1 In Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu,eds.,Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization LI HONGZHANG'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD,1862-1874 Richard J.Smith Rice University No high-ranking official in nineteenth century China had more direct and sustained contact with foreigners than Li Hongzhang.Even the most cursory glance at his memorials,letters,and telegraph messages for the period from 1862 to 1901 reveals that Americans and Europeans loomed large in Li's world of discourse,both official and private.In part,of course,Li's preoccupation with Westerners can be explained by the simple fact of imperialist expansion into Asia during the late Qing period;from the 1840s onward,Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult,if not impossible,to ignore the unsettling presence of foreigners in the Middle Kingdom.But not all Qing bureaucrats responded to the West in the same way,just as not all Westerners reponded to Qing officials in the same way.The salient feature of Li's approach was his Janus-like effort to build up China's wealth and power by using the scientific and technological skills of Westerners,yet all the while working to eliminate dependence upon them--or as he put it, to learn Western methods "without always having to use their men."[1]What were the origins of Li's strategy of "barbarian management?"How did his early experiences with foreigners affect his outlook?And how successful was he in the pursuit of his twin goals? The employment of foreigners was,of course,nothing new in Chinese history.By the mid-nineteenth century,Chinese policymakers could look back on more than two thousand years of precedent in the use of "barbarians"for civil and military purposes.In the early Qing period this tradition included the appointment of Jesuit missionaries as civil officials in the Imperial Board of Astronomy (Qintian jian),the incorporation of Russian soldiers into the dynasty's elite Banner forces,the employment of Dutch troops as "allies"against Zheng Chenggong(Koxinga),and the periodic use of individual Westerners as mercenaries and military technicians in the Opium War era.[2]But China's mid-nineteenth century circumstances were unique in at least two fundamental ways.First,imperialism gave Westerners political and economic power in China vastly disproportunate to their numbers;and secondly,Americans and Europeans had far more to offer China technologically,and perhaps even culturally,than any barbarians in the past. When Li Hongzhang became acting governor of Jiangsu province in April of 1862,it did not take him long to realize both things.The problem was what to do about the situation.In a sense,Li had few choices.The location and timing of his appointment placed him inescapably in the vortex of Sino-foreign relations at the provincial level.As the Taiping Rebellion raged seemingly out of control,the throne and local officials had already acted to secure Western assistance against the rebels.In 1860 the foreign powers defended Shanghai against the Taiping forces of Li Xiucheng,although they simultaneously conducted military operations against the Qing in order to secure compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin(1858).During 1860-1861,negotiations began for the purchase of Western ships and guns,as well as the formal and informal employment of foreign military and naval personnel.By early 1862,not only had the Qing central
1 In Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization LI HONGZHANG'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD, 1862-1874 Richard J. Smith Rice University No high-ranking official in nineteenth century China had more direct and sustained contact with foreigners than Li Hongzhang. Even the most cursory glance at his memorials, letters, and telegraph messages for the period from 1862 to 1901 reveals that Americans and Europeans loomed large in Li's world of discourse, both official and private. In part, of course, Li's preoccupation with Westerners can be explained by the simple fact of imperialist expansion into Asia during the late Qing period; from the 1840s onward, Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the unsettling presence of foreigners in the Middle Kingdom. But not all Qing bureaucrats responded to the West in the same way, just as not all Westerners reponded to Qing officials in the same way. The salient feature of Li's approach was his Janus-like effort to build up China's wealth and power by using the scientific and technological skills of Westerners, yet all the while working to eliminate dependence upon them--or as he put it, to learn Western methods "without always having to use their men." [1] What were the origins of Li's strategy of "barbarian management?" How did his early experiences with foreigners affect his outlook? And how successful was he in the pursuit of his twin goals? The employment of foreigners was, of course, nothing new in Chinese history. By the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese policymakers could look back on more than two thousand years of precedent in the use of "barbarians" for civil and military purposes. In the early Qing period this tradition included the appointment of Jesuit missionaries as civil officials in the Imperial Board of Astronomy (Qintian jian), the incorporation of Russian soldiers into the dynasty's elite Banner forces, the employment of Dutch troops as "allies" against Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), and the periodic use of individual Westerners as mercenaries and military technicians in the Opium War era. [2] But China's mid-nineteenth century circumstances were unique in at least two fundamental ways. First, imperialism gave Westerners political and economic power in China vastly disproportunate to their numbers; and secondly, Americans and Europeans had far more to offer China technologically, and perhaps even culturally, than any barbarians in the past. When Li Hongzhang became acting governor of Jiangsu province in April of 1862, it did not take him long to realize both things. The problem was what to do about the situation. In a sense, Li had few choices. The location and timing of his appointment placed him inescapably in the vortex of Sino-foreign relations at the provincial level. As the Taiping Rebellion raged seemingly out of control, the throne and local officials had already acted to secure Western assistance against the rebels. In 1860 the foreign powers defended Shanghai against the Taiping forces of Li Xiucheng, although they simultaneously conducted military operations against the Qing in order to secure compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin (1858). During 1860-1861, negotiations began for the purchase of Western ships and guns, as well as the formal and informal employment of foreign military and naval personnel. By early 1862, not only had the Qing central
2 government committed itself to purchasing a naval force for the Yangzi River to be staffed by British officers(the Lay-Osborn flotilla),but local officials in Jiangsu and Zhejiang had also begun to raise Sino-foreign mercenary contingents such as the Ever- Victorious Army(EVA)to contend with the persistent Taiping menace.Meanwhile,the Sino-foreign Inspectorate of Customs,established in 1854 at Shanghai,had become an ever more visible and influential feature of China's civil administration.Despite his claim to Zeng Guofan that he would simply "strive for self-strengthening and not mix with foreigners,"Li Hongzhang could not have avoided contact with them even if he had wanted to.[3] Li Hongzhang and the Ever-Victorious Army Li quickly sized matters up in 1862.As Professor Kwang-Ching Liu has indicated,the newly-appointed acting governor immediately recognized the inevitability of dealing with foreigners,and lost no time in trying to gain the upper hand with them. Within two weeks of his arrival at Shanghai,he began to acquire modern Western weapons for his Anhui Army,having viewed their effectiveness against the Taipings first-hand.Employment of Western instructors from the Ever-Victorious Army followed naturally.By late 1862,Li's army had acquired over one thousand rifles and employed perhaps a half a dozen Western instructors from the EVA.Less than a year later,the Anhui Army had expanded to over forty thousand men and now boasted more than ten thousand rifles and several large cannon,in addition to about a dozen new foreign drill instructors--most of whom also came from the Ever-Victorious Army.[4] In the early stages of modernizing his military forces,Li relied heavily on the personal assistance of Frederick T.Ward,the colorful American commander of the Ever- Victorious Army.He used Ward's contacts to acquire guns,ships,and other military supplies,and sought to win the American commander's friendship in order to ingratiate himself with the foreign powers.In what would become a characteristic feature of Li's approach to foreign relations,he overestimated American influence,both locally and at the capital;but he had a far more realistic grasp of domestic political realities.He saw, for example,that Ward enjoyed a close personal relationship with the corrupt but powerful local taotai,Wu Xu,and that any effort to undermine the position of one would necessarily provoke the antagonism of the other.[5] As the first Westerner in modern times to hold official rank in the Qing military hierarchy,Ward presented special problems of responsibility and restraint.Although the American adventurer had petitioned to become a Chinese subject,and had married a Chinese woman(the daughter of his merchant-official patron,Yang Fang),his loyalties were difficult to judge,much less to assure.Although in the early stages of his career as a Chinese officer Ward had established an extraordinary reputation for bravery and effectiveness against the Taipings,reports in March and April by Li's predecessor(Xue Huan),that the American commander had not yet shaved his head in the Manchu fashion nor changed to Chinese clothing because he feared the ridicule of other foreigners, provoked the throne to issue several anxious edicts on the subject.Li,however,remained relatively unconcerned.Writing to Zeng Guofan in June he stated that although Ward had not yet shaved his forehead,nor paid him a courtesy visit,he (Li)had no time to quarrel with foreigners over such "petty faults."[6]
2 government committed itself to purchasing a naval force for the Yangzi River to be staffed by British officers (the Lay-Osborn flotilla), but local officials in Jiangsu and Zhejiang had also begun to raise Sino-foreign mercenary contingents such as the EverVictorious Army (EVA) to contend with the persistent Taiping menace. Meanwhile, the Sino-foreign Inspectorate of Customs, established in 1854 at Shanghai, had become an ever more visible and influential feature of China's civil administration. Despite his claim to Zeng Guofan that he would simply "strive for self-strengthening and not mix with foreigners," Li Hongzhang could not have avoided contact with them even if he had wanted to. [3] Li Hongzhang and the Ever-Victorious Army Li quickly sized matters up in 1862. As Professor Kwang-Ching Liu has indicated, the newly-appointed acting governor immediately recognized the inevitability of dealing with foreigners, and lost no time in trying to gain the upper hand with them. Within two weeks of his arrival at Shanghai, he began to acquire modern Western weapons for his Anhui Army, having viewed their effectiveness against the Taipings first-hand. Employment of Western instructors from the Ever-Victorious Army followed naturally. By late 1862, Li's army had acquired over one thousand rifles and employed perhaps a half a dozen Western instructors from the EVA. Less than a year later, the Anhui Army had expanded to over forty thousand men and now boasted more than ten thousand rifles and several large cannon, in addition to about a dozen new foreign drill instructors--most of whom also came from the Ever-Victorious Army. [4] In the early stages of modernizing his military forces, Li relied heavily on the personal assistance of Frederick T. Ward, the colorful American commander of the EverVictorious Army. He used Ward's contacts to acquire guns, ships, and other military supplies, and sought to win the American commander's friendship in order to ingratiate himself with the foreign powers. In what would become a characteristic feature of Li's approach to foreign relations, he overestimated American influence, both locally and at the capital; but he had a far more realistic grasp of domestic political realities. He saw, for example, that Ward enjoyed a close personal relationship with the corrupt but powerful local taotai, Wu Xu, and that any effort to undermine the position of one would necessarily provoke the antagonism of the other. [5] As the first Westerner in modern times to hold official rank in the Qing military hierarchy, Ward presented special problems of responsibility and restraint. Although the American adventurer had petitioned to become a Chinese subject, and had married a Chinese woman (the daughter of his merchant-official patron, Yang Fang), his loyalties were difficult to judge, much less to assure. Although in the early stages of his career as a Chinese officer Ward had established an extraordinary reputation for bravery and effectiveness against the Taipings, reports in March and April by Li's predecessor (Xue Huan), that the American commander had not yet shaved his head in the Manchu fashion nor changed to Chinese clothing because he feared the ridicule of other foreigners, provoked the throne to issue several anxious edicts on the subject. Li, however, remained relatively unconcerned. Writing to Zeng Guofan in June he stated that although Ward had not yet shaved his forehead, nor paid him a courtesy visit, he (Li) had no time to quarrel with foreigners over such "petty faults." [6]
3 Significantly,the concerns expressed by Qing officials over Ward's devotion to the imperial cause were not entirely groundless.According to letters written in the summer of 1862 to the American Minister,Anson Burlingame,Ward complained vociferously about the "rascally officials"at Shanghai who,he claimed,had robbed him of credit for his accomplishments against the Taipings,and had witheld some 350,000 taels of payment due him.Significantly Ward asked Burlingame to "say a word"to Prince Gong"about my people,and remarked:"if I had not my foot so deeply in the mire I would throw them all overboard."This last remark is a telling one,for it suggests that by August of 1862 Ward had become ensnared in an elaborate web of control spun by local officials.Although claiming to be disgusted with the "lying,swindling and smuggling"that surrounded him,he had become,in fact,a part of the problem by virtue of his multifarious dealings with the undeniably corrupt Yang Fang and Wu Xu.[7] Li was well aware of Ward's involvement in at least some of the illegal activities of Yang and Wu;yet while the American commander remained alive he did not move overtly against either him or them.As a result,Ward continued to work closely with Li, providing advice and assistance in obtaining arms,and cooperating closely with the Anhui Army in military operations against the Taipings.Despite Ward's occasionally complaints over the policies and practices of the "Devilish Governor,"he and Li seem to have been on generally good terms.The American commander recognized the need for Li's political support,while the Jiangsu governor saw in Ward a strong,fearless,and well-connected Western leader,whose weapons were extremely powerful and whose Chinese soldiers were "no different from foreign troops."[8] Ward's death at the battle of Ciqi (in Zhejiang)in late September,1862,brought both opportunities and difficulties to Li.On the one hand,it helped him to undermine the power of Wu Xu,since the Shanghai taotai had relied heavily on Ward.On the other hand,it deprived the Jiangsu governor of a valuable foreign adviser,and brought a raft of administrative problems to his door.These had to do with the politics of replacing Ward as commander of the EVA.Although both the British and the French put forward their own candidates for leadership of the force,Li steadfastly insisted that if a Westerner were to head the Ever-Victorious Army that person would have to be "a man of Ward's stamp, ability,sagacity and willingness to attach himself to the Chinese cause"--someone who would be entirely under Chinese jurisdiction "as to praise or blame."Beijing expressed a similar view,indicating that if foreigners were to lead Chinese troops they had to petition to become Chinese subjects and accept Chinese control as Ward had done.[9] Ward's right-hand man,Henry A.Burgevine--also an American adventurer-- seemed to fit the bill.Like Ward,he was a brave officer who had petitioned to become a Chinese subject,taken a Chinese wife,and devoted himself wholeheartedly to the anti- Taiping cause.Unlike Ward,however,he was impetuous,short-tempered,extravagant, unreliable and difficult to get along with.In early January,1863,after several months of continuous bickering with the Chinese authorities,Burgevine had a particularly serious altercation with Yang Fang over payment of the EVA,during which he struck Yang and took from him forty thousand dollars.Li Hongzhang immediately called for the American commander's dismissal,accusing him of robbery,rebellion and treason. Reportedly,the Chinese government place a reward of 50,000 taels on his head.After failing to secure reinstatement,Burgevine eventually joined the Taipings,only to be captured by the Qing authorities.He "accidentally"drowned in their custody during 1865.[10]
3 Significantly, the concerns expressed by Qing officials over Ward's devotion to the imperial cause were not entirely groundless. According to letters written in the summer of 1862 to the American Minister, Anson Burlingame, Ward complained vociferously about the "rascally officials" at Shanghai who, he claimed, had robbed him of credit for his accomplishments against the Taipings, and had witheld some 350,000 taels of payment due him. Significantly Ward asked Burlingame to "say a word" to Prince Gong "about my people," and remarked: "if I had not my foot so deeply in the mire I would throw them all overboard." This last remark is a telling one, for it suggests that by August of 1862 Ward had become ensnared in an elaborate web of control spun by local officials. Although claiming to be disgusted with the "lying, swindling and smuggling" that surrounded him, he had become, in fact, a part of the problem by virtue of his multifarious dealings with the undeniably corrupt Yang Fang and Wu Xu. [7] Li was well aware of Ward's involvement in at least some of the illegal activities of Yang and Wu; yet while the American commander remained alive he did not move overtly against either him or them. As a result, Ward continued to work closely with Li, providing advice and assistance in obtaining arms, and cooperating closely with the Anhui Army in military operations against the Taipings. Despite Ward's occasionally complaints over the policies and practices of the "Devilish Governor," he and Li seem to have been on generally good terms. The American commander recognized the need for Li's political support, while the Jiangsu governor saw in Ward a strong, fearless, and well-connected Western leader, whose weapons were extremely powerful and whose Chinese soldiers were "no different from foreign troops." [8] Ward's death at the battle of Ciqi (in Zhejiang) in late September, 1862, brought both opportunities and difficulties to Li. On the one hand, it helped him to undermine the power of Wu Xu, since the Shanghai taotai had relied heavily on Ward. On the other hand, it deprived the Jiangsu governor of a valuable foreign adviser, and brought a raft of administrative problems to his door. These had to do with the politics of replacing Ward as commander of the EVA. Although both the British and the French put forward their own candidates for leadership of the force, Li steadfastly insisted that if a Westerner were to head the Ever-Victorious Army that person would have to be "a man of Ward's stamp, ability, sagacity and willingness to attach himself to the Chinese cause"--someone who would be entirely under Chinese jurisdiction "as to praise or blame." Beijing expressed a similar view, indicating that if foreigners were to lead Chinese troops they had to petition to become Chinese subjects and accept Chinese control as Ward had done. [9] Ward's right-hand man, Henry A. Burgevine--also an American adventurer-- seemed to fit the bill. Like Ward, he was a brave officer who had petitioned to become a Chinese subject, taken a Chinese wife, and devoted himself wholeheartedly to the antiTaiping cause. Unlike Ward, however, he was impetuous, short-tempered, extravagant, unreliable and difficult to get along with. In early January, 1863, after several months of continuous bickering with the Chinese authorities, Burgevine had a particularly serious altercation with Yang Fang over payment of the EVA, during which he struck Yang and took from him forty thousand dollars. Li Hongzhang immediately called for the American commander's dismissal, accusing him of robbery, rebellion and treason. Reportedly, the Chinese government place a reward of 50,000 taels on his head. After failing to secure reinstatement, Burgevine eventually joined the Taipings, only to be captured by the Qing authorities. He "accidentally" drowned in their custody during 1865. [10]
In the meantime,Li Hongzhang found it necessary to appoint two regular British officers to lead the Ever-Victorious Army--first,John Y.Holland,of the Royal Navy (on a temporary basis);then,in March of 1863,Charles G.Gordon of the Royal Engineers. Brilliant but erratic,Gordon managed to pull the EVA together and once again employ it with effect against the Taipings.Like Ward,he worked closely with Li,although he,too, chafed at the Jiangsu governor's administrative practices--most particularly his consistently dilatory payment of the force.In fact,at several points during Gordon's tenure as commander of the Ever-Victorious Army,he and Li had basic disagreements that threatened to undermine their cooperative venture;and on at least two occasions,the EVA and the Anhui Army nearly came to blows.[11] The most serious altercation between Li and Gordon occurred in late 1863,after the Jiangsu governor had executed several high-ranking Taiping leaders who had surrendered the strategic city of Suzhou to the Anhui Army on December 4,having received Gordon's personal guarantee of their safety.This so-called "Suzhou Incident" provoked a huge outcry on the part of Westerners in China.At Shanghai,for example, representatives of the foreign powers denounced Li in a strongly-worded public proclamation.Gordon,humilated and outraged,threatened to restore Suzhou to the rebels,attack Li's troops with his foreign-led Ever-Victorious Army,and even join the Taipings.The British commander-in-chief,General W.G.Brown,took the Ever- Victorious Army under his own command and directed Gordon to "suspend all active aid to the Imperialist [i.e.Qing]cause,and the British minister,Frederick Bruce,informed the Qing authorities that Gordon could hold no communication with Li Hongzhang,"or in any way be under his orders."[12] The Chinese government,for its part,felt that Li Hongzhang's response to the situation at Suzhou had been perfectly appropriate in light of the threatening attitude of the surrendered rebel leaders,and that the foreign powers had no right or reason to become involved in the matter.Thus,although in Li's report of the Suzhou affair to the throne he had suggested the possibility of punishment for himself in order to placate the Western authorities,Beijing had no such intentions.Commenting simply that "foreigners do not understand the principles involved,"the throne shifted the burden of this delicate matter to the Zongli Yamen.[13] With passions still high and matters at a diplomatic impasse,Li found a strong foreign supporter in Robert Hart,newly-appointed Inspector-General(I.G.)of the Chinese Maritime Cusoms administration.In Shanghai to settle the accounts of the ill- fated Lay-Osborn Flotilla and to take care of other Customs-related business at the treaty port,Hart immediately and almost instinctively began to act as a mediator for the Qing government;and in so doing,he became,wittingly or otherwise,a valuable ally of Li Hongzhang.Hart would continue to play these dual roles of middleman and advocate for Li,with greater or lesser enthusiasm,throughout his long career in China.[14] The I.G.believed from the outset that Gordon should take the field against the Taipings rather than remain in garrison.In his view,the first priority was unquestionably the rapid suppression of the rebels.This development would,Hart reasoned,benefit both the foreign powers and the Qing government--not least in the expansion of Sino-foreign trade.Furthermore,despite the EVA's recent problems with pay and discipline,Hart saw the force as a potent weapon in the Qing-Taiping struggle.Significantly,he also sought to protect Gordon from "impeachment"by Li Hongzhang for insubordination--a possibility he foresaw based on the Lay-Osborn affair and his own growing experience
4 In the meantime, Li Hongzhang found it necessary to appoint two regular British officers to lead the Ever-Victorious Army--first, John Y. Holland, of the Royal Navy (on a temporary basis); then, in March of 1863, Charles G. Gordon of the Royal Engineers. Brilliant but erratic, Gordon managed to pull the EVA together and once again employ it with effect against the Taipings. Like Ward, he worked closely with Li, although he, too, chafed at the Jiangsu governor's administrative practices--most particularly his consistently dilatory payment of the force. In fact, at several points during Gordon's tenure as commander of the Ever-Victorious Army, he and Li had basic disagreements that threatened to undermine their cooperative venture; and on at least two occasions, the EVA and the Anhui Army nearly came to blows. [11] The most serious altercation between Li and Gordon occurred in late 1863, after the Jiangsu governor had executed several high-ranking Taiping leaders who had surrendered the strategic city of Suzhou to the Anhui Army on December 4, having received Gordon's personal guarantee of their safety. This so-called "Suzhou Incident" provoked a huge outcry on the part of Westerners in China. At Shanghai, for example, representatives of the foreign powers denounced Li in a strongly-worded public proclamation. Gordon, humilated and outraged, threatened to restore Suzhou to the rebels, attack Li's troops with his foreign-led Ever-Victorious Army, and even join the Taipings. The British commander-in-chief, General W. G. Brown, took the EverVictorious Army under his own command and directed Gordon to "suspend all active aid to the Imperialist [i.e. Qing] cause," and the British minister, Frederick Bruce, informed the Qing authorities that Gordon could hold no communication with Li Hongzhang, "or in any way be under his orders." [12] The Chinese government, for its part, felt that Li Hongzhang's response to the situation at Suzhou had been perfectly appropriate in light of the threatening attitude of the surrendered rebel leaders, and that the foreign powers had no right or reason to become involved in the matter. Thus, although in Li's report of the Suzhou affair to the throne he had suggested the possibility of punishment for himself in order to placate the Western authorities, Beijing had no such intentions. Commenting simply that "foreigners do not understand the principles involved," the throne shifted the burden of this delicate matter to the Zongli Yamen. [13] With passions still high and matters at a diplomatic impasse, Li found a strong foreign supporter in Robert Hart, newly-appointed Inspector-General (I. G.) of the Chinese Maritime Cusoms administration. In Shanghai to settle the accounts of the illfated Lay-Osborn Flotilla and to take care of other Customs-related business at the treaty port, Hart immediately and almost instinctively began to act as a mediator for the Qing government; and in so doing, he became, wittingly or otherwise, a valuable ally of Li Hongzhang. Hart would continue to play these dual roles of middleman and advocate for Li, with greater or lesser enthusiasm, throughout his long career in China. [14] The I.G. believed from the outset that Gordon should take the field against the Taipings rather than remain in garrison. In his view, the first priority was unquestionably the rapid suppression of the rebels. This development would, Hart reasoned, benefit both the foreign powers and the Qing government--not least in the expansion of Sino-foreign trade. Furthermore, despite the EVA's recent problems with pay and discipline, Hart saw the force as a potent weapon in the Qing-Taiping struggle. Significantly, he also sought to protect Gordon from "impeachment" by Li Hongzhang for insubordination--a possibility he foresaw based on the Lay-Osborn affair and his own growing experience
5 with the Qing bureaucracy.Finally,Hart genuinely believed,as did Li,that since the Chinese supported the Ever-Victorious Army,they had every right to its services Few other foreigners in China shared Hart's view.General Brown,for instance, urged that the Ever-Victorious Army be disbanded immediately,"leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles."On December 19,1863,the North-China Herald editorialized: "We are glad that...Major Gordon will refrain from farther [sic]operations.It is by such means only that the Chinese can be acted on.It is hopeless to appeal to their sense of honour,for they have none;but they are keenly alive to their interests,and,rather than sacrifice these,may accomodate their actions to European principles....[If Li Hongzhang finds]that the consequence of his conduct has been to deprive him of the all- important aid of the disciplined Chinese contingent [the EVA],he will in [the]future refrain from acts of treachery.[15] Li greatly resented these foreign insults,but he was also anxious to placate Gordon.He therefore sent Dr.Halliday Macartney,who had also recently entered Li's service as an independent adviser and arsenal superviser,to see Gordon immediately after the Suzhou Incident in an attempt to placate the enraged foreign commander Gordon,as it developed,vigorously denounced Macartney for interceding on Li's behalf, accusing the well-intentioned Scotsman of conduct unbecoming a British gentleman.Yet soon thereafter Gordon reestablished contact with the Jiangsu governor,presumably on the latter's initiative--despite his own initial outrage and Bruce's unambiguous orders. Why?The answer is simple:Gordon desperately wanted to return to action. Quite apart from his well-known and insatiable love of battle,the British commander believed that the Ever-Victorious Army would grow increasingly degenerate and difficult to manage if it remained in garrison at Kunshan.Furthemore,Gordon was quite aware that the Anhui Army had proven itself capable of achieving military victory in his absence.This raised unpalatable possibility that he and his vaunted Sino-foreign force might come to be viewed as no longer indispensible to the safety of Shanghai and the suppression of the Taipings--a blow to Gordon's ego.Finally,according to General Brown,Gordon had received "direct hints"that Li Hongzhang would dismiss him if he refused to take the field against the Taipings.In a letter to the British Minister,Bruce, Gordon later claimed:"I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels;that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them,of no character,and that the Footae [Governor Li]will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner [sic]put in,or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp,of whose action at times we should never feel certain."[16] Meanwhile,Hart had been trying on his own to prod Gordon back into Li Hongzhang's service.Although a memorial written by the Jiangsu governor on February 25,1864,suggests that Li himself initiated a reconciliation with Gordon,using Hart as his intermediary,the I.G.'s journals provide no such indications.An entry for January 18 states simply:"My intention is to endeavor to get Gordon to work again,and to find out all the circumstances connected with the Footae's action in beheading the Wangs [kings] at Suzhou."At this point,Hart was obviously inclined to urge Gordon's return to action regardless of what he might discover about the execution.This was not only because of the I.G.'s views regarding Shanghai's security;it was also because,as he indicated in his private journal,he feared that the Chinese authorities would read Gordon's refusal to fight as evidence of the unmanageability of"an able and reliable"man,who just happened to
5 with the Qing bureaucracy. Finally, Hart genuinely believed, as did Li, that since the Chinese supported the Ever-Victorious Army, they had every right to its services. Few other foreigners in China shared Hart's view. General Brown, for instance, urged that the Ever-Victorious Army be disbanded immediately, "leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles." On December l9, l863, the North-China Herald editorialized: "We are glad that . . . Major Gordon will refrain from farther [sic] operations. It is by such means only that the Chinese can be acted on. It is hopeless to appeal to their sense of honour, for they have none; but they are keenly alive to their interests, and, rather than sacrifice these, may accomodate their actions to European principles . . . . [If Li Hongzhang finds] that the consequence of his conduct has been to deprive him of the allimportant aid of the disciplined Chinese contingent [the EVA], he will in [the] future refrain from acts of treachery." [15] Li greatly resented these foreign insults, but he was also anxious to placate Gordon. He therefore sent Dr. Halliday Macartney, who had also recently entered Li's service as an independent adviser and arsenal superviser, to see Gordon immediately after the Suzhou Incident in an attempt to placate the enraged foreign commander. Gordon, as it developed, vigorously denounced Macartney for interceding on Li's behalf, accusing the well-intentioned Scotsman of conduct unbecoming a British gentleman. Yet soon thereafter Gordon reestablished contact with the Jiangsu governor, presumably on the latter's initiative--despite his own initial outrage and Bruce's unambiguous orders. Why? The answer is simple: Gordon desperately wanted to return to action. Quite apart from his well-known and insatiable love of battle, the British commander believed that the Ever-Victorious Army would grow increasingly degenerate and difficult to manage if it remained in garrison at Kunshan. Furthemore, Gordon was quite aware that the Anhui Army had proven itself capable of achieving military victory in his absence. This raised unpalatable possibility that he and his vaunted Sino-foreign force might come to be viewed as no longer indispensible to the safety of Shanghai and the suppression of the Taipings--a blow to Gordon's ego. Finally, according to General Brown, Gordon had received "direct hints" that Li Hongzhang would dismiss him if he refused to take the field against the Taipings. In a letter to the British Minister, Bruce, Gordon later claimed: "I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character, and that the Footae [Governor Li] will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner [sic] put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain." [16] Meanwhile, Hart had been trying on his own to prod Gordon back into Li Hongzhang's service. Although a memorial written by the Jiangsu governor on February 25, l864, suggests that Li himself initiated a reconciliation with Gordon, using Hart as his intermediary, the I.G.'s journals provide no such indications. An entry for January l8 states simply: "My intention is to endeavor to get Gordon to work again, and to find out all the circumstances connected with the Footae's action in beheading the Wangs [kings] at Suzhou." At this point, Hart was obviously inclined to urge Gordon's return to action regardless of what he might discover about the execution. This was not only because of the I. G.'s views regarding Shanghai's security; it was also because, as he indicated in his private journal, he feared that the Chinese authorities would read Gordon's refusal to fight as evidence of the unmanageability of "an able and reliable" man, who just happened to