Journal of Sociology Social Welfare o do, for example, courageous or wise thi It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, in terests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset Hursthouse, 2008). Neither traits"nor"dispositions"cap- tures the full or classical meaning of virtues as an intercon ected whole. The "virtues talk to each other, " as McCloskey says(2006, p. 171). So, for example, courage, as distinct from recklessness, is balanced and completed by temperance and prudence. Social work is a field for the exercise of all the virtues The concept of virtues, understood as positive and stable character traits, gets at what matters to professional prac tice--not our opinions, but how well we act, as a matter of habit and will in the professional use of self, in ways required for and developed by practice within the profession of social work In professional ethics, virtue-based approaches, includ ing the Hippocratic ethics that prevailed in medicine for 2,500 years until well into the last century, look not simply to those virtues needed for the end of human well-being, but specifi cally to those virtues required for and developed by the profes- sion in question, given its mission and purpose. Unlike general ethics, it addresses the question of the character and virtues of ellent professional, whether physician, lawyer, worker(Oakley Cocking, 2001) Limitations of Virtue Ethics An objection frequently made to virtue ethics is its weak ness as a guide to action, in particular to resolving quandaries, widely seen as the central task of professional ethics. Virtue ethicists have responded by providing detailed but not always convincing examples of how to resolve a dilemma without resort to principles, duties, or rules( for example, Hursthouse, 1995). More pers rsuasively, they use a tu quoque (you too)ar gument, pointing to the large gap in principle-based ethics between ethical standards and concrete practice situations where precisely the master virtue of phronesis or prudence is most required(e.g, Hursthouse, 1991, 1995)
88 Joumal of Sociology & Social Welfare to do, for example, courageous or wise things. "It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset" (Hursthouse, 2008). Neither "traits" nor "disposifions" captures the full or classical meaning of virtues as an interconnected whole. The "virtues talk to each other," as McCloskey says (2006, p. 171). So, for example, courage, as distinct from recklessness, is balanced and completed by temperance and prudence. Social work is a field for the exercise of all the virtues together. The concept of virtues, understood as positive and stable character traits, gets at what matters to professional practice—not our opinions, but how well we act, as a matter of habit and will in the professional use of self, in ways required for and developed by practice within the profession of social work. In professional ethics, virtue-based approaches, including the Hippocrafic ethics that prevailed in medicine for 2,500 years until well into the last century, look not simply to those virtues needed for the end of human well-being, but specifically to those virtues required for and developed by the profession in question, given its mission and purpose. Unlike general ethics, it addresses the question of the character and virtues of an excellent professional, whether physician, lawyer, or social worker (Oakley & Cocking, 2001). Limitations of Virtue Ethics An objection frequently made to virtue ethics is its weakness as a guide to action, in particular to resolving quandaries, widely seen as the central task of professional ethics. Virtue ethicists have responded by providing detailed but not always convincing examples of how to resolve a dilemma without resort to principles, duties, or rules (for example, Hursthouse, 1995). More persuasively, they use a tu quoque (you too) argument, pointing to the large gap in principle-based ethics between ethical standards and concrete practice situations where precisely the master virtue of phronesis or prudence is most required (e.g., Hursthouse, 1991,1995)
Virtues and the Ethical Social worker In any case, a social worker who aims to develop those virtues necessary to flourish as a professional (or as a human being)to be guided in action by what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances--is not thereby obliged to dis regard principles or consequences. A leading virtue ethicist, Hursthouse(1999), claims Anscombe and Aquinas as virtue ethicists rather than deontologists, but acknowledges that neither rejected the concepts of ethical principles or obliga tions, or indeed of exceptionless norms such as the absolute proscription on lying or the intentional taking of innocent human life(Finnis, 2005). For Aquinas, the principle of love of self and neighbor(and thus respect for the well-being of each and all human beings)was such that no human act could be judged as other than wrong if it was not in line with it(Finnis, 2005). In professional as distinct from general ethics, especially in the health and helping professions, ethicists who discuss the 2e> irtues tend to empha did ac A related concern is with the apparent circularity of virtue ethics--virtuous behavior is what the virtuous person models, but that person is virtuous who behaves virtuously. So how do we decide who is virtuous and therefore an exemplar in the first place This may be less disabling an objection than it appears, especially in a society where there is general agree ment on what a virtuous person is like and how they behave, as we agree on the color yellow or the taste of chocolate and teach those things to children by pointing to exemplars. But in a society where such consensus in the moral sphere is thin nd often seen as a matter of personal or subjective values, the foundation of a shared moral tradition that would produce general agreement in identifying virtuous persons is weak or lacking. Even virtue ethics in this context tends to the subjec tive and relativistic (e.g, Hursthouse, 1991), to consequen tialism in anscombe's sense-Anscombe coined the term in her 1958 article to denote the idea that anything goes if the price is right(Anscombe, 1958; Coope, 2006). Anscombe herself(1958)argued that the intellectual work had not been done to make the virtues usable in moral philosophy and the
Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker 89 In any case, a social worker who aims to develop those virtues necessary to flourish as a professional (or as a human being)—to be guided in action by what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances—is not thereby obliged to disregard principles or consequences. A leading virtue ethicist, Hursthouse (1999), claims Anscombe and Aquinas as virtue ethicists rather than deontologists, but acknowledges that neither rejected the concepts of ethical principles or obligations, or indeed of exceptionless norms such as the absolute proscription on lying or the intentional taking of innocent human life (Einnis, 2005). Eor Aquinas, the principle of love of self and neighbor (and thus respect for the well-being of each and all human beings) was such that no human act could be judged as other than wrong if it was not in line with it (Einnis, 2005). In professional as distinct from general ethics, especially in the health and helping professions, ethicists who discuss the virtues tend to emphasize, as did Aquinas, the complementarity and mutual necessity of principles, duties, and virtues (Ereeman, 2000; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Pellegrino, 2008). A related concern is v/ith the apparent circularity of virtue ethics—virtuous behavior is what the virtuous person models, but that person is virtuous who behaves virtuously. So how do we decide who is virtuous and therefore an exemplar in the first place? This may be less disabling an objection than it appears, especially in a society where there is general agreement on what a virtuous person is like and how they behave, as we agree on the color yellow or the taste of chocolate and teach those things to children by pointing to exemplars. But in a society where such consensus in the moral sphere is thin and often seen as a matter of personal or subjective values, the foundation of a shared moral tradition that would produce general agreement in identifying virtuous persons is weak or lacking. Even virtue ethics in this context tends to the subjective and relativistic (e.g., Hursthouse, 1991), to consequentialism in Anscombe's sense—Anscombe coined the term in her 1958 article to denote the idea that anything goes if the price is right (Anscombe, 1958; Coope, 2006). Anscombe herself (1958) argued that the intellectual work had not been done to make the virtues usable in moral philosophy and the
Journal of Sociology Social Welfare necessary tools for doing it were not available in the current state of philosophy One response to this problem is to point out that in terms of giving guidance for action, utilitarianism and Kantian de ontology are again in no better shape. As Hursthouse(1999) Act utilitarianism must specify what are to count as the best consequences, and deontology what is to count as a correct moral rule, producing a second premise, before ar idance is given. And, similarly, virtue ethics must specify who is to count as a virtuous age So far, the three are all in the same position. (p s/t Virtue ethics thus defines a virtuous agent as one who has and exercises certain character traits or virtues the virtues then being defined as those character traits a human being needs for eudaimonia-that is, to flourish and live well as a human being. As Peterson and Seligman(2004)found, there is a strong convergence across time, place, and cultures on what the main virtues are Another response to the circularity objection is to point out that seeking guidance from a virtuous agent, far from being a mystery, is an everyday experience, especially perhaps in the helping professions. If I am unsure how to act in a given situation or grey area and I want to act honestly (with integ rity), I will seek out someone I know to be honest, indeed more reliably honest than I (If I want a way out of what honesty I might look for som at fudging of this sort. I do not have to be a person of great probity myself to recognize such a friend or colleague, just as I do not have to be a carpenter to appreciate a well-made table(Boswell, 2008). Similarly, if I see the need for prudence or sound practical judgment, I will consult someone I respect for this virtue. If I am lucky, this may even be my supervisor Compared with utilitarianism or deontology, which reduce ethical questions to one or a few basic principles, virtue ethics draws on the rich human vocabulary that societies have de-e veloped to define an action, not only as right or wrong, but, in the case of the latter, more specifically as dishonest, cowardly
90 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare necessary tools for doing it were not available in the current state of philosophy. One response to this problem is to point out that in terms of giving guidance for action, utilitarianism and Kantian deontology are again in no better shape. As Hursthouse (1999) puts it: Act utilitarianism must specify what are to count as the best consequences, and deontology what is to count as a correct moral rule, producing a second premise, before any guidance is given. And, similarly, virtue ethics must specify who is to count as a virtuous agent. So far, the three are all in the same position, (p. 28) Virtue ethics thus defines a virtuous agent as one who has and exercises certain character traits or virtues, the virtues then being defined as those character traits a human being needs for eudaimonia—that is, to flourish and live well as a human being. As Peterson and Seligman (2004) foimd, there is a strong convergence across time, place, and cultures on what the main virtues are. Another response to the circularity objection is to point out that seeking guidance from a virtuous agent, far from being a mystery, is an everyday experience, especially perhaps in the helping professions. If I am unsure how to act in a given situation or grey area and I want to act honestly (with integrity), I will seek out someone I know to be honest, indeed more reliably honest than I. (If I want a way out of what honesty may require, I might look for someone I know to be clever at fudging of this sort.) I do not have to be a person of great probity myself to recognize such a friend or colleague, just as I do not have to be a carpenter to appreciate a well-made table (Boswell, 2008). Similarly, if I see the need for prudence or sound practical judgment, I will consult someone I respect for this virtue. If I am lucky, this may even be my supervisor! Gompared with utilitarianism or deontology, which reduce ethical questions to one or a few basic principles, virtue ethics draws on the rich human vocabulary that societies have developed to define an action, not only as right or wrong, but, in the case of the latter, more specifically as dishonest, cowardly