《国际战略》课程教学资源：The Hegemonic Illusion Traditional Strategic Studies In Context

SPECIAL SECTION ON THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES The Hegemonic Illusion?Traditional Strategic Studies In Context STEVEN E.MILLER* John F.Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University, Cambridge,MA,UISA At the heart of Buzan Hansen's(2009)narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies,narrow and overly militarized but dominant,against a diverse set of challengers who aim to widen and deepen the field.Gradually,the challengers erode the hegemonic position of the traditionalists.This analysis reflects the assumptions, premises,and perceptions that Buzan Hansen bring to this proj- ect as protagonists in the camp of the challengers.The present article offers a traditionalist response to this narrative,suggesting that the evolution of the field looks very different when viewed through the lens of traditional strategic studies. Keywords insecurity·security·international security studies· Copenhagen School N THEIR IMPOSING INTELLECTUAL HISTORY of the field of inter- national security studies,Barry Buzan Lene Hansen (2009)attribute a singular role to the school of thought they call traditional strategic studies.It is,in the beginning of their story,the imperious hegemon,pre- occupied with bipolarity,obsessed with nuclear weapons,state-centric, policy-driven,force-oriented,and content to live within these narrow and unquestioned boundaries in its seemingly impregnable bastion at the top of the heap.But,gradually,challengers arise,new schools of thought that seek to widen and deepen'the conceptual basis of security studies-a burgeon- ing bevy of constructivists,post-structuralists,feminists,peace researchers, post-colonialists,critical analysts,all inclined to look beyond the state and to question the centrality of military security issues. Much of the narrative drive in Buzan Hansen's impressive book derives from this struggle between the dominant traditionalists and the upstart challengers.The authors'analysis emphasizes the inexorable erosion of the position of the traditionalists as the field is widened and deepened by the insti- tutionalization of other schools of thought.This is a clever way to conceive of the evolution of the field,and it enables Buzan Hansen to impose order on @The Author(s),2010.Reprints and permissions: SECURITY http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DIALOGUE SAGE Publications,http://sdi.sagepub.com Dowrloaded from sdi.sagepub al41k388RJ91Z7/%7010610388212

© The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav SAGE Publications, http://sdi.sagepub.com Vol. 41(6): 639–648, DOI: 10.1177/0967010610388212 The Hegemonic Illusion? Traditional Strategic Studies In Context STEVEN E. MILLER* John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA At the heart of Buzan & Hansen’s (2009) narrative is a conflict dynamic that pits traditional strategic studies, narrow and overly militarized but dominant, against a diverse set of challengers who aim to widen and deepen the field. Gradually, the challengers erode the hegemonic position of the traditionalists. This analysis reflects the assumptions, premises, and perceptions that Buzan & Hansen bring to this proj￾ect as protagonists in the camp of the challengers. The present article offers a traditionalist response to this narrative, suggesting that the evolution of the field looks very different when viewed through the lens of traditional strategic studies. Keywords    insecurity • security • international security studies • Copenhagen School I N THEIR IMPOSING INTELLECTUAL HISTORY of the field of inter￾national security studies, Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen (2009) attribute a singular role to the school of thought they call traditional strategic studies. It is, in the beginning of their story, the imperious hegemon, pre￾occupied with bipolarity, obsessed with nuclear weapons, state-centric, policy-driven, force-oriented, and content to live within these narrow and unquestioned boundaries in its seemingly impregnable bastion at the top of the heap. But, gradually, challengers arise, new schools of thought that seek to ‘widen and deepen’ the conceptual basis of security studies – a burgeon￾ing bevy of constructivists, post-structuralists, feminists, peace researchers, post-­colonialists, critical analysts, all inclined to look beyond the state and to question the centrality of military security issues. Much of the narrative drive in Buzan & Hansen’s impressive book derives from this struggle between the dominant traditionalists and the upstart challengers. The authors’ analysis emphasizes the inexorable erosion of the position of the traditionalists as the field is widened and deepened by the insti￾tutionalization of other schools of thought. This is a clever way to conceive of the evolution of the field, and it enables Buzan & Hansen to impose order on Special Section on The Evolution of International Security Studies Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

640 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 huge bodies of literature and to craft a coherent storyline out of a very messy intellectual map. But this is the story of the field as told by two European scholars who are viewing this history through the lens of the challengers.Their characteriza- tion of the evolution of the field is accordingly both revealing and debat- able.It reveals how traditional strategic studies is viewed by those who work within other schools of thought.It reveals how they see and define the field and the contending schools within it.But it is not the story as a traditionalist would tell it. What Does It Mean To Be Dominant? It is a core premise of the Buzan Hansen interpretation that traditional strategic studies long occupied a dominant,hegemonic position in the field of international security studies.This does not accord with a common self-image among traditionalists,who have tended to regard themselves within the aca- demic context as a small tribe of unfashionable and often unwelcome inter- lopers who fit uneasily in conventional university departments and who often feel weak and marginalized.There is a striking disjunction between the self- image of many traditionalists and the emphatic assertion of their supremacy by Buzan Hansen.An American traditionalist would likely see the evolu- tion of the field as involving a long and only partially successful struggle to establish strategic studies as a legitimate academic discipline in an academy inclined to dismiss its offerings as high journalism or mere policy jottings But,beyond this perceptual disconnect,what does it mean to say that strate- gic studies was dominant and hegemonic?Strategic studies',suggest Buzan Hansen(2009:263),'called the shots'.Who called what shots?'Strategic studies'was simply a label applied to a loose collection of individuals and institutions who worked on a particular broadly related array of substantive issues.Moreover,the traditionalists have never been a unified or homoge- nous group but are themselves divided along political,ideological,disciplin- ary,methodological,and theoretical lines-whether hawks versus doves or offensive versus defensive realists or historians versus political scientists. This was not a single dominant scholarly community but a subfield marked by cleavages and internal disagreement.There was no coherent organized movement,no governing body,no single dominant institution,no subfield policymaking apparatus,nothing anywhere that 'called the shots'or that consciously made concerted efforts to prevent others from working on dif- ferent arrays of issues from different perspectives.There was ample room for individuals to strike off in their own substantive direction or for alternative schools of thought to form-as indeed happened,a point definitively demon- strated in Buzan Hansen's book. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

640 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 huge bodies of literature and to craft a coherent storyline out of a very messy intellectual map. But this is the story of the field as told by two European scholars who are viewing this history through the lens of the challengers. Their characteriza￾tion of the evolution of the field is accordingly both revealing and debat￾able. It reveals how traditional strategic studies is viewed by those who work within other schools of thought. It reveals how they see and define the field and the contending schools within it. But it is not the story as a traditionalist would tell it. What Does It Mean To Be Dominant? It is a core premise of the Buzan & Hansen interpretation that traditional strategic studies long occupied a dominant, hegemonic position in the field of international security studies. This does not accord with a common self-image among traditionalists, who have tended to regard themselves within the aca￾demic context as a small tribe of unfashionable and often unwelcome inter￾lopers who fit uneasily in conventional university departments and who often feel weak and marginalized. There is a striking disjunction between the self￾image of many traditionalists and the emphatic assertion of their supremacy by Buzan & Hansen. An American traditionalist would likely see the evolu￾tion of the field as involving a long and only partially successful struggle to establish strategic studies as a legitimate academic discipline in an academy inclined to dismiss its offerings as high journalism or mere policy jottings. But, beyond this perceptual disconnect, what does it mean to say that strate￾gic studies was dominant and hegemonic? ‘Strategic studies’, suggest Buzan & Hansen (2009: 263), ‘called the shots’. Who called what shots? ‘Strategic studies’ was simply a label applied to a loose collection of individuals and institutions who worked on a particular broadly related array of substantive issues. Moreover, the traditionalists have never been a unified or homoge￾nous group but are themselves divided along political, ideological, disciplin￾ary, methodological, and theoretical lines – whether hawks versus doves or offensive versus defensive realists or historians versus political scientists. This was not a single dominant scholarly community but a subfield marked by cleavages and internal disagreement. There was no coherent organized movement, no governing body, no single dominant institution, no subfield policymaking apparatus, nothing anywhere that ‘called the shots’ or that consciously made concerted efforts to prevent others from working on dif￾ferent arrays of issues from different perspectives. There was ample room for individuals to strike off in their own substantive direction or for alternative schools of thought to form – as indeed happened, a point definitively demon￾strated in Buzan & Hansen’s book. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 641 Buzan Hansen identify eleven schools of thought within international security studies.Only one-neorealism-resonates with traditional strate- gic studies.The other nine represent alternatives to the traditional approach and indeed are defined collectively as challengers to it (Buzan Hansen, 2009:101).As Buzan Hansen describe in detail,the challengers are well established and have long histories-some nearly as long as strategic studies itself.They are well populated with scholars,have extensive literatures,and along the way have collected their own set of journals and institutes and net- works.These alternative schools of thought appear to be particularly deeply entrenched in European universities and seem to have long been the preferred and prevalent approaches to the study of international security studies.After reading Buzan Hansen's account of these alternative approaches,it is not obvious why the traditionalists are regarded as dominant and hegemonic, because in the academic context they do not appear to warrant singular status or to possess any commanding comparative advantage. To Buzan Hansen,the hegemonic dominance of the traditionalists is obvious and unquestioned.There is no demonstration that it is true on the basis of some clear metric.What accounts for the authors'deeply rooted perception?There are at least four mutually reinforcing answers.First,tra- ditional strategic studies has always been linked to the world of power and policy,whereas the challengers to it generally stand apart from and offer a critique of that world.Hence,traditionalists look like,and often are, players in the policy process,prominent voices in the policy debate.Those who operate in alternative schools of thought are less policy-driven or more oppositional to structures of power.They are critics of the establishment, outsiders whose normative objections to the character of the system and the content of national policy can make them seem or cause them to be more distant from the policy action.The greater proximity of the traditionalists to power leads to an image of dominance,but this should not be confused with a position of intellectual hegemony.Within the academic realm,as Buzan Hansen's book shows,traditionalists share the terrain with many other schools of thought,the methods and substantive orientations of tradition- al security studies are much criticized and heavily contested,and in many scholarly settings it is not the most popular or influential approach to the field of international security studies. A second,related,point is that the security policymaking community that so dominates the public debate is generally viewed as operating in the tradi- tionalist mode.If one regards the national security bureaucracy of the state as part of the traditionalist coalition,then it will indeed seem vastly larger, vastly richer,vastly more powerful,and vastly more influential than any other scholarly tradition.However,studying the powerful does not make a scholarly grouping dominant or hegemonic in the intellectual life of the academy.As Buzan Hansen illustrate,the traditionalist orientation is often Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 641 Buzan & Hansen identify eleven schools of thought within international security studies. Only one – neorealism – resonates with traditional strate￾gic studies. The other nine represent alternatives to the traditional approach and indeed are defined collectively as challengers to it (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 101). As Buzan & Hansen describe in detail, the challengers are well established and have long histories – some nearly as long as strategic studies itself. They are well populated with scholars, have extensive literatures, and along the way have collected their own set of journals and institutes and net￾works. These alternative schools of thought appear to be particularly deeply entrenched in European universities and seem to have long been the preferred and prevalent approaches to the study of international security studies. After reading Buzan & Hansen’s account of these alternative approaches, it is not obvious why the traditionalists are regarded as dominant and hegemonic, because in the academic context they do not appear to warrant singular status or to possess any commanding comparative advantage. To Buzan & Hansen, the hegemonic dominance of the traditionalists is obvious and unquestioned. There is no demonstration that it is true on the basis of some clear metric. What accounts for the authors’ deeply rooted perception? There are at least four mutually reinforcing answers. First, tra￾ditional strategic studies has always been linked to the world of power and policy, whereas the challengers to it generally stand apart from and offer a critique of that world. Hence, traditionalists look like, and often are, players in the policy process, prominent voices in the policy debate. Those who operate in alternative schools of thought are less policy-driven or more opposi­tional to structures of power. They are critics of the establishment, outsiders whose normative objections to the character of the system and the content of national policy can make them seem or cause them to be more distant from the policy action. The greater proximity of the traditionalists to power leads to an image of dominance, but this should not be confused with a position of intellectual hegemony. Within the academic realm, as Buzan & Hansen’s book shows, traditionalists share the terrain with many other schools of thought, the methods and substantive orientations of tradition￾al security studies are much criticized and heavily contested, and in many scholarly settings it is not the most popular or influential approach to the field of international security studies. A second, related, point is that the security policymaking community that so dominates the public debate is generally viewed as operating in the tradi￾tionalist mode. If one regards the national security bureaucracy of the state as part of the traditionalist coalition, then it will indeed seem vastly larger, vastly richer, vastly more powerful, and vastly more influential than any other scholarly tradition. However, studying the powerful does not make a scholarly grouping dominant or hegemonic in the intellectual life of the academy. As Buzan & Hansen illustrate, the traditionalist orientation is often Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

642 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 criticized on moral and theoretical grounds;both its legitimacy and its ade- quacy as an academic subfield have been questioned. Third,as Buzan Hansen rightly indicate,some of the main substantive preoccupations of traditional strategic studies-notably nuclear-weapons issues and the superpower rivalry-were among the most compelling issues on the public policy agenda during the Cold War era.Hence,the traditional- ists tended to be deeply involved in the most visible,controversial,signifi- cant debates and the most prominent policy fights.Challengers are usually working in different substantive and conceptual contexts and must battle for attention,recognition,and policy focus.Alternative schools of thought gen- erally believe that more attention should be given to their concerns but find the actual public policy agenda preoccupied with military security and grand strategic issues that are the staple of traditional security studies.But,again,to note that traditionalists work on issues that generally get more public policy focus is not the same thing as establishing that within academe traditionalists have occupied a hegemonic place. Fourth,the perception that traditional security studies is dominant may derive in part from the fact that-apart from realism-the other schools of thought define themselves to a striking degree in reference to traditional strategic studies.As Buzan Hansen (2009:101)write,the alternatives are 'those approaches which in various ways challenged Strategic Studies.These approaches had one thing in common-namely their criticism of Strategic Studies'.In this framework,the traditionalists are in the center of the bull's eye,inevitably and inherently central to the world-view of scholars and schools of thought who define themselves as alternatives or contrasts to traditional strategic studies. Whatever the explanation,the assumption of unquestioned hegemonic dominance by traditional strategic studies is a central element in Buzan Hansen's understanding of the history and evolution of the field.It conveys a sense of the field as a contest involving nine plucky Davids taking on a single overweening Goliath.This may be an attractive notion for the challengers, but it is not how things look from a traditionalist perspective. A Narrow Substantive Agenda? A second fundamental plank in Buzan Hansen's telling of the story is that traditional strategic studies is marked by a narrow substantive ambit in need of the 'widening and deepening'advocated by the challengers.The tradition- alists were and are devoted to a military state-centric agenda and are wedded to assumptions of rationality.Alternative schools of thought arose 'to chal- lenge military-state centrism'(Buzan Hansen,2009:187). What is the substantive domain of traditional strategic studies?There is Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

642 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 criticized on moral and theoretical grounds; both its legitimacy and its ade￾quacy as an academic subfield have been questioned. Third, as Buzan & Hansen rightly indicate, some of the main substantive preoccupations of traditional strategic studies – notably nuclear-weapons issues and the superpower rivalry – were among the most compelling issues on the public policy agenda during the Cold War era. Hence, the traditional￾ists tended to be deeply involved in the most visible, controversial, signifi￾cant debates and the most prominent policy fights. Challengers are usually working in different substantive and conceptual contexts and must battle for attention, recognition, and policy focus. Alternative schools of thought gen￾erally believe that more attention should be given to their concerns but find the actual public policy agenda preoccupied with military security and grand strategic issues that are the staple of traditional security studies. But, again, to note that traditionalists work on issues that generally get more public policy focus is not the same thing as establishing that within academe traditionalists have occupied a hegemonic place. Fourth, the perception that traditional security studies is dominant may derive in part from the fact that – apart from realism – the other schools of thought define themselves to a striking degree in reference to traditional strategic studies. As Buzan & Hansen (2009: 101) write, the alternatives are ‘those approaches which in various ways challenged Strategic Studies. These approaches had one thing in common – namely their criticism of Strategic Studies’. In this framework, the traditionalists are in the center of the bull’s eye, inevitably and inherently central to the world-view of scholars and schools of thought who define themselves as alternatives or contrasts to traditional strategic studies. Whatever the explanation, the assumption of unquestioned hegemonic dominance by traditional strategic studies is a central element in Buzan & Hansen’s understanding of the history and evolution of the field. It conveys a sense of the field as a contest involving nine plucky Davids taking on a single overweening Goliath. This may be an attractive notion for the challengers, but it is not how things look from a traditionalist perspective. A Narrow Substantive Agenda? A second fundamental plank in Buzan & Hansen’s telling of the story is that traditional strategic studies is marked by a narrow substantive ambit in need of the ‘widening and deepening’ advocated by the challengers. The tradition￾alists were and are devoted to a military state-centric agenda and are wedded to assumptions of rationality. Alternative schools of thought arose ‘to chal￾lenge military-state centrism’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 187). What is the substantive domain of traditional strategic studies? There is Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012

Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 643 no single precise definition,but Buzan Hansen (2009:12)invoke the well- known formulation that the focus is on 'the use,threat,and control of force'. In their telling,during the formative Cold War years this translated into a preoccupation with superpower rivalry and nuclear technology.Security analysis during the Cold War',they write,'was almost synonymous with studying US-Soviet relations and a bipolar system with enmity between two superpowers whose direct and covert influence stretched around the globe'(Buzan Hansen,2009:50).It is certainly true that traditional strate- gic studies has focused heavily(though not exclusively)on the threat or use of force by states.The traditionalists did lavish attention on the superpower competition and on the nuclear postures embedded so dangerously at the center of the Soviet-American rivalry.Buzan Hansen's portrait is accurate as far as it goes. But this picture does not fully capture the range of interests of the tradition- alists.It reflects the state of the Cold War world more than the conceptual state of the subfield.Rather,traditionalists have been interested in the politi- cal uses of organized violence.There is a spectrum of force that ranges from the manipulation of threats,targeted killings,or very small applications of force at one end to major-power war or nuclear war at the other.In between are insurgencies and counterinsurgency,guerrilla campaigns,and varieties of limited war.There is also a spectrum of actors who might employ force for political ends,including terrorists,factions,secessionists or other substate actors,private contractors,states,coalitions,and even international institu- tions(for example,UN peacekeeping operations).Connecting the one spec- trum to the other produces a range of phenomena of interest to traditionalists: deterrent and compellent strategies that rely on the effective deployment of threats;terrorist attacks;discrete and limited uses of force(such as drone attacks intended to target specific human beings);intrastate conflict (often deriving from weak or failed states);interstate conflict (of which there have been a number since the end of the Cold War);and nuclear use or nuclear war (hence the concern about nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.)There is no linear relationship between actors and the scale of force:great powers may use force in very limited ways;terrorists could use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.There is also a wide range of purposes for which force may be used.Some involve efforts to save lives and keep the peace.Some involve diplomatic signaling and the communication of threats. Some involve efforts to save or destroy friendly or hostile governments,to obtain power or to overturn those who are in power.Some involve gaining access to or control over important resources.Some involve old-fashioned self-defense.Some involve greed or revenge or conquest. This substantive framework has easily accommodated the evolving agenda of security issues after the Cold War.A prominent strand of work in the field over the past 20 years,for example,has focused on the problem of inter- Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012

Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 643 no single precise definition, but Buzan & Hansen (2009: 12) invoke the well￾known formulation that the focus is on ‘the use, threat, and control of force’. In their telling, during the formative Cold War years this translated into a preoccupation with superpower rivalry and nuclear technology. ‘Security analysis during the Cold War’, they write, ‘was almost synonymous with studying US–Soviet relations and a bipolar system with enmity between two superpowers whose direct and covert influence stretched around the globe’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 50). It is certainly true that traditional strate￾gic studies has focused heavily (though not exclusively) on the threat or use of force by states. The traditionalists did lavish attention on the superpower competition and on the nuclear postures embedded so dangerously at the center of the Soviet–American rivalry. Buzan & Hansen’s portrait is accurate as far as it goes. But this picture does not fully capture the range of interests of the tradition￾alists. It reflects the state of the Cold War world more than the conceptual state of the subfield. Rather, traditionalists have been interested in the politi￾cal uses of organized violence. There is a spectrum of force that ranges from the manipulation of threats, targeted killings, or very small applications of force at one end to major-power war or nuclear war at the other. In between are insurgencies and counterinsurgency, guerrilla campaigns, and varieties of limited war. There is also a spectrum of actors who might employ force for political ends, including terrorists, factions, secessionists or other substate actors, private contractors, states, coalitions, and even international institu￾tions (for example, UN peacekeeping operations). Connecting the one spec￾trum to the other produces a range of phenomena of interest to traditionalists: deterrent and compellent strategies that rely on the effective deployment of threats; terrorist attacks; discrete and limited uses of force (such as drone attacks intended to target specific human beings); intrastate conflict (often deriving from weak or failed states); interstate conflict (of which there have been a number since the end of the Cold War); and nuclear use or nuclear war (hence the concern about nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.) There is no linear relationship between actors and the scale of force: great powers may use force in very limited ways; terrorists could use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. There is also a wide range of purposes for which force may be used. Some involve efforts to save lives and keep the peace. Some involve diplomatic signaling and the communication of threats. Some involve efforts to save or destroy friendly or hostile governments, to obtain power or to overturn those who are in power. Some involve gaining access to or control over important resources. Some involve old-fashioned self-defense. Some involve greed or revenge or conquest. This substantive framework has easily accommodated the evolving agenda of security issues after the Cold War. A prominent strand of work in the field over the past 20 years, for example, has focused on the problem of inter￾Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012