POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 223 modest but sufficient to exclude well over the majority of adult males) and who were two years'resident in their voting district (the hsien), were with few exceptions enfranchised.The proportion of population registered was probably in the range of 4 to 6 per cent.The electorate was thereby enormously enlarged over that in the late Ch'ing elections,when considerably less than I per cent qualified.Voting was for representatives to two new houses of the national parliament and to the provincial as- semblies.The balloting was indirect:that is,the voters chose electors who later met to select the actual legislators.The process ran from Decem- ber I9tz into January 1913 or beyond.The new provincial assemblies were constituted during the winter months.The new parliament (or national assembly)gathered in Peking in April 1913. As a practical matter,some seats in the parliament,such as those de- signated for Tibet,Mongolia and Overseas Chinese,could not be filled by election and were effectively appointed by Yuan Shih-k'ai.In this manner,Ts'ao Ju-lin from Shanghai,practising law in Peking and soon to receive high office in the Foreign Ministry,became a delegate from Mongolia in the upper house."If one leaves aside such anomalies(64 seats out of 274)and counts only those elected from the 21 home'and Manchurian provinces,the KMT had won a clear majority in the upper house(I23 seats out of zro).It was virtually the same in the lower house In any case,since many representatives had no party affiliation or indulged in multiple membership,KMT members exceeded the combined total from the three other main competing parties in the lower house by 169 to 154.Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was very discouraged.The KMT was in an ex- cellent position to press for a prime minister and cabinet selected from the predominant party in the parliament. The explanation for the KMTs victory was,at the most general level, the political strength derived from being the party most closely identified with the revolution.Without predominance in the country's decentralized administrative structures,the KMT had to mobilize this strength by a direct appeal to the electorate,which was restricted to the educated and propertied classes.The party apparently relied both on whatever adminis- trative authority it possessed and on an energetic campaign of persuasion in regions under hostile or indifferent governorship.In contrast to the other parties,the KMT espoused local self-government and accepted,at least under existing circumstances,a large amount of provincial autonomy. The position was popular with local and provincial elites.The KMT, then,constructed a winning strategy out of revolutionary prestige, organizational effectiveness,and a politically attractive programme. 13 Ts'ao Ju-lin,I-theng chih hui-i(A lifetime's recollections),79. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 223 modest but sufficient to exclude well over the majority of adult males) and who were two years' resident in their voting district (the hsien), were with few exceptions enfranchised. The proportion of population registered was probably in the range of 4 to 6 per cent. The electorate was thereby enormously enlarged over that in the late Ch'ing elections, when considerably less than 1 per cent qualified. Voting was for representatives to two new houses of the national parliament and to the provincial assemblies. The balloting was indirect: that is, the voters chose electors who later met to select the actual legislators. The process ran from December 1912 into January 1913 or beyond. The new provincial assemblies were constituted during the winter months. The new parliament (or national assembly) gathered in Peking in April 1913. As a practical matter, some seats in the parliament, such as those designated for Tibet, Mongolia and Overseas Chinese, could not be filled by election and were effectively appointed by Yuan Shih-k'ai. In this manner, Ts'ao Ju-lin from Shanghai, practising law in Peking and soon to receive high office in the Foreign Ministry, became a delegate from Mongolia in the upper house.1 ' If one leaves aside such anomalies (64 seats out of 274) and counts only those elected from the 21 'home' and Manchurian provinces, the KMT had won a clear majority in the upper house (123 seats out of 210). It was virtually the same in the lower house. In any case, since many representatives had no party affiliation or indulged in multiple membership, KMT members exceeded the combined total from the three other main competing parties in the lower house by 169 to 154. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was very discouraged. The KMT was in an excellent position to press for a prime minister and cabinet selected from the predominant party in the parliament. The explanation for the KMT's victory was, at the most general level, the political strength derived from being the party most closely identified with the revolution. Without predominance in the country's decentralized administrative structures, the KMT had to mobilize this strength by a direct appeal to the electorate, which was restricted to the educated and propertied classes. The party apparently relied both on whatever administrative authority it possessed and on an energetic campaign of persuasion in regions under hostile or indifferent governorship. In contrast to the other parties, the KMT espoused local self-government and accepted, at least under existing circumstances, a large amount of provincial autonomy. The position was popular with local and provincial elites. The KMT, then, constructed a winning strategy out of revolutionary prestige, organizational effectiveness, and a politically attractive programme. 13 Ts'ao Ju-lin, I-sheng thih hui-i (A lifetime's recollections), 79. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
224 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 Although its scale has not been measured,the purchase of votes,par- ticularly to influence the electoral colleges in their choice of members to the lower house,was widely reported.Thus China's liberal republic was no more immune to the influence of private and official money on its electoral process than other large representative systems as they developed. Neither the reports nor the electoral results,however,suggest that cor- ruption was decisive nationally. The leading architect of the KMT victory,Sung Chiao-jen,only 3o years old at the time,was emboldened to plan for his party the attainment of the national power that was denied the revolutionaries in 1912.The entente between Yuan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionaries had been damaged by the collapse of T'ang Shao-i's cabinet with its Tung-meng hui par- ticipation and by instances of Yuan's arbitrary behaviour in the summer of 1912.But it had been revived in late August and early September by Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing.They visited Peking and joined Yuan in a celebration of unity,common purpose and mutual respect.As a result the KMT in the autumn of 19Iz was cooperating with,though not signifi- cantly participating in,Peking's executive government.The KMTs electoral campaign of the following months was not overtly directed against Yuan Shih-k'ai.But as its success became apparent in January and February 1913 Sung Chiao-jen began to attack Yuan's government and its policies in his speeches."4 He pressed more vigorously his assertion of the parliament as the progenitor of the cabinet,including the prime minister,and as being responsible for drafting a new more permanent constitution.He explicitly advocated the diminution of presidential powers.Indeed,Sung was seriously contemplating ousting Yuan from his post,despite Sun Yat-sen's continuing endorsement of Yuan's recon- firmation as president by the new assembly." Sung Chiao-jen's plans did not come to fruition.He was assassinated on zo March 1913 by agents of Yuan's government.The relationship among elections,parties,the parliament and executive power that he had envisaged did not come to pass,either in that year or subsequently.Other political parties were later formed and reformed,but none came to power except at the head of armies. The destruction of the parliamentary party movement,however,need not obscure the extraordinary vigour characterizing it in the first two years of the republic.It was built,after all,on the previous decade of ex- 14 K.S.Liew,Struggle for democracy:Sung Chiao-jen and the 19II Chinese Revolution,186-9. 15 Ibid.189.Wu Hsiang-hsiang,Sung Chiao-jen:Chung-kno min-chu hsien-cheng ti hrien-ch'u (Sung Chiao-jen:precursor of Chinese democracy and constitutional government),219-6.Ernest P.Young,The presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai:liberalism and dictatorship in early republican China, 115-16,282-3: Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
224 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, 1912-1 6 Although its scale has not been measured, the purchase of votes, particularly to influence the electoral colleges in their choice of members to the lower house, was widely reported. Thus China's liberal republic was no more immune to the influence of private and official money on its electoral process than other large representative systems as they developed. Neither the reports nor the electoral results, however, suggest that corruption was decisive nationally. The leading architect of the KMT victory, Sung Chiao-jen, only 30 years old at the time, was emboldened to plan for his party the attainment of the national power that was denied the revolutionaries in 1912. The entente between Yuan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionaries had been damaged by the collapse of T'ang Shao-i's cabinet with its T'ung-meng hui participation and by instances of Yuan's arbitrary behaviour in the summer of 1912. But it had been revived in late August and early September by Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing. They visited Peking and joined Yuan in a celebration of unity, common purpose and mutual respect. As a result the KMT in the autumn of 1912 was cooperating with, though not significantly participating in, Peking's executive government. The KMT's electoral campaign of the following months was not overtly directed against Yuan Shih-k'ai. But as its success became apparent in January and February 1913 Sung Chiao-jen began to attack Yuan's government and its policies in his speeches.'4 He pressed more vigorously his assertion of the parliament as the progenitor of the cabinet, including the prime minister, and as being responsible for drafting a new more permanent constitution. He explicitly advocated the diminution of presidential powers. Indeed, Sung was seriously contemplating ousting Yuan from his post, despite Sun Yat-sen's continuing endorsement of Yuan's reconfirmation as president by the new assembly." Sung Chiao-jen's plans did not come to fruition. He was assassinated on 20 March 1913 by agents of Yuan's government. The relationship among elections, parties, the parliament and executive power that he had envisaged did not come to pass, either in that year or subsequently. Other political parties were later formed and reformed, but none came to power except at the head of armies. The destruction of the parliamentary party movement, however, need not obscure the extraordinary vigour characterizing it in the first two years of the republic. It was built, after all, on the previous decade of ex- 14 K. S. Liew, Struggle for democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the if 11 Chinese Revolution, 186-9. 15 Ibid. 189. Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Sung Chiao-jen: Chung-kuo min-chu hsien-cheng ti hsien-ch'U (Sung Chiao-jen: precursor of Chinese democracy and constitutional government), 219-6. Ernest P. Young, The presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: liberalism and dictatorship in early republican China, 115-16, 282-3. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
YUAN SHIH-K'AI ON THE ISSUES 22) perience in political organization and movement outside the government and could draw on the intensive study and debate of those years.More- over,party organization and contest were part of a period marked by liberal enthusiasms and liberating.social tendencies.For example,re- verence for officialdom dramatically diminished.A small but highly active and assertive women's movement,advocating female suffrage,universal education for women,and reform of marriage practices,drew national attention.Newspapers proliferated and national issues were strenuously debated.New hair and clothing styles prospered in the cities.Those of a conservative bent watched with growing concern the strain on the fa- miliar social and political integument. YUAN SHIH-K'AI ON THE ISSUES No official of the late Ch'ing had achieved more for reform in as short a time as had Yuan Shih-k'ai.With the backing of Tz'u-hsi,the empress dowager,and the help of an ever growing entourage recruited on behalf of reform programmes,he had become involved in almost every aspect of institutional change and innovation sponsored by the empire in its last years.'6 His bent was practical rather than theoretical.He did not conceive the ideas for reform programmes or develop their rationale; rather,he implemented them and demonstrated their feasibility.Even allowing for this pragmatic emphasis,however,one is struck by Yuan's shift towards conservatism during his presidency. As a pragmatist and politician,he had accepted the inevitability of a republic when the forces of the revolution showed their hold on the country.And during the first years of republicanism,he avoided a serious rupture with the revolutionary leaders by wooing them and by tactically retreating when confrontation threatened.But his unease with the polit- ical and social liberality of the revolutionary aftermath soon became evident.He thought students had become unruly.Advocates of women's equality,he felt,were attacking the family and hence the social order. The removal of Confucius from the primary school curriculum,in his view,went too far in the first year of the republic.Bureaucratic discipline 16 For research on aspects of Yuan's activities,while Chihli governor-general,see:Esther Morrison,'The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy:an historical study of public administration'(Radcliffe College,Ph.D.dissertation,1959);Stephen R.MacKinnon, Power and politics in late imperial China:Yuan Shi-kai in Beijing and Tianjin,1901-1908;John E.Schrecket,Imperialiim and Chinese nationalism:Germany in Shantung;Watanabe Atsushi, En Seigai seiken no keizaiteki kiban-hokuyo-ha no kigyo katsudo'(The economic basis of the Yuan Shih-k'ai regime:the industrial activity of the Peiyang clique),in Chrigoks kindaika no shakai Edzo:Shingai kakumei no thiteki ichi (The social framework of China's modernization:the historical position of the 19tr Revolution). Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
YUAN SHIH-K AI ON THE ISSUES 225 perience in political organization and movement outside the government and could draw on the intensive study and debate of those years. Moreover, party organization and contest were part of a period marked by liberal enthusiasms and liberating. social tendencies. For example, reverence for officialdom dramatically diminished. A small but highly active and assertive women's movement, advocating female suffrage, universal education for women, and reform of marriage practices, drew national attention. Newspapers proliferated and national issues were strenuously debated. New hair and clothing styles prospered in the cities. Those of a conservative bent watched with growing concern the strain on the familiar social and political integument. YUAN SHIH-K'AI ON THE ISSUES No official of the late Ch'ing had achieved more for reform in as short a time as had Yuan Shih-k'ai. With the backing of Tz'u-hsi, the empress dowager, and the help of an ever growing entourage recruited on behalf of reform programmes, he had become involved in almost every aspect of institutional change and innovation sponsored by the empire in its last years.'6 His bent was practical rather than theoretical. He did not conceive the ideas for reform programmes or develop their rationale; rather, he implemented them and demonstrated their feasibility. Even allowing for this pragmatic emphasis, however, one is struck by Yuan's shift towards conservatism during his presidency. As a pragmatist and politician, he had accepted the inevitability of a republic when the forces of the revolution showed their hold on the country. And during the first years of republicanism, he avoided a serious rupture with the revolutionary leaders by wooing them and by tactically retreating when confrontation threatened. But his unease with the political and social liberality of the revolutionary aftermath soon became evident. He thought students had become unruly. Advocates of women's equality, he felt, were attacking the family and hence the social order. The removal of Confucius from the primary school curriculum, in his view, went too far in the first year of the republic. Bureaucratic discipline 16 For research on aspects of Yuan's activities, while Chihli governor-general, see: Esther Morrison, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy: an historical study of public administration' (Radcliffe College, Ph.D. dissertation, 1959); Stephen R. MacKinnon, Power and politics in late imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in Beijing and Tianjin, iaoi-1908; John E. Schreclcer, Imperialism and Chinese nationalism: Germany in Shantung; Watanabe Atsushi, 'En Seigai seiken no keizaiteki kiban — hokuy6-ha no kigyo katsudo' (The economic basis of the Yuan Shih-k'ai regime: the industrial activity of the Peiyang clique), in Chugoku kindaika no shakai kozo: Shingai kakwnei no shiteki ichi (The social framework of China's modernization: the historical position of the 1911 Revolution). Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
226 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 had just about disappeared after the revolution,he complained,and taxes were being frittered away by local interests.The countryside was in disorder.In general,he was impressed by China's backwardness.Reforms were necessary,he often asserted,but too much had been attempted too quickly.Retrenchment was his keynote. The domestic issues which most exercised Yuan in his first presidential years were the role of parties and representative assemblies and the rela- tionship between the provinces and the centre. Yuan had entered his presidency by swearing to uphold the constitu- tion.The prominence of representative assemblies was intrinsic to the provisional constitution as drafted by the revolutionaries in 19I2 and was a natural culmination of political movement and debate during the previous decade and more.Yuan contested neither the necessity of a constitution nor the appropriateness of some sort of representative system.But he was never happy with the forms developed in 1912,and he increasingly criticized their operations.One focus of complaint was the political parties.As early as July I9I2 he warned,If the parties continue to maintain their own selfish ways and quarrel with each other without regard to the laws,the proclaimed republic will cease to exist."7 When the national elections began in December 1912,Yuan expressed concern that the winners might put the influence of party above concern for the general welfare.'s The KMT,with its electoral victory,became a particular enemy,but Yuan also showed little regard for the other parties.As Yuan turned to constructing his own arrangements for governance,he reflected that 'the government's hand has been tied by the provisional constitution.On the one hand the defects of this instrument have deprived the govern- ment of all liberty of action and on the other hand parliament has entirely failed to render its cooperation with the executive in promoting the com- mon weal.The consequence has been complete disorganization of the administration and ever increasing ruin for the citizens."In this view, openly expressed only after Yuan had destroyed the KMT,the parliament had failed and a constitution more in accord with the needs of government was required.Yuan's assassination of Sung Chiao-jen in March 1913 was not simply the removal of a political enemy;it also expressed the gulf 17 The China year book,1913,514. 18 Cheng-fi ung-pao (Government gazette),229(16 Dec.1912)6-8. 19 'Inaugural address of president to the Council of Government',15 Dec.1913,British Foreign Office Archives,Public Record Office,London,FO 228/1852.This document pur- ports to be a translation of a verbatim and unedited record of Yuan's speech;a comparison with the formal published text,Cheng-fi kung-pao,585 (19 Dec.1913)1-6,tends to support its authenticity. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
226 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 had just about disappeared after the revolution, he complained, and taxes were being frittered away by local interests. The countryside was in disorder. In general, he was impressed by China's backwardness. Reforms were necessary, he often asserted, but too much had been attempted too quickly. Retrenchment was his keynote. The domestic issues which most exercised Yuan in his first presidential years were the role of parties and representative assemblies and the relationship between the provinces and the centre. Yuan had entered his presidency by swearing to uphold the constitution. The prominence of representative assemblies was intrinsic to the provisional constitution as drafted by the revolutionaries in 1912 and was a natural culmination of political movement and debate during the previous decade and more. Yuan contested neither the necessity of a constitution nor the appropriateness of some sort of representative system. But he was never happy with the forms developed in 1912, and he increasingly criticized their operations. One focus of complaint was the political parties. As early as July 1912 he warned, 'If the parties continue to maintain their own selfish ways and quarrel with each other without regard to the laws, the proclaimed republic will cease to exist.'17 When the national elections began in December 1912, Yuan expressed concern that the winners might put the influence of party above concern for the general welfare.'8 The KMT, with its electoral victory, became a particular enemy, but Yuan also showed little regard for the other parties. As Yuan turned to constructing his own arrangements for governance, he reflected that 'the government's hand has been tied by the provisional constitution. On the one hand the defects of this instrument have deprived the government of all liberty of action and on the other hand parliament has entirely failed to render its cooperation with the executive in promoting the common weal. The consequence has been complete disorganization of the administration and ever increasing ruin for the citizens.'19 In this view, openly expressed only after Yuan had destroyed the KMT, the parliament had failed and a constitution more in accord with the needs of government was required. Yuan's assassination of Sung Chiao-jen in March 1913 was not simply the removal of a political enemy; it also expressed the gulf 17 The China year book, 1913, 514. 18 Cheng-fu kung-pao (Government gazette), 229 (16 Dec. 1912) 6-8. 19 'Inaugural address of president to the Council of Government', 15 Dec. 1915, British Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London, FO 228/1852. This document pur- ports to be a translation of a verbatim and unedited record of Yuan's speech; a comparison with the formal published text, Cheng-ju kung-pao, 585 (19 Dec. 1913) 1-6, tends to support its authenticity. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
YUAN SHIH-K'AI ON THE ISSUES 227 separating Yuan's and Sung's ideas about the proper organization of na- tional government. The second divisive domestic issue that preoccupied Yuan was the degree of centralization appropriate to China's polity.When Liang Ch'i- ch'ao publicly declined Yuan's offer of a post under the Ch'ing in No- vember 1911,he identified the fundamental issues facing the country as two:whether the government should be monarchical or republican,and whether the organization of the polity should be federal or unitary."0 The former question was resolved by the revolution but the latter was left unanswered.The first year of the republic was marked by the anomaly of a de facto federation presided over by a president increasingly committed to a unitary,centralized national structure. Like the role of representative government and parties,the issue of centralization had emerged acutely in the previous decade.Many of the reforms sponsored by the Ch'ing court in its last years were dedicated to imposing a more centralized control over the country.The I9II Revolu- tion was in part a provincial reaction to Peking's pretensions to increased power.After the revolution those who still believed in a centralized unity were horrified at the extremes to which federalism had been taken. Bureaucratic,fiscal,legislative and even military autonomy were exten- sively assumed by most provincial governments.The argument persuaded some that federalism cut into the strength of the national government and that in a world of predatory imperialists,China could not afford any- thing less than a radical augmentation of power in the central government. (Those stressing the importance of parties and the national assembly did not necessarily favour federalism,although liberal centralizers,like Sung Chiao-jen,found it expedient tactically to ally with defenders of provincial autonomy and to sponsor some of their demands.) Yuan,perforce,acquiesced in provincial.autonomy during the early months of his presidency but showed growing impatience with it.In July 19Iz he went through the motions of confirming in office all the pro- vincial military governors who in no way owed him their positions. He piously pleaded for their 'cooperation with the government'."In the autumn of that year,he tried with little success to assume the authority to appoint civil officials in the provinces.The effort was generally taken as interference in the internal affairs of the province and was frequently rejected,sometimes hotly.In late November,when asking the provincial authorities to submit to Peking for approval their appointments of county magistrates,he plaintively noted that the provisional constitution gave o Ting Wen-chiang,Liang Jen-kung hsien-theng nien-p'ucang-pien ch'u-kao,346. 2I Cheng-fu kung-pao,74(13 July 1912)2-3. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
YUAN SHIH-KAI ON THE ISSUES 227 separating Yuan's and Sung's ideas about the proper organization of national government. The second divisive domestic issue that preoccupied Yuan was the degree of centralization appropriate to China's polity. When Liang Ch'ich'ao publicly declined Yuan's offer of a post under the Ch'ing in November 1911, he identified the fundamental issues facing the country as two: whether the government should be monarchical or republican, and whether the organization of the polity should be federal or unitary.10 The former question was resolved by the revolution but the latter was left unanswered. The first year of the republic was marked by the anomaly of a de facto federation presided over by a president increasingly committed to a unitary, centralized national structure. Like the role of representative government and parties, the issue of centralization had emerged acutely in the previous decade. Many of the reforms sponsored by the Ch'ing court in its last years were dedicated to imposing a more centralized control over the country. The 1911 Revolution was in part a provincial reaction to Peking's pretensions to increased power. After the revolution those who still believed in a centralized unity were horrified at the extremes to which federalism had been taken. Bureaucratic, fiscal, legislative and even military autonomy were extensively assumed by most provincial governments. The argument persuaded some that federalism cut into the strength of the national government and that in a world of predatory imperialists, China could not afford anything less than a radical augmentation of power in the central government. (Those stressing the importance of parties and the national assembly did not necessarily favour federalism, although liberal centralizers, like Sung Chiao-jen, found it expedient tactically to ally with defenders of provincial autonomy and to sponsor some of their demands.) Yuan, perforce, acquiesced in provincial. autonomy during the early months of his presidency but showed growing impatience with it. In July 1912 he went through the motions of confirming in office all the provincial military governors who in no way owed him their positions. He piously pleaded for their 'cooperation with the government'.21 In the autumn of that year, he tried with little success to assume the authority to appoint civil officials in the provinces. The effort was generally taken as interference in the internal affairs of the province and was frequently rejected, sometimes hotly. In late November, when asking the provincial authorities to submit to Peking for approval their appointments of county magistrates, he plaintively noted that the provisional constitution gave 20 Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung hsitn-shcng nien-p'u ch'ang-pitn ch'u-kao, 346. 21 Cheng-fu kung-pao, 74 (13 July 1912) 2-3. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008