concludes,"Racial equality had been an unspoken problem across the political spectrum that Britain,rather than of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since its beginning."9 accommodating Berlin,had to respond firmly to Germany's naval program. Anglo-German Naval Rivalry,1898-1914 With the Reichstag's passage of the First Naval Law in the Contrary to Tirpitz'expectations,Britain did not leave the spring of 1898,Germany began building a battle fleet, bulk of its battle fleet in peripheral waters as Germany's pursuing Weltpolitik through turning its economic might building program proceeded.Instead,faced with a threat to into geopolitical sway.The Second Naval Law,passed two the home islands,London began pulling its battleships years later,set fleet strength at thirty-eight battleships, from imperial stations to concentrate them in local waters. giving Germany a world-class fleet and ensuring that Indeed,the alliance with Japan and rapprochement with the Germany's building program would upset the stable United States were important diplomatic vehicles balance of power in Europe that had existed since the end facilitating this redistribution of the fleet.Moreover,Britain of the Napoleonic Wars.Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,the embarked on its own building program to ensure that the chief architect of Germany's buildup,did not intend on Royal Navy would retain a comfortable margin of overtaking Britain as the world's premier naval power. superiority over the German fleet.As Paul Kennedy Rather,he envisaged that the navy would serve as a"risk comments,"Tirpitz'calculations that Germany could fleet"-a means of compelling Britain and the other major develop a formidable naval force in home waters without powers to defer to German dominance in Europe.While the British either noticing it or being able to respond to it Britain's fleet would be dispersed throughout its empire, was flawed from the start."22 Germany would concentrate its boats in the North Sea, thereby enjoying the influence and strategic advantages that So began the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain would accompany naval primacy in Europe.As Tirpitz that would ultimately culminate in World War I.Mounting wrote,"The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea;it antagonism between the two powers was driven principally influenced the entire globe without us needing to be by geopolitical interest;Germany's bid to expand its directly engaged in any other place." strategic reach posed an unacceptable threat to Britain's national interests.Nonetheless,a number of other The British initially reacted cautiously to Germany's naval considerations made the escalation of hostility particularly ambitions,uncertain whether such geopolitical stirrings difficult to arrest.The British were coming to see Germany represented an opportunity or a threat.Britain and as a formidable economic competitor and took umbrage at Germany had strong economic ties and generally good the tariffs Berlin implemented to protect its agricultural relations,prompting London to consider the possibility of and industrial sectors.As tensions mounted,ideological an Anglo-German alliance-a tempting option in the face differences -in particular,British discomfort with of the Franco-Russian coupling that had taken shape in Germany's illiberal politics-became part of the "mental 1892."From 1902 onwards,however,British attitudes furniture"that fueled mutual antagonism on both sides. toward the growth of the German fleet hardened.German And popular sentiment hemmed in leaders on both sides. support for the Boers in their war with Britain helped fuel The Anglophobia and nationalism sold to the German London's distrust of Berlin.Influenced by the mainstream public to disarm the left and win support for naval funding press,anti-German sentiment also spread widely among eventually entrapped officials in Berlin,making it politically the public.And the scope of Tirpitz'program ensured that perilous for them to step back from competition with the German fleet would pose a serious threat to the security Britain.Although Britain lacked Germany's "massive of the home islands.By 1903,a consensus had formed government-instigated propaganda,"officials in London NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 6
new america foundation page 6 concludes, “Racial equality had been an unspoken problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since its beginning.”19 Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1898-1914 With the Reichstag’s passage of the First Naval Law in the spring of 1898, Germany began building a battle fleet, pursuing Weltpolitik through turning its economic might into geopolitical sway. The Second Naval Law, passed two years later, set fleet strength at thirty-eight battleships, giving Germany a world-class fleet and ensuring that Germany’s building program would upset the stable balance of power in Europe that had existed since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the chief architect of Germany’s buildup, did not intend on overtaking Britain as the world’s premier naval power. Rather, he envisaged that the navy would serve as a “risk fleet” – a means of compelling Britain and the other major powers to defer to German dominance in Europe. While Britain’s fleet would be dispersed throughout its empire, Germany would concentrate its boats in the North Sea, thereby enjoying the influence and strategic advantages that would accompany naval primacy in Europe. As Tirpitz wrote, “The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea; it influenced the entire globe without us needing to be directly engaged in any other place.”20 The British initially reacted cautiously to Germany’s naval ambitions, uncertain whether such geopolitical stirrings represented an opportunity or a threat. Britain and Germany had strong economic ties and generally good relations, prompting London to consider the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance – a tempting option in the face of the Franco-Russian coupling that had taken shape in 1892.21 From 1902 onwards, however, British attitudes toward the growth of the German fleet hardened. German support for the Boers in their war with Britain helped fuel London’s distrust of Berlin. Influenced by the mainstream press, anti-German sentiment also spread widely among the public. And the scope of Tirpitz’ program ensured that the German fleet would pose a serious threat to the security of the home islands. By 1903, a consensus had formed across the political spectrum that Britain, rather than accommodating Berlin, had to respond firmly to Germany’s naval program. Contrary to Tirpitz’ expectations, Britain did not leave the bulk of its battle fleet in peripheral waters as Germany’s building program proceeded. Instead, faced with a threat to the home islands, London began pulling its battleships from imperial stations to concentrate them in local waters. Indeed, the alliance with Japan and rapprochement with the United States were important diplomatic vehicles facilitating this redistribution of the fleet. Moreover, Britain embarked on its own building program to ensure that the Royal Navy would retain a comfortable margin of superiority over the German fleet. As Paul Kennedy comments, “Tirpitz’ calculations that Germany could develop a formidable naval force in home waters without the British either noticing it or being able to respond to it was flawed from the start.”22 So began the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain that would ultimately culminate in World War I. Mounting antagonism between the two powers was driven principally by geopolitical interest; Germany’s bid to expand its strategic reach posed an unacceptable threat to Britain’s national interests. Nonetheless, a number of other considerations made the escalation of hostility particularly difficult to arrest. The British were coming to see Germany as a formidable economic competitor and took umbrage at the tariffs Berlin implemented to protect its agricultural and industrial sectors. As tensions mounted, ideological differences – in particular, British discomfort with Germany’s illiberal politics – became part of the “mental furniture” that fueled mutual antagonism on both sides. And popular sentiment hemmed in leaders on both sides. The Anglophobia and nationalism sold to the German public to disarm the left and win support for naval funding eventually entrapped officials in Berlin, making it politically perilous for them to step back from competition with Britain. Although Britain lacked Germany’s “massive government-instigated propaganda,” officials in London
faced considerable pressure from the public and the press -the border of Venezuela,fishing rights in the Barents Sea, to block Germany's rising ambition.23 the Panama Canal,the border between Alaska and Canada -dampening rivalry and sending signals of benign intent. In 1907,Britain joined France and Russia in fashioning the To be sure,Britain was motivated by necessity,not Triple Entente,a pact meant to hem in German ambition. altruism;it faced a serious strategic deficiency and needed This countervailing coalition fueled fears of encirclement in to reduce imperial commitments,prompting it to pursue Germany.Berlin reacted by increasing its armaments, rapprochement with the United States.But it was London's which only escalated competition with the Triple Entente- practice of strategic restraint and Washington's readiness to and especially with Britain.Although the London and reciprocate that transformed the Anglo-American Berlin at times explored the possibility of a negotiated relationship from enmity to amity.Britain was then able to agreement to end the spiraling naval race,such efforts were cede naval primacy in the western Atlantic to a partner repeatedly foiled by hardliners on both sides. rather than retreat from the region under pressure from an adversary.Diplomacy cleared the way for strategic Britain did not want war,but took prudent steps to balance retrenchment. against Germany's growing battle fleet.Germany also did not want war,but Berlin eventually decided it needed to go The case of Britain and Japan demonstrates that strategic to war to break out of the encircling coalition that its naval cooperation,even if it entails formal alliance,does not have buildup had itself triggered.To be sure,Germany began its the same pacifying effects as the practice of reciprocal naval buildup to increase its geopolitical sway.But when it restraint.Britain and Japan coordinated fleet strength and took the decision for war in the summer of 1914,Berlin was naval operations,but each viewed the other side as motivated by an insecurity of its own making,not a boastful pursuing its own self-interest,not joint gains.Britain saw confidence in its ability to prevail.Germany from 1898 Japan as taking advantage of the alliance to expand its onwards set in motion a set of actions and reactions that led strategic reach in East Asia.Japan saw Britain as using the to an unintended hegemonic war. alliance to defend its imperial interests in the Far East and Indian Ocean.Absent the concessions and mutual The Lessons of History accommodation that indicate benign intent,strategic As the twentieth century opened,Britain faced the cooperation did not deepen into durable rapprochement. unenviable task of overhauling its grand strategy to respond to the simultaneous rise of the United States,Japan,and In the case of Britain and Germany,neither side practiced Germany.Britain succeeded in ending geopolitical rivalry strategic restraint;instead,a classic insecurity spiral set in, with the United States,but soon found itself at war with with a tit-for-tat naval rivalry leading to the escalation of Germany and,later,Japan.A number of important hostility.British and German elites both appreciated the historical lessons emerge from the divergent trajectories of potential for diplomacy and arms control to forestall the Britain's relations with these three rising powers. naval race.But domestic pressures on both sides virtually precluded conciliatory moves.Once the naval race had Strategic restraint and mutual accommodation begun,a combination of strategic imperative and domestic The critical ingredient making possible lasting constraints produced a self-reinforcing dynamic.It was this rapprochement between the United States and Great dynamic that led to Germany's self-encirclement and, Britain was the reciprocal practice of strategic restraint. ultimately,to a hegemonic war that neither Germany nor Both parties were willing to withhold their power and give Britain wanted or intended. ground on issues over which there were conflicts of interest NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 7
new america foundation page 7 faced considerable pressure from the public and the press to block Germany’s rising ambition.23 In 1907, Britain joined France and Russia in fashioning the Triple Entente, a pact meant to hem in German ambition. This countervailing coalition fueled fears of encirclement in Germany. Berlin reacted by increasing its armaments, which only escalated competition with the Triple Entente – and especially with Britain. Although the London and Berlin at times explored the possibility of a negotiated agreement to end the spiraling naval race, such efforts were repeatedly foiled by hardliners on both sides. Britain did not want war, but took prudent steps to balance against Germany’s growing battle fleet. Germany also did not want war, but Berlin eventually decided it needed to go to war to break out of the encircling coalition that its naval buildup had itself triggered. To be sure, Germany began its naval buildup to increase its geopolitical sway. But when it took the decision for war in the summer of 1914, Berlin was motivated by an insecurity of its own making, not a boastful confidence in its ability to prevail. Germany from 1898 onwards set in motion a set of actions and reactions that led to an unintended hegemonic war. The Lessons of History As the twentieth century opened, Britain faced the unenviable task of overhauling its grand strategy to respond to the simultaneous rise of the United States, Japan, and Germany. Britain succeeded in ending geopolitical rivalry with the United States, but soon found itself at war with Germany and, later, Japan. A number of important historical lessons emerge from the divergent trajectories of Britain’s relations with these three rising powers. Strategic restraint and mutual accommodation The critical ingredient making possible lasting rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain was the reciprocal practice of strategic restraint. Both parties were willing to withhold their power and give ground on issues over which there were conflicts of interest – the border of Venezuela, fishing rights in the Barents Sea, the Panama Canal, the border between Alaska and Canada – dampening rivalry and sending signals of benign intent. To be sure, Britain was motivated by necessity, not altruism; it faced a serious strategic deficiency and needed to reduce imperial commitments, prompting it to pursue rapprochement with the United States. But it was London’s practice of strategic restraint and Washington’s readiness to reciprocate that transformed the Anglo-American relationship from enmity to amity. Britain was then able to cede naval primacy in the western Atlantic to a partner rather than retreat from the region under pressure from an adversary. Diplomacy cleared the way for strategic retrenchment. The case of Britain and Japan demonstrates that strategic cooperation, even if it entails formal alliance, does not have the same pacifying effects as the practice of reciprocal restraint. Britain and Japan coordinated fleet strength and naval operations, but each viewed the other side as pursuing its own self-interest, not joint gains. Britain saw Japan as taking advantage of the alliance to expand its strategic reach in East Asia. Japan saw Britain as using the alliance to defend its imperial interests in the Far East and Indian Ocean. Absent the concessions and mutual accommodation that indicate benign intent, strategic cooperation did not deepen into durable rapprochement. In the case of Britain and Germany, neither side practiced strategic restraint; instead, a classic insecurity spiral set in, with a tit-for-tat naval rivalry leading to the escalation of hostility. British and German elites both appreciated the potential for diplomacy and arms control to forestall the naval race. But domestic pressures on both sides virtually precluded conciliatory moves. Once the naval race had begun, a combination of strategic imperative and domestic constraints produced a self-reinforcing dynamic. It was this dynamic that led to Germany’s self-encirclement and, ultimately, to a hegemonic war that neither Germany nor Britain wanted or intended