplies for sale,but instead of this terrorism(except in the Japanese quarter)seems the order of the day and looting and commandeering are the only methods the soldiers think fit of resorting t02.28 Panic and disorder too reigned outside Beijing.The drought,disease, and famine of 1goo meant that granaries and storehouses were empty and any improvement would have to wait at least until the harvest of the following year.A British Military Attache noted in a report of 4 October that 'the natives will hardly venture to harvest the crops,and it seems probable that the homeless and starving population together with the unruly elements that have been driven out of Peking [Beijing] will form themselves in the winter into bands of brigands'.29 By mid September,Hart feared that the siege might be renewed.He wrote to Campbell Boxers are beginning to swarm all round Peking,and have been seen even in the city-they tried to carry off a Frenchman yesterday!-and a second siege,or isolation,but on a larger scale is quite possible'30 Punitive raids on Chinese towns and villages suspected of harbouring Boxers added to the chaos and hardened opposition to peace discussions.Although the Allies claimed they had invaded China in the defence of civilization,looting and the torching of villages undermined that presentation.Field Marshall Count Alfred von Waldersee(1832- 1904)had been appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expedition in recognition of the fact that the most significant death had been that of von Ketteler.But he arrived on 27 September in Tianjin,too late to participate in the lifting of the Siege.He remained keen to give substance to Kaiser Wilhelm's statement 'just as the Huns a thousand years ago...may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinese will ever again dare to look 2Hart to Campbell',Letter 1147(8 September 1go0),Fairbank et al,eds,The IG in Peking,1235. 29 The Military Attache was A.Churchill.The report can be found in 'China Expedition,1goo:Reports on Operations to Relieve Tientsin and Peking,UK National Archives,WOg2/6145. 30Hart to Campbeli,Letter 1175(12 September 1go0),in Fairbank et al.,eds, The IG in Peking,1237-
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 639 to run out of supplies. Expectations of bad weather, which would make the roads impassable, had driven the relief forces forward. In Beijing, these forces lost their discipline. On 8 September, Robert Hart wrote to James Campbell: ‘such a mixture of soldiers makes life difficult: their policy ought to be to restore order and confidence and induce people to bring in supplies for sale, but instead of this terrorism (except in the Japanese quarter) seems the order of the day and looting and commandeering are the only methods the soldiers think fit of resorting to’.28 Panic and disorder too reigned outside Beijing. The drought, disease, and famine of 1900 meant that granaries and storehouses were empty and any improvement would have to wait at least until the harvest of the following year. A British Military Attach´e noted in a report of 4 October that ‘the natives will hardly venture to harvest the crops, and it seems probable that the homeless and starving population together with the unruly elements that have been driven out of Peking [Beijing] will form themselves in the winter into bands of brigands’.29 By mid September, Hart feared that the siege might be renewed. He wrote to Campbell ‘Boxers are beginning to swarm all round Peking, and have been seen even in the city—they tried to carry off a Frenchman yesterday!—and a second siege, or isolation, but on a larger scale is quite possible’.30 Punitive raids on Chinese towns and villages suspected of harbouring Boxers added to the chaos and hardened opposition to peace discussions. Although the Allies claimed they had invaded China in the defence of civilization, looting and the torching of villages undermined that presentation. Field Marshall Count Alfred von Waldersee (1832– 1904) had been appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expedition in recognition of the fact that the most significant death had been that of von Ketteler. But he arrived on 27 September in Tianjin, too late to participate in the lifting of the Siege. He remained keen to give substance to Kaiser Wilhelm’s statement ‘just as the Huns a thousand years ago ... may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinese will ever again dare to look 28 ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1147 (8 September 1900), Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1235. 29 The Military Attach´e was A. Churchill. The report can be found in ‘China Expedition, 1900: Reports on Operations to Relieve Tientsin and Peking’, UK National Archives, WO32/6145. 30 ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1175 (12 September 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1237
640 HANS VAN DE VEN askance at a German'.31 He argued that one can only command the respect of the Asian through force and its ruthless application'and declared that 'no outdated clemency'would be shown toward 'this ridiculous and childish people'32 A series of actions across the north China plain,including the punitive expedition to the provincial capital Baoding in Zhili Province in October,gave substance to these words. Unilateral action increased tensions.In the last week of September, Russia seized Niuzhuang,Anshan,and Liaoyang in Manchuria,while the British took Shanhaiguan to forestall Russian penetration south of the Great Wall.But,the Russians did occupy the railroad from Shanhaiguan to Tianjin and claimed a concession area that included the railroad station.33 German naval vessels sailed up the Yangtze River into an area that the British regarded as their sphere of influence.Japanese and French forces too remained ready to act if it did come to a general land grab. Given Allied actions and attitudes,it is not strange that some Qing officials began to advocate a resumption of war.In a memorandum of early November,Hart wrote to the Zongli Yamen that strong rumours existed that one leading pro-Boxer official,Prince Duan,whose son had failed to become heir apparent because of foreign opposition,had written to all provincial governors to prepare for the renewal of combat during the winter months when the Tianjin harbour would be frozen over and foreign naval vessels would be unable to sail up the Yangtze River as its water levels would be low.Hart further stated that the story was in circulation that another pro-Boxer official,Gangyi,who died as a result of his support for the Boxers,had gone to south China to issue instructions to governors there.34 He politely stated that he himself doubted the veracity of these reports,but stressed that the resumption of battle could only lead to the collapse of the Qing.Because Allied forces were able to go where they pleased,he noted,the court should not have any false ideas about its safety,no matter how far it withdrew inland. 31 Quoted in Roger Thompson,Military Dimensions of the Boxer Uprising in Shanxi',in Hans van de Ven,ed.,Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden,Brill,2000),311. 32 Sabine Dabringhaus,An Army on Vacation?'in F.C.Boemecke,Anticipating Total War(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999),470. 33 Wright,Hart,739-40. 3 Memorandum on the Attack on the Ministers,Number Six',Out Letters,44. No date,but listed between documents dated g1 October and 13 November in the index
640 HANS VAN DE VEN askance at a German’.31 He argued that ‘one can only command the respect of the Asian through force and its ruthless application’ and declared that ‘no outdated clemency’ would be shown toward ‘this ridiculous and childish people’.32 A series of actions across the north China plain, including the punitive expedition to the provincial capital Baoding in Zhili Province in October, gave substance to these words. Unilateral action increased tensions. In the last week of September, Russia seized Niuzhuang, Anshan, and Liaoyang in Manchuria, while the British took Shanhaiguan to forestall Russian penetration south of the Great Wall. But, the Russians did occupy the railroad from Shanhaiguan to Tianjin and claimed a concession area that included the railroad station.33 German naval vessels sailed up the Yangtze River into an area that the British regarded as their sphere of influence. Japanese and French forces too remained ready to act if it did come to a general land grab. Given Allied actions and attitudes, it is not strange that some Qing officials began to advocate a resumption of war. In a memorandum of early November, Hart wrote to the Zongli Yamen that strong rumours existed that one leading pro-Boxer official, Prince Duan, whose son had failed to become heir apparent because of foreign opposition, had written to all provincial governors to prepare for the renewal of combat during the winter months when the Tianjin harbour would be frozen over and foreign naval vessels would be unable to sail up the Yangtze River as its water levels would be low. Hart further stated that the story was in circulation that another pro-Boxer official, Gangyi, who died as a result of his support for the Boxers, had gone to south China to issue instructions to governors there.34 He politely stated that he himself doubted the veracity of these reports, but stressed that the resumption of battle could only lead to the collapse of the Qing. Because Allied forces were able to go where they pleased, he noted, the court should not have any false ideas about its safety, no matter how far it withdrew inland. 31 Quoted in Roger Thompson, ‘Military Dimensions of the Boxer Uprising in Shanxi’, in Hans van de Ven, ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden, Brill, 2000), 311. 32 Sabine Dabringhaus, ‘An Army on Vacation?’ in F. C. Boemecke, Anticipating Total War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 470. 33 Wright, Hart, 739–40. 34 ‘Memorandum on the Attack on the Ministers, Number Six’, Out Letters, 44. No date, but listed between documents dated 31 October and 13 November in the index