International Security 17:1 126 While studies of American strategy in Korea often disagree on whether American policy was too soft or too tough,many agree on what constituted the last chance for peace.Several authors argue that escalation of the Korean conflict could have been avoided even after American troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7,1950,seized the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Wonsan in mid-October,and briefly engaged Chinese detachments north of those cities from October 25 through November 7.9 Analysts of the war have therefore paid great attention to American policy in the period between November 7,when the Chinese disengaged from American forces,and No- vember 24,when MacArthur began the massive drive toward the Yalu. During this period,they suggest,some mixture of reassuring buffers and sobering threats might still have dissuaded the Chinese from a major offen- sive against American troops.10 Smoke,Deterrence and American Foreign Policy,ch.7;Walter Zelman,"Chinese Intervention in the Korean War:A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence,"UCLA Security Studies Project,No.11(1967) Morton H.Halperin,Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York:Wiley,1963),ch.3;Osgood, Limited War,ch.8;Thomas C.Schelling,Arms and Influence(New Haven:Yale University Press, 1966),pp.53-55 and passim;Robert Jervis,Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1976),p.46 and passim;Lebow,Between Peace and War, pp.172-184 and passim;John Orme,"Deterrence Failures:A Second Look,"International Security, Vol.11,No.4(Spring 1987),pp.109-112;and Paul K.Huth,Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven:Yale University Press,1988),pp.139-148. 9.See,for example,George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.222-231."Even as late as the second or third week in November,Washington had the opportunity to take steps to reduce Peking's incentives to engage in a major war by modifying the U.S.war objectives and restricting military operations.The final 'point of no return'for U.S.policy was not passed until shortly before the Chinese launched their all-out offensive."Allen Whiting argues that "while China crossed the Yalu on October 15th,she did not cross the Rubicon until November 26th."Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.118.See also Halperin,Limited War,pp.50-53;Zelman, "Chinese Intervention,"p.27;Orme,"Deterrence Failures,"p.110;Kalicki,Pattern of Sino- American Crises,p.63;Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang,China under Threat:The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1980),pp.53-58.Gurtov and Hwang view China's late October engagements as a "warning shot"designed to deter American escalation.Lebow,Between Peace and War,pp.178-179,also portrays Chinese intervention in late October and early November as part of a deterrence strategy designed to avoid escalation. These positions are undercut by the new documentary evidence from China. 10.For discussions of the potential effectiveness of a buffer in this period,see Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.155,160-162 and passim;William Whitney Stueck,Jr.,The Road to Confron- tation:American Foreign Policy Toward China and Korea,1947-1950(Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press,1981),p.251;George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.222- 231;Zelman,"Chinese Intervention,"p.26;Orme,"Deterrence Failures,"pp.109-110;Schelling, Arms and Influence,pp.54-55;Kalicki,Pattern of Sino-American Crises,pp.57-64.Kalicki discusses "the all-important buffer,"but believes that MacArthur's initial late October thrusts north of the neck of Korea "eliminated"this buffer.Still,he argues that the two weeks between Chinese disengagement and MacArthur's final drive north allowed time for the Americans to pull back This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 17:1 | 126 While studies of American strategy in Korea often disagree on whether American policy was too soft or too tough, many agree on what constituted the last chance for peace. Several authors argue that escalation of the Korean conflict could have been avoided even after American troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, seized the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Wonsan in mid-October, and briefly engaged Chinese detachments north of those cities from October 25 through November 7.9 Analysts of the war have therefore paid great attention to American policy in the period between November 7, when the Chinese disengaged from American forces, and November 24, when MacArthur began the massive drive toward the Yalu. During this period, they suggest, some mixture of reassuring buffers and sobering threats might still have dissuaded the Chinese from a major offensive against American troops.10 Smoke, Deterrence and American Foreign Policy, ch. 7; Walter Zelman, "Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence," UCLA Security Studies Project, No. 11 (1967); Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley, 1963), ch. 3; Osgood, Limited War, ch. 8; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 53-55 and passim; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 46 and passim; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 172-184 and passim; John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 109-112; and Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 139-148. 9. See, for example, George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 222-231. "Even as late as the second or third week in November, Washington had the opportunity to take steps to reduce Peking's incentives to engage in a major war by modifying the U.S. war objectives and restricting military operations. The final 'point of no return' for U.S. policy was not passed until shortly before the Chinese launched their all-out offensive." Allen Whiting argues that, "while China crossed the Yalu on October 15th, she did not cross the Rubicon until November 26th." Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 118. See also Halperin, Limited War, pp. 50-53; Zelman, "Chinese Intervention," p. 27; Orme, "Deterrence Failures," p. 110; Kalicki, Pattern of SinoAmerican Crises, p. 63; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 53-58. Gurtov and Hwang view China's late October engagements as a "warning shot" designed to deter American escalation. Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 178-179, also portrays Chinese intervention in late October and early November as part of a deterrence strategy designed to avoid escalation. These positions are undercut by the new documentary evidence from China. 10. For discussions of the potential effectiveness of a buffer in this period, see Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 155, 160-162 and passim; William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Foreign Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 251; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 222- 231; Zelman, "Chinese Intervention," p. 26; Orme, "Deterrence Failures," pp. 109-110; Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 54-55; Kalicki, Pattern of Sino-American Crises, pp. 57-64. Kalicki discusses "the all-important buffer," but believes that MacArthur's initial late October thrusts north of the neck of Korea "eliminated" this buffer. Still, he argues that the two weeks between Chinese disengagement and MacArthur's final drive north allowed time for the Americans to pull back This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 127 A central problem for Western analyses of the Korean War has been that arguments about American coercive diplomacy rest on speculation about Chinese leaders'risk analysis and war goals.Scholars have long noted that without solid evidence about Chinese strategy we cannot accurately assess the value of the various prescriptive conclusions drawn by leaders and aca- demics.11 In recent years,the declassification of American documents has spawned excellent new work on the Korean conflict.12 But no matter how voluminous and well-interpreted,American documents cannot tell us what the Chinese side was thinking in 1950.Because of the continuing restrictions on Chinese archival materials,Western analysts have been forced to deduce Chinese strategy from behavior. Mao's Korean War cables offer the first documentary evidence of Chinese strategy in 1950 available to the West.Three of the telegrams are translated in their entirety in the appendix of this article.The cables help answer three crucial questions:Why did China enter the Korean conflict?What were Mao's military and political strategies once he entered?Given Mao's strategies, to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and to settle for peace.For a skeptical discussion of the buffer proposals in mid-November,see Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations:The British Buffer Plan of November,1950."Like Kalicki,Farrar suggests that British proposals for a buffer might have been more effective if they had been implemented before the late October and early November clashes north of the neck. For the most assertive argument for the potential utility of additional deterrent threats against the Chinese Mainland,see Halperin,Limited War,pp.50-53.Jacek Kugler also argues that increased bombing threats could have coerced Chinese withdrawal from Korea;Kugler,"As- sessing Stable Deterrence,"in Kugler and Frank C.Zagare,Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Boulder,Colo.:Lynne Rienner,1987),p.53;see also General Nathan F.Twining,Neither Liberty Nor Safety:A Hard Look at U.S.Military Policy and Strategy (New York:Holt,Rinehart and Winston, 1966),pp.53-54.Discussing deterrent threats without making such extensive claims are Zelman, "Chinese Entrance,"pp.27-28;and George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp.220-221.Without making prescriptions for American policy,various other authors have suggested that China might have discounted the possibility of American conventional or atomic strategic bombing.See,for example,Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations,"p.77;and Richard K. Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington:Brookings,1987),pp.34-36. 11.See,for example,Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.172;Osgood,Limited War,pp.179 and 184;and Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations,"p.77. 12.Prominent examples include Bruce Cumings,ed.,Child of Conflict:The Korean-American Relationship,1943-53(Seattle:University of Washington Press,1983);Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War:American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953 (Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1985);Stueck,Road To Confrontation;and Burton I.Kaufman,The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis,Credibility and Command (New York:Knopf,1986).For an extensive histo- riography of this literature,see Rosemary Foot,"Making Known the Unknown War:Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,Diplomatic History,Vol.15,No.3 (Summer 1991),Pp.411-431. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 127 A central problem for Western analyses of the Korean War has been that arguments about American coercive diplomacy rest on speculation about Chinese leaders' risk analysis and war goals. Scholars have long noted that without solid evidence about Chinese strategy we cannot accurately assess the value of the various prescriptive conclusions drawn by leaders and academics.11 In recent years, the declassification of American documents has spawned excellent new work on the Korean conflict.12 But no matter how voluminous and well-interpreted, American documents cannot tell us what the Chinese side was thinking in 1950. Because of the continuing restrictions on Chinese archival materials, Western analysts have been forced to deduce Chinese strategy from behavior. Mao's Korean War cables offer the first documentary evidence of Chinese strategy in 1950 available to the West. Three of the telegrams are translated in their entirety in the appendix of this article. The cables help answer three crucial questions: Why did China enter the Korean conflict? What were Mao's military and political strategies once he entered? Given Mao's strategies, to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and to settle for peace. For a skeptical discussion of the buffer proposals in mid-November, see Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations: The British Buffer Plan of November, 1950." Like Kalicki, Farrar suggests that British proposals for a buffer might have been more effective if they had been implemented before the late October and early November clashes north of the neck. For the most assertive argument for the potential utility of additional deterrent threats against the Chinese Mainland, see Halperin, Limited War, pp. 50-53. Jacek Kugler also argues that increased bombing threats could have coerced Chinese withdrawal from Korea; Kugler, "Assessing Stable Deterrence," in Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1987), p. 53; see also General Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: AHard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 53-54. Discussing deterrent threats without making such extensive claims are Zelman, "Chinese Entrance," pp. 27-28; and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 220-221. Without making prescriptions for American policy, various other authors have suggested that China might have discounted the possibility of American conventional or atomic strategic bombing. See, for example, Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations," p. 77; and Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 34-36. 11. See, for example, Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 172; Osgood, Limited War, pp. 179 and 184; and Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations," p. 77. 12. Prominent examples include Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-53 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Stueck, Road To Confrontation; and Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command (New York: Knopf, 1986). For an extensive historiography of this literature, see Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411-431. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 17:1 128 what options,if any,were open to American policy makers to avert a larger war?The answers to these questions lead to a reevaluation of many standard lessons of Korea. In conjunction with other available Chinese sources,13 the cables provide strong evidence that:Mao's decision to enter Korea in force was triggered by the American decision to send U.S.forces north of the 38th parallel;Mao attacked fully recognizing that the United States might respond by bombing Chinese cities;Mao did not intend to allow American troops to remain permanently behind a buffer in North Korea,regardless of the buffer's width; and once Chinese troops were dispatched to Korea,Mao's primary goal was the destruction or expulsion of all foreign forces on the Korean peninsula. The new documents demonstrate that once American troops actually crossed the 38th parallel on October 7,1950,neither reassurances nor coercive threats could have dissuaded Mao from launching massive attacks on Amer- ican troops.Neither of the policy correctives proposed during the Truman- MacArthur debate would have prevented a wider war:additional bombing threats would not have deterred China and might have made Mao increase the intensity of his preparations for a massive assault on American positions, while the adoption of the buffer zone policy would also have failed to dissuade Mao from escalation. Below,I review the standard theoretical accounts of the case,then offer a reinterpretation based on the new evidence about Mao's strategy.I close by exploring the implications of the new history for theories of coercive diplo- macy. The Dual Failure of Deterrence The 1950 Sino-American crisis has been described as a bilateral failure of deterrence.14 The Chinese failed to deter both the U.S.crossing of the 38th 13.Memoirs available in English include those of Marshals Nie Rongzhen and Peng Dehuai. See Nie,Inside the Red Star:The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing:New World Press, 1988);and Peng,Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal (Beijing:Foreign Languages Press,1984).I am grateful to Robert Ross and Michael Hunt for bringing the following Chinese language sources to my attention:the memoirs of Hong Xuezhi,vice-commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army in Korea,entitled Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi (Recollections of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea)(Beijing:Liberation Army Literary and Artistic Publishing House, November 1990):Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian,Banmendian Tanpan (Panmunjon Negotia- tions)(Beijing:Liberation Army Publishing House,August 1989);and Ye Yumeng,Chubing Chaoxian(Dispatching Troops to Korea)(Beijing:October Literary and Artistic Publishers,October, 1990).Although Ye's book is written in a literary style,it is based on extensive historical research. 14.See Walter A.Zelman,"Chinese Intervention in the Korean War";and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,ch.7. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 17:1 1 128 what options, if any, were open to American policy makers to avert a larger war? The answers to these questions lead to a reevaluation of many standard lessons of Korea. In conjunction with other available Chinese sources,13 the cables provide strong evidence that: Mao's decision to enter Korea in force was triggered by the American decision to send U.S. forces north of the 38th parallel; Mao attacked fully recognizing that the United States might respond by bombing Chinese cities; Mao did not intend to allow American troops to remain permanently behind a buffer in North Korea, regardless of the buffer's width; and once Chinese troops were dispatched to Korea, Mao's primary goal was the destruction or expulsion of all foreign forces on the Korean peninsula. The new documents demonstrate that once American troops actually crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, neither reassurances nor coercive threats could have dissuaded Mao from launching massive attacks on American troops. Neither of the policy correctives proposed during the TrumanMacArthur debate would have prevented a wider war: additional bombing threats would not have deterred China and might have made Mao increase the intensity of his preparations for a massive assault on American positions, while the adoption of the buffer zone policy would also have failed to dissuade Mao from escalation. Below, I review the standard theoretical accounts of the case, then offer a reinterpretation based on the new evidence about Mao's strategy. I close by exploring the implications of the new history for theories of coercive diplomacy. The Dual Failure of Deterrence The 1950 Sino-American crisis has been described as a bilateral failure of deterrence.14 The Chinese failed to deter both the U.S. crossing of the 38th 13. Memoirs available in English include those of Marshals Nie Rongzhen and Peng Dehuai. See Nie, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing: New World Press, 1988); and Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984). I am grateful to Robert Ross and Michael Hunt for bringing the following Chinese language sources to my attention: the memoirs of Hong Xuezhi, vice-commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army in Korea, entitled Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi (Recollections of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea) (Beijing: Liberation Army Literary and Artistic Publishing House, November 1990); Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian Tanpan (Panmunjon Negotiations) (Beijing: Liberation Army Publishing House, August 1989); and Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian (Dispatching Troops to Korea) (Beijing: October Literary and Artistic Publishers, October, 1990). Although Ye's book is written in a literary style, it is based on extensive historical research. 14. See Walter A. Zelman, "Chinese Intervention in the Korean War"; and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, ch. 7. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 129 parallel on October 7 and MacArthur's November 24 offensive toward the Yalu.The Americans also failed twice:they were unable to prevent initial Chinese entry into Korea in October,and also failed to dissuade the Chinese from launching a counteroffensive in late November. THE FIRST DETERRENCE FAILURE:OCTOBER 1950 The standard interpretations of the Chinese failure to deter the United States in October are straightforward and stand up well to the historical evidence. The tragedy stemmed from American misperceptions about how Chinese weakness would affect Mao's calculations and from the fact that communi- cations between the two capitals were so poor.In calling for the unconditional surrender of North Korean troops(October 1)and in crossing the 38th parallel (October 7),the Americans felt that China's vulnerability would probably preclude Chinese entrance into the war.However,as Allen Whiting has argued,it was China's vulnerability that,instead,precipitated its October crossing of the Yalu.15 While the Chinese attempted to deter the American crossing,the lack of direct communications meant that their warnings were both too weak and too late to reverse the American decisions.16 In September and October,the United States was emboldened in Korea both by MacArthur's stunning success at Inchon and by China's military, economic and political weakness.17 In late September,Marshal Nie Rongzhen and Premier Zhou Enlai voiced deterrent warnings.These statements were accompanied by movements of Chinese troops in and around Manchuria. On the night of October 2,Zhou called Indian Ambassador Panikkar to a midnight meeting.Zhou gave him a message to pass to Washington:if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea,China would enter the war.18 Believing these warnings to be bluffs,the Americans nevertheless crossed the parallel on October 7. 15.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.158-160. 16.On problems of diplomatic signaling,see Zelman,"Chinese Entrance into the Korean War," passim;George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.188-190;Lebow,Between Peace and War,pp.148-149,and 178;and Kalicki,Pattern of Sino-American Conflict,pp.56,and 211-217. 17.The Inchon landing of September 15,1950,reversed American fortunes in Korea by suc- cessfully dividing North Korean troops at the waist of Korea.The forces south of the 38th parallel were trapped and the forces north of it were in disarray.For discussion of the invasion, see Appleman,South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu,ch.25.For discussion of American perception of Chinese weakness in the fall of 1950,see Tsou,America's Failure in China,pp.573- 574;and Foot,The Wrong War,pp.80-81. 18.See Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.108-109. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 129 parallel on October 7 and MacArthur's November 24 offensive toward the Yalu. The Americans also failed twice: they were unable to prevent initial Chinese entry into Korea in October, and also failed to dissuade the Chinese from launching a counteroffensive in late November. THE FIRST DETERRENCE FAILURE: OCTOBER 1950 The standard interpretations of the Chinese failure to deter the United States in October are straightforward and stand up well to the historical evidence. The tragedy stemmed from American misperceptions about how Chinese weakness would affect Mao's calculations and from the fact that communications between the two capitals were so poor. In calling for the unconditional surrender of North Korean troops (October 1) and in crossing the 38th parallel (October 7), the Americans felt that China's vulnerability would probably preclude Chinese entrance into the war. However, as Allen Whiting has argued, it was China's vulnerability that, instead, precipitated its October crossing of the Yalu.15 While the Chinese attempted to deter the American crossing, the lack of direct communications meant that their warnings were both too weak and too late to reverse the American decisions.16 In September and October, the United States was emboldened in Korea both by MacArthur's stunning success at Inchon and by China's military, economic and political weakness.17 In late September, Marshal Nie Rongzhen and Premier Zhou Enlai voiced deterrent warnings. These statements were accompanied by movements of Chinese troops in and around Manchuria. On the night of October 2, Zhou called Indian Ambassador Panikkar to a midnight meeting. Zhou gave him a message to pass to Washington: if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea, China would enter the war.18 Believing these warnings to be bluffs, the Americans nevertheless crossed the parallel on October 7. 15. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 158-160. 16. On problems of diplomatic signaling, see Zelman, "Chinese Entrance into the Korean War," passim; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 188-190; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 148-149, and 178; and Kalicki, Pattern of Sino-American Conflict, pp. 56, and 211-217. 17. The Inchon landing of September 15, 1950, reversed American fortunes in Korea by successfully dividing North Korean troops at the waist of Korea. The forces south of the 38th parallel were trapped and the forces north of it were in disarray. For discussion of the invasion, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, ch. 25. For discussion of American perception of Chinese weakness in the fall of 1950, see Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 573- 574; and Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 80-81. 18. See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 108-109. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 17:1 130 The Chinese faced several serious problems in their effort to deter the Americans.First,the United States had solid realpolitik incentives to cross the parallel.Second,without direct diplomatic contacts it was difficult for Beijing to communicate a message strong and authoritative enough to deter implementation of the American strategy.Third,the clearest Chinese warn- ing came only after Truman had decided to cross the 38th parallel. American strategic planners considered Korea a region of little geostrategic significance.American troops were withdrawn from Korea in the spring of 1949 because the manpower was considered better used elsewhere.After the North Korean attack on the South,Truman dispatched American forces in order to punish aggression and save the American reputation for resolve against communist expansion.The decision to intervene was not based on a reevaluation of the strategic significance of Korea. But if the goal of the war was simply to restore the international boundary at the 38th parallel,the United States would find itself back in the position it had been in before 1949,assisting South Korea at the expense of other more important strategic goals world-wide.Dean Acheson put the American dilemma in July of 1950 this way:"In the longer run,if we should succeed in reoccupying the South,the question of garrisoning and supporting it would arise.This would be a hard task for us to take on,and yet it seemed hardly sensible to repel the attack and then abandon the country.I could not see the end of it."19 In the fall of 1950 the American defense budget was still tightly constrained:the outbreak of the Korean War mobilized the American public behind higher military spending levels,but the most significant Ko- rean War increase would not occur until after the Americans crossed the parallel and met the massive Chinese counteroffensive.20 Given this budget- 19.Acheson paraphrased a July 10,1950,letter to Paul Nitze;Present at the Creation,pp.450- 451.The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department argued that the 38th parallel was a geograph- ically infelicitous position to assume a permanent defense,and that a halt there would permit renewed military instability in Korea and lead to exorbitant American expenditures.See Foot, The Wrong War,pp.71-72;and John Lewis Gaddis,The Long Peace:Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York:Oxford University Press,1987),p.99. 20.The defense budget made two significant jumps after the outbreak of war in Korea.After the initial North Korean attack on the South,the budget jumped from about $14 billion to $25 billion.After the November Chinese counteroffensive in North Korea,it jumped an additional $17 billion.See Paul Y.Hammond,"NSC 68:Prologue to Rearmament,"in Warner R.Schilling, Paul Y.Hammond,and Glenn H.Snyder,Strategy,Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press,1962),pp.351-363.Just before the Chinese counteroffensive,Truman said that the ability of the administration to push the larger package through Congress was This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 17:1 | 130 The Chinese faced several serious problems in their effort to deter the Americans. First, the United States had solid realpolitik incentives to cross the parallel. Second, without direct diplomatic contacts it was difficult for Beijing to communicate a message strong and authoritative enough to deter implementation of the American strategy. Third, the clearest Chinese warning came only after Truman had decided to cross the 38th parallel. American strategic planners considered Korea a region of little geostrategic significance. American troops were withdrawn from Korea in the spring of 1949 because the manpower was considered better used elsewhere. After the North Korean attack on the South, Truman dispatched American forces in order to punish aggression and save the American reputation for resolve against communist expansion. The decision to intervene was not based on a reevaluation of the strategic significance of Korea. But if the goal of the war was simply to restore the international boundary at the 38th parallel, the United States would find itself back in the position it had been in before 1949, assisting South Korea at the expense of other more important strategic goals world-wide. Dean Acheson put the American dilemma in July of 1950 this way: "In the longer run, if we should succeed in reoccupying the South, the question of garrisoning and supporting it would arise. This would be a hard task for us to take on, and yet it seemed hardly sensible to repel the attack and then abandon the country. I could not see the end of it."'19 In the fall of 1950 the American defense budget was still tightly constrained: the outbreak of the Korean War mobilized the American public behind higher military spending levels, but the most significant Korean War increase would not occur until after the Americans crossed the parallel and met the massive Chinese counteroffensive.20 Given this budget- 19. Acheson paraphrased aJuly 10, 1950, letter to Paul Nitze; Present at the Creation, pp. 450- 451. The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department argued that the 38th parallel was a geographically infelicitous position to assume a permanent defense, and that a halt there would permit renewed military instability in Korea and lead to exorbitant American expenditures. See Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 71-72; and John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 99. 20. The defense budget made two significant jumps after the outbreak of war in Korea. After the initial North Korean attack on the South, the budget jumped from about $14 billion to $25 billion. After the November Chinese counteroffensiven North Korea, it jumped an additional $17 billion. See Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC 68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 351-363. Just before the Chinese counteroffensive, Truman said that the ability of the administration topush the larger package through Congress was This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions