NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION GRAND STRATEGY AND POWER TRANSITIONS What We Can Learn from Great Britain CHARLES A.KUPCHAN,GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JULY 20II This essay draws lessons for great-power grand strategy from the history of Great Britain and its effort to manage the hegemonic power transitions that spawned World War I and World War II.It focuses on two main issues.The first is the diplomacy of managing power transitions.At the turn of the twentieth century,Britain faced a rapidly changing strategic landscape.London had to deal with the simultaneous rise of three major powers-the United States,Germany,and Japan.The Boer uprising in South Africa meanwhile added to the difficulty of sustaining imperial commitments with limited resources.The essay examines what went right and what went wrong as Britain struggled to adjust its grand strategy to a rapidly changing strategic landscape.With the United States,Britain practiced a deft diplomacy that succeeded in replacing enmity with amity. With Japan,Britain struck an alliance that constrained Japanese ambition and protected British positions in the Pacific-but that then lapsed after two decades.As for its relationship with Germany,Britain adjusted with impressive alacrity to the growing size of the German battle fleet and its impact on the balance of power in Europe.Nonetheless,Britain was unable to convince Germany to rein in its ambition and soon found itself enmeshed in a great-power war.' The analysis in this essay underscores the central role found themselves at war two decades later.Engagement played by strategic restraint in facilitating rapprochement failed to avert war in the long run.And with Germany, between Britain and the United States.Britain's readiness Britain revamped its grand strategy in response to to engage the United States and accommodate its rise Germany's naval buildup,relying on a combination of fleet cleared the way for a peaceful transition of power.However, redistribution,naval building,and diplomacy to deter the essay also underscores the difficulties inherent in Germany.London was nevertheless unable to convince averting conflict during power transitions.Britain pursued Germany to give up its bid for hegemony in Europe.A rapprochement with Japan,and the Anglo-Japanese strategy of deterrence led to a mounting naval race,which Alliance was successfully tested during World War I.But triggered hegemonic war. the coupling ended soon thereafter-and Britain and Japan
Grand Strategy and Power Transitions What We Can Learn from Great Britain Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown University and Council on Foreign Relations July 2011 This essay draws lessons for great-power grand strategy from the history of Great Britain and its effort to manage the hegemonic power transitions that spawned World War I and World War II. It focuses on two main issues. The first is the diplomacy of managing power transitions. At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain faced a rapidly changing strategic landscape. London had to deal with the simultaneous rise of three major powers – the United States, Germany, and Japan. The Boer uprising in South Africa meanwhile added to the difficulty of sustaining imperial commitments with limited resources. The essay examines what went right and what went wrong as Britain struggled to adjust its grand strategy to a rapidly changing strategic landscape. With the United States, Britain practiced a deft diplomacy that succeeded in replacing enmity with amity. With Japan, Britain struck an alliance that constrained Japanese ambition and protected British positions in the Pacific – but that then lapsed after two decades. As for its relationship with Germany, Britain adjusted with impressive alacrity to the growing size of the German battle fleet and its impact on the balance of power in Europe. Nonetheless, Britain was unable to convince Germany to rein in its ambition and soon found itself enmeshed in a great-power war.1 The analysis in this essay underscores the central role played by strategic restraint in facilitating rapprochement between Britain and the United States. Britain’s readiness to engage the United States and accommodate its rise cleared the way for a peaceful transition of power. However, the essay also underscores the difficulties inherent in averting conflict during power transitions. Britain pursued rapprochement with Japan, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was successfully tested during World War I. But the coupling ended soon thereafter – and Britain and Japan found themselves at war two decades later. Engagement failed to avert war in the long run. And with Germany, Britain revamped its grand strategy in response to Germany’s naval buildup, relying on a combination of fleet redistribution, naval building, and diplomacy to deter Germany. London was nevertheless unable to convince Germany to give up its bid for hegemony in Europe. A strategy of deterrence led to a mounting naval race, which triggered hegemonic war. New America Foundation
The second major focus of this essay is the domestic transition in the global distribution of power can be politics of grand strategy.During the years prior to World handled with equal equanimity and tranquility.On the War I,the British government faced contradictory other hand,Great Britain's deft diplomacy did not succeed pressures on the home front -rising anti-German in preventing the outbreak of World War I,largely because sentiment on the one hand,but aversion to a continental Germany,for domestic reasons,was unwilling-or unable commitment and strong support for the defense of overseas -to practice strategic restraint and calibrate the scope of its imperial commitments on the other.Nonetheless,London geopolitical ambition.The result was a classic insecurity did an impressive job of managing these pressures, spiral that escalated to war.The inter-war era provides undertaking a timely redistribution and augmentation of equally sobering lessons about the potential for domestic the fleet,preparing for a continental commitment,and economic shock to produce strategic pathologies. relying on diplomacy to reduce threats in the periphery. Despite this strategic reorientation,however,Britain Managing Power Transition: nonetheless found itself at war in 1914.The main cause was British Grand Strategy and the Rise of the domestic politics of grand strategy in Germany,a factor the United States,Japan,and Germany over which Britain had little influence.The outbreak of By the end of the 18oos,Britain faced a power transition on World War I underscores the intimate connection between three fronts:the ascent of the United States in the Western policy and politics and the degree to which domestic Hemisphere;the rise of Japan as a Pacific naval power;and pressures can overwhelm and make short shrift of sound Germany's decision to draw on its mounting economic and strategic calculations. industrial might to build a world-class fleet of battleships. Britain responded to each of these three challengers in a During the years prior to World War II,domestic politics different way.It accommodated the United States, again had a profound effect on the conduct of grand advancing rapprochement with its longstanding adversary strategy.The political consequences of the economic and laying the foundation for the strategic partnership that dislocation caused by the Great Depression produced has lasted to this day.London fashioned a formal alliance under-balancing in Great Britain;preoccupied with its with Japan,with the two powers combining their naval economic fragility,London refused to rearm until it was too assets to ensure superiority in the Pacific.The Anglo- late to deter or even effectively prepare for war with Nazi Japanese alliance,however,ultimately proved hollow as Germany.Other status quo powers similarly turned inward each country saw the other as taking advantage of it for and avoided alliance commitments.At the same time, unilateral gain.With Germany,Britain practiced economic duress produced virulent strains of nationalism deterrence,making clear to Berlin that it intended to do in both Germany and Japan.The combination of under- what was necessary to retain naval supremacy in the balancing by status quo states and excessive ambition European theater.Germany saw Britain as seeking to block among revisionist states produced gross power its rise,not defend its legitimate security interests.A classic asymmetries-with disastrous consequences. spiral ensued.The essay briefly summarizes these three episodes and then draws lessons. This essay's historical reflections provide cause for both optimism and pessimism about the coming transition in Anglo-American Rapprochement,1895-1906 the distribution of global power.On the one hand,Great The United States and Great Britain were long-term bitter Britain peacefully ceded global hegemony to the United enemies.The American colonies revolted against British States,marking the only peaceful power transition in rule in 1775 and the two parties again went to war in 1812. history.Perhaps the rise of China and the coming Amid the U.S.Civil War,Britain came close to intervening NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 2
new america foundation page 2 The second major focus of this essay is the domestic politics of grand strategy. During the years prior to World War I, the British government faced contradictory pressures on the home front – rising anti-German sentiment on the one hand, but aversion to a continental commitment and strong support for the defense of overseas imperial commitments on the other. Nonetheless, London did an impressive job of managing these pressures, undertaking a timely redistribution and augmentation of the fleet, preparing for a continental commitment, and relying on diplomacy to reduce threats in the periphery. Despite this strategic reorientation, however, Britain nonetheless found itself at war in 1914. The main cause was the domestic politics of grand strategy in Germany, a factor over which Britain had little influence. The outbreak of World War I underscores the intimate connection between policy and politics and the degree to which domestic pressures can overwhelm and make short shrift of sound strategic calculations. During the years prior to World War II, domestic politics again had a profound effect on the conduct of grand strategy. The political consequences of the economic dislocation caused by the Great Depression produced under-balancing in Great Britain; preoccupied with its economic fragility, London refused to rearm until it was too late to deter or even effectively prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Other status quo powers similarly turned inward and avoided alliance commitments. At the same time, economic duress produced virulent strains of nationalism in both Germany and Japan. The combination of underbalancing by status quo states and excessive ambition among revisionist states produced gross power asymmetries – with disastrous consequences. This essay’s historical reflections provide cause for both optimism and pessimism about the coming transition in the distribution of global power. On the one hand, Great Britain peacefully ceded global hegemony to the United States, marking the only peaceful power transition in history. Perhaps the rise of China and the coming transition in the global distribution of power can be handled with equal equanimity and tranquility. On the other hand, Great Britain’s deft diplomacy did not succeed in preventing the outbreak of World War I, largely because Germany, for domestic reasons, was unwilling – or unable – to practice strategic restraint and calibrate the scope of its geopolitical ambition. The result was a classic insecurity spiral that escalated to war. The inter-war era provides equally sobering lessons about the potential for domestic economic shock to produce strategic pathologies. Managing Power Transition: British Grand Strategy and the Rise of the United States, Japan, and Germany By the end of the 1800s, Britain faced a power transition on three fronts: the ascent of the United States in the Western Hemisphere; the rise of Japan as a Pacific naval power; and Germany’s decision to draw on its mounting economic and industrial might to build a world-class fleet of battleships. Britain responded to each of these three challengers in a different way. It accommodated the United States, advancing rapprochement with its longstanding adversary and laying the foundation for the strategic partnership that has lasted to this day. London fashioned a formal alliance with Japan, with the two powers combining their naval assets to ensure superiority in the Pacific. The AngloJapanese alliance, however, ultimately proved hollow as each country saw the other as taking advantage of it for unilateral gain. With Germany, Britain practiced deterrence, making clear to Berlin that it intended to do what was necessary to retain naval supremacy in the European theater. Germany saw Britain as seeking to block its rise, not defend its legitimate security interests. A classic spiral ensued. The essay briefly summarizes these three episodes and then draws lessons. Anglo-American Rapprochement, 1895-1906 The United States and Great Britain were long-term bitter enemies. The American colonies revolted against British rule in 1775 and the two parties again went to war in 1812. Amid the U.S. Civil War, Britain came close to intervening
on behalf of the Confederacy;London preferred a weak and the border between Alaska and Canada.Following divided America to one whose ascent might come at the settlement by arbitration of the Alaska/Canada boundary in expense of British hegemony.After the Union's victory and 1903,President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the for decades thereafter,the United States and Great Britain dispute "was the last serious trouble between ourselves and remained watchful antagonists.Britain's naval superiority the British Empire."3 In 1905 Roosevelt went further, in the Western Atlantic and its imperial presence in North writing that an Anglo-American war was "practically and South America stood in the way of the United States' impossible now"and "will grow entirely so as the years go growing interest in extending its sway throughout the by.In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into Western Hemisphere. account a war with England.I treat it as out of the question."4 Similar attitudes prevailed in London.In A border dispute that broke out between Venezuela and reflecting on the prospect of war with the United States, British Guiana in 1895 was to serve as the turning point in A.H.Lee,the civil lord of the Admiralty,noted that "I Anglo-American relations.In the midst of growing cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to nationalist sentiment in the United States,President contemplate it under any circumstances."5 Grover Cleveland,backed by Congress,insisted that London submit the dispute to arbitration with the United Anglo-American rapprochement started in the realm of States.London initially refused,rejecting Washington's high politics;at the outset,it was exclusively diplomats and claim that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a high office-holders who negotiated the bargains that voice in the dispute.But after the prospect of war emerged, enabled the two countries to back away from rivalry.But by London promptly backed down,and agreed to submit its 1898,advancing reconciliation cleared the way for broader dispute with Venezuela to an arbitration tribunal.The main societal engagement in the process of rapprochement. impetus behind the change of course was the Admiralty's Traders and financiers with vested interests in transatlantic insistence that Great Britain did not have sufficient naval commerce became vocal proponents of improved relations. resources to go to war with the United States.Accordingly, After an outpouring of British support for the U.S.victory London had little choice but to turn to diplomacy to over Spain,the New York Chamber of Commerce held a accommodate Washington's demands.As Kenneth Bourne dinner meeting at which the British and American flags describes London's predicament,"Great Britain's resources were hanging side-by-side;the participants sang both"God were now stretched beyond their limit."Stephen Rock Save the Queen”and“The Star-Spangled Banner..” agrees that,"Britain's cultivation of American friendship Branches of the Anglo-American Committee were founded was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation,a in London and New York to lobby for improved relations cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic and greater cooperation.6 position."2 The media and mobilized citizenry also played a growing London's conciliation of Washington in 1896 was an role in broadening and deepening societal support for explicit effort to use strategic restraint to dampen Anglo-American rapprochement.After the Spanish. geopolitical rivalry with the United States.It succeeded. American War,according to Robert George Neale,"Public During the next few years,London and Washington traded opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost concessions and reached accords on a host of issues, unanimous in its support for United States action against including fishing rights in the Bering Sea,the Spanish- Spain in both the Caribbean and Pacific....Leaders and American War and U.S.imperial expansion in the Pacific, articles from all the major newspapers and journals the construction and fortification of the Panama Canal,and practically without exception were in favour of America's NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 3
new america foundation page 3 on behalf of the Confederacy; London preferred a weak and divided America to one whose ascent might come at the expense of British hegemony. After the Union’s victory and for decades thereafter, the United States and Great Britain remained watchful antagonists. Britain’s naval superiority in the Western Atlantic and its imperial presence in North and South America stood in the way of the United States’ growing interest in extending its sway throughout the Western Hemisphere. A border dispute that broke out between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1895 was to serve as the turning point in Anglo-American relations. In the midst of growing nationalist sentiment in the United States, President Grover Cleveland, backed by Congress, insisted that London submit the dispute to arbitration with the United States. London initially refused, rejecting Washington’s claim that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a voice in the dispute. But after the prospect of war emerged, London promptly backed down, and agreed to submit its dispute with Venezuela to an arbitration tribunal. The main impetus behind the change of course was the Admiralty’s insistence that Great Britain did not have sufficient naval resources to go to war with the United States. Accordingly, London had little choice but to turn to diplomacy to accommodate Washington’s demands. As Kenneth Bourne describes London’s predicament, “Great Britain’s resources were now stretched beyond their limit.” Stephen Rock agrees that, “Britain’s cultivation of American friendship was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation, a cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic position.”2 London’s conciliation of Washington in 1896 was an explicit effort to use strategic restraint to dampen geopolitical rivalry with the United States. It succeeded. During the next few years, London and Washington traded concessions and reached accords on a host of issues, including fishing rights in the Bering Sea, the SpanishAmerican War and U.S. imperial expansion in the Pacific, the construction and fortification of the Panama Canal, and the border between Alaska and Canada. Following settlement by arbitration of the Alaska/Canada boundary in 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the dispute “was the last serious trouble between ourselves and the British Empire.”3 In 1905 Roosevelt went further, writing that an Anglo-American war was “practically impossible now” and “will grow entirely so as the years go by. In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into account a war with England. I treat it as out of the question.”4 Similar attitudes prevailed in London. In reflecting on the prospect of war with the United States, A.H. Lee, the civil lord of the Admiralty, noted that “I cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to contemplate it under any circumstances.”5 Anglo-American rapprochement started in the realm of high politics; at the outset, it was exclusively diplomats and high office-holders who negotiated the bargains that enabled the two countries to back away from rivalry. But by 1898, advancing reconciliation cleared the way for broader societal engagement in the process of rapprochement. Traders and financiers with vested interests in transatlantic commerce became vocal proponents of improved relations. After an outpouring of British support for the U.S. victory over Spain, the New York Chamber of Commerce held a dinner meeting at which the British and American flags were hanging side-by-side; the participants sang both “God Save the Queen” and “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Branches of the Anglo-American Committee were founded in London and New York to lobby for improved relations and greater cooperation.6 The media and mobilized citizenry also played a growing role in broadening and deepening societal support for Anglo-American rapprochement. After the SpanishAmerican War, according to Robert George Neale, “Public opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost unanimous in its support for United States action against Spain in both the Caribbean and Pacific. . . . Leaders and articles from all the major newspapers and journals practically without exception were in favour of America’s
actions.Addresses were received by the government from The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,1902-1923 numerous political associations in support of Anglo- At the same time that the rise of the United States American friendship."7 The same was true of the media challenged British interests in the Western Hemisphere, and public in the United States.One diplomat in the expansion of the Japanese fleet threatened Britain's Washington observed that "unanimous,or almost naval position in the Pacific.As in the Atlantic,Britain unanimous support for England is now manifested by the turned to diplomacy to address its emerging naval Press throughout the length and breadth of the country... deficiencies in the Pacific.It concluded an alliance with pass[ing]the bound of moderation in as great degree as the Japan in 1902,which lasted until 1923.During the bulk of dislike and distrust of yesterday."8 these two decades,the alliance proved to be a vital tool for preserving cooperative relations between the two powers A shared sense of cultural commonality played an and for coordinating naval operations against shared important role in consolidating rapprochement.Indeed,a threats.After World War I,however,the alliance frayed. "cult of Anglo-Saxonism"was emerging in both Britain and Whereas cooperation between Britain and the United States the United States by the turn of the century.British elites only deepened over time,Britain and Japan drifted apart in regularly spoke of a"common kinship of race"and "ties of the interwar era.The two powers were allies in World War blood,"and began referring to the prospect of war with the I,but direct adversaries in World War II. United States as a"civil war"or "fratricidal strife."9 On the other side of the Atlantic,Richard Olney,who had served as The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 neutralized secretary of state under President William McKinley, the threat that the growing Japanese fleet posed to British referred to Britain as America's "best friend"and noted interests in the Far East and provided the Royal Navy,in “the close community·.·in origin,speech,thought,, combination with the Japanese fleet,sufficient strength to literature,institutions,ideals-in the kind and degree of retain superiority over Russia and France,allies since 1892. civilization enjoyed by both." In return,Japan earned British protection of its home islands and London's ostensible backing of Japan's These shifts in public discourse helped transform the territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula,which had identities of opposition which had fueled antagonism into been fueled by Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of the identities of friendship which consolidated 1984-1895.London pressed Tokyo to extend the pact to rapprochement.By 1901,Britain had removed the United include the Malay peninsula and the Indian Ocean,but States from the two-power standard,effectively Japanese leaders insisted on restricting the alliance to acknowledging that the Royal Navy was no longer northeast Asia. contemplating operations against the United States.The last contingent of British regulars left Canada in 1906.By Amid Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- the early 19oos,the U.S.General Staff concluded that war 1905,the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was broadened.Tokyo with Britain was"the least of all possible conflicts." agreed to accede to London's request to extend the pact to include India,while London acquiesced to Tokyo's de facto It would not be until the 194os that Britain and the United occupation of Korea.The alliance was again revised and States fashioned the "special relationship"of today.But extended in 191,with Japan effectively winning Britain's rapprochement between 1985 and 1906 laid the foundation acceptance of its annexation of Korea in 1910.Britain was for strategic partnership-and made possible the first motivated primarily by its desire to maintain influence over peaceful power transition in history. Japan and the imperative,given Britain's need to concentrate its naval strength against the rising German NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 4
new america foundation page 4 actions. Addresses were received by the government from numerous political associations in support of AngloAmerican friendship.”7 The same was true of the media and public in the United States. One diplomat in Washington observed that “unanimous, or almost unanimous support for England is now manifested by the Press throughout the length and breadth of the country . . . pass[ing] the bound of moderation in as great degree as the dislike and distrust of yesterday.”8 A shared sense of cultural commonality played an important role in consolidating rapprochement. Indeed, a “cult of Anglo-Saxonism” was emerging in both Britain and the United States by the turn of the century. British elites regularly spoke of a “common kinship of race” and “ties of blood,” and began referring to the prospect of war with the United States as a “civil war” or “fratricidal strife.”9 On the other side of the Atlantic, Richard Olney, who had served as secretary of state under President William McKinley, referred to Britain as America’s “best friend” and noted “the close community . . . in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals – in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both.”10 These shifts in public discourse helped transform the identities of opposition which had fueled antagonism into the identities of friendship which consolidated rapprochement. By 1901, Britain had removed the United States from the two-power standard, effectively acknowledging that the Royal Navy was no longer contemplating operations against the United States. The last contingent of British regulars left Canada in 1906. By the early 1900s, the U.S. General Staff concluded that war with Britain was “the least of all possible conflicts.”11 It would not be until the 1940s that Britain and the United States fashioned the “special relationship” of today. But rapprochement between 1985 and 1906 laid the foundation for strategic partnership – and made possible the first peaceful power transition in history. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923 At the same time that the rise of the United States challenged British interests in the Western Hemisphere, the expansion of the Japanese fleet threatened Britain’s naval position in the Pacific. As in the Atlantic, Britain turned to diplomacy to address its emerging naval deficiencies in the Pacific. It concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902, which lasted until 1923. During the bulk of these two decades, the alliance proved to be a vital tool for preserving cooperative relations between the two powers and for coordinating naval operations against shared threats. After World War I, however, the alliance frayed. Whereas cooperation between Britain and the United States only deepened over time, Britain and Japan drifted apart in the interwar era. The two powers were allies in World War I, but direct adversaries in World War II. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 neutralized the threat that the growing Japanese fleet posed to British interests in the Far East and provided the Royal Navy, in combination with the Japanese fleet, sufficient strength to retain superiority over Russia and France, allies since 1892. In return, Japan earned British protection of its home islands and London’s ostensible backing of Japan’s territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula, which had been fueled by Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1984-1895. London pressed Tokyo to extend the pact to include the Malay peninsula and the Indian Ocean, but Japanese leaders insisted on restricting the alliance to northeast Asia. Amid Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was broadened. Tokyo agreed to accede to London’s request to extend the pact to include India, while London acquiesced to Tokyo’s de facto occupation of Korea. The alliance was again revised and extended in 1911, with Japan effectively winning Britain’s acceptance of its annexation of Korea in 1910. Britain was motivated primarily by its desire to maintain influence over Japan and the imperative, given Britain’s need to concentrate its naval strength against the rising German
threat,of minimizing naval requirements in the Pacific. assistance in protecting Britain's potentially exposed According to the Committee of Imperial Defence,the imperial interests.Britain saw Japan as capitalizing on the alliance helped ensure that"the risk of attack by Japan [is] alliance to advance its territorial ambitions in the region; excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be London's ambassador characterized Japan as "a frankly provided against."The alliance was put to the test during opportunistic,not to say selfish,country."5 Rather than World War I,with impressive results.Japan attacked-and sending signals of benign intent through the practice of proceeded to occupy-German positions in the Far East strategic restraint,Britain and Japan appeared to each other and,although it declined requests to send ground troops to to be seeking unilateral advantage.The alliance was seen by the European theater,Tokyo did dispatch naval vessels to both parties as an instrumental pact of convenience,not a patrol and escort convoys in the Indian Ocean and diplomatic vehicle for advancing lasting rapprochement. Mediterranean. Second,a lack of transparency encouraged the parties- The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was again renewed in 1921. Britain in particular-to question Japanese intent.As a However,despite the concrete strategic cooperation that member of Parliament noted,"In making a treaty with the took place during World War I,the pact was effectively Japanese we were making a treaty with a people who were defunct by the close of World War I.It did not formally more or less an enigma to us."16 Admiral Cyprian Bridge, lapse until the Washington Naval Treaty came into effect in one of the British officers overseeing naval cooperation with 1923.But Britain decided to renew the alliance mainly his Japanese counterparts complained about "the innate because,according to the Foreign Office,"it affords us the suspiciousness of the Oriental."7 Although Japanese elites only means of exercising a restraining and moderating had a better sense of British intentions due to the influence on Japanese ambitions.In similar fashion, democratic nature of its government,they sensed British Japan saw the alliance principally as a means of ratifying its distrust and discomfort.The resulting resentment eroded territorial gains in the Far East and preventing its strategic Tokyo's confidence in the benign nature of British isolation among the major powers.By the time the alliance intentions. ended,both parties were well aware that it had lost much of its former political and strategic consequence.Britain and Finally,the absence of cultural commonality stood in the Japan remained on cordial terms throughout the 192os.But way of rapprochement.While rapprochement between the following decade was another matter altogether;absent Britain and the United States benefited from a shared sense the alliance with Britain,Japan soon found itself in direct of Anglo-Saxon heritage,the opposite was true of Britain geopolitical competition with the Western powers. and Japan.Of the naval prowess of the Japanese,Admiral According to David Steeds,the end of the alliance"was one Bridge admitted that,"I admire them greatly.""But,"he of the main causes of the breakdown of the 193os and the continued,"I feel no social or moral affinity with them and sequence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.4 I would rather live with any branch of the Caucasian race, even the Russian,than I would them."This type of overt Alliance between Britain and Japan failed to produce a racism appeared frequently in official and public discourse peaceful power transition for three main reasons.First, -and the Japanese were well aware of it.Indeed,Japan although British and Japanese elites concluded a formal pressed for a clause on racial equality to be included in the strategic pact,each party saw the other as pursuing founding documents of the League of Nations-but failed. individual gain,not pursuing common interests.Japan saw A profound sense of cultural and racial difference persisted Britain as taking advantage of the alliance to reduce its throughout the two decades of alliance-and stood in the naval presence in the Far East and to secure Japanese way of a deeper strategic partnership.As Ian Nish NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 5
new america foundation page 5 threat, of minimizing naval requirements in the Pacific. According to the Committee of Imperial Defence, the alliance helped ensure that “the risk of attack by Japan [is] excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be provided against.”12 The alliance was put to the test during World War I, with impressive results. Japan attacked – and proceeded to occupy – German positions in the Far East and, although it declined requests to send ground troops to the European theater, Tokyo did dispatch naval vessels to patrol and escort convoys in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was again renewed in 1921. However, despite the concrete strategic cooperation that took place during World War I, the pact was effectively defunct by the close of World War I. It did not formally lapse until the Washington Naval Treaty came into effect in 1923. But Britain decided to renew the alliance mainly because, according to the Foreign Office, “it affords us the only means of exercising a restraining and moderating influence on Japanese ambitions.”13 In similar fashion, Japan saw the alliance principally as a means of ratifying its territorial gains in the Far East and preventing its strategic isolation among the major powers. By the time the alliance ended, both parties were well aware that it had lost much of its former political and strategic consequence. Britain and Japan remained on cordial terms throughout the 1920s. But the following decade was another matter altogether; absent the alliance with Britain, Japan soon found itself in direct geopolitical competition with the Western powers. According to David Steeds, the end of the alliance “was one of the main causes of the breakdown of the 1930s and the sequence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.”14 Alliance between Britain and Japan failed to produce a peaceful power transition for three main reasons. First, although British and Japanese elites concluded a formal strategic pact, each party saw the other as pursuing individual gain, not pursuing common interests. Japan saw Britain as taking advantage of the alliance to reduce its naval presence in the Far East and to secure Japanese assistance in protecting Britain’s potentially exposed imperial interests. Britain saw Japan as capitalizing on the alliance to advance its territorial ambitions in the region; London’s ambassador characterized Japan as “a frankly opportunistic, not to say selfish, country.”15 Rather than sending signals of benign intent through the practice of strategic restraint, Britain and Japan appeared to each other to be seeking unilateral advantage. The alliance was seen by both parties as an instrumental pact of convenience, not a diplomatic vehicle for advancing lasting rapprochement. Second, a lack of transparency encouraged the parties – Britain in particular – to question Japanese intent. As a member of Parliament noted, “In making a treaty with the Japanese we were making a treaty with a people who were more or less an enigma to us.”16 Admiral Cyprian Bridge, one of the British officers overseeing naval cooperation with his Japanese counterparts complained about “the innate suspiciousness of the Oriental.”17 Although Japanese elites had a better sense of British intentions due to the democratic nature of its government, they sensed British distrust and discomfort. The resulting resentment eroded Tokyo’s confidence in the benign nature of British intentions. Finally, the absence of cultural commonality stood in the way of rapprochement. While rapprochement between Britain and the United States benefited from a shared sense of Anglo-Saxon heritage, the opposite was true of Britain and Japan. Of the naval prowess of the Japanese, Admiral Bridge admitted that, “I admire them greatly.” “But,” he continued, “I feel no social or moral affinity with them and I would rather live with any branch of the Caucasian race, even the Russian, than I would them.”18 This type of overt racism appeared frequently in official and public discourse – and the Japanese were well aware of it. Indeed, Japan pressed for a clause on racial equality to be included in the founding documents of the League of Nations – but failed. A profound sense of cultural and racial difference persisted throughout the two decades of alliance – and stood in the way of a deeper strategic partnership. As Ian Nish