218 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 remained an ideal,and new national institutions,such as a parliament and a presidential office,were emerging and acquiring legitimacy.In this situation,the achievements of the national leadership-or their failures- were still important to all revolutionaries and affected the general po- litical climate. In the first year after the outbreak of the revolution,leading revolution- aries engaged sequentially in three political roles:as conspirators against Ch'ing rule,as office-holders and administrative authorities during and after the revolution,and as organizers of an open political party seeking victory in a national election. The rapid spread of revolution under a republican banner owed much to the propaganda and diffuse conspiratorial network of the Tung- meng hui and associated groups.The prestige of the veteran Tung-meng hui leadership was greatly enhanced by revolutionary success.But,as already noted,the revolutionary provincial governments were in most cases swamped by the ready participation of gentry politicians and army officers.The local rewards of successful conspiracy were not monopolized by the prominent conspirators-far from it.Veteran revolutionaries did emerge as power-holders in some provinces,however,and the resulting access to funds and armies gave these men special weight in the Tung- meng hui camp. The transition from conspirator to administrator for the national (as distinct from provincial)leaders occurred first in the inter-provincial revolutionary capital established in Nanking in January 1912.Sun Yat- sen,for example,was president of the provisional revolutionary govern- ment in Nanking from January until that government disbanded in April. Later,like a few other prominent revolutionaries,he accepted an appoint- ment in Yuan Shih-k'ai's new republican government in Peking.For Sun this meant becoming director of railway development,an office that carried little weight but apparently suited his intention of focusing on social concerns rather than politics.Huang Hsing was army minister in the Nanking government and then stayed on to be resident-general (liu-shon)of the southern armies by appointment from Yuan Shih-k'ai. He loyally disbanded soldiers in the Nanking area to the extent permitted by the money allotted him and then resigned in June 1912.Sung Chiao- jen,while in Nanking,drafted the constitution under which the new order was to be governed and,with some other Tung-meng hui veterans, joined the new republican cabinet in Peking in the spring of 1912. Neither the conspiratorial nor the administrative role provided the re- volutionaries with lasting and predominant positions.Outside the few provinces where they were in charge or strongly represented,the tendency Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
2l8 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 remained an ideal, and new national institutions, such as a parliament and a presidential office, were emerging and acquiring legitimacy. In this situation, the achievements of the national leadership - or their failures - were still important to all revolutionaries and affected the general political climate. In the first year after the outbreak of the revolution, leading revolutionaries engaged sequentially in three political roles: as conspirators against Ch'ing rule, as office-holders and administrative authorities during and after the revolution, and as organizers of an open political party seeking victory in a national election. The rapid spread of revolution under a republican banner owed much to the propaganda and diffuse conspiratorial network of the T'ungmeng hui and associated groups. The prestige of the veteran T'ung-meng hui leadership was greatly enhanced by revolutionary success. But, as already noted, the revolutionary provincial governments were in most cases swamped by the ready participation of gentry politicians and army officers. The local rewards of successful conspiracy were not monopolized by the prominent conspirators - far from it. Veteran revolutionaries did emerge as power-holders in some provinces, however, and the resulting access to funds and armies gave these men special weight in the T'ungmeng hui camp. The transition from conspirator to administrator for the national (as distinct from provincial) leaders occurred first in the inter-provincial revolutionary capital established in Nanking in January 1912. Sun Yatsen, for example, was president of the provisional revolutionary government in Nanking from January until that government disbanded in April. Later, like a few other prominent revolutionaries, he accepted an appointment in Yuan Shih-k'ai's new republican government in Peking. For Sun this meant becoming director of railway development, an office that carried little weight but apparently suited his intention of focusing on social concerns rather than politics. Huang Hsing was army minister in the Nanking government and then stayed on to be resident-general (liu-shou) of the southern armies by appointment from Yuan Shih-k'ai. He loyally disbanded soldiers in the Nanking area to the extent permitted by the money allotted him and then resigned in June 1912. Sung Chiaojen, while in Nanking, drafted the constitution under which the new order was to be governed and, with some other T'ung-meng hui veterans, joined the new republican cabinet in Peking in the spring of 1912. Neither the conspiratorial nor the administrative role provided the revolutionaries with lasting and predominant positions. Outside the few provinces where they were in charge or strongly represented, the tendency Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 2I9 in the first year of the republic was towards a reduced proportion of ad- ministrative power in revolutionary hands.When T'ang Shao-i resigned as prime minister in late June Iorz over conflict with Yuan,the cabinet members who had come from Nanking soon followed T'ang out of the government.Yuan's domination of civil and military officialdom in Peking made withdrawal the only feasible course.Thereafter,the best prospect for the veteran revolutionaries'peaceful recovery of national political influence became party organization,not the perquisites of bureaucratic office. The T'ung-meng hui had officially transformed itself from a revolution- ary society into an open political party in March I91z.T'ang Shao-i, Yuan Shih-k'ai's choice for the premiership,had joined it as part of the negotiated arrangements between Peking and the revolutionaries.But it was a minority party in the provisional parliament,even though it could marshal a majority by alliance with other sympathetic groups.In August 1912,under Sung Chiao-jen's leadership,a new party was formed around the T'ung-meng hui core.Four smaller parties were absorbed and a new name was adopted:the Kuomintang (KMT),in its later incarnations usually translated as the Nationalist Party. The reorganization was more than formal.The new party was the result of compromise.Its politics seemed significantly less radical than the old T'ung-meng hui.Mention of Sun Yat-sen's policy towards land taxation and ownership,which despite its moderation had disturbed those from socially elite backgrounds,was missing.Advocacy of equality for women was dropped from the party's platform.A reference to 'interna- tional equality',raising the issue of China's unequal treaties,was softened to 'maintaining international peace'.A call for 'administrative unity' in the T'ung-meng hui programme gave way to a more vague encourage- ment of political unity',while support for local self-government'was retained.The changes were conservative,but with a particular social and political bias quite different from that of Yuan Shih-k'ai.Sung Chiao- jen,against the wishes of some revolutionary veterans,was laying the basis for an approach to a socially conservative gentry constituency that had already developed a stake in local autonomy and participation in politics.The revolutionaries had adjusted their stance to the politically radical but socially conservative character of the revolution.Thus recast, the party was vastly successful in the national elections of the winter of I9I2-I3. Viewed through the eyes of the revolutionary leaders,the first year of the republic could be seen as a series of retreats.During the revolution itself,force was not employed to its limits in a quest for total victory. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 219 in the first year of the republic was towards a reduced proportion of administrative power in revolutionary hands. When T'ang Shao-i resigned as prime minister in late June 1912 over conflict with Yuan, the cabinet members who had come from Nanking soon followed T'ang out of the government. Yuan's domination of civil and military officialdom in Peking made withdrawal the only feasible course. Thereafter, the best prospect for the veteran revolutionaries' peaceful recovery of national political influence became party organization, not the perquisites of bureaucratic office. The T'ung-meng hui had officially transformed itself from a revolutionary society into an open political party in March 1912. T'ang Shao-i, Yuan Shih-k'ai's choice for the premiership, had joined it as part of the negotiated arrangements between Peking and the revolutionaries. But it was a minority party in the provisional parliament, even though it could marshal a majority by alliance with other sympathetic groups. In August 1912, under Sung Chiao-jen's leadership, a new party was formed around the T'ung-meng hui core. Four smaller parties were absorbed and a new name was adopted: the Kuomintang (KMT), in its later incarnations usually translated as the Nationalist Party. The reorganization was more than formal. The new party was the result of compromise. Its politics seemed significantly less radical than the old T'ung-meng hui. Mention of Sun Yat-sen's policy towards land taxation and ownership, which despite its moderation had disturbed those from socially elite backgrounds, was missing. Advocacy of equality for women was dropped from the party's platform. A reference to 'international equality', raising the issue of China's unequal treaties, was softened to 'maintaining international peace'. A call for 'administrative unity' in the T'ung-meng hui programme gave way to a more vague encouragement of 'political unity', while support for 'local self-government' was retained. The changes were conservative, but with a particular social and political bias quite different from that of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Sung Chiaojen, against the wishes of some revolutionary veterans, was laying the basis for an approach to a socially conservative gentry constituency that had already developed a stake in local autonomy and participation in politics. The revolutionaries had adjusted their stance to the politically radical but socially conservative character of the revolution. Thus recast, the party was vastly successful in the national elections of the winter of 1912-13. Viewed through the eyes of the revolutionary leaders, the first year of the republic could be seen as a series of retreats. During the revolution itself, force was not employed to its limits in a quest for total victory. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
220 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 (Much revolutionary force was,in any case,not responsive primarily to the revolutionary party leaders.)Power seemed increasingly to slip from revolutionary hands as authority was reconstituted.Not until the winter elections of 1912-13 did the tide turn.Even then,some of the revolution- aries appeared sceptical about the electoral route to power and the dilution of revolutionary commitment that this entailed.+But when we view the year through other eyes,the Tung-meng hui appears more formidable. In the early months of the republic,some of the leading non-T'ung- meng hui parties attempted to amalgamate,without much success.One of them was the Min she,or Association of the People,organized around Li Yuan-hung,military governor of Hupei and national vice-president in the new republican order.This party,which emerged in January 1912, represented the alienation of the Hupei leadership from the T'ung-meng hui.It was important because of Li's prestige as chief of the first revolu- tionary government and his strength as commander of a sizeable atmy. Another significant group was the Tung-i tang,or Unity Party.Its dominant personality was the scholar Chang Ping-lin,who had been a republican for a decade and was once a leading member of the Tung- meng hui.He broke with that organization in 191o and was joined by some of his comrades from the Shanghai revolutionary organization, the Kuang-fu hui,or Restoration Society.After the revolution he was also joined by men prominent in Kiangsu and Chekiang affairs,who, though bureaucratic or 'monarchist'in background,had supported the revolution as it progressed.These included Chang Chien,the scholar- reformer who was a minister in Sun Yat-sen's Nanking cabinet,and Ch'eng Te-ch'uian,imperial governor and then republican military gov- ernor of Kiangsu.The Unity Party served as a vehicle for former officials and important gentry who hoped to make the transition to the new order with the help of Chang Ping-lin.'Its programme,like its name,stressed unity and spoke of the administrative reorganization of the country's regions in order to unify the national territory.It did not,in contrast to the Tung-meng hui and KMT,specify the importance of local self- government. Many who had played a prominent role in organizing for representative government under the monarchy,through provincial and national as- semblies,formed another party that responded to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's 4 Sun Yat-sen was one,at least retrospectively.Li Shou-k'ung,Min-ch's chih ewo-hui (National assemblies in the early republic),61-2.A major T'ung-meng hui contingent in Kwangtung held back from the new party for a time because of their critical view. 5 Ting Wen-chiang,et al.eds.Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao (Extended annals of Mr Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,First draft),398,400.Takeuchi Katsumi and Kashiwada Tenzan,Shina seito eessha shi(A history of political parties and societics in China),1.94. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
22O THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 (Much revolutionary force was, in any case, not responsive primarily to the revolutionary party leaders.) Power seemed increasingly to slip from revolutionary hands as authority was reconstituted. Not until the winter elections of 1912-13 did the tide turn. Even then, some of the revolutionaries appeared sceptical about the electoral route to power and the dilution of revolutionary commitment that this entailed.4 But when we view the year through other eyes, the T'ung-meng hui appears more formidable. In the early months of the republic, some of the leading non-T'ungmeng hui parties attempted to amalgamate, without much success. One of them was the Min she, or Association of the People, organized around Li Yuan-hung, military governor of Hupei and national vice-president in the new republican order. This party, which emerged in January 1912, represented the alienation of the Hupei leadership from the T'ung-meng hui. It was important because of Li's prestige as chief of the first revolutionary government and his strength as commander of a sizeable army. Another significant group was the T'ung-i tang, or Unity Party. Its dominant personality was the scholar Chang Ping-lin, who had been a republican for a decade and was once a leading member of the T'ungmeng hui. He broke with that organization in 1910 and was joined by some of his comrades from the Shanghai revolutionary organization, the Kuang-fu hui, or Restoration Society. After the revolution he was also joined by men prominent in Kiangsu and Chekiang affairs, who, though bureaucratic or 'monarchist' in background, had supported the revolution as it progressed. These included Chang Chien, the scholarreformer who was a minister in Sun Yat-sen's Nanking cabinet, and Ch'eng Te-ch'iian, imperial governor and then republican military governor of Kiangsu. The Unity Party served as a vehicle for former officials and important gentry who hoped to make the transition to the new order with the help of Chang Ping-lin.' Its programme, like its name, stressed unity and spoke of the administrative reorganization of the country's regions in order to unify the national territory. It did not, in contrast to the T'ung-meng hui and KMT, specify the importance of local selfgovernment. Many who had played a prominent role in organizing for representative government under the monarchy, through provincial and national assemblies, formed another party that responded to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's 4 Sun Yat-sen was one, at least retrospectively. Li Shou-k'ung, Min-ch'u chih kuo-hui (National assemblies in the early republic), 61-2. A major T'ung-meng hui contingent in Kwangtung held back from the new party for a time because of their critical view. 5 Ting Wen-chiang, tt al. eds. Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao (Extended annals of Mr Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, First draft), 398, 400. Takeuchi Katsumi and Kashiwada Tenzan, Shina seito kessha shi (A history of political parties and societies in China), 1.94. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 22I leadership.By the fall of 1912 its name had become the Min-chu tang,or Democratic Party.This group had formed quasi-parties before the re- volution and had worked together in a variety of projects,in particular the petition movement of 19o9 and I9to for the opening of a parliament. In its post-revolutionary form,this party was soon advocating the actual abolition of the provincial administrative unit as a step towards unifying the nation's authority and building a single strong government.s These parties only begin the list of those that felt themselves the besieged minority before Tung-meng hui strength.In May 191z they came together in the Kung-ho tang,or Republican Party,in order,as Chang Ping-lin put it in a letter to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,to fend off the power of a one-party dictatorship'.7 The new party was unable for long to con- tain the different groups,and Chang Ping-lin's and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's soon re-emerged as separate bodies.But the reasons had not to do with a changed estimate of Tung-meng hui power.Rather,the split was partly attributable to excessive fear of that power.Liang was a particular object of revolutionary venom.Some party organizers in the first year of the republic were anxious to avoid the T'ung-meng hui onslaught that might be provoked by Liang's participation. The T'ung-meng hui hostility to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao could be traced back to the competition for the loyalty of Overseas Chinese and Chinese students abroad during the previous decade,and to bitter debates between Liang and T'ung-meng hui spokesmen over the desirability of revolution, as well as numerous other issues.Perhaps still caught in a reactive posture, Liang adhered unseasonably to the continuance of the Manchu throne, even as its imminent demise was apparent in late 191 and early 1912.He publicly advocated at this time 'a republic with a figurehead monarch' (hsu-chfin eung-ho).From his listening post in Japan,he commissioned emissaries in China to advance the proposition to,among others,Chang Ping-lin and Yuan Shih-k'ai.Liang's monarchical republic was the last gasp of the movement for a constitutional monarchy under the Ch'ing, which he had been organizing and agitating for over a decade.His final formulation was perhaps the movement's most radical statement of its case,with the monarch not only shorn of all power but consciously relegated to the role of symbol,like the post-1946 Japanese emperor.But Liang's efforts on its behalf,as well as specific plots during the revolution designed to frustrate the real republicans,did nothing to reconcile him to the Tung-meng hui group. 6 Li Shou-k'ung,Min-ch'u chih Euo-huti,72. 7 Ting Wen-chiang,Liang Jen-king hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao,398. 8 For an excellent account of some of these debates,see Martin Bernal,Chinere rocialism to 1907,129-97. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 221 leadership. By the fall of 1912 its name had become the Min-chu tang, or Democratic Party. This group had formed quasi-parties before the revolution and had worked together in a variety of projects, in particular the petition movement of 1909 and 1910 for the opening of a parliament. In its post-revolutionary form, this party was soon advocating the actual abolition of the provincial administrative unit as a step towards unifying the nation's authority and building a single strong government.6 These parties only begin the list of those that felt themselves the besieged minority before T'ung-meng hui strength. In May 1912 they came together in the Kung-ho tang, or Republican Party, in order, as Chang Ping-lin put it in a letter to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 'to fend off the power of a one-party dictatorship'.7 The new party was unable for long to contain the different groups, and Chang Ping-lin's and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's soon re-emerged as separate bodies. But the reasons had not to do with a changed estimate of T'ung-meng hui power. Rather, the split was partly attributable to excessive fear of that power. Liang was a particular object of revolutionary venom. Some party organizers in the first year of the republic were anxious to avoid the T'ung-meng hui onslaught that might be provoked by Liang's participation. The T'ung-meng hui hostility to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao could be traced back to the competition for the loyalty of Overseas Chinese and Chinese students abroad during the previous decade, and to bitter debates between Liang and T'ung-meng hui spokesmen over the desirability of revolution, as well as numerous other issues.8 Perhaps still caught in a reactive posture, Liang adhered unseasonably to the continuance of the Manchu throne, even as its imminent demise was apparent in late 1911 and early 1912. He publicly advocated at this time 'a republic with a figurehead monarch' {hsu-chiin kung-ho). From his listening post in Japan, he commissioned emissaries in China to advance the proposition to, among others, Chang Ping-lin and Yuan Shih-k'ai. Liang's monarchical republic was the last gasp of the movement for a constitutional monarchy under the Ch'ing, which he had been organizing and agitating for over a decade. His final formulation was perhaps the movement's most radical statement of its case, with the monarch not only shorn of all power but consciously relegated to the role of symbol, like the post-1946 Japanese emperor. But Liang's efforts on its behalf, as well as specific plots during the revolution designed to frustrate the real republicans, did nothing to reconcile him to the T'ung-meng hui group. 6 Li Shou-k'ung, Min-ch'u chih kuo-hui, 72. 7 Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao, 398. 8 For an excellent account of some of these debates, see Martin Bernal, Chinese socialism to 129-97- Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
222 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,I912-16 Liang seems to have adopted the view of his associate Chang Chun-mai (Carsun Chang),who wrote him from China on the day of the Manchu abdication that,although the new political system the revolutionaries had designed was not what Liang's group had wanted,the country could not bear any further alterations,as it stood on the verge of disruption.But attacks on Liang and his followers did not cease after his final abandon- ment of monarchy.A movement in Kwangtung advocated depriving him of his public rights as a Chinese citizen.In July 1912,reacting to an insulting article,some revolutionary editors organized the sacking of the offices of a reformist journal in Tientsin,and tried to effect the arrest of its managers,who were Liang's close associates.Party meetings were disrupted by T'ung-meng hui agents,Liang was told,and threats intimi- dated others from gathering.0 Meanwhile,Yuan Shih-k'ai,who had unsuccessfully sought Liang's support during the revolution,apparently lost interest after concluding his negotiations with the revolutionaries in the early the spring of 1912.Even Yuan found Liang a liability in an atmosphere where the Tung-meng hui set the political tone.Liang's representatives in China advised him that he should secure a formal invi- tation to Peking before returning from Japan."Only after Yuan had re- ceived Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing in the capital could he be induced to extend the same invitation to Liang at the end of September 191z.The next month Liang was feted in Peking and shortly resumed his journalis- tic and political activities in China.But he was still unreconciled to the revolutionaries,who renewed their attack on him. This view of I9Iz from other than T'ung-meng hui eyes shows that, although revolutionaries were deficient in administrative positions,they retained considerable political potential.Some of this potential was realized in the national elections that followed the founding of the KMT by three-and-a-half months and for which the new party was intended. These elections stand out as the only occasion when various Chinese political parties competed for the votes of a substantial nationwide elec- torate with considerable freedom from bureaucratic manipulation or coercion. The formalities of the elections were these.Males over zI years old, who either had the equivalent of an elementary schooling or were pro- perty owners and direct taxpayers at specified levels (the levels were 9 Ting Wen-chiang,Liang Jen-king hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao,372. o Ibid.395,400-1.The continuing clashes between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the revolutionaries are described and analysed by Chang P'eng-yuan,Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yi Min-kno cheng-chih (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and republican politics),42-58. 11 Ting Wen-chiang,Liang Jen-kung hrien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao,398. I2 For example,Min-li pao (Independent people's newspaper),4 Nov.I912. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
222 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 Liang seems to have adopted the view of his associate Chang Chiin-mai (Carsun Chang), who wrote him from China on the day of the Manchu abdication that, although the new political system the revolutionaries had designed was not what Liang's group had wanted, the country could not bear any further alterations, as it stood on the verge of disruption.9 But attacks on Liang and his followers did not cease after his final abandonment of monarchy. A movement in Kwangtung advocated depriving him of his public rights as a Chinese citizen. In July 1912, reacting to an insulting article, some revolutionary editors organized the sacking of the offices of a reformist journal in Tientsin, and tried to effect the arrest of its managers, who were Liang's close associates. Party meetings were disrupted by T'ung-meng hui agents, Liang was told, and threats intimidated others from gathering.10 Meanwhile, Yuan Shih-k'ai, who had unsuccessfully sought Liang's support during the revolution, apparently lost interest after concluding his negotiations with the revolutionaries in the early the spring of 1912. Even Yuan found Liang a liability in an atmosphere where the T'ung-meng hui set the political tone. Liang's representatives in China advised him that he should secure a formal invitation to Peking before returning from Japan." Only after Yuan had received Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing in the capital could he be induced to extend the same invitation to Liang at the end of September 1912. The next month Liang was feted in Peking and shortly resumed his journalistic and political activities in China. But he was still unreconciled to the revolutionaries, who renewed their attack on him.12 This view of 1912 from other than T'ung-meng hui eyes shows that, although revolutionaries were deficient in administrative positions, they retained considerable political potential. Some of this potential was realized in the national elections that followed the founding of the KMT by three-and-a-half months and for which the new party was intended. These elections stand out as the only occasion when various Chinese political parties competed for the votes of a substantial nationwide electorate with considerable freedom from bureaucratic manipulation or coercion. The formalities of the elections were these. Males over 21 years old, who either had the equivalent of an elementary schooling or were property owners and direct taxpayers at specified levels (the levels were 9 Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao, 372. 10 Ibid. 395, 400-1. The continuing clashes between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the revolutionaries are described and analysed by Chang P'eng-yuan, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yii Mm-kuo cheng-chih (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and republican politics), 42-58. 11 Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao, 398. 12 For example, Min-lipoo (Independent people's newspaper), 4 Nov. 1912. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008