《近代中国对外关系史 The History of Modern China's Foreign Relations》课程教学资源（阅读材料）The Cambridge History of China, vol. XII, chps, IV

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 2I3 their accrued privileges,including command over provincial armies,the retention of tax revenues,and the selection of local and provincial officials. At the same time,local assemblies below the provincial level swelled greatly in incidence and assertiveness.To the minds of the provincial- ists,the two demands of unity and self-government could be wedded in federal structures.The early republic was at first a de facto confederation of provinces.But the continuing foreign pressure on Chinese sovereignty put a great strain on such a loose arrangement. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER The new political order had the task of establishing itself amidst these unresolved tensions.A brief description of its structure in the spring of I9Iz is a necessary preliminary to tracing the main events. As agreed in the negotiations concluding the revolution,Yuan Shih- k'ai was president.He swore to a republican oath composed,like the Provisional Constitution(Lin-shih yueh-fa)of 1912,by the revolutionary leadership.But the president was endowed by the new constitution with considerable executive power.Impeachment was not made easy;he was theoretically commander-in-chief of all China's army and navy;and, again theoretically,he possessed broad powers of appointment.He was to share responsibilities with a prime minister and cabinet,whom he appointed with the concurrence of the parliament or national assembly. The first prime minister was Tang Shao-i,an old associate of Yuan's, whose sympathy for the revolutionary side unexpectedly persisted after the revolution. The first provisional parliament of the republic consisted of represen- tatives from the provinces,five delegates each.The parliament lacked any significant royalist group,but adherents of the main revolutionary party,the T'ung-meng hui,held less than one-third of the seats.This reflected the Tung-meng hui's failure to dominate more than a minority of the governments even of those provinces that had joined the revolu- tion.The other major parties represented either factions that had pre- viously split from the T'ung-meng hui,or the reformist constitutional movement of officials and gentry that had adopted republicanism only during-and in some cases,after-the revolution.One principal achieve- ment of this parliament was the legislation guiding the election of a more permanent,bicameral parliament and of new provincial assemblies. (The new assemblies actually were constituted in the first half of 1913.) Another achievement was the rejection of Yuan's efforts to establish administrative machinery for subordinating the provinces. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 213 their accrued privileges, including command over provincial armies, the retention of tax revenues, and the selection of local and provincial officials. At the same time, local assemblies below the provincial level swelled greatly in incidence and assertiveness. To the minds of the provincial￾ists, the two demands of unity and self-government could be wedded in federal structures. The early republic was at first a de facto confederation of provinces. But the continuing foreign pressure on Chinese sovereignty put a great strain on such a loose arrangement. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER The new political order had the task of establishing itself amidst these unresolved tensions. A brief description of its structure in the spring of 1912 is a necessary preliminary to tracing the main events. As agreed in the negotiations concluding the revolution, Yuan Shih￾k'ai was president. He swore to a republican oath composed, like the Provisional Constitution (Lin-shih yueh-fa) of 1912, by the revolutionary leadership. But the president was endowed by the new constitution with considerable executive power. Impeachment was not made easy; he was theoretically commander-in-chief of all China's army and navy; and, again theoretically, he possessed broad powers of appointment. He was to share responsibilities with a prime minister and cabinet, whom he appointed with the concurrence of the parliament or national assembly. The first prime minister was T'ang Shao-i, an old associate of Yuan's, whose sympathy for the revolutionary side unexpectedly persisted after the revolution. The first provisional parliament of the republic consisted of represen￾tatives from the provinces, five delegates each. The parliament lacked any significant royalist group, but adherents of the main revolutionary party, the T'ung-meng hui, held less than one-third of the seats. This reflected the T'ung-meng hui's failure to dominate more than a minority of the governments even of those provinces that had joined the revolu￾tion. The other major parties represented either factions that had pre￾viously split from the T'ung-meng hui, or the reformist constitutional movement of officials and gentry that had adopted republicanism only during - and in some cases, after - the revolution. One principal achieve￾ment of this parliament was the legislation guiding the election of a more permanent, bicameral parliament and of new provincial assemblies. (The new assemblies actually were constituted in the first half of 1913.) Another achievement was the rejection of Yuan's efforts to establish administrative machinery for subordinating the provinces. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

214 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 In most provinces,political leadership was drawn from two institutions: the army,especially the leaders of the modern New Army units formed around the country in the late Ch'ing,and the provincial assemblies. Although the precipitation of the revolution had often begun at lower levels,it was people from these two groups who had consolidated power as Ch'ing authority collapsed.The top executive was in every province the military governor (-)If we exclude the Manchurian provinces and Kansu,where conditions differed and comparison is difficult,then I2 of the remaining 17'home'provinces had soldiers as military governors in the mid summer of 1912.(Of these 12,six were Chinese graduates of the Japanese Army Officers Academy.)There were five men without mili- tary backgrounds in this post,two of them in provinces that had not joined the revolution before the Ch'ing abdication.The balance between army and provincial assembly varied considerably from province to province.In Yunnan the New Army officers maintained rigid control over the provincial government.In Hunan they gave way to leaders out of the provincial assembly.In a few provinces the revolutionary party and its adherents were a third force and might even,as in Kwangtung, dominate the provincial government.In some cases,important sections of the army,not necessarily including the military governor,were ad- herents of the revolutionary party or shared its relative radicalism,as in Hupei and Kiangsu.The resulting politics was often quite confusing. Remarkably,sufficient cohesion was achieved in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces to prevent Peking from injecting its power locally.Only in the three northern provinces of Chihli,Honan and Shantung and,somewhat less confidently,in Manchuria could Yuan unilaterally appoint important officials. Most provincial governments were not only immune to Peking's control;they were also able to muster sufficient energy to prevent lesser administrative units from splitting off.The consolidation of provincial authority was in several cases a difficult process.One pattern by which the revolution had spread was the establishment of sub-provincial re- volutionary governments,often at the prefectural level.Their subor- dination to the provincial government was not always accomplished either swiftly or completely.But in comparison with Peking's authority in the formerly revolutionary provinces,the fiscal and appointive powers of provincial governments in their own domain were extensive by the end of 1912.This was due partly to the circumstances of the revolution-its primary act having been the destruction of central authority and its form being internally decentralized.It also owed much to the assertion that provinces could best serve China's interests by insisting on their autonomy Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008

214 TH E ER A O F YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 In most provinces, political leadership was drawn from two institutions: the army, especially the leaders of the modern New Army units formed around the country in the late Ch'ing, and the provincial assemblies. Although the precipitation of the revolution had often begun at lower levels, it was people from these two groups who had consolidated power as Ch'ing authority collapsed. The top executive was in every province the military governor (tu-tu). If we exclude the Manchurian provinces and Kansu, where conditions differed and comparison is difficult, then 12 of the remaining 17 'home' provinces had soldiers as military governors in the mid summer of 1912. (Of these 12, six were Chinese graduates of the Japanese Army Officers Academy.) There were five men without mili￾tary backgrounds in this post, two of them in provinces that had not joined the revolution before the Ch'ing abdication. The balance between army and provincial assembly varied considerably from province to province. In Yunnan the New Army officers maintained rigid control over the provincial government. In Hunan they gave way to leaders out of the provincial assembly. In a few provinces the revolutionary party and its adherents were a third force and might even, as in Kwangtung, dominate the provincial government. In some cases, important sections of the army, not necessarily including the military governor, were ad￾herents of the revolutionary party or shared its relative radicalism, as in Hupei and Kiangsu. The resulting politics was often quite confusing. Remarkably, sufficient cohesion was achieved in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces to prevent Peking from injecting its power locally. Only in the three northern provinces of Chihli, Honan and Shantung and, somewhat less confidently, in Manchuria could Yuan unilaterally appoint important officials. Most provincial governments were not only immune to Peking's control; they were also able to muster sufficient energy to prevent lesser administrative units from splitting off. The consolidation of provincial authority was in several cases a difficult process. One pattern by which the revolution had spread was the establishment of sub-provincial re￾volutionary governments, often at the prefectural level. Their subor￾dination to the provincial government was not always accomplished either swiftly or completely. But in comparison with Peking's authority in the formerly revolutionary provinces, the fiscal and appointive powers of provincial governments in their own domain were extensive by the end of 1912. This was due partly to the circumstances of the revolution - its primary act having been the destruction of central authority and its form being internally decentralized. It also owed much to the assertion that provinces could best serve China's interests by insisting on their autonomy Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 2I5 in the face of the stifling centralization that was believed to have marked Ch'ing rule,especially in its final years. Among the many presentations of the case for provincial autonomy was that written in 1912 by Tai Chi-t'ao,a young journalist in Shanghai. 'With respect to the localities,the role of the province is that of the highest administrative district.With respect to the centre,it is the largest sphere of self-government.To attain the goals of republicanism,one must seek to develop people's rights (minch'tian],and in seeking to develop people's rights,the scope of self-government must be enlarged.'Tai noted that advocates of centralization 'argue that the reason for China's not prospering is that localism is too ingrained,so that province is set off from province,and prefecture from prefecture...'.But Tai would reverse the argument.China was too large and its people too numerous to be ruled through centralized institutions,which had often caused decay and collapse under the empire.'Seen in this light,the reason China has not prospered is that the ideas of centralization are too ingrained and the concept of self-government too weak.'Provincial autonomy and the popular election of provincial chiefs,Tai felt,were keys to national political progress and tranquillity. These sentiments were squarely opposed to those of Peking's bureau- crats,including the country's president.Tai's analysis also implied the need to check the attempt of sub-provincial districts to escape provincial power. The actual success of provincial governments in extending their power throughout their provinces varied widely.The Ch'ing in its last few years had begun establishing self-government councils and assemblies at the hsien and lesser levels.After the revolution,the incidence of such bodies mounted rapidly.In the Ch'ing plan,these local representative organs were supposed to manage and finance a range of local reforms, particularly in education,under the guidance of centrally appointed of- ficials.With the revolution,some local assemblies became politically ag- gressive and presumed to select their own executive authorities,including county magistrates.Such assertiveness harmonized with one persistent school of political thought over the centuries that urged a closer,more organic connection between local elites and their administrators.As a practical matter in I9rz and 1913,it not only violated the conceptions entertained for the Chinese polity by the centralizers in Peking;it also defied provincial authority.Generally speaking,provincial authority prevailed.But judging from provincial budgets in these years,the success 1 Tai Chi-t'ao,Tai T'ien-ch'ou wen-chi(Collected essays of Tai Chi-t'ao)(Taipei reprint edn, 1962),187-95. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 215 in the face of the stifling centralization that was believed to have marked Ch'ing rule, especially in its final years. Among the many presentations of the case for provincial autonomy was that written in 1912 by Tai Chi-t'ao, a young journalist in Shanghai. 'With respect to the localities, the role of the province is that of the highest administrative district. With respect to the centre, it is the largest sphere of self-government. To attain the goals of republicanism, one must seek to develop people's rights [min-ch'iian], and in seeking to develop people's rights, the scope of self-government must be enlarged.' Tai noted that advocates of centralization 'argue that the reason for China's not prospering is that localism is too ingrained, so that province is set off from province, and prefecture from prefecture. . .'. But Tai would reverse the argument. China was too large and its people too numerous to be ruled through centralized institutions, which had often caused decay and collapse under the empire. 'Seen in this light, the reason China has not prospered is that the ideas of centralization are too ingrained and the concept of self-government too weak.' Provincial autonomy and the popular election of provincial chiefs, Tai felt, were keys to national political progress and tranquillity.' These sentiments were squarely opposed to those of Peking's bureau￾crats, including the country's president. Tai's analysis also implied the need to check the attempt of sub-provincial districts to escape provincial power. The actual success of provincial governments in extending their power throughout their provinces varied widely. The Ch'ing in its last few years had begun establishing self-government councils and assemblies at the hsien and lesser levels. After the revolution, the incidence of such bodies mounted rapidly. In the Ch'ing plan, these local representative organs were supposed to manage and finance a range of local reforms, particularly in education, under the guidance of centrally appointed of￾ficials. With the revolution, some local assemblies became politically ag￾gressive and presumed to select their own executive authorities, including county magistrates. Such assertiveness harmonized with one persistent school of political thought over the centuries that urged a closer, more organic connection between local elites and their administrators. As a practical matter in 1912 and 1913, it not only violated the conceptions entertained for the Chinese polity by the centralizers in Peking; it also defied provincial authority. Generally speaking, provincial authority prevailed. But judging from provincial budgets in these years, the success 1 Tai Chi-t'ao, Tai T'ien-ch'ou wen-chi (Collected essays of Tai Chi-t'ao) (Taipei reprint edn, 1962), 187-95. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

216 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 was often only partial,as more revenue seems to have been retained in the counties than had been the case in most provinces under the Ch'ing. Meanwhile,the charge on provincial revenues was greatly increased by the expanded armies of the revolutionary aftermath.Despite some demobilization even before the Ch'ing abdication,the provinces that had joined the revolution were in most cases left with a large assortment of troops,some inherited from the Ch'ing and some conscripted during the revolution.The soldiers could not easily be dismissed without payment of the arrears that had commonly accumulated;but the longer they were retained,the greater was the amount owed and the more likely were they to take to rioting and looting.In Kiangsu,for example,a Japanese consul estimated that the province had 44,ooo soldiers at the end of the Ch'ing rule there,that the numbers grew to 180,ooo during the revolution, and that after strenuous efforts at disbandment,there were still over 1o0,ooo in various military units in August 1912.The precise numbers nationally were a matter of speculation.For purposes of negotiating loans with foreign banks,in part to pay for demobilization,the Peking govern- ment used a figure of over 8o0,ooo men under arms throughout the coun- try.As long as such locally financed troops remained,they both strength- ened and weakened the provinces.They provided a potential defence against Peking authority;but they drained funds from provincial budgets that might otherwise have financed reforms and given vitality to pro- vincial autonomy.Demobilization continued in I9Iz and 1913,so that by the spring of 1913 there were perhaps half a million troops in fairly modernized or formal units.But financing and command remained pro- vincial responsibilities in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces, until Yuan's armed assault on provincial autonomy in the summer of 1913. Despite numerous mutinies,which were characteristically directed against the actuality or threat of short wages,the armies did not turn against the social order or challenge the dominance of the existing elite groups.Nor did the countryside stay long in a turbulent state.Reports of banditry were common,and occasionally villages would rise up against extortionate taxes or malfeasant officials.But suppression was regularly applied and rural disturbances did not reach proportions worthy of na- tional attention before the Second Revolution.The threat from below 2 Funatsu Shinichiro,consul in Nanking,to Uchida Yasuchika,foreign minister,secret despatch No.38(23 Aug.1912),microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry,MT 5.1.10.5- 1. 3 Japanese General Staff,'Kakumei-go ni okeru Shina kakusho zogen ichi-ranbyo'(Table of changes in military strength of the various Chinese provinces after the revolution),Io March 1913,microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry,MT 5.1.1o.5-1,reel 463,pp. 420-1. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008

2l6 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 was often only partial, as more revenue seems to have been retained in the counties than had been the case in most provinces under the Ch'ing. Meanwhile, the charge on provincial revenues was greatly increased by the expanded armies of the revolutionary aftermath. Despite some demobilization even before the Ch'ing abdication, the provinces that had joined the revolution were in most cases left with a large assortment of troops, some inherited from the Ch'ing and some conscripted during the revolution. The soldiers could not easily be dismissed without payment of the arrears that had commonly accumulated; but the longer they were retained, the greater was the amount owed and the more likely were they to take to rioting and looting. In Kiangsu, for example, a Japanese consul estimated that the province had 44,000 soldiers at the end of the Ch'ing rule there, that the numbers grew to 180,000 during the revolution, and that after strenuous efforts at disbandment, there were still over 100,000 in various military units in August 1912.2 The precise numbers nationally were a matter of speculation. For purposes of negotiating loans with foreign banks, in part to pay for demobilization, the Peking govern￾ment used a figure of over 800,000 men under arms throughout the coun￾try. As long as such locally financed troops remained, they both strength￾ened and weakened the provinces. They provided a potential defence against Peking authority; but they drained funds from provincial budgets that might otherwise have financed reforms and given vitality to pro￾vincial autonomy. Demobilization continued in 1912 and 1913, so that by the spring of 1913 there were perhaps half a million troops in fairly modernized or formal units.3 But financing and command remained pro￾vincial responsibilities in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces, until Yuan's armed assault on provincial autonomy in the summer of 1913. Despite numerous mutinies, which were characteristically directed against the actuality or threat of short wages, the armies did not turn against the social order or challenge the dominance of the existing elite groups. Nor did the countryside stay long in a turbulent state. Reports of banditry were common, and occasionally villages would rise up against extortionate taxes or malfeasant officials. But suppression was regularly applied and rural disturbances did not reach proportions worthy of na￾tional attention before the Second Revolution. The threat from below 2 Funatsu Shinichiro, consul in Nanking, to Uchida Yasuchika, foreign minister, secret despatch No. 38 (23 Aug. 1912), microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MT 5.1.10.5- 1 . 3 Japanese General Staff, 'Kakumei-go ni okeru Shina kakusho zogen ichi-ranbyo' (Table of changes in military strength of the various Chinese provinces after the revolution), 10 March 1913, microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MT 5.1.10.5-1, reel 463, pp. 420-1. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 2I7 preoccupied the local social and political leadership,even though it was diffuse and unorganized.It was successfully contained,while the national leadership experimented with liberal politics. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT The question of whether groups might properly band together outside the government in order to effect political ends has been a lively one in the course of Chinese history.The weight of orthodox opinion under the empire had been that such parties,cliques or factions were injurious to the proper working of government and were evil in themselves.Much of this critical view focused on the word fang or party.When the Ch'ing dynasty fell and the sanctions against parties vanished,it was as if the centuries of denial had produced an almost unquenchable thirst for polit- ical parties and associations.Within the first few months of the new republic,some dozen political groups emerged that were at least nominally in competition for political power through the representative system. This proliferation of political organization was an important expres- sion of the climate of the revolutionary aftermath,but it was also built upon pre-revolutionary experience.The leaders in party formation had more often than not spent time in Japan,where political parties had been developing for over three decades and were at the time of the i9tI Revolu- tion entering a new stage of importance in Japanese politics.Chinese political parties had been appearing in clandestine and conspiratorial forms since Sun Yat-sen established branches of the Hsing-Chung hui in Honolulu and Hong Kong in 1894 and 1895.The establishment of pro- vincial assemblies and the national consultative assembly in the last years of the Ch'ing stimulated the formation of open political groupings that hardly pretended to avoid the appearance of being tang.Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, prominent political writer and veteran activist,encouraged these devel- opments,both in his widely-read essays and as practical adviser from his exile in Japan.When the revolution came,China's educated elite,par- ticularly that portion which had absorbed Western notions of political organization,entered the political game with brash enthusiasm. Interest first focuses naturally on the leading revolutionary group,of whom the most famous were Sun Yat-sen,Huang Hsing and Sung Chiao- jen.These national leaders had no disciplined organization at their dis- posal that effectively reached the local scene.Therefore they did not typically control the behaviour of even the most committed of local revolutionary activists.Recent scholarship has emphasized the autonomy of provincial politics after the I9It Revolution.But national unity Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT ZIJ preoccupied the local social and political leadership, even though it was diffuse and unorganized. It was successfully contained, while the national leadership experimented with liberal politics. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT The question of whether groups might properly band together outside the government in order to effect political ends has been a lively one in the course of Chinese history. The weight of orthodox opinion under the empire had been that such parties, cliques or factions were injurious to the proper working of government and were evil in themselves. Much of this critical view focused on the word tang or party. When the Ch'ing dynasty fell and the sanctions against parties vanished, it was as if the centuries of denial had produced an almost unquenchable thirst for polit￾ical parties and associations. Within the first few months of the new republic, some dozen political groups emerged that were at least nominally in competition for political power through the representative system. This proliferation of political organization was an important expres￾sion of the climate of the revolutionary aftermath, but it was also built upon pre-revolutionary experience. The leaders in party formation had more often than not spent time in Japan, where political parties had been developing for over three decades and were at the time of the 1911 Revolu￾tion entering a new stage of importance in Japanese politics. Chinese political parties had been appearing in clandestine and conspiratorial forms since Sun Yat-sen established branches of the Hsing-Chung hui in Honolulu and Hong Kong in 1894 and 1895. The establishment of pro￾vincial assemblies and the national consultative assembly in the last years of the Ch'ing stimulated the formation of open political groupings that hardly pretended to avoid the appearance of being tang. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, prominent political writer and veteran activist, encouraged these devel￾opments, both in his widely-read essays and as practical adviser from his exile in Japan. When the revolution came, China's educated elite, par￾ticularly that portion which had absorbed Western notions of political organization, entered the political game with brash enthusiasm. Interest first focuses naturally on the leading revolutionary group, of whom the most famous were Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing and Sung Chiao￾jen. These national leaders had no disciplined organization at their dis￾posal that effectively reached the local scene. Therefore they did not typically control the behaviour of even the most committed of local revolutionary activists. Recent scholarship has emphasized the autonomy of provincial politics after the 1911 Revolution. But national unity Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008