CHAPTER 4 POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION: THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 The years immediately following the Revolution of 191,when Yuan Shih-k'ai was president of the first Chinese republic (19I2-16),can be approached in two quite different ways.One emphasizes the beginnings of warlordism:the breakdown of political unity,the emergence of military rule,and the spread of an amoral and treacherous spirit of fauve qui peat among those in authority.In this view,the triumph of the Revolution was rendered meaningless even at the very moment of victory.When the for- mal mandate to govern was passed from the child Manchu emperor and his court to Yuan Shih-k'ai in February 1912,China lost her powerful monarchical symbols of political integration with a history of over two thousand years.In exchange,an unscrupulous and reactionary militarist occupied the central post,with neither programme nor imperial potency; the new republican forms meant little.The result,according to this view, was a rapid slide into warlordism under Yuan Shih-k'ai's aegis. The second approach stresses the continuities with the pre-revolu- tionary years and sees the Revolution of I9II not as another episode in the weakening of China's polity,but as an early climax in a nationalist movement to invigorate politics and society.In this view,the aftermath of the revolution witnessed a testing in practice of the two competing ideas of self-government and administrative centralization,that had been winning adherents during the previous decade.It was a time of energetic political experimentation.Along with experiment went conflict,as the expansion of political participation collided with efforts to centralize authority.But it was only after these competing programmes had each had a period of vigorous life that the attributes of warlordism emerged. The Yuan Shih-k'ai presidency period is best understood,according to this interpretation,as the logical consequence of China's first wave of nationalism,embracing both its virtues and its fatal flaws. Ample data can be marshalled on behalf of either approach.In this account the second approach is favoured,because it seems to make more sense of the leading political tendencies,among which Yuan's presidency was only one.But the first approach is a useful corrective to any inadvert- 2o8 Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
CHAPTER 4 POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION: THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, 1912-16 The years immediately following the Revolution of 1911, when Yuan Shih-k'ai was president of the first Chinese republic (1912-16), can be approached in two quite different ways. One emphasizes the beginnings of warlordism: the breakdown of political unity, the emergence of military rule, and the spread of an amoral and treacherous spirit of sauve qui peut among those in authority. In this view, the triumph of the Revolution was rendered meaningless even at the very moment of victory. When the formal mandate to govern was passed from the child Manchu emperor and his court to Yuan Shih-k'ai in February 1912, China lost her powerful monarchical symbols of political integration with a history of over two thousand years. In exchange, an unscrupulous and reactionary militarist occupied the central post, with neither programme nor imperial potency; the new republican forms meant little. The result, according to this view, was a rapid slide into warlordism under Yuan Shih-k'ai's aegis. The second approach stresses the continuities with the pre-revolutionary years and sees the Revolution of 1911 not as another episode in the weakening of China's polity, but as an early climax in a nationalist movement to invigorate politics and society. In this view, the aftermath of the revolution witnessed a testing in practice of the two competing ideas of self-government and administrative centralization, that had been winning adherents during the previous decade. It was a time of energetic political experimentation. Along with experiment went conflict, as the expansion of political participation collided with efforts to centralize authority. But it was only after these competing programmes had each had a period of vigorous life that the attributes of warlordism emerged. The Yuan Shih-k'ai presidency period is best understood, according to this interpretation, as the logical consequence of China's first wave of nationalism, embracing both its virtues and its fatal flaws. Ample data can be marshalled on behalf of either approach. In this account the second approach is favoured, because it seems to make more sense of the leading political tendencies, among which Yuan's presidency was only one. But the first approach is a useful corrective to any inadvert- 208 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 209 ent glorification of the politicians of the period.This first wave of nation- alism,after all,came nowhere near attaining its essential objective of a strong and independent Chinese state.More thoroughgoing attempts were required before China's sovereignty was recovered.And meanwhile, warlordism and its special oppressions intervened. THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION Whichever approach is preferred,the ambiguity of the Revolution of 1911 must be acknowledged,hovering as it did between success and fail- ure,with the unresolved tensions in the polity being passed on to the early republic.Our account of the period begins by noting these am- biguities or tensions and discussing their various sources. The ambiguity of the revolutionary aftermath began with the negotiated settlement of the revolution itself.The first talks between imperial officials and representatives of the revolutionary forces took place in November I911,about one month after the first republican successes. Formal negotiations began in December.The main issues were worked out during January 1912,and the abdication of the Ch'ing monarch was decreed on I2 February.Within three more months the institutions of a new national government were functioning in Peking.Who had won? Judging from the eruption of armed attacks on the government in 1913 and 1916(sometimes called the Second and Third Revolutions),we can conclude that the settlement of I9Iz was an unstable compromise. On the one hand,the settlement consolidated an enormous revolu- tionary victory.The Ch'ing dynasty was overthrown,a feat that had eluded numerous previous attempts,including the massive Taiping Rebellion of the mid nineteenth century.Moreover,the Ch'ing was replaced by a new form of government;the imperial order,which had supported an immeasurable accumulation of attitudes and political habits,was abolished.Both these accomplishments proved to be irrev- ocable,despite attempts to rescind one or both of them in 1915-16 and 1917.The two irreducible aims of the republican revolutionaries had been permanently achieved:the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of a republic. On the other hand,the new arrangements were far from ideal for those who had served the revolution the longest.Perhaps the generous set- tlement accorded the abdicating child emperor and his large household, including promise of a substantial stipend,was a harmless concession (though his survival allowed the Japanese to use him in the 193os when establishing a subservient Manchu kingdom in the north-east).Revolu- Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 209 ent glorification of the politicians of the period. This first wave of nationalism, after all, came nowhere near attaining its essential objective of a strong and independent Chinese state. More thoroughgoing attempts were required before China's sovereignty was recovered. And meanwhile, warlordism and its special oppressions intervened. THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION Whichever approach is preferred, the ambiguity of the Revolution of 1911 must be acknowledged, hovering as it did between success and failure, with the unresolved tensions in the polity being passed on to the early republic. Our account of the period begins by noting these ambiguities or tensions and discussing their various sources. The ambiguity of the revolutionary aftermath began with the negotiated settlement of the revolution itself. The first talks between imperial officials and representatives of the revolutionary forces took place in November 1911, about one month after the first republican successes. Formal negotiations began in December. The main issues were worked out during January 1912, and the abdication of the Ch'ing monarch was decreed on 12 February. Within three more months the institutions of a new national government were functioning in Peking. Who had won ? Judging from the eruption of armed attacks on the government in 1913 and 1916 (sometimes called the Second and Third Revolutions), we can conclude that the settlement of 1912 was an unstable compromise. On the one hand, the settlement consolidated an enormous revolutionary victory. The Ch'ing dynasty was overthrown, a feat that had eluded numerous previous attempts, including the massive Taiping Rebellion of the mid nineteenth century. Moreover, the Ch'ing was replaced by a new form of government; the imperial order, which had supported an immeasurable accumulation of attitudes and political habits, was abolished. Both these accomplishments proved to be irrevocable, despite attempts to rescind one or both of them in 1915-16 and 1917. The two irreducible aims of the republican revolutionaries had been permanently achieved: the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of a republic. On the other hand, the new arrangements were far from ideal for those who had served the revolution the longest. Perhaps the generous settlement accorded the abdicating child emperor and his large household, including promise of a substantial stipend, was a harmless concession (though his survival allowed the Japanese to use him in the 1930s when establishing a subservient Manchu kingdom in the north-east). RevoluCambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
210 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 tionary expectations were more seriously compromised by the new head of state,Yuan Shih-k'ai,a leading imperial official.The revolutionary spokesmen accepted the sz year-old Yuan to lead the new order as the price for his arranging the Ch'ing abdication and in order to avoid a prolonged civil war.Some were even optimistic about his likely future role.He was capable and could be labelled a 'progressive'among the mandarins.After all his power was to be limited by constitutional ar- rangements,including a cabinet and a national legislature,designed by the revolutionaries themselves.But the resulting compromise of a con- stitutional president with no established revolutionary or republican commitments was to prove a source of great uneasiness.This uneasiness was heightened by Yuan's unwillingess to leave Peking in order to receive his presidential confirmation in Nanking,the centre of revolu- tionary power by early 1912.And it was further augmented by the limited role accorded veteran revolutionaries,who were excluded from the fin- ancial and army posts in the first republican cabinet in Peking.The question of who had won the revolution remained clouded. Another ambiguity lay in the effect of the revolution on national unity. Conceived in nationalism,the revolution demanded the preservation of the territory of the Ch'ing dynasty as a basis for the new nation.Yuan's rise to the presidency stemmed from the urgency of this demand.In practice,however,the revolution severed most administrative ties between the provinces and the central government.In some provinces, ironically,distrust of Yuan as president increased the resistance to reconstituting administrative links between province and centre.Further- more,the outlying areas of Outer Mongolia and Tibet had moved towards complete separation from any Chinese government. In the case of Mongolia and Tibet,the set-back to Han Chinese na- tionalist goals had two aspects.Local non-Han elites took the occasion to escape from Peking's control,thereby shrinking the Ch'ing legacy to the republic.And foreign powers took the opportunity to expand their spheres of influence,thereby tightening the strategic encirclement of China.Begun in reaction to late Ch'ing programmes of intervention in these old dependencies,princely Mongolian and Tibetan movements to throw off Peking's authority succeeded in late 19I and early 1912.But they consolidated their successes only under Russian protection in Outer Mongolia and British protection in Tibet.Peking's subsequent efforts to recover these lost territories had,of necessity,to take the form of nego- tiating with these European powers.Neither Russia nor Great Britain was insisting on full colonial absorption.But all that the early republican gov- ernments could salvage was a tenuous suzerainty in these outlying por- tions of the former Ch'ing empire. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
2IO THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI , I 9 I 2-1 6 tionary expectations were more seriously compromised by the new head of state, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a leading imperial official. The revolutionary spokesmen accepted the 52 year-old Yuan to lead the new order as the price for his arranging the Ch'ing abdication and in order to avoid a prolonged civil war. Some were even optimistic about his likely future role. He was capable and could be labelled a 'progressive' among the mandarins. After all his power was to be limited by constitutional arrangements, including a cabinet and a national legislature, designed by the revolutionaries themselves. But the resulting compromise of a constitutional president with no established revolutionary or republican commitments was to prove a source of great uneasiness. This uneasiness was heightened by Yuan's unwillingess to leave Peking in order to receive his presidential confirmation in Nanking, the centre of revolutionary power by early 1912. And it was further augmented by the limited role accorded veteran revolutionaries, who were excluded from the financial and army posts in the first republican cabinet in Peking. The question of who had won the revolution remained clouded. Another ambiguity lay in the effect of the revolution on national unity. Conceived in nationalism, the revolution demanded the preservation of the territory of the Ch'ing dynasty as a basis for the new nation. Yuan's rise to the presidency stemmed from the urgency of this demand. In practice, however, the revolution severed most administrative ties between the provinces and the central government. In some provinces, ironically, distrust of Yuan as president increased the resistance to reconstituting administrative links between province and centre. Furthermore, the outlying areas of Outer Mongolia and Tibet had moved towards complete separation from any Chinese government. In the case of Mongolia and Tibet, the set-back to Han Chinese nationalist goals had two aspects. Local non-Han elites took the occasion to escape from Peking's control, thereby shrinking the Ch'ing legacy to the republic. And foreign powers took the opportunity to expand their spheres of influence, thereby tightening the strategic encirclement of China. Begun in reaction to late Ch'ing programmes of intervention in these old dependencies, princely Mongolian and Tibetan movements to throw off Peking's authority succeeded in late 1911 and early 1912. But they consolidated their successes only under Russian protection in Outer Mongolia and British protection in Tibet. Peking's subsequent efforts to recover these lost territories had, of necessity, to take the form of negotiating with these European powers. Neither Russia nor Great Britain was insisting on full colonial absorption. But all that the early republican governments could salvage was a tenuous suzerainty in these outlying portions of the former Ch'ing empire. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 2IT Foreign governments took advantage of revolutionary disruption in a variety of ways.The degree of foreign participation in China's customs collection greatly increased,when foreign commissioners became not just assessors and accountants but also actual collectors of the revenue. Further,the proceeds were,by arrangements struck during the revolu- tion,deposited in foreign banks before disbursement.The measure gave foreign financiers both heightened controls and profits.These and other augmentations of foreign privilege during the Revolution of 1o betrayed Chinese nationalism and sullied the revolutionary banner. A number of circumstances marking the revolution help to explain the ambiguities of the result.The revolutionary movement,whose broadest organization had been the T'ung-meng hui,had failed to pre- serve solidarity in the years preceding the revolution.Its national leaders often had little connection with revolutionary developments in the pro- vinces and were unable to weld into a cohesive whole the forces that burgeoned there during the revolution.Such unified revolutionary de- termination as they were able to muster was blunted by the fear that continued disruption and warfare might lead to full-scale foreign inter- vention,for which they were strategically and psychologically quite un- prepared.Hence,despite a loosely joined accumulation of revolutionary troops that quantitatively far surpassed those at the disposal of the Ch'ing court,compromise seemed necessary.Compromise included accepting the Ch'ing prime minister,Yuan Shih-k'ai,as president.Although 14 provinces established revolutionary governments,in the revolution's aftermath the old revolutionary organization could rely on committed adherents as chief executives in only three provinces(Kwangtung,Kiangsi and Anhwei).Revolutionaries had in fact never been completely in charge of the revolution and were not disposed to press the issue. Another feature of the revolution that contributed to the ambiguity of the result was the social conservatism that accompanied its political ra- dicalism.The revolution replaced a venerable system of government with the latest Western model.The constitution located sovereignty in the people.Sovereignty was to be exercised by a national assembly (or parliament)plus a president,cabinet and judiciary.But it soon became apparent that the new political system would not displace the prevailing social elites from their positions of dominance.On the contrary,the old ruling class emerged both unscathed and invigorated.Although secret societies with their lower class constituencies were active,notably in Szechwan and Shensi,they did not seriously challenge the political pre- eminence of army officers,republican revolutionary politicians,and the leaders of self-government bodies.All three of these dominant groups were socially elite,mainly gentry.Another possible threat to the received Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 211 Foreign governments took advantage of revolutionary disruption in a variety of ways. The degree of foreign participation in China's customs collection greatly increased, when foreign commissioners became not just assessors and accountants but also actual collectors of the revenue. Further, the proceeds were, by arrangements struck during the revolution, deposited in foreign banks before disbursement. The measure gave foreign financiers both heightened controls and profits. These and other augmentations of foreign privilege during the Revolution of 1911 betrayed Chinese nationalism and sullied the revolutionary banner. A number of circumstances marking the revolution help to explain the ambiguities of the result. The revolutionary movement, whose broadest organization had been the T'ung-meng hui, had failed to preserve solidarity in the years preceding the revolution. Its national leaders often had little connection with revolutionary developments in the provinces and were unable to weld into a cohesive whole the forces that burgeoned there during the revolution. Such unified revolutionary determination as they were able to muster was blunted by the fear that continued disruption and warfare might lead to full-scale foreign intervention, for which they were strategically and psychologically quite unprepared. Hence, despite a loosely joined accumulation of revolutionary troops that quantitatively far surpassed those at the disposal of the Ch'ing court, compromise seemed necessary. Compromise included accepting the Ch'ing prime minister, Yuan Shih-k'ai, as president. Although 14 provinces established revolutionary governments, in the revolution's aftermath the old revolutionary organization could rely on committed adherents as chief executives in only three provinces (Kwangtung, Kiangsi and Anhwei). Revolutionaries had in fact never been completely in charge of the revolution and were not disposed to press the issue. Another feature of the revolution that contributed to the ambiguity of the result was the social conservatism that accompanied its political radicalism. The revolution replaced a venerable system of government with the latest Western model. The constitution located sovereignty in the people. Sovereignty was to be exercised by a national assembly (or parliament) plus a president, cabinet and judiciary. But it soon became apparent that the new political system would not displace the prevailing social elites from their positions of dominance. On the contrary, the old ruling class emerged both unscathed and invigorated. Although secret societies with their lower class constituencies were active, notably in Szechwan and Shensi, they did not seriously challenge the political preeminence of army officers, republican revolutionary politicians, and the leaders of self-government bodies. All three of these dominant groups were socially elite, mainly gentry. Another possible threat to the received Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2I2 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,I912-16 social order was the existence of mass armies,mobilized in support of the revolution in several provinces.But these too were contained and, where necessary,forcibly dispersed(Kwangtung was the most dramatic case). The formal recognition of popular sovereignty was accompanied by the spread of political participation in the society,and this was radical. But at the same time the organized forces of the revolution,no matter how quarrelsome among themselves,were generally united in keeping political control in upper class hands,especially those of the gentry,and this was conservative.When Chiao Ta-feng as revolutionary military governor of Hunan appeared to be basing his power on secret societies in late October 19II,he was assassinated,and a more socially conservative grouping around the provincial assembly leader,Tan Yen-k'ai,took power.When the revolutionary government in Kweichow persisted in an alliance with lower class elements,it was overthrown in March 1912 by military force from a neighbouring revolutionary province (Yunnan). The Chinese social elite had become more variegated in its cultural styles and economic activity since the late nineteenth century.But in the after- math of the 1911 Revolution it still acted with remarkable cohesion and determination in defence of its interests.The few defectors or waverers were easily deposed,without resort to assistance from Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking. While the gentry were successfully guarding against threats to their social power,they made two demands on the national and provincial leadership.The country should remain unified;and the localities should enjoy self-government.Here was another source of unresolved tension in the revolutionary aftermath.Chinese unity was both a treasured his- torical inheritance and,in the face of foreign designs,an urgent present necessity.There seemed to be no serious dissent from this fundamental proposition.But how was Chinese unity to be organized?In the wake of the revolution some important political leaders and groups urged a cen- tralized administration.They included Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking and Ts'ai O,military governor in the distant province of Yunnan.A central- ized administration was a plank in some party platforms.But in the early months after the revolution,these voices were drowned out (and voted down in the national assembly)by the advocates of local self-government, who often espoused an extreme form of provincial autonomy. The idea that autonomous provinces would better serve Chinese na- tionalism than would a centralized state had gained considerable currency in the last years of the Ch'ing.After most provinces emerged from the revolution fully autonomous,there was little disposition to surrender Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
212 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 social order was the existence of mass armies, mobilized in support of the revolution in several provinces. But these too were contained and, where necessary, forcibly dispersed (Kwangtung was the most dramatic case). The formal recognition of popular sovereignty was accompanied by the spread of political participation in the society, and this was radical. But at the same time the organized forces of the revolution, no matter how quarrelsome among themselves, were generally united in keeping political control in upper class hands, especially those of the gentry, and this was conservative. When Chiao Ta-feng as revolutionary military governor of Hunan appeared to be basing his power on secret societies in late October 1911, he was assassinated, and a more socially conservative grouping around the provincial assembly leader, T'an Yen-k'ai, took power. When the revolutionary government in Kweichow persisted in an alliance with lower class elements, it was overthrown in March 1912 by military force from a neighbouring' revolutionary province (Yunnan). The Chinese social elite had become more variegated in its cultural styles and economic activity since the late nineteenth century. But in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution it still acted with remarkable cohesion and determination in defence of its interests. The few defectors or waverers were easily deposed, without resort to assistance from Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking. While the gentry were successfully guarding against threats to their social power, they made two demands on the national and provincial leadership. The country should remain unified; and the localities should enjoy self-government. Here was another source of unresolved tension in the revolutionary aftermath. Chinese unity was both a treasured historical inheritance and, in the face of foreign designs, an urgent present necessity. There seemed to be no serious dissent from this fundamental proposition. But how was Chinese unity to be organized ? In the wake of the revolution some important political leaders and groups urged a centralized administration. They included Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking and Ts'ai O, military governor in the distant province of Yunnan. A centralized administration was a plank in some party platforms. But in the early months after the revolution, these voices were drowned out (and voted down in the national assembly) by the advocates of local self-government, who often espoused an extreme form of provincial autonomy. The idea that autonomous provinces would better serve Chinese nationalism than would a centralized state had gained considerable currency in the last years of the Ch'ing. After most provinces emerged from the revolution fully autonomous, there was little disposition to surrender Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008